Criminal Articles from www.NJLaws website: October 2013

Wednesday, October 9, 2013

Sentencing

Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents persons charged with criminal offenses throughout New Jersey.
Sentencing by the Judge after conviction for a criminal offense: 2C:43-1. Degrees of crimes 2C:43-1. Degrees of Crimes. a. Crimes defined by this code are classified, for the purpose of sentence, into four degrees, as follows:
(1) Crimes of the first degree;
(2) Crimes of the second degree;
(3) Crimes of the third degree; and
(4) Crimes of the fourth degree.
A crime is of the first, second, third or fourth degree when it is so designated by the code. An offense, declared to be a crime, without specification of degree, is of the fourth degree.
b. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a crime defined by any statute of this State other than this code and designated as a high misdemeanor shall constitute for the purpose of sentence a crime of the third degree. Except as provided in sections 2C:1-4c. and 2C:1-5b. and notwithstanding any other provision of law, a crime defined by any statute of this State other than this code and designated as a misdemeanor shall constitute for the purpose of sentence a crime of the fourth degree.
Amended by L. 1979, c. 178, s. 81; 1987, c. 106, s. 8.
2C:43-2 Sentence in accordance with code; authorized dispositions.
2C:43-2. Sentence in accordance with code; authorized dispositions. a. Except as otherwise provided by this code, all persons convicted of an offense or offenses shall be sentenced in accordance with this chapter.
b. Except as provided in subsection a. of this section and subject to the applicable provisions of the code, the court may suspend the imposition of sentence on a person who has been convicted of an offense, or may sentence him as follows:
(1) To pay a fine or make restitution authorized by N.J.S.2C:43-3 or P.L.1997, c.253 (C.2C:43-3.4 et al.); or
(2) To be placed on probation and, in the case of a person convicted of a crime, to imprisonment for a term fixed by the court not exceeding 364 days to be served as a condition of probation, or in the case of a person convicted of a disorderly persons offense, to imprisonment for a term fixed by the court not exceeding 90 days to be served as a condition of probation; or
(3) To imprisonment for a term authorized by sections 2C:11-3, 2C:43-5, 2C:43-6, 2C:43-7, and 2C:43-8 or 2C:44-5; or
(4) To pay a fine, make restitution and probation, or fine, restitution and imprisonment; or
(5) To release under supervision in the community or to require the performance of community-related service; or
(6) To a halfway house or other residential facility in the community, including agencies which are not operated by the Department of Human Services; or
(7) To imprisonment at night or on weekends with liberty to work or to participate in training or educational programs.
c. Instead of or in addition to any disposition made according to this section, the court may postpone, suspend, or revoke for a period not to exceed two years the drivers license, registration certificate, or both of any person convicted of a crime, disorderly persons offense, or petty disorderly persons offense in the course of which a motor vehicle was used. In imposing this disposition and in deciding the duration of the postponement, suspension, or revocation, the court shall consider the severity of the crime or offense and the potential effect of the loss of driving privileges on the persons ability to be rehabilitated. Any postponement, suspension, or revocation shall be imposed consecutively with any custodial sentence.
d. This chapter does not deprive the court of any authority conferred by law to decree a forfeiture of property, suspend or cancel a license, remove a person from office, or impose any other civil penalty. Such a judgment or order may be included in the sentence.
e. The court shall state on the record the reasons for imposing the sentence, including its findings pursuant to the criteria for withholding or imposing imprisonment or fines under sections 2C:44-1 to 2C:44-3, where imprisonment is imposed, consideration of the defendants eligibility for release under the law governing parole and the factual basis supporting its findings of particular aggravating or mitigating factors affecting sentence.
f. The court shall explain the parole laws as they apply to the sentence and shall state:
(1) the approximate period of time in years and months the defendant will serve in custody before parole eligibility;
(2) the jail credits or the amount of time the defendant has already served;
(3) that the defendant may be entitled to good time and work credits; and
(4) that the defendant may be eligible for participation in the Intensive Supervision Program.
Amended 197,c.178,s.82; 1981,c.269,s.2; 1983,c.124,s.1; 1987,c.106,s.9; 1994,c.155; 1997,c.253,s.1.
2C:43-2.1. Motor vehicle theft or unlawful taking; restitution A person who is convicted of an offense involving the theft or unlawful taking of a motor vehicle, in addition to any other fine, penalty, or restitution which may be imposed by law, is liable to the owner of the motor vehicle for any reasonable and necessary expense incurred by the owner in recovering the motor vehicle and for any damage to the motor vehicle prior to its recovery by the owner. In the sentencing proceedings on the offense, the owner may submit evidence of expenses incurred and damages sustained. The court shall make a finding of the amount of expenses incurred and damages sustained, and if the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support such a finding, the court may conduct a hearing upon the issue. The court shall order the person convicted of the offense to make restitution to the owner in the amount of the expenses and damages found by the court. The court shall file a copy of the order with the clerk of the Superior Court who shall enter upon his record of docketed judgments the name of the convicted person as judgment debtor, and of the owner as judgment creditor, a statement that the restitution is ordered under this section, the amount of the restitution, and the date of the order. This entry shall have the same force as a judgment docketed in the Superior Court.
L.1983, c. 411, s. 1, eff. Jan. 4, 1984. 2C:43-3 Fines and restitutions 2C:43-3. Fines and Restitutions. A person who has been convicted of an offense may be sentenced to pay a fine, to make restitution, or both, such fine not to exceed:
a. (1) $200,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the first degree;
(2) $150,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the second degree;
b. (1) $15,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the third degree;
(2) $10,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the fourth degree;
c. $1,000.00, when the conviction is of a disorderly persons offense;
d. $500.00, when the conviction is of a petty disorderly persons offense;
e. Any higher amount equal to double the pecuniary gain to the offender or loss to the victim caused by the conduct constituting the offense by the offender. In such case the court shall make a finding as to the amount of the gain or loss, and if the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support such a finding the court may conduct a hearing upon the issue. For purposes of this section the term "gain" means the amount of money or the value of property derived by the offender and "loss" means the amount of value separated from the victim or the amount of any payment owed to the victim and avoided or evaded and includes any reasonable and necessary expense incurred by the owner in recovering or replacing lost, stolen or damaged property, or recovering any payment avoided or evaded, and, with respect to property of a research facility, includes the cost of repeating an interrupted or invalidated experiment or loss of profits. The term "victim" shall mean a person who suffers a personal physical or psychological injury or death or incurs loss of or injury to personal or real property as a result of a crime committed against that person, or in the case of a homicide, the nearest relative of the victim. The terms "gain" and "loss" shall also mean, where appropriate, the amount of any tax, fee, penalty and interest avoided, evaded, or otherwise unpaid or improperly retained or disposed of;
f. Any higher amount specifically authorized by another section of this code or any other statute;
g. Up to twice the amounts authorized in subsection a., b., c. or d. of this section, in the case of a second or subsequent conviction of any tax offense defined in Title 54 of the Revised Statutes or Title 54A of the New Jersey Statutes, as amended and supplemented, or of any offense defined in chapter 20 or 21 of this code;
h. In the case of violations of chapter 35, any higher amount equal to three times the street value of the controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog. The street value for purposes of this section shall be determined pursuant to subsection e. of N.J.S.2C:44-2.
The restitution ordered paid to the victim shall not exceed the victims loss, except that in any case involving the failure to pay any State tax, the amount of restitution to the State shall be the full amount of the tax avoided or evaded, including full civil penalties and interest as provided by law. In any case where the victim of the offense is any department or division of State government, the court shall order restitution to the victim. Any restitution imposed on a person shall be in addition to any fine which may be imposed pursuant to this section.
Amended 1979, c.178, s.83; 1981, c.290, s.37; 1987, c.76, s.34; 1987, c.106, s.10; 1991, c.329, s.2; 1995, c.20, s.6; 1995, c.417, s.2; 1997, c.181, s.12.
2C:43-3.1. Victim, witness, criminal disposition, and collection funds
2. a. (1) In addition to any disposition made pursuant to the provisions of N.J.S.2C:43-2, any person convicted of a crime of violence, theft of an automobile pursuant to N.J.S.2C:20-2, eluding a law enforcement officer pursuant to subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2 or unlawful taking of a motor vehicle pursuant to subsection b., c. or d. of N.J.S.2C:20-10 shall be assessed at least $100.00, but not to exceed $10,000.00 for each such crime for which he was convicted which resulted in the injury or death of another person. In imposing this assessment, the court shall consider factors such as the severity of the crime, the defendants criminal record, defendants ability to pay and the economic impact of the assessment on the defendants dependents.
(2) (a) In addition to any other disposition made pursuant to the provisions of N.J.S.2C:43-2 or any other statute imposing sentences for crimes, any person convicted of any disorderly persons offense, any petty disorderly persons offense, or any crime not resulting in the injury or death of any other person shall be assessed $50.00 for each such offense or crime for which he was convicted.
(b) In addition to any other disposition made pursuant to the provisions of section 24 of P.L.1982, c.77 (C.2A:4A-43) or any other statute indicating the dispositions that can be ordered for adjudications of delinquency, any juvenile adjudicated delinquent, according to the definition of "delinquency" established in section 4 of P.L.1982, c.77 (C.2A:4A-23), shall be assessed at least $30.00 for each such adjudication, but not to exceed the amount which could be assessed pursuant to paragraph (1) or paragraph (2) (a) of subsection a. of this section if the offense was committed by an adult.
(c) In addition to any other assessment imposed pursuant to the provisions of R.S.39:4-50, the provisions of section 12 of P.L.1990, c.103 (C.39:3-10.20) relating to a violation of section 5 of P.L.1990, c.103 (C.39:3-10.13), the provisions of section 19 of P.L.1954, c.236 (C.12:7-34.19) or the provisions of section 3 of P.L.1952, c.157 (C.12:7-46), any person convicted of operating a motor vehicle, commercial motor vehicle or vessel while under the influence of liquor or drugs shall be assessed $50.00.
(d) In addition to any term or condition that may be included in an agreement for supervisory treatment pursuant to N.J.S.2C:43-13 or imposed as a term or condition of conditional discharge pursuant to N.J.S.2C:36A-1, a participant in either program shall be required to pay an assessment of $50.00.
(3) All assessments provided for in this section shall be collected as provided in section 3 of P.L.1979, c.396 (C.2C:46-4) and the court shall so order at the time of sentencing. When a defendant who is sentenced to incarceration in a State correctional facility has not, at the time of sentencing, paid an assessment for the crime for which he is being sentenced or an assessment imposed for a previous crime, the court shall specifically order the Department of Corrections to collect the assessment during the period of incarceration and to deduct the assessment from any income the inmate receives as a result of labor performed at the institution or on any work release program or from any personal account established in the institution for the benefit of the inmate. All moneys collected, whether in part or in full payment of any assessment imposed pursuant to this section, shall be forwarded monthly by the parties responsible for collection, together with a monthly accounting on forms prescribed by the Victims of Crime Compensation Board pursuant to section 19 of P.L.1991, c.329 (C.52:4B-8.1), to the Victims of Crime Compensation Board.
(4) The Victims of Crime Compensation Board shall forward monthly all moneys received from assessments collected pursuant to this section to the State Treasury for deposit as follows:
(a) Of moneys collected on assessments imposed pursuant to paragraph a. (1):
(i) the first $72.00 collected for deposit in the Victims of Crime Compensation Board Account,
(ii) the next $3.00 collected for deposit in the Criminal Disposition and Revenue Collection Fund,
(iii) the next $25.00 collected for deposit in the Victim Witness Advocacy Fund, and
(iv) moneys collected in excess of $100.00 for deposit in the Victims of Crime Compensation Board Account;
(b) Of moneys collected on assessments imposed pursuant to paragraph a. (2) (a), (c) or (d):
(i) the first $39.00 collected for deposit in the Victims of Crime Compensation Board Account,
(ii) the next $3.00 collected for deposit in the Criminal Disposition and Revenue Collection Fund, and
(iii) the next $8.00 collected for deposit in the Victim and Witness Advocacy Fund;
(c) Of moneys collected on assessments imposed pursuant to paragraph a. (2) (b):
(i) the first $17.00 for deposit in the Victims of Crime Compensation Board Account, and
(ii) the next $3.00 collected for deposit in the Criminal Disposition and Revenue Collection Fund, and
(iii) the next $10.00 for deposit in the Victim and Witness Advocacy Fund, and
(iv) moneys collected in excess of $30.00 for deposit in the Victims of Crime Compensation Board Account.
(5) The Victims of Crime Compensation Board shall provide the Attorney General with a monthly accounting of moneys received, deposited and identified as receivable, on forms prescribed pursuant to section 19 of P.L.1991, c.329 (C.52:4B-8.1).
(6) (a) The Victims of Crime Compensation Board Account shall be a separate, nonlapsing, revolving account that shall be administered by the Victims of Crime Compensation Board. All moneys deposited in that Account shall be used in satisfying claims pursuant to the provisions of the "Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of 1971," P.L.1971, c.317 (C.52:4B-1 et seq.) and for related administrative costs.
(b) The Criminal Disposition and Revenue Collection Fund shall be a separate, nonlapsing, revolving account that shall be administered by the Victims of Crime Compensation Board. All moneys deposited in that Fund shall be used as provided in section 19 of P.L.1991, c.329 (C.52:4B-8.1).
(c) The Victim and Witness Advocacy Fund shall be a separate, nonlapsing, revolving fund and shall be administered by the Division of Criminal Justice, Department of Law and Public Safety and all moneys deposited in that Fund pursuant to this section shall be used for the benefit of victims and witnesses of crime as provided in section 20 of P.L.1991, c.329 (C.52:4B-43.1) and for related administrative costs.
b. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.1991, c.329).
c. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.1991, c.329).
d. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.1991, c.329).
L.1979,c.396,s.2; amended 1982,c.164,s.1; 1985,c.251,s.1; 1985,c.406; 1987,c.106,s.11; 1990,c.64,s.1; 1991,c.329,s.3; 1995,c.135,s.1.
2C:43-3.2. Assessments for Safe Neighborhoods Services 11. a. (1) In addition to any other fine, fee or assessment imposed, any person convicted of a crime, disorderly or petty disorderly persons offense or violation of R.S.39:4-50 shall be assessed $75 for each conviction.
(2) In addition to any term or condition that may be included in an agreement for supervisory treatment pursuant to N.J.S.2C:43-13 or imposed as a term or condition of conditional discharge pursuant to section 3 of P.L.1987, c.106 (C.2C:36A-1), a participant in either program shall be required to pay an assessment of $75.
b. All assessments provided for in this section shall be collected as provided for collection of fines and restitutions in section 3 of P.L.1979, c.396 (C.2C:46-4) and shall be forwarded to the Department of the Treasury as provided in subsection c. of this section.
c. All money collected pursuant to this section shall be forwarded to the Department of the Treasury to be deposited into the Safe Neighborhoods Services Fund created by section 5 of this act.
L.1993,c.220,s.11.
2C:43-3.3.Additional penalties for persons convicted of crime deposited in "Law Enforcement Officers Training and Equipment Fund" 9. a. In addition to any disposition made pursuant to the provisions of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes, any person convicted of a crime shall be assessed a penalty of $30.
b. In addition to any other disposition made pursuant to the provisions of section 24 of P.L.1982, c.77 (C.2A:4A-43) or any other statute indicating the dispositions that may be ordered for adjudications of delinquency, a juvenile adjudicated delinquent for an offense which if committed by an adult would be a crime shall be assessed a penalty of $15.
c. The penalties assessed under subsections a. and b. of this section shall be collected as provided for the collection of fines and restitution in section 3 of P.L.1979, c.396 (C.2C:46-4) and forwarded to the State Treasury for deposit in a separate account to be known as the "Law Enforcement Officers Training and Equipment Fund." The penalty assessed in this section shall be collected only after a penalty assessed in section 2 of P.L.1979, c.396 (C.2C:43-3.1) and any restitution ordered is collected.
The fund shall be used to support the development and provision of basic and in-service training courses for law enforcement officers by police training schools approved pursuant to P.L.1961, c.56 (C.52:17B-66 et seq.). In addition, the fund shall also be used to enable police training schools to purchase equipment needed for the training of law enforcement officers. Distributions from the fund shall only be made directly to such approved schools.
d. The Police Training Commission in the Department of Law and Public Safety shall be responsible for the administration and distribution of the fund pursuant to its authority under section 6 of P.L.1961, c.56 (C.52:17B-71).
e. An adult prisoner of a State correctional institution who does not pay the penalty imposed pursuant to this section shall have the penalty deducted from any income the inmate receives as a result of labor performed at the institution or any type of work release program. If any person, including an inmate, fails to pay the penalty imposed pursuant to this section, the court may order the suspension of the persons drivers license or nonresident reciprocity privilege, or prohibit the person from receiving or obtaining a license until the assessment is paid. The court shall notify the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles of such an action. Prior to any action being taken pursuant to this subsection, the person shall be given notice and a hearing before the court to contest the charge of the failure to pay the assessment.
L.1996,c.115,s.9.
2C:43-3.4 Restitution for extradition costs.
4. In addition to any fine or restitution authorized by N.J.S.2C:43-3, the court may sentence a defendant to make restitution for costs incurred by any law enforcement entity in extraditing the defendant from another jurisdiction if the court finds that, at the time of the extradition, the defendant was located in the other jurisdiction in order to avoid prosecution for a crime committed in this State or service of a criminal sentence imposed by a court of this State.
L.1997,c.253,s.4. 2C:43-3.5 Additional penalty for certain offenses.
1. a. In addition to any term or condition that may be included in an agreement for supervisory treatment pursuant to N.J.S.2C:43-13 or imposed as a term or condition of conditional discharge pursuant to N.J.S.2C:36A-1 for a violation of any offense defined in chapter 35 or 36 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes, each participant shall be assessed a penalty of $50 for each adjudication or conviction.
b.All penalties provided by this section shall be collected as provided for collection of fines and restitutions in section 3 of P.L.1979, c.396 (C.2C:46-4) and shall be forwarded to the Department of the Treasury as provided in subsection c. of this section.
c.All monies collected pursuant to this section shall be forwarded to the Department of the Treasury to be deposited in the " Drug Abuse Education Fund" established pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1999, c.12 (C.54A:9-25.12).
d.Monies in the fund shall be appropriated by the Legislature on an annual basis in the manner and for the purposes prescribed by section 2 of P.L.1999, c.12 (C.54A:9-25.13).
L.1999,c.295,s.1.
2C:43-3.6 Additional penalty for sex offense for deposit in Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner Program Fund.
11. a. In addition to any fine, fee, assessment or penalty authorized under the provisions of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes, a person convicted of a sex offense, as defined in section 2 of P.L.1994, c. 133 (C.2C:7-2), shall be assessed a penalty of $800 for each such offense.
b.All penalties provided for in this section, collected as provided for the collection of fines and restitutions in section 3 of P.L.1979, c.396 (C.2C:46-4), shall be forwarded to the Department of the Treasury to be deposited in the "Statewide Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner Program Fund" established pursuant to section 12 of P.L.2001, c.81 (C.52:4B-59).
L.2001,c.81,s.11.
2C:43-4. Penalties Against Corporations; Forfeiture of Corporate Charter or Revocation of Certificate Authorizing Foreign Corporation to do Business in the State a. The court may suspend the imposition of sentence of a corporation which has been convicted of an offense or may sentence it to pay a fine of up to three times the fine provided for in N.J.S.2C:43-3 in addition to any restitution required by N.J.S.2C:44-2.
b. When a corporation is convicted of an offense or a high managerial agent of a corporation, as defined in N.J.S.2C:2-7 is convicted of an offense committed in conducting the affairs of the corporation, the court may request the Attorney General to institute appropriate proceedings to dissolve the corporation, forfeit its charter, revoke any franchises held by it, or to revoke the certificate authorizing the corporation to conduct business in this State.
Amended 1991,c.329,s.4.
2C:43-5. Young adult offenders Any person who, at the time of sentencing, is less than 26 years of age and who has been convicted of a crime may be sentenced to an indeterminate term at the Youth Correctional Institution Complex, in accordance with R.S. 30:4-146 et seq., in the case of men, and to the Correctional Institution for Women, in accordance with R.S. 30:4-153 et seq., in the case of women, instead of the sentences otherwise authorized by the code. This section shall not apply to any person less than 26 years of age at the time of sentencing who qualifies for a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment without eligibility for parole, pursuant to subsection c. of N.J.S. 2C:43-6; however, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection c. of N.J.S. 2C:43-6, the mandatory minimum term may be served at the Youth Correctional Institution Complex or the Correctional Institution for Women.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:43-5, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 84, eff. Sept. 1, 1979; L.1983, c. 92, s. 1, eff. March 11, 1983.
2C:43-6. Sentence of imprisonment for crime; ordinary terms; mandatory terms 2C:43-6. Sentence of Imprisonment for Crime; Ordinary Terms; Mandatory Terms. a. Except as otherwise provided, a person who has been convicted of a crime may be sentenced to imprisonment, as follows:
(1) In the case of a crime of the first degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between 10 years and 20 years;
(2) In the case of a crime of the second degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between five years and 10 years;
(3) In the case of a crime of the third degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between three years and five years;
(4) In the case of a crime of the fourth degree, for a specific term which shall be fixed by the court and shall not exceed 18 months.
b. As part of a sentence for any crime, where the court is clearly convinced that the aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors, as set forth in subsections a. and b. of 2C:44-1, the court may fix a minimum term not to exceed one-half of the term set pursuant to subsection a., or one-half of the term set pursuant to a maximum period of incarceration for a crime set forth in any statute other than this code, during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole; provided that no defendant shall be eligible for parole at a date earlier than otherwise provided by the law governing parole.
c. A person who has been convicted under 2C:39-4a. of possession of a firearm with intent to use it against the person of another, or of a crime under any of the following sections: 2C:11-3, 2C:11-4, 2C:12-1b., 2C:13-1, 2C:14-2a., 2C:14-3a., 2C:15-1, 2C:18-2, 2C:29-5, who, while in the course of committing or attempting to commit the crime, including the immediate flight therefrom, used or was in possession of a firearm as defined in 2C:39-1f., shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the court. The term of imprisonment shall include the imposition of a minimum term. The minimum term shall be fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed by the court or three years, whichever is greater, or 18 months in the case of a fourth degree crime, during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole.
The minimum terms established by this section shall not prevent the court from imposing presumptive terms of imprisonment pursuant to 2C:44-1f. (1) except in cases of crimes of the fourth degree.
A person who has been convicted of an offense enumerated by this subsection and who used or possessed a firearm during its commission, attempted commission or flight therefrom and who has been previously convicted of an offense involving the use or possession of a firearm as defined in 2C:44-3d., shall be sentenced by the court to an extended term as authorized by 2C:43-7c., notwithstanding that extended terms are ordinarily discretionary with the court.
d. The court shall not impose a mandatory sentence pursuant to subsection c. of this section, 2C:43-7c. or 2C:44-3d., unless the ground therefor has been established at a hearing. At the hearing, which may occur at the time of sentencing, the prosecutor shall establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the weapon used or possessed was a firearm. In making its finding, the court shall take judicial notice of any evidence, testimony or information adduced at the trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings and shall also consider the presentence report and any other relevant information.
e. A person convicted of a third or subsequent offense involving State taxes under N.J.S.2C:20-9, N.J.S.2C:21-15, any other provision of this code, or under any of the provisions of Title 54 of the Revised Statutes, or Title 54A of the New Jersey Statutes, as amended and supplemented, shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the court. This shall not preclude an application for and imposition of an extended term of imprisonment under N.J.S.2C:44-3 if the provisions of that section are applicable to the offender.
f. A person convicted of manufacturing, distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute any dangerous substance or controlled substance analog under N.J.S.2C:35-5, of maintaining or operating a controlled dangerous substance production facility under N.J.S.2C:35-4, of employing a juvenile in a drug distribution scheme under N.J.S.2C:35-6, leader of a narcotics trafficking network under N.J.S.2C:35-3, or of distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute on or near school property or buses under section 1 of P.L.1987, c.101 (C.2C:35-7), who has been previously convicted of manufacturing, distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog, shall upon application of the prosecuting attorney be sentenced by the court to an extended term as authorized by subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:43-7, notwithstanding that extended terms are ordinarily discretionary with the court. The term of imprisonment shall, except as may be provided in N.J.S.2C:35-12, include the imposition of a minimum term. The minimum term shall be fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed by the court or three years, whichever is greater, not less than seven years if the person is convicted of a violation of N.J.S.2C:35-6, or 18 months in the case of a fourth degree crime, during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole.
The court shall not impose an extended term pursuant to this subsection unless the ground therefor has been established at a hearing. At the hearing, which may occur at the time of sentencing, the prosecutor shall establish the ground therefor by a preponderance of the evidence. In making its finding, the court shall take judicial notice of any evidence, testimony or information adduced at the trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings and shall also consider the presentence report and any other relevant information.
For the purpose of this subsection, a previous conviction exists where the actor has at any time been convicted under chapter 35 of this title or Title 24 of the Revised Statutes or under any similar statute of the United States, this State, or any other state for an offense that is substantially equivalent to N.J.S.2C:35-3, N.J.S.2C:35-4, N.J.S.2C:35-5, N.J.S.2C:35-6 or section 1 of P.L.1987, c.101 (C.2C:35-7).
g. Any person who has been convicted under subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:39-4 of possessing a machine gun or assault firearm with intent to use it against the person of another, or of a crime under any of the following sections: N.J.S.2C:11-3, N.J.S.2C:11-4, N.J.S.2C:12-1b., N.J.S.2C:13-1, N.J.S.2C:14-2a., N.J.S.2C:14-3a., N.J.S.2C:15-1, N.J.S.2C:18-2, N.J.S.2C:29-5, N.J.S.2C:35-5, who, while in the course of committing or attempting to commit the crime, including the immediate flight therefrom, used or was in possession of a machine gun or assault firearm shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the court. The term of imprisonment shall include the imposition of a minimum term. The minimum term shall be fixed at 10 years for a crime of the first or second degree, five years for a crime of the third degree, or 18 months in the case of a fourth degree crime, during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole.
The minimum terms established by this section shall not prevent the court from imposing presumptive terms of imprisonment pursuant to paragraph (1) of subsection f. of N.J.S.2C:44-1 for crimes of the first degree.
A person who has been convicted of an offense enumerated in this subsection and who used or possessed a machine gun or assault firearm during its commission, attempted commission or flight therefrom and who has been previously convicted of an offense involving the use or possession of any firearm as defined in subsection d. of N.J.S.2C:44-3, shall be sentenced by the court to an extended term as authorized by subsection d. of N.J.S.2C:43-7, notwithstanding that extended terms are ordinarily discretionary with the court.
h. The court shall not impose a mandatory sentence pursuant to subsection g. of this section, subsections d. of N.J.S.2C:43-7 or N.J.S.2C:44-3, unless the ground therefor has been established at a hearing. At the hearing, which may occur at the time of sentencing, the prosecutor shall establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the weapon used or possessed was a machine gun or assault firearm. In making its finding, the court shall take judicial notice of any evidence, testimony or information adduced at the trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings and shall also consider the presentence report and any other relevant information.
i. A person who has been convicted under paragraph (6) of subsection b. of 2C:12-1 of causing bodily injury while eluding shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the court. The term of imprisonment shall include the imposition of a minimum term. The minimum term shall be fixed at, or between one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed by the court. The minimum term established by this subsection shall not prevent the court from imposing a presumptive term of imprisonment pursuant to paragraph (1) of subsection f. of 2C:44-1.
Amended 1979,c.178,s.85; 1981,c.31,s.1; 1981,c.290,s.38; 1981,c.569,s.1; 1982,c.119,s.1; 1987,c.76,s.35; 1987,c.106,s.12; 1988,c.44,s.13; 1990,c.32,s.6; 1993,c.219,s.6.
2C:43-6.1. Person under minimum mandatory sentence for possession of firearm with intent to use against property of another; review of sentence; imposition of other sentence Any person who, on the effective date of this amendatory and supplementary act, is serving a minimum mandatory sentence as provided for by N.J.S. 2C:43-6c. solely as a result of his conviction under subsection a. of N.J.S. 2C:39-4 for the possession of a firearm with intent to use it against the property of another, and has not had his sentence suspended or been paroled or discharged, may move to have his sentence reviewed by the sentencing court. For good cause shown, the court may impose any sentence which would have otherwise been available for such person.
L.1982, c. 119, s. 2, eff. Aug. 31, 1982.
2C:43-6.2. Probation; reduction of mandatory minimum term 1. On a motion by the prosecutor made to the assignment judge that the imposition of a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under (a) subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:43-6 for a defendant who has not previously been convicted of an offense under that subsection, or (b) subsection e. of N.J.S.2C:39-10 for a defendant who has not previously been convicted of an offense under chapter 39 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes, does not serve the interests of justice, the assignment judge shall place the defendant on probation pursuant to paragraph (2) of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:43-2 or reduce to one year the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment during which the defendant will be ineligible for parole. The sentencing court may also refer a case of a defendant who has not previously been convicted of an offense under that subsection to the assignment judge, with the approval of the prosecutor, if the sentencing court believes that the interests of justice would not be served by the imposition of a mandatory minimum term.
L.1989,c.53,s.1; amended 1993,c.49,s.2.
2C:43-6.3. Review of sentence Any person who, on the effective date of this act, is serving a mandatory minimum sentence as provided for by subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:43-6, who has not been previously convicted under that subsection, and has not had his sentence suspended or been paroled or discharged, may move to have his sentence reviewed by the assignment judge for the sentencing court. If the prosecutor agrees that the sentence under review does not serve the interests of justice, the judge shall reduce the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment without parole eligibility to one year or place the person on probation pursuant to paragraph (2) of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:43-2.
L.1989, c.53, s.2. 2C:43-7 Sentence of imprisonment for crime; extended terms.
2C:43-7. Sentence of Imprisonment for Crime; Extended Terms.
a.In the cases designated in section 2C:44-3, a person who has been convicted of a crime may be sentenced, and in the cases designated in subsection e. of section 2 of P.L.1994, c.130 (C.2C:43-6.4), in subsection b. of section 2 of P.L.1995, c.126 (C.2C:43-7.1) and in the cases designated in section 1 of P.L.1997, c.410 (C.2C:44-5.1), a person who has been convicted of a crime shall be sentenced, to an extended term of imprisonment, as follows:
(1)In case of aggravated manslaughter sentenced under subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:11-4; or kidnapping when sentenced as a crime of the first degree under paragraph (1) of subsection c. of 2C:13-1; or aggravated sexual assault if the person is eligible for an extended term pursuant to the provisions of subsection g. of N.J.S.2C:44-3 for a specific term of years which shall be between 30 years and life imprisonment;
(2)Except for the crime of murder and except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection, in the case of a crime of the first degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between 20 years and life imprisonment;
(3)In the case of a crime of the second degree, for a term which shall be fixed by the court between 10 and 20 years;
(4)In the case of a crime of the third degree, for a term which shall be fixed by the court between five and 10 years;
(5)In the case of a crime of the fourth degree pursuant to 2C:43-6c.and 2C:44-3d.for a term of five years, and in the case of a crime of the fourth degree pursuant to 2C:43-6f. and 2C:43-6g. for a term which shall be fixed by the court between three and five years;
(6)In the case of the crime of murder, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court between 35 years and life imprisonment, of which the defendant shall serve 35 years before being eligible for parole;
(7)In the case of kidnapping under paragraph (2) of subsection c. of 2C:13-1, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court between 30 years and life imprisonment, of which the defendant shall serve 30 years before being eligible for parole.
b.As part of a sentence for an extended term and notwithstanding the provisions of 2C:43-9, the court may fix a minimum term not to exceed one-half of the term set pursuant to subsection a. during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole or a term of 25 years during which time the defendant shall not be eligible for parole where the sentence imposed was life imprisonment; provided that no defendant shall be eligible for parole at a date earlier than otherwise provided by the law governing parole.
c.In the case of a person sentenced to an extended term pursuant to 2C:43-6c., 2C:43-6f. and 2C:44-3d., the court shall impose a sentence within the ranges permitted by 2C:43-7a.(2), (3), (4) or (5) according to the degree or nature of the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced, which sentence shall include a minimum term which shall, except as may be specifically provided by N.J.S.2C:43-6f., be fixed at or between one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed by the court or five years, whichever is greater, during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole. Where the sentence imposed is life imprisonment, the court shall impose a minimum term of 25 years during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole, except that where the term of life imprisonment is imposed on a person convicted for a violation of N.J.S.2C:35-3, the term of parole ineligibility shall be 30 years.
d.In the case of a person sentenced to an extended term pursuant to N.J.S.2C:43-6g., the court shall impose a sentence within the ranges permitted by N.J.S.2C:43-7a(2), (3), (4) or (5) according to the degree or nature of the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced, which sentence shall include a minimum term which shall be fixed at 15 years for a crime of the first or second degree, eight years for a crime of the third degree, or five years for a crime of the fourth degree during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole. Where the sentence imposed is life imprisonment, the court shall impose a minimum term of 25 years during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole, except that where the term of life imprisonment is imposed on a person convicted of a violation of N.J.S.2C:35-3, the term of parole eligibility shall be 30 years.
Amended 1979, c.178, s.86; 1981, c.31, s.2; 1982, c.111, s.2; 1986, c.172, s.3; 1987, c.106, s.13; 1988, c.44, s.14; 1990, c.32, s.7; 1990, c.87, s.3; 1994, c.127, s.1; 1994, c.130, s.3; 1995, c.126, s.3; 1997, c.410, s.2; 2001, c.443, s.6.
2C:43-7.1. Life imprisonment without parole; extended term for repeat violent offenders 2. a. Life Imprisonment Without Parole. A person convicted of a crime under any of the following: N.J.S.2C:11-3; subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:11-4; a crime of the first degree under N.J.S.2C:13-1, paragraphs (3) through (6) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:14-2; N.J.S.2C:15-1; or section 1 of P.L.1993, c.221 (C.2C:15-2), who has on two or more prior and separate occasions been convicted of a crime under any of the foregoing sections or under any similar statute of the United States, this State, or any other state for a crime that is substantially equivalent to a crime under any of the foregoing sections, shall be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment by the court, with no eligibility for parole.
b. Extended Term for Repeat Violent Offenders. A person shall be sentenced to an extended term of imprisonment pursuant to N.J.S.2C:43-7 if:
(1) The person is convicted of any of the following crimes: a crime of the second degree under N.J.S.2C:11-4; a crime of the second or third degree under subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:12-1; a crime of the second degree under N.J.S.2C:13-1; a crime under N.J.S.2C:14-3 for aggravated criminal sexual contact under any of the circumstances set forth in paragraphs (3) through (6) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:14-2; a crime of the second degree under N.J.S.2C:15-1; a crime of the second degree under N.J.S.2C:18-2; or a crime of the second degree under N.J.S.2C:39-4 for possession of a weapon with the purpose of using it unlawfully against the person of another, and the person has on two or more prior and separate occasions been convicted of any of the foregoing crimes or any of the crimes enumerated in subsection a. of this section or under any similar statute of the United States, this State, or any other state for a crime that is substantially equivalent to a crime enumerated in this subsection or in subsection a. of this section; or
(2) The person is convicted of a crime enumerated in subsection a. of this section, does not have two or more prior convictions that require sentencing under subsection a. and has two or more prior convictions that would require sentencing under paragraph (1) of this subsection if the person had been convicted of a crime enumerated in paragraph (1).
c. The provisions of this section shall not apply unless the prior convictions are for crimes committed on separate occasions and unless the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced was committed either within 10 years of the date of the defendants last release from confinement for commission of any crime or within 10 years of the date of the commission of the most recent of the crimes for which the defendant has a prior conviction.
d. The court shall not impose a sentence of imprisonment pursuant to this section, unless the ground therefor has been established at a hearing after the conviction of the defendant and on written notice to the defendant of the ground proposed. The defendant shall have the right to hear and controvert the evidence against him and to offer evidence upon the issue. Prior convictions shall be defined and proven in accordance with N.J.S.2C:44-4.
e. For purposes of this section, a term of life shall mean the natural life of a person sentenced pursuant to this section. Except that a defendant who is at least 70 years of age and who has served at least 35 years in prison pursuant to a sentence imposed under this section shall be released on parole if the full Parole Board determines that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the community.
L.1995,c.126,s.2. 2C:43-8. Sentence of imprisonment for disorderly persons offenses and petty disorderly persons offenses A person who has been convicted of a disorderly persons offense or a petty disorderly persons offense may be sentenced to imprisonment for a definite term which shall be fixed by the court and shall not exceed 6 months in the case of a disorderly persons offense or 30 days in the case of a petty disorderly persons offense.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:43-8, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. 2C:43-9. Release of all offenders; length of re commitment and re parole after revocation of parole Release of offenders on parole, re commitment and re parole after revocation shall be governed by the "Parole Act of 1979," P.L.1979, c. 441 (C. 30:4-123.45 et seq.).
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:43-9, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 86A, eff. Sept. 1, 1979; L.1981, c. 290, s. 39, eff. Sept. 24, 1981.
2C:43-10. Place of imprisonment; beginning sentences; transfers a. Sentences for terms of 1 year or longer. Except as provided in section 2C:43-5 and in subsection b. of this section, when a person is sentenced to imprisonment for any term of 1 year or greater, the court shall commit him to the custody of the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections for the term of his sentence and until released in accordance with law.
b. County institution. In any county in which a county penitentiary or a county workhouse is located, a person sentenced to imprisonment for a return not exceeding 18 months may be committed to the penitentiary or workhouse of such county.
c. Sentences for terms of less than 1 year. When a person is sentenced to imprisonment for a term of less than 1 year, the court shall commit him either to the common jail of the county, the county workhouse or the county penitentiary for the term of his sentence and until released in accordance with law. In counties of the first class having a workhouse or penitentiary, however, no sentence exceeding 6 months shall be to the common jail of the county.
d. Aggregation of sentences when a person is sentenced to more than one term of imprisonment, and the sentences are to be consecutive, the terms shall be aggregated for the purpose of determining the place of imprisonment under subsections a., b. or c. of this section.
e. Duties of sheriff and keeper on sentence to State Prison. In all cases where the defendant, upon conviction, is sentenced by the court to imprisonment, for any term of 1 year or greater, the sheriff of the county or his lawful deputy shall, within 15 days transport him to the State Prison and there deliver him into the custody of the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections together with a copy of the sentence of the court ordering such imprisonment certified by the clerk of the court where the conviction was had, a copy of the courts statement of reasons for the sentence, and a copy of the presentence report or any presentence information used by the judge in determining sentence.
In every case at least 48 hours, exclusive of Sundays and legal holidays, shall elapse between the time of sentence and removal to the State Prison.
f. Beginning sentences in county institutions. Every person sentenced to the county workhouse or penitentiary shall be transferred to and confined therein within 10 days after the sentence.
g. Transfer of persons sentenced to county jail, penitentiary or workhouse from one to another thereof. Every person sentenced to imprisonment in a county jail, penitentiary or workhouse may upon the application of the board of chosen freeholders of such county and by order of the Superior Court, be transferred from any one of such county penal institutions to any other thereof. No such transfer or re transfer shall in any way affect the term of the original sentence of the person so transferred or re transferred.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:43-10, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 87, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
Consequences of a Criminal Guilty Plea
1. You will have to appear in open court and tell the judge what you did that makes you guilty of the particular offense(s)
2. Do you understand that if you plead guilty:

a. You will have a criminal record
b. You may go to Jail or Prison.
c. You will have to pay Fines and Court Costs.

3. If you are on Probation, you will have to submit to random drug and urine testing. If you violate Probation, you often go to jail.
4. In indictable matters, you will be required to provide a DNA sample, which could be used by law enforcement for the investigation of criminal activity, and pay for the cost of testing.
5. You must pay restitution if the court finds there is a victim who has suffered a loss and if the court finds that you are able or will be able in the future to pay restitution.
6. If you are a public office holder or employee, you can be required to forfeit your office or job by virtue of your plea of guilty.
7. If you are not a United States citizen or national, you may be deported by virtue of your plea of guilty.
8. You must wait 5-10 years to expunge a first offense. 2C:52-3
9. You could be put on Probation.
10. In Drug Cases, a mandatory DEDR penalty of $500-$1,000, and lose your drivers license for 6 months - 2years. You must pay a Law Enforcement Officers Training and Equipment Fund penalty of $30.
11. You may be required to do Community Service.
12. You must pay a minimum Violent Crimes Compensation Board assessment of $50 ($100 minimum if you are convicted of a crime of violence) for each count to which you plead guilty.
13. You must pay a $75 Safe Neighborhood Services Fund assessment for each conviction.
14. If you are being sentenced to probation, you must pay a fee of up to $25 per month for the term of probation.
15. You lose the presumption against incarceration in future cases. 2C:44-1
16. You may lose your right to vote.
The defense of a person charged with a criminal offense is not impossible. There are a number of viable defenses and arguments which can be pursued to achieve a successful result. Advocacy, commitment, and persistence are essential to defending a client accused of a criminal offense.
Jail for Crimes and Disorderly Conduct:
If someone pleads Guilty or is found Guilty of a criminal offense, the following is the statutory Prison/Jail terms.
NJSA 2C: 43-8 (1) In the case of a crime of the first degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between 10 years and 20 years;
(2) In the case of a crime of the second degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between five years and 10 years;
(3) In the case of a crime of the third degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between three years and five years;
(4) In the case of a crime of the fourth degree, for a specific term which shall be fixed by the court and shall not exceed 18 months.
2C:43-3 Fines have been increased recently! 2C:43-3. Fines and Restitutions. A person who has been convicted of an offense may be sentenced to pay a fine, to make restitution, or both, such fine not to exceed:
a. (1) $200,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the first degree;
(2) $150,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the second degree;
b. (1) $15,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the third degree;
(2) $10,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the fourth degree;
c. $1,000.00, when the conviction is of a disorderly persons offense;
d. $500.00, when the conviction is of a petty disorderly persons offense;
If facing any criminal charge, retain an experienced attorney immediately to determine you rights and obligations to the court. Current criminal charge researched by Kenneth Vercammen, Esq. 732-572-0500

Arrest for a Criminal Violation and Right to Remain Silent; Miranda Rights

Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey.
1. Tell The Police Officer or Detective that you wish to talk to your Lawyer. Repeat this request to every officer who speaks to you. 2. Identify yourself, if asked. If the incident is related to a motor vehicle, produce your license, registration, and insurance card. 3. Beyond identifying yourself, give no other information. Answer NO other questions. SIGN NOTHING. If you are asked any other questions, reply politely, "I would rather not discuss it². 4. Call your lawyer at the first opportunity. NOTE: If you are arrested for Drunk Driving in New Jersey, you must give breath samples before you call your Lawyer. You are not required to do field sobriety tests such as walking a straight line, Remember: Even a fish would not get caught if they kept their mouth closed. OJ remained silent and is playing golf today. [Copyright 1985-1986 Alan Marain]
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the use of involuntary statements and confessions at trial. The State bears the burden of proof in a motion to suppress a statement allegedly obtained in violation of the Miranda doctrine. New Jersey requires the higher standard of beyond a reasonable doubt when the court determines if Miranda has not been fully complied with. State v Yough 49 NJ 587, 600-601 (1967), State v Whittington 142 NJ Super. 45, 49-50 (App. Div. 1976), State v Flower 224 NJ Super. 208, 213 (Law Div 1987) affd per curiam 224 NJ Super. 90 (App. Div. 1988).
WHAT IS INTERROGATION? As set forth in NJ Practice , Vol. 32 Criminal Practice and Procedure (West 1998) Section 755, the United States Supreme Court in Rhode Island V Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) held that the term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express questioning but also to any words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. It is "an established principle of our federalist system" that states may afford "individual liberties more expansive than those afforded by the federal constitution." State v Novembrino 105 NJ 95, 144-145 (1987).
Generally, a statement given by a defendant is not admissible in a criminal case unless the court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was informed of his Miranda rights before giving the statement and "in light of all the circumstances attending the confession it was given voluntarily." State v Hampton 61 NJ 250, 272 (1972). What is at stake is ensuring the use of effective procedural safeguards to secure the right of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution that " no person shall be.... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," which is now made applicable to state action by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, once informed of his rights " a defendant may waive effectuation of these rights provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." State v Flower 224 NJ Super. 208, 213 (Law Div 1987) affd per curiam 224 NJ Super. 90 (App. Div. 1988). citing Miranda v Arizona 384 US 436, 444, 86 S. Ct 1602, 1612, 16 L. Ed 2d 694 (1966); emphasis in Flower. In State v Flower 224 NJ Super. 208, 213 (Law Div 1987) affd per curiam 224 NJ Super. 90 (App. Div. 1988), the defendant had a low IQ and limited vocabulary. He gave confessions to police and a confession to DYFS. The court excluded the confession to the police, even though Miranda warnings were given and there was lack of coercion and an admitted waiver of rights by the defendant. The court concluded that since the Defendant could not understand his Miranda rights, he could not waive them. One cannot knowingly and intelligently waive a right that he cannot understand or appreciate. 224 NJ Super. at 216. The court also excluded confessions to a DYFS investigator on the same grounds since she was acting in a law enforcement capacity and failed to inform Defendant of his Miranda rights. Id at 220. Where it is charged that a confession was given under the influence of narcotics or during a withdrawal period, the central question of voluntariness remains the same, and the trial court must scrutinize all the pertinent facts attending the confession with particular focus on Defendants demeanor, coherence, articulateness, capacity to full use of his faculties, his memory and his overall intelligence. State v Arcediano 371 F. Supp. 457 (D. NJ 1974); See also Wade v Yeager 245 F. Supp 62 (D. NJ 1964).
The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the waiver was made knowingly and intelligently. If the suspect is intoxicated or under the influence of drugs to the point that he cannot understand his constitutional rights, then any waiver is void. If the suspect is suffering from a mental disability which renders him incapable of understanding his constitutional rights, then any waiver is void. The level of mental disability which would render a suspect incapable of understanding his constitutional rights is probably close to the point at which the suspect could be said to be incapable of managing his own affairs. Where circumstances cast doubt on knowing and intelligent quality of alleged waiver of right to counsel, there can be no waiver. State vs. Dickens 192 NJ Super. 290 (App. Div. 1983). Intoxication is grounds to suppress statements. See e.g. Common vs. Brithsher 563 A.2d 502, App granted 575 A.2d 107. (If Defendants intoxication combined to render him incapable of understanding Miranda warning waiver of Miranda rights would be invalid); Common vs. Andel 477 A.2d 13 56 (1984); (Defendants waiver of his Miranda rights was vitiated by his intoxication, his eyes glaring and had a strong odor of alcohol. Statements made by defendant while in custody should suppressed.) The court has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights Johnson vs. Zerbst 304 US 458 58 S. Court 1019, 82 Ed 146 (1938). In Common vs. Hosey 334 NE 2d 44 ( Mass 75 ) the court reversed and remanded a matter where tried judge allowed admission of defendants statement to police where defendant was extremely high, extremely emotional and detected from reality. Due process requires not only that a conviction not be based on an involuntary confession but also that a trial court hold what has become known as a Jackson Denno hearing when a defendant contests the voluntariness of his statement. Miller vs. Dugger 838 F. 2d 1530 ( 11 Cir. 1988) cert. den 486 US 1061. 1085.S. Ct. 2832 100 L. Ed 2d 933 (1988). At the Jackson- Denno hearing and at oral argument, we will explain through cross-examination and witnesses the involuntary nature of any statements the state intends to produce.
CALL KENNETH A. VERCAMMEN, ESQ. 732-572-0500 For an Appointment
About Kenneth Vercammen:
Kenneth Vercammen is a Litigation Attorney in Edison, NJ, approximately 17 miles north of Princeton. He often lectures for the American Bar Association and New Jersey State Bar Association on personal injury, criminal / municipal court law and practices to improve service to clients. He has published 125 articles in national and New Jersey publications on trial and litigation topics. He has served as a Special Acting Prosecutor in seven different cities and towns in New Jersey.
In his private practice, he has devoted a substantial portion of his professional time to the preparation and trial of litigated matters. He has appeared in Courts throughout New Jersey several times each week on many personal injury matters, Municipal Court trials, and contested administrative law hearings.
Consequences of a Criminal Guilty Plea
1. You will have to appear in open court and tell the judge what you did that makes you guilty of the particular offense(s)
2. Do you understand that if you plead guilty:

a. You will have a criminal record
b. You may go to Jail or Prison.
c. You will have to pay Fines and Court Costs.

2C:21-5 Bad Checks NJSA

Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey.
Model Jury charge (N.J.S.A. 2C:21-5)
If someone is Indicted for BAD CHECKS, the Judge will read portions of the following to the Jury. They are called Request to Charge. If the amount of check is less than $200.00, the case will be heard in the municipal court The defendant (name) has been charged with the crime of issuing (or passing) a bad check (or similar sight order), in that the defendant allegedly:
(Read Indictment)The pertinent part of the statute on which this indictment is based reads as follows:
A person who issues or passes a check or similar sight order for the payment of money, knowing that it will not be honored by the drawee, commits an offense.
As used in the statute, the word issue means to put into circulation.1 The word pass means to move from one , person to another, or hand from one person to another.2 A check is a draft drawn on a bank payable on demand.3 , [Where appropriate, charge the following: A sight order is an instrument for an immediate collection of money.4 A , drawee is the financial institution at which the issuer had, or made representation (he/she) had, an account at the , time the check or order was issued or passed. , The State must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1) The defendant knowingly issued or passed a check [or, where appropriate, sight order] for the , payment of money; and
(2) The defendant knew at the time (he/she) issued or passed it, that it would not be honored by the drawee.5
Knowingly. A person acts knowingly with respect to the nature of (his/her) conduct or the attendant circumstances , if the person is aware that (his/her) conduct is of that nature, or that such circumstances exist, or the person is aware , of a high
probability of their existence. A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of (his/her) conduct if the person is aware that it is practically certain that (his/her) conduct will cause such a result.
You may infer that the issuer knew that the check [or, where appropriate, sight order] would not be paid, if you , find, either:
(a) The issuer had no account with the drawee at the time the check [or, where appropriate, sight order] , was issued; or (b) Payment was refused by the drawee for lack of funds, upon presentation within 30 days after issue, and , the issuer failed to make good within 10 days after receiving notice of that refusal or after notice has been , sent to the issuers last known address. Notice of refusal may be given to the issuer orally or in writing in , any reasonable manner by any person.6
That is, if you find that the issuer had no account with the drawee at the time the check [or, where appropriate, sight order] was issued, or payment was refused by the drawee for lack of funds, upon presentation of the check , [or, where appropriate, order] within 30 days of issue, and the issuer failed to make good within 10 days after , receiving reasonable written or oral notice of that refusal or after reasonable notice has been sent to the issuers last , known address, you may then conclude, but are not required to conclude, that the issuer had knowledge the check , [or, where appropriate, sight order] would not be paid., If you find that the State has proven all these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you may return a verdict of, guilty. On the other hand, if you find that the State has failed to prove any of these elements beyond a reasonable , doubt, then you must return a verdict of not guilty., If you find that the State has proven each of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, then the State has , the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt, the amount of the check [or, where appropriate, sight order]. , You must specify if the amount of the check [or, where appropriate, sight order] is: (a) $75, 000.00 or more;
(b) $1, 000.00 or more but less than $75, 000.00; (c) $200.00 or more but less than $1, 000.00; or (d) Less than $200.00.
1 N.J.S.A. 12A:3-102.
2 Blacks Law Dictionary.
3 N.J.S.A. 12A:3-104.
4 United Benefit Fire Insurance Co. v. First National Bank of Arizona, Phoenix, 405 P.2d 488 (l965).
5 These inferences do not apply in the case of a post-dated check or similar sight order.
6 Contrary to pre-Code law, the State is not required to prove that the defendant intended to defraud the victim. The State need only prove that the defendant knew that the check (or similar sight order) would not be honored. See, Commonwealth v. Frank, 468 A.2d 1131 (Pa. Super. 1983) and Commonwealth v. Mutnik, 486 Pa. 428, 406 A.2d 516 (1979) which define the Pennsylvania bad check statute which, as the Code statute, is based upon the Model Penal Code. See, also, State v. Passafiume, 184 N.J. Super. 447, 449 (App. Div. 1982).
Consequences of a Criminal Guilty Plea
1. You will have to appear in open court and tell the judge what you did that makes you guilty of the particular offense(s)
2. Do you understand that if you plead guilty:

a. You will have a criminal record
b. You may go to Jail or Prison.
c. You will have to pay Fines and Court Costs.

Receiving Stolen Property

Kenneth Vercammens Law office represents individuals charged with criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey.
2C:20-7. Receiving stolen property
2C:20-7. Receiving Stolen Property. a. Receiving. A person is guilty of theft if he knowingly receives or brings into this State movable property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it is probably stolen. It is an affirmative defense that the property was received with purpose to restore it to the owner. Receiving means acquiring possession, control or title, or lending on the security of the property.
b. Presumption of knowledge. The requisite knowledge or belief is presumed in the case of a person who:
(1) Is found in possession or control of two or more items of property stolen on two or more separate occasions; or
(2) Has received stolen property in another transaction within the year preceding the transaction charged; or
(3) Being a person in the business of buying or selling property of the sort received, acquires the property without having ascertained by reasonable inquiry that the person from whom he obtained it had a legal right to possess and dispose of it ;or
(4) Is found in possession of two or more defaced access devices.
Amended 1979, c.178, s.35; 1981, c.290, s.19; 1997, c.6, s.3.
AT THE END OF THE TRIAL, THE JUDGE WILL READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS AND LAW TO THE JURY:
RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY
(N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7(a))
The defendant is charged with the crime of receiving stolen property. [Describe the property allegedly involved] This charge is based on a statute which reads:
A person is guilty of theft if he knowingly receives (or brings into this State) movable property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it has probably been stolen.1
Under this statute the State must prove 3 elements to establish that a defendant is guilty of receiving stolen property. These elements are: 1. That the defendant received (or brought into this State) movable property of another; 2. That the defendant acted knowingly when he/she received (or brought into this State) the movable property of another; 3. That the defendant either knew that the property had been stolen or believed that it had probably been stolen2 at the time he/she received the property (or brought the property into this State).
The first element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant received (or brought into this State) movable property of another. The term receive means to acquire possession, control, or title (or to lend on the security) of the property.3
(Charge Model Charge on Possession, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-1c)
The term movable property means property, the location of which can be changed (including things growing on, affixed to, or found in land, and documents, although the rights represented thereby have no physical location).4 The term property means anything of value.5 Property of another means property in which the defendant does not have a lawful interest.6 The State need not, however, prove the identity of the owner, the identity of the original thief,7 or the identity of the person from whom the defendant received the property. The second element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant acted knowingly when (he/she) received (or brought into this State) the movable property of another.
A person acts knowingly with respect to the nature of (his/her) conduct or the attendant circumstances if (he/she) is aware that (his/her) conduct is of that nature, or that such circumstances exist, or (he/she) is aware of a high probability of their existence. A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of (his/her) conduct if (he/she) is aware that it is practically certain that (his/her) conduct will cause such a result. Knowing, with knowledge or equivalent terms have the same meaning.8
The third element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant either knew that the property had been stolen or believed that it had probably been stolen at the time the defendant received the property (or brought the property into this State). Stolen property means property that has been the subject of any unlawful taking. An unlawful taking occurs when a person takes or exercises unlawful control over the property of another with the purpose, that is, the conscious object, of depriving the other of it permanently or for so extended a period as to appropriate a substantial portion of its economic value.9 I have already defined the term knowing to you in discussing the second element and I will not repeat it here. The State is not required to prove that the property, in fact, had been stolen. On the other hand, mere proof that the property was stolen is not sufficient to establish this element. Rather, what the State must prove is that the defendant either knew that the property was stolen or believed that it had probably been stolen. A belief that property has probably been stolen is a belief that it is more likely than not that the property had been stolen. You must realize that knowledge and belief are states of mind which cannot be seen but can only be determined by drawing inferences from ones conduct, words or actions, and from all of the surrounding circumstances. It therefore is not necessary that the State produce witnesses to testify that the defendant said (he/she) knew or believed the property was stolen. (His/her) state of mind is to be determined by you after you examine (his/her) conduct and actions, all that was said or done at that particular time and place, and all the surrounding circumstances.10
To reiterate, the three elements which the State must prove are: 1. That the defendant received (or brought into this State) movable property of another; 2. That in so doing the defendant acted knowingly; and 3. That the defendant either knew that the property had been stolen or believed that it had probably been stolen when (he/she) received it (or brought it into this State).11
If you conclude the State has proven all three elements of this offense beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty. On the other hand, if you find that the State has failed to prove any element beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty.
(NOTE: Do not charge the following for certain types of property such as an automobile or
firearm. See N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2b(2)(b) and (c).)
Since the value of the property involved determines the degree or severity of the crime, the State must also prove its value beyond a reasonable doubt. If you find the defendant guilty, then you must indicate whether you find the value of the property involved:
(1) exceeds $500, (2) is at least $200 but does not exceed $500, or (3) is less than $200.
Value is to be determined by the fair market value of the property at the time the defendant is alleged to have received or brought into this State the movable property of another. Fair market value means the price that a buyer would be willing to pay and a seller would be willing to accept if both parties were aware of all the relevant surrounding circumstances and neither party were under any compulsion to buy or sell.
1 The language or brings into this State is placed in parentheses to suggest that in a case where there is nothing to indicate that this language applies, consideration might be given to deleting the language and thereby eliminating unnecessary verbiage.
2 Where the defendant is also the person who took the property, the third element must be modified. State v. Underwood, 286 N.J. Super. 129 (App. Div. 1995). In such cases, the State must prove that the defendant intended an unlawful taking, id. at 135; that is, the defendant acted with the purpose to permanently deprive the owner of the property. Id. at 138. Thus, in such cases the third element could be phrased as follows: The property was stolen by the defendant. In order for you to find that the defendant stole the property, the State must prove that the defendant acted with the purpose to deprive the owner of the property. To deprive means to withhold or cause to be withheld property of another permanently or for so extended a period as to appropriate a substantial portion of its economic value... (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-1a) A person acts purposely with respect to the nature of his conduct or a result thereof if it is his or her conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or cause such a result. (N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(1)).
3 N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7a. It is suggested that the language or to lend on the security only be charged when it applies to the facts of the case.
4 N.J.S.A. 2C:20-1e. It is suggested that the language relating to things on land or documents be charged only when it applies to the facts of the case.
5 N.J.S.A. 2C:20-1g. The statutory definition gives examples of various types of property as being included in the definition, such as trade secrets and choices in action. Reference should be made to the statutory definition in particular cases to determine whether additional language should be charged.
6 N.J.S.A. 2C:20-1h. This is not the complete definition of property of another, but should be sufficient in the usual case. The definition goes on to address joint ownership issues, contraband, and security interests. When applicable under the facts of a case, this language should be included.
7 Consideration should be given to deleting the language as to the identity of the thief in an Underwood situation. See fn. 2, supra.
8 N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(2).
9 N.J.S.A. 2C:20-1a and p; State v. Underwood, supra, 286 N.J. Super. at 135-136.
10 In the appropriate case, the jury may be advised that such knowledge or belief may be inferred from the presence of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7b if the evidence provides a factual basis for such an instruction. See State v. Humphrey, 183 N.J. Super. 580 (Law Div. 1982); N.J.R.E. 303; N.J.S.A. 2C:1-13e.
If the jury is instructed as to an inference permitted by N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7b, care should be taken to avoid the use of the term presumption and it should be clearly stated that the inference is only permissive in nature. Thus, language such as the following should be charged:
However, you are never required or compelled to draw this inference. It is your exclusive province to determine whether the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence support any inference and you are always free to accept them or reject them if you wish.
It should also be noted that aside from the inference authorized by the statute, there is a question as to whether recent unexplained possession of stolen property permits an inference of guilty knowledge. The former receiving stolen property statute (N.J.S.A. 2A:139-1) provided for such an inference (see State v. DiRienzo, 53 N.J. 360 (1969) and one trial level court has held that a common law inference still may be drawn even in the absence of a specific statutory authorization. State in the Interest of L.L.A., 178 N.J. Super. 555 (J. & D.R. Ct. 1980); cf. State v. Burch, 179 N.J. Super. 336 (App. Div. 1981) certif. den. 89 N.J. 396 (1981) (applying inference in theft by unlawful taking prosecution under N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3.); see also State v. Ippolito, 287 N.J. Super. 375, 383 (App. Div. 1996) (holding in theft by unlawful taking case that {t}he inference charge is given when there is a dispute concerning the identity of the person who physically took the property, but is inappropriate where . . . defendant admits that he took the property and possessed it from the time it was taken until it was recovered but he has explained his possession as a claim of right.)
In contrast, one commentator has suggested that the common law inference does not appear to have survived the enactment of the Code, at least with respect to receiving, as opposed to unlawful taking, prosecutions. Cannel, Title 2C: CRIMINAL CODE ANNOTATED, COMMENT TO N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7 at p. 437.
If the inference of guilty knowledge from recent, unexplained possession of stolen property is to be charged, care should be taken not to charge it in such a manner or under such circumstances as to violate a non-testifying defendants right to remain silent. This issue is discussed in State v. Burch, supra, 179 N.J. Super. 336. There, the court stated that when it is clear from the record that defendant is the only source to supply (an) explanation, the instruction is prejudicial and should not be given. Id. However, the court also noted that in a stolen property case some evidence, other than the defendants testimony, such as a sales slip or sales clerk, is usually available to the defense to account for innocent possession. Id. at 343. Thus, the court concluded that the instruction concerning the inference was proper even though there (was) an absence of a specific showing in the record as to the availability of an evidence source other than the defendants own testimony . . . Id. at 343-44; see also State v. DiRienzo, 53 N.J. 360 (1969) and State v. Dent, 51 N.J. 428 (1968) which are discussed in Burch.
11 If the evidence requires, any affirmative defenses should be charged at this point. See e.g. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2c. With respect to a claim of right defense pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2c(2), see State v. Ippolito, supra, 287 N.J. Super. 375 and separate model jury charge.
NOTE ALSO that N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7a specifically says that it is an affirmative defense that the property was received with the purpose to restore it to the owner. This defense must be charged when there is a basis for it in the evidence. State v. Underwood, supra, 286 N.J. Super. at 138.
Consequences of a Criminal Guilty Plea
1. You will have to appear in open court and tell the judge what you did that makes you guilty of the particular offense(s)
2. Do you understand that if you plead guilty:

a. You will have a criminal record
b. You may go to Jail or Prison.
c. You will have to pay Fines and Court Costs.

2C:20-2 Theft of Movable Property

Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey.
Theft of Movable property 2C:20-2
If someone is criminally indicted for theft, at trial the judge will read to the jurors the following jury instructions of the law:
The following charge is to be used when the factual circumstances indicate an unlawful taking of personal property and the value of the property is in dispute. In other instances, reference must be made to 2C:20-2b to determine the degree of theft. See Charge # 2.291 on GRADATION OF THEFT OFFENSES. Note that 2C:20-2b(2) makes some offenses of the third degree regardless of the value of the property).
The indictment charges the defendant with (here read the indictment) . The statute on which the indictment is based is 2C:20-3a which reads in its pertinent part as follows:
A person is guilty of theft if he unlawfully takes, or exercises control over movable property of another with purpose to deprive him thereof.
(If appropriate, here define "movable property, "property" and "property of another.")
You cannot find the defendant guilty unless you determine that the State has proven the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, the State must prove that the defendant unlawfully took (here describe property listed in indictment). In order to prove an unlawful taking, the State need not prove that the property was carried out of the place in which it was kept, but only that it was moved or taken from its original location. If the defendant is found with the stolen property shortly after it was taken, charge the jury that it may draw an inference that the defendant took the property).
Second, the State must prove that at the time the defendant took this property (his/her) purpose was to deprive the owner of the (here describe property). With regard to the requirement of proof of a purpose to deprive another of (his/her) property, you are instructed that a person acts purposely with respect to the nature of (his/her) conduct or a result thereof if it is (his/her) conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result. In other words, in order for you to find that the defendant acted purposely, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time the defendant took the property it was (his/her) conscious object to deprive (the owner) of (describe property).
(If appropriate, insert relevant portions of the following definition.) "Deprive" means
(1) to withhold (or cause to be withheld) property of another permanently or for so extended a period as to appropriate a substantial portion of its economic value...or,
(2) to dispose (or cause disposal) of the property so as to make it unlikely that the owner will recover it).
Thus, if you find after a careful consideration of all of the evidence that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements as I have explained them, then your verdict should be guilty.
However, if the State has not proven each of the elements described above to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt, then your verdict should be not guilty.
1 N.J.S.A. 2C:20-1e - "Movable Property" means property the location of which can be changed, including things growing on, affixed to, or found in land, and documents, although the rights represented thereby have no physical location. Unless the character of the property unlawfully taken is in dispute, the Court may instruct the jury that the property so taken is "(movable) property" under the statute.
N.J.S.A. 2C:20-1g - "Property" means anything of value including real estate, tangible and intangible personal property, trade secrets, contract rights, chooses-in-action and other interests in or claims to wealth, admission or transportation tickets, captured or domestic animals, food and drink, electric, gas, steam or other power.
N.J.S.A. 2C:20-1b - "Property of Another" includes property in which any person other than the actor has an interest which the actor is not privileged to infringe, regardless of the fact that the actor also has an interest in the property....
2 See Supplementary Note to this Charge; State v. Dancyger, 29 N.J. 76 (1959).
3 When the defendant is found to be in possession of the stolen property within a short time after the theft, see supplement attached to this charge.
Theft penalties increased!
2C:20-1 Definitions.
2C:20-1. Definitions. In chapters 20 and 21, unless a different meaning plainly is required:
a."Deprive" means: (1) to withhold or cause to be withheld property of another permanently or for so extended a period as to appropriate a substantial portion of its economic value, or with purpose to restore only upon payment of reward or other compensation; or (2) to dispose or cause disposal of the property so as to make it unlikely that the owner will recover it.
b."Fiduciary" means an executor, general administrator of an intestate, administrator with the will annexed, substituted administrator, guardian, substituted guardian, trustee under any trust, express, implied, resulting or constructive, substituted trustee, executor, conservator, curator, receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, assignee for the benefit of creditors, partner, agent or officer of a corporation, public or private, temporary administrator, administrator, administrator pendente lite, administrator ad prosequendum, administrator ad litem or other person acting in a similar capacity.
c."Financial institution" means a bank, insurance company, credit union, savings and loan association, investment trust or other organization held out to the public as a place of deposit of funds or medium of savings or collective investment.
d."Government" means the United States, any state, county, municipality, or other political unit, or any department, agency or subdivision of any of the foregoing, or any corporation or other association carrying out the functions of government.
e."Movable property" means property the location of which can be changed, including things growing on, affixed to, or found in land, and documents, although the rights represented thereby have no physical location. "Immovable property" is all other property.
f."Obtain" means: (1) in relation to property, to bring about a transfer or purported transfer of a legal interest in the property, whether to the obtainer or another; or (2) in relation to labor or service, to secure performance thereof.
g."Property" means anything of value, including real estate, tangible and intangible personal property, trade secrets, contract rights, choices in action and other interests in or claims to wealth, admission or transportation tickets, captured or domestic animals, food and drink, electric, gas, steam or other power, financial instruments, information, data, and computer software, in either human readable or computer readable form, copies or originals.
h."Property of another" includes property in which any person other than the actor has an interest which the actor is not privileged to infringe, regardless of the fact that the actor also has an interest in the property and regardless of the fact that the other person might be precluded from civil recovery because the property was used in an unlawful transaction or was subject to forfeiture as contraband. Property in possession of the actor shall not be deemed property of another who has only a security interest therein, even if legal title is in the creditor pursuant to a conditional sales contract or other security agreement.
i."Trade secret" means the whole or any portion or phase of any scientific or technical information, design, process, procedure, formula or improvement which is secret and of value. A trade secret shall be presumed to be secret when the owner thereof takes measures to prevent it from becoming available to persons other than those selected by the owner to have access thereto for limited purposes.
j."Dealer in property" means a person who buys and sells property as a business.
k."Traffic" means:
(1)To sell, transfer, distribute, dispense or otherwise dispose of property to another person; or
(2)To buy, receive, possess, or obtain control of or use property, with intent to sell, transfer, distribute, dispense or otherwise dispose of such property to another person.
l."Broken succession of title" means lack of regular documents of purchase and transfer by any seller except the manufacturer of the subject property, or possession of documents of purchase and transfer by any buyer without corresponding documents of sale and transfer in possession of seller, or possession of documents of sale and transfer by seller without corresponding documents of purchase and transfer in possession of any buyer.
m."Person" includes any individual or entity or enterprise, as defined herein, holding or capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.
n."Anything of value" means any direct or indirect gain or advantage to any person.
o."Interest in property which has been stolen" means title or right of possession to such property.
p."Stolen property" means property that has been the subject of any unlawful taking.
q."Enterprise" includes any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact, although not a legal entity, and it includes illicit as well as licit enterprises and governmental as well as other entities.
r."Attorney General" includes the Attorney General of New Jersey, his assistants and deputies. The term shall also include a county prosecutor or his designated assistant prosecutor, if a county prosecutor is expressly authorized in writing by the Attorney General to carry out the powers conferred on the Attorney General by this chapter.
s."Access device" means property consisting of any telephone calling card number, credit card number, account number, mobile identification number, electronic serial number, personal identification number, or any other data intended to control or limit access to telecommunications or other computer networks in either human readable or computer readable form, either copy or original, that can be used to obtain telephone service.
t."Defaced access device" means any access device, in either human readable or computer readable form, either copy or original, which has been removed, erased, defaced, altered, destroyed, covered or otherwise changed in any manner from its original configuration.
u."Domestic companion animal" means any animal commonly referred to as a pet or one that has been bought, bred, raised or otherwise acquired, in accordance with local ordinances and State and federal law for the primary purpose of providing companionship to the owner, rather than for business or agricultural purposes.
Amended 1981, c.167, s.5; 1984, c.184, s.1; 1997, c.6, s.1; 1998, c.100, s.1.
2C:20-1.1. Offense involving access device; presumption of unlawful purpose
6. In any prosecution for an offense enumerated in chapter 20 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes involving a defaced access device, any removal, erasure, defacement, alteration, destruction, covering or other change in such access device from its original configuration performed by any person other than an authorized manufacturer of, or service provider to access devices shall be presumed to be for an unlawful purpose.
L.1997,c.6,s.6.
2C:20-2 Consolidation of theft offenses; grading; provisions applicable to theft generally.
2C:20-2. Consolidation of Theft Offenses; Grading; Provisions Applicable to Theft Generally. a. Consolidation of Theft Offenses. Conduct denominated theft in this chapter constitutes a single offense, but each episode or transaction may be the subject of a separate prosecution and conviction. A charge of theft may be supported by evidence that it was committed in any manner that would be theft under this chapter, notwithstanding the specification of a different manner in the indictment or accusation, subject only to the power of the court to ensure fair trial by granting a bill of particulars, discovery, a continuance, or other appropriate relief where the conduct of the defense would be prejudiced by lack of fair notice or by surprise.
b.Grading of theft offenses.
(1)Theft constitutes a crime of the second degree if:
(a)The amount involved is $75,000.00 or more;
(b)The property is taken by extortion;
(c)The property stolen is a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-2 and the quantity is in excess of one kilogram;
(d)The property stolen is a persons benefits under federal or State law, or from any other source, which the Department of Human Services or an agency acting on its behalf has budgeted for the persons health care and the amount involved is $75,000 or more;or
(e)The property stolen is human remains or any part thereof.
(2)Theft constitutes a crime of the third degree if:
(a)The amount involved exceeds $500.00 but is less than $75,000.00;
(b)The property stolen is a firearm, motor vehicle, vessel, boat, horse, domestic companion animal or airplane;
(c)The property stolen is a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-2 and the amount involved is less than $75,000.00 or is undetermined and the quantity is one kilogram or less;
(d)It is from the person of the victim;
(e)It is in breach of an obligation by a person in his capacity as a fiduciary;
(f)It is by threat not amounting to extortion;
(g)It is of a public record, writing or instrument kept, filed or deposited according to law with or in the keeping of any public office or public servant;
(h)The property stolen is a persons benefits under federal or State law, or from any other source, which the Department of Human Services or an agency acting on its behalf has budgeted for the persons health care and the amount involved is less than $75,000;
(i)The property stolen is any real or personal property related to, necessary for, or derived from research, regardless of value, including, but not limited to, any sample, specimens and components thereof, research subject, including any warm-blooded or cold-blooded animals being used for research or intended for use in research, supplies, records, data or test results, prototypes or equipment, as well as any proprietary information or other type of information related to research;
(j)The property stolen is a New Jersey Prescription Blank as referred to in R.S.45:14-14; or
(k)The property stolen consists of an access device or a defaced access device.
(3)Theft constitutes a crime of the fourth degree if the amount involved is at least $200.00 but does not exceed $500.00. If the amount involved was less than $200.00 the offense constitutes a disorderly persons offense.
(4)The amount involved in a theft shall be determined by the trier of fact. The amount shall include, but shall not be limited to, the amount of any State tax avoided, evaded or otherwise unpaid, improperly retained or disposed of. Amounts involved in thefts committed pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct, whether from the same person or several persons, may be aggregated in determining the grade of the offense.
c.Claim of right. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution for theft that the actor:
(1)Was unaware that the property or service was that of another;
(2)Acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service involved or that he had a right to acquire or dispose of it as he did; or
(3) Took property exposed for sale, intending to purchase and pay for it promptly, or reasonably believing that the owner, if present, would have consented.
d.Theft from spouse. It is no defense that theft was from the actors spouse, except that misappropriation of household and personal effects, or other property normally accessible to both spouses, is theft only if it occurs after the parties have ceased living together.
Amended 1979, c.178, s.33; 1981, c.167, s.6; 1987, c.76, s.31; 1987, c.106, s.5; 1993, c.219, s.3; 1993, c.363; 1995, c.20, s.5; 1996, c.154, s.9; 1997, c.6, s.2; 1998, c.100, s.2; 1999, c.95, s.2.
2C:20-2.1. Additional penalties for theft or unlawful taking of motor vehicle 1. a. In addition to any other disposition authorized by law, a person convicted under the provisions of this chapter of theft or unlawful taking of a motor vehicle shall be subject:
(1) For the first offense, to a penalty of $500.00 and to the suspension or postponement of the persons license to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period of one year.
(2) For a second offense, to a penalty of $750.00 and to the suspension or postponement of the persons license to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period of two years.
(3) For a third or subsequent offense, to a penalty of $1,000.00, and to the suspension or postponement of the persons license to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for 10 years.
b. The suspension or postponement of the persons license to operate a motor vehicle pursuant to subsection a. of this section shall commence on the day the sentence is imposed. In the case of any person who at the time of the imposition of sentence is less than 17 years of age, the period of the suspension of driving privileges authorized herein, including a suspension of the privilege of operating a motorized bicycle, shall commence on the day the sentence is imposed and shall run for a period as fixed by the court of one year for a first offense, two years for a second offense or 10 years for a third offense calculated from the day after the day the person reaches the age of 17 years. If the driving privilege of any person is under revocation, suspension, or postponement for a violation of any provision of this Title or Title 39 of the Revised Statutes at the time of any conviction or adjudication of delinquency for a violation of any offense defined in this chapter or chapter 36 of this Title, the revocation, suspension, or postponement period imposed herein shall commence as of the date of termination of the existing revocation, suspension, or postponement.
Upon conviction the court shall collect forthwith the New Jersey drivers licenses of the person and forward such license or licenses to the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles along with a report indicating the first and last day of the suspension or postponement period imposed by the court pursuant to this section. If the court is for any reason unable to collect the license or licenses of the person, the court shall cause a report of the conviction or adjudication of delinquency to be filed with the director. That report shall include the complete name, address, date of birth, eye color, and sex of the person and shall indicate the first and last day of the suspension or postponement period imposed by the court pursuant to this section. The court shall inform the person orally and in writing that if the person is convicted of personally operating a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension or postponement imposed pursuant to this section the person shall, upon conviction, be subject to the penalties set forth in R.S.39:3-40. A person shall be required to acknowledge receipt of the written notice in writing. Failure to receive a written notice or failure to acknowledge in writing the receipt of a written notice shall not be a defense to a subsequent charge of a violation of R.S.39:3-40. If the person is the holder of a drivers license from another jurisdiction, the court shall not collect the license but shall notify the director who shall notify the appropriate officials in the licensing jurisdiction. The court shall, however, in accordance with the provisions of this section, revoke the persons non-resident driving privileges in this State.
c. All penalties provided for in this section shall be collected as provided for the collection of fines and restitutions in section 3 of P.L.1979, c.396 (C.2C:46-4), and shall be distributed in accordance with the provisions of N.J.S.2C:64-6 as if the collected monies were the proceeds of property forfeited pursuant to the provisions of chapter 64. However, the distributed monies are to be used for law enforcement activities related to auto theft.
L.1991,c.83,s.1; amended 1993,c.219,s.4.
2C:20-2.2. Additional fine for auto theft Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:43-3, if the fair market value of the automobile and its contents at the time it was stolen exceeds $7,500.00 and the automobile is not recovered, the court may sentence the defendant to pay a fine for that higher amount.
L.1991,c.83,s.2.
2C:20-3. Theft by unlawful taking or disposition a. Movable property. A person is guilty of theft if he unlawfully takes, or exercises unlawful control over, movable property of another with purpose to deprive him thereof.
b. Immovable property. A person is guilty of theft if he unlawfully transfers any interest in immovable property of another with purpose to benefit himself or another not entitled thereto.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:20-3, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:20-4. Theft by deception A person is guilty of theft if he purposely obtains property of another by deception. A person deceives if he purposely:
a. Creates or reinforces a false impression, including false impressions as to law, value, intention or other state of mind; but deception as to a persons intention to perform a promise shall not be inferred from the fact alone that he did not subsequently perform the promise;
b. Prevents another from acquiring information which would affect his judgment of a transaction; or
c. Fails to correct a false impression which the deceiver previously created or reinforced, or which the deceiver knows to be influencing another to whom he stands in a fiduciary or confidential relationship.
The term "deceive" does not, however, include falsity as to matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing or exaggeration by statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:20-4, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:20-5. Theft by extortion A person is guilty of theft by extortion if he purposely and unlawfully obtains property of another by extortion. A person extorts if he purposely threatens to:
a. Inflict bodily injury on or physically confine or restrain anyone or commit any other criminal offense;
b. Accuse anyone of an offense or cause charges of an offense to be instituted against any person;
c. Expose or publicize any secret or any asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to impair his credit or business repute;
d. Take or withhold action as an official, or cause an official to take or withhold action;
e. Bring about or continue a strike, boycott or other collective action, if the property is not demanded or received for the benefit of the group in whose interest the actor purports to act;
f. Testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with respect to another's legal claim or defense; or
g. Inflict any other harm which would not substantially benefit the actor but which is calculated to materially harm another person.
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution based on paragraphs b, c, d or f that the property obtained was honestly claimed as restitution or indemnification for harm done in the circumstances or as lawful compensation for property or services.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:20-5, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 34, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:20-6. Theft of property lost, mislaid, or delivered by mistake A person who comes into control of property of another that he knows to have been lost, mislaid, or delivered under a mistake as to the nature or amount of the property or the identity of the recipient is guilty of theft if, knowing the identity of the owner and with purpose to deprive said owner thereof, he converts the property to his own use.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:20-6, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:20-7. Receiving stolen property
2C:20-7. Receiving Stolen Property. a. Receiving. A person is guilty of theft if he knowingly receives or brings into this State movable property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it is probably stolen. It is an affirmative defense that the property was received with purpose to restore it to the owner. "Receiving" means acquiring possession, control or title, or lending on the security of the property.
b. Presumption of knowledge. The requisite knowledge or belief is presumed in the case of a person who:
(1) Is found in possession or control of two or more items of property stolen on two or more separate occasions; or
(2) Has received stolen property in another transaction within the year preceding the transaction charged; or
(3) Being a person in the business of buying or selling property of the sort received, acquires the property without having ascertained by reasonable inquiry that the person from whom he obtained it had a legal right to possess and dispose of it ;or
(4) Is found in possession of two or more defaced access devices.
Amended 1979, c.178, s.35; 1981, c.290, s.19; 1997, c.6, s.3.
2C:20-7.1. Fencing a. Possession of altered property. Any dealer in property who knew or should have known that the identifying features such as serial numbers and permanently affixed labels of property in his possession have been removed or altered without the consent of the manufacturer is guilty of possession of altered property. It is a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that a person lawfully possesses the usual indicia of ownership in addition to mere possession.
b. Dealing in stolen property. A person is guilty of dealing in stolen property if he traffics in, or initiates, organizes, plans, finances, directs, manages or supervises trafficking in stolen property.
c. The value of the property involved in the violation of this section shall be determined by the trier of fact. The value of the property involved in the violation of this section may be aggregated in determining the grade of the offense where the acts or conduct constituting a violation were committed pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct, whether from the same person or several persons.
d. It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section that the actor:
(1) Was unaware that the property or service was that of another;
(2) Acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service involved or that he had a right to acquire or dispose of it as he did.
e. In addition to the presumptions contained in N.J.S. 2C:20-7b. the following presumptions are available in the prosecution for a fencing offense:
(1) Proof of the purchase or sale of property at a price substantially below its fair market value, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person buying or selling the property knew that it had been stolen;
(2) Proof of the purchase or sale of property by a dealer in that property, out of the regular course of business, or without the usual indicia of ownership other than mere possession, or the property or the job lot of which it is a part was bought, received, possessed or controlled in broken succession of title, so that it cannot be traced, by appropriate documents, in unbroken succession to the manufacturer, in all cases where the regular course of business reasonably indicates records of purchase, transfer or sale, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person buying or selling the property knew that it had been stolen; and
(3) Proof that a person buying or selling property of the sort received obtained such property without having ascertained by reasonable inquiry that the person from whom he obtained it had a legal right to possess or control it gives rise to an inference that such person knew that it had been stolen.
L.1981, c. 167, s. 7, eff. June 15, 1981.
2C:20-8. Theft of services
2C:20-8. Theft of Services. a. A person is guilty of theft if he purposely obtains services which he knows are available only for compensation, by deception or threat, or by false token, slug, or other means, including but not limited to mechanical or electronic devices or through fraudulent statements, to avoid payment for the service. "Services" include labor or professional service; transportation, telephone, telecommunications, electric, water, gas, cable television, or other public service; accommodation in hotels, restaurants or elsewhere; entertainment; admission to exhibitions; use of vehicles or other movable property. Where compensation for service is ordinarily paid immediately upon the rendering of such service, as in the case of hotels and restaurants, absconding without payment or offer to pay gives rise to a presumption that the service was obtained by deception as to intention to pay.
b. A person commits theft if, having control over the disposition of services of another, to which he is not entitled, he knowingly diverts such services to his own benefit or to the benefit of another not entitled thereto.
c. Any person who, without permission and for the purpose of obtaining electric current, gas or water with intent to defraud any vendor of electricity, gas or water or a person who is furnished by a vendor with electric current, gas or water:
(1) Connects or causes to be connected by wire or any other device with the wires, cables or conductors of any such vendor or any other person; or
(2) Connects or disconnects the meters, pipes or conduits of such vendor or any other person or in any other manner tampers or interferes with such meters, pipes or conduits, or connects with such meters, pipes or conduits by pipes, conduits or other instruments--is guilty of a disorderly persons offense.
The existence of any of the conditions with reference to meters, pipes, conduits or attachments, described in this subsection, is presumptive evidence that the person to whom gas, electricity or water is at the time being furnished by or through such meters, pipes, conduits or attachments has, with intent to defraud, created or caused to be created with reference to such meters, pipes, conduits or attachments, the condition so existing; provided, however, that the presumption shall not apply to any person so furnished with gas, electricity or water for less than 31 days or until there has been at least one meter reading.
A violation of this subsection shall be deemed to be a continuing offense as long as the conditions described in this subsection exist.
d. Any person who, without permission or authority, connects or causes to be connected by wires or other devices, any meter erected or set up for the purpose of registering or recording the amount of electric current supplied to any customer by any vendor of electricity within this State, or changes or shunts the wiring leading to or from any such meter, or by any device, appliance or means whatsoever tampers with any such meter so that the meter will not measure or record the full amount of electric current supplied to such customer, is guilty of a disorderly persons offense.
The existence of any of the conditions with reference to meters or attachments described in this subsection is presumptive evidence that the person to whom electricity is at the time being furnished by or through such meters or attachments has, with intent to defraud, created or caused to be created with reference to such meters or attachments, the condition so existing; provided, however, that the presumption shall not apply to any person so furnished with electricity for less than 31 days or until there has been at least one meter reading.
A violation of this subsection shall be deemed to be a continuing offense as long as the conditions described in this subsection exist.
e. Any person who, with intent to obtain cable television service without payment, in whole or in part, of the lawful charges therefor, or with intent to deprive another of the lawful receipt of such service, damages, cuts, tampers with, installs, taps or makes any connection with, or who displaces, removes, injures or destroys any wire, cable, conduit, apparatus or equipment of a cable television company operating a CATV system; or who, without authority of a cable television company, intentionally prevents, obstructs or delays, by any means or contrivance, the sending, transmission, conveyance, distribution or receipt of programming material carried by equipment of the cable television company operating a CATV system, is a disorderly person.
The existence of any of the conditions with reference to wires, cables, conduits, apparatus or equipment described in this subsection is presumptive evidence that the person to whom cable television service is at the time being furnished has, with intent to obtain cable television service without authorization or compensation or to otherwise defraud, created or caused to be created the condition so existing.
f. Any person who purposely or knowingly manufactures, constructs, sells, offers for sale, distributes or installs any equipment, device or instrument designed or intended to facilitate the interception, decoding or receipt of any cable television service with intent to obtain such service and avoid the lawful payment of the charges therefor to the provider, in whole or in part, is a disorderly person.
Any communications paraphernalia prohibited under this subsection shall be subject to forfeiture and may be seized by the State or any law enforcement officer in accordance with the provisions of N.J.S.2C:64-1 et seq.
g. Any person who purposely or knowingly maintains or possesses any equipment, device or instrument of the type described in subsection f. of this section or maintains or possesses any equipment, device or instrument actually used to facilitate the interception, decoding or receipt of any cable television service with intent to obtain such service and avoid the lawful payment, in whole or in part, of the charges therefor to the provider, is a disorderly person.
Any communications paraphernalia prohibited under this subsection shall be subject to forfeiture and may be seized by the State or any law enforcement officer in accordance with the provisions of N.J.S.2C:64-1 et seq.
h. Any person who, with the intent of depriving a telephone company of its lawful charges therefor, purposely or knowingly makes use of any telecommunications service by means of the unauthorized use of any electronic or mechanical device or connection, or by the unauthorized use of billing information, or by the use of a computer, computer equipment or computer software, or by the use of misidentifying or misleading information given to a representative of the telephone company is guilty of a crime of the third degree.
The existence of any of the conditions with reference to electronic or mechanical devices, computers, computer equipment or computer software described in this subsection is presumptive evidence that the person to whom telecommunications service is at the time being furnished has, with intent to obtain telecommunications service without authorization or compensation or to otherwise defraud, created or caused to be created the condition so existing.
i. Any person who purposely or knowingly manufactures, constructs, sells, offers for sale, distributes, installs, or otherwise provides any service, equipment, device, computer, computer equipment, computer software or instrument designed or intended to facilitate the receipt of any telecommunications service and avoid the lawful payment of the charges therefor to the provider, in whole or in part, is guilty of a crime of the third degree.
Any communications paraphernalia, computer, computer equipment or computer software prohibited under this subsection shall be subject to forfeiture and may be seized by the State or any law enforcement officer in accordance with the provisions of N.J.S.2C:64-1 et seq.
j. Any person who purposely or knowingly maintains or possesses any equipment, device, computer, computer equipment, computer software or instrument of the type described in subsection i. of this section, or maintains or possesses any equipment, device, computer, computer equipment, computer software or instrument actually used to facilitate the receipt of any telecommunications service with intent to obtain such service and avoid the lawful payment, in whole or in part, of the charges therefor to the provider, is guilty of a crime of the third degree.
Any communications paraphernalia, computer, computer equipment or computer software prohibited under this subsection shall be subject to forfeiture and may be seized by the State or any law enforcement officer in accordance with the provisions of N.J.S.2C:64-1 et seq.
k. In addition to any other disposition authorized by law, and notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:43-3, every person who violates this section shall be sentenced to make restitution to the vendor and to pay a minimum fine of $500.00 for each offense. In determining the amount of restitution, the court shall consider the costs expended by the vendor, including but not limited to the repair and replacement of damaged equipment, the cost of the services unlawfully obtained, investigation expenses, and attorney fees.
l. The presumptions of evidence applicable to offenses defined in subsections c., d., e. and h. of this section shall also apply in any prosecution for theft of services brought pursuant to the provisions of subsection a. or b. of this section.
Amended 1983, c.15, s.1; 1985, c.10; 1989, c.112; 1997, c.6, s.4.
2C:20-9. Theft by failure to make required disposition of property received Theft by Failure to Make Required Disposition of Property Received. A person who purposely obtains or retains property upon agreement or subject to a known legal obligation to make specified payment or other disposition, whether from such property or its proceeds or from his own property to be reserved in equivalent amount, is guilty of theft if he deals with the property obtained as his own and fails to make the required payment or disposition. The foregoing applies notwithstanding that it may be impossible to identify particular property as belonging to the victim at the time of the actors failure to make the required payment or disposition. An officer or employee of the government or of a financial institution is presumed: (a) to know any legal obligation relevant to his criminal liability under this section, and (b) to have dealt with the property as his own if he fails to pay or account upon lawful demand, or if an audit reveals a shortage or falsification of accounts. The fact that any payment or other disposition was made with a subsequently dishonored negotiable instrument shall constitute prima facie evidence of the actors failure to make the required payment or disposition, and the trier of fact may draw a permissive inference therefrom that the actor did not intend to make the required payment or other disposition.
Amended by L. 1987, c. 76, s. 32.
2C:20-10. Unlawful taking of means of conveyance.
2C:20-10. Unlawful Taking of Means of Conveyance
a. A person commits a disorderly persons offense if, with purpose to withhold temporarily from the owner, he takes, operates, or exercises control over any means of conveyance, other than a motor vehicle, without consent of the owner or other person authorized to give consent. "Means of conveyance" includes but is not limited to motor vehicles, bicycles, motorized bicycles, boats, horses, vessels, surfboards, rafts, skimobiles, airplanes, trains, trams and trailers. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under subsections a., b. and c. of this section that the actor reasonably believed that the owner or any other person authorized to give consent would have consented to the operation had he known of it.
b. A person commits a crime of the fourth degree if, with purpose to withhold temporarily from the owner, he takes, operates or exercises control over a motor vehicle without the consent of the owner or other person authorized to give consent.
c. A person commits a crime of the third degree if, with purpose to withhold temporarily from the owner, he takes, operates or exercises control over a motor vehicle without the consent of the owner or other person authorized to give consent and operates the motor vehicle in a manner that creates a risk of injury to any person or a risk of damage to property.
d. A person commits a crime of the fourth degree if he enters and rides in a motor vehicle knowing that the motor vehicle has been taken or is being operated without the consent of the owner or other person authorized to consent.
Amended 1979,c.178,s.35A; 1993,c.134.
2C:20-11 Shoplifting
Consequences of a Criminal Guilty Plea
1. You will have to appear in open court and tell the judge what you did that makes you guilty of the particular offense(s)
2. Do you understand that if you plead guilty:

a. You will have a criminal record
b. You may go to Jail or Prison.
c. You will have to pay Fines and Court Costs.

Criminal Articles from www.NJLaws website

Wednesday, October 9, 2013

Sentencing

Sentencing

Arrest for a Criminal Violation and Right to Remain Silent; Miranda Rights

Arrest for a Criminal Violation and Right to Remain Silent; Miranda Rights

2C:21-5 Bad Checks NJSA

2C:21-5 Bad Checks NJSA

Receiving Stolen Property

Receiving Stolen Property

2C:20-2 Theft of Movable Property

2C:20-2 Theft of Movable Property

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