2C:44-2. Fines and Restitutions
Criteria for Imposing Fines and Restitutions
a. The court may sentence a defendant to pay a fine in addition to a sentence of imprisonment or probation if:
(1) The defendant has derived a pecuniary gain from the offense or the court is of opinion that a fine is specially adapted to deterrence of the type of offense involved or to the correction of the offender;
(2) The defendant is able, or given a fair opportunity to do so, will be able to pay the fine; and
(3) The fine will not prevent the defendant from making restitution to the victim of the offense.
b. The court shall sentence a defendant to pay restitution in addition to a sentence of imprisonment or probation that may be imposed if:
(1) The victim, or in the case of a homicide, the nearest relative of the victim, suffered a loss; and
(2) The defendant is able to pay or, given a fair opportunity, will be able to pay restitution.
c. (1) In determining the amount and method of payment of a fine, the court shall take into account the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that its payment will impose.
(2) In determining the amount and method of payment of restitution, the court shall take into account all financial resources of the defendant, including the defendant's likely future earnings, and shall set the amount of restitution so as to provide the victim with the fullest compensation for loss that is consistent with the defendant's ability to pay. The court shall not reduce a restitution award by any amount that the victim has received from the Violent Crimes Compensation Board, but shall order the defendant to pay any restitution ordered for a loss previously compensated by the Board to the Violent Crimes Compensation Board. If restitution to more than one person is set at the same time, the court shall set priorities of payment.
d. Nonpayment. When a defendant is sentenced to pay a fine or make restitution, or both, the court shall not impose at the same time an alternative sentence to be served in the event that the fine or restitution is not paid. The response of the court to nonpayment shall be determined only after the fine or restitution has not been paid, as provided in section 2C:46-2.
e. Whenever the maximum potential fine which may be imposed on a conviction for an offense defined in the "Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1986," N.J.S. 2C:35-1 et al. depends on the street value of the controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog involved and the court intends to impose a fine in excess of the maximum ordinary fine applicable to the offense for which defendant was convicted, and where the fine has not been agreed to pursuant to the provisions of N.J.S.2C:35-12, the court at the time of sentence shall determine the street value at the time and place of the offense based on the amount and purity of the controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog involved. The sentencing court's finding as to the street value may be based on expert opinion in the form of live testimony or by affidavit, or by such other means as the court deems appropriate. The court's finding as to street value shall not be subject to modification by an appellate court except upon a showing that the finding was totally lacking in support on the record or was arbitrary or capricious.
f. The ordering of restitution pursuant to this section shall not operate as a bar to the seeking of civil recovery by the victim based on the incident underlying the criminal conviction. Restitution ordered under this section is to be in addition to any civil remedy which a victim may possess, but any amount due the victim under any civil remedy shall be reduced by the amount ordered under this section to the extent necessary to avoid double compensation for the same loss, and the initial restitution judgment shall remain in full force and effect.
Friday, June 27, 2008
The Fifth Amendment - "To take the 5th"
Self-incrimination
The Fifth Amendment protects witnesses from being forced to incriminate themselves. To "plead the Fifth" or to "take the Fifth" is to refuse to answer a question because the response could form incriminating evidence.
Civil or criminal proceedings
Fifth Amendment protections apply wherever and whenever an individual is compelled to testify. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the privilege against self-incrimination applies whether the witness is in Federal or state court (see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)), and whether the proceeding itself is criminal or civil (see McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924)).
People have asserted the privilege in grand jury or in congressional hearings in the 1950s, where witnesses testifying before the House Committee on Un-American Activities and the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee claimed the privilege in response to questions concerning their alleged membership in the Communist Party. The amendment has also been used by defendants and witnesses in criminal cases involving the Mafia. The Supreme Court has also used the incorporation doctrine to apply the self-incrimination clause against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fifth_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution
The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the right of a witness to "take the 5th" if called as a witness at a trial. State of New Jersey v. P.Z. (A-21-96) - Decided November 26, 1997
The Supreme Court wrote:
"The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. As explained in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 1493, 12 L. Ed.2d 653, 659 (1964), the Fifth Amendment protects “the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own free will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for such silence.” It reflects our understanding that government is “constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured, and may not by coercion prove a charge against an accused out of his own mouth.” Ibid.
In New Jersey, the privilege is derived from the common law and is codified in our statutes and rules. State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 237, 250 (1993); see N.J.S.A. 2A:84-19; N.J.R.E. 503. Its importance is not diminished by the lack of specific constitutional articulation; rather, from colonial times, “New Jersey has recognized the right against self-incrimination and has consistently and vigorously protected that right.” Reed, supra, 133 N.J. at 250.
A person invoking the privilege against self-incrimination may do so “'in any . . . proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might tend to incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.'” Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426, 104 S. Ct. 1136, 1141, 79 L. Ed.2d 409, 418 (1984) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 94 S. Ct. 316, 322, 38 L. Ed.2d 274, 281 (1973)); Banca v. Town of Phillipsburg, 181 N.J. Super. 109, 114-15 (App. Div. 1981); see New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. S.S., 275 N.J. Super. 173, 179 (App. Div. 1994). However, the privilege is not self-executing under either federal or state law and must be invoked by anyone claiming its protection. Murphy, supra, 465 U.S. at 428-29, 104 S. Ct. at 1142-43, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 419-20; Reed, supra, 133 N.J. at 251. Generally, when the privilege is not asserted and the person questioned chooses to answer, the choice to respond is considered voluntary. Murphy, supra, 465 U.S. at 429, 104 S. Ct. at 1143, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 420; State v. Fary, 19 N.J. 431, 435 (1955)."
The Fifth Amendment protects witnesses from being forced to incriminate themselves. To "plead the Fifth" or to "take the Fifth" is to refuse to answer a question because the response could form incriminating evidence.
Civil or criminal proceedings
Fifth Amendment protections apply wherever and whenever an individual is compelled to testify. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the privilege against self-incrimination applies whether the witness is in Federal or state court (see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)), and whether the proceeding itself is criminal or civil (see McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924)).
People have asserted the privilege in grand jury or in congressional hearings in the 1950s, where witnesses testifying before the House Committee on Un-American Activities and the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee claimed the privilege in response to questions concerning their alleged membership in the Communist Party. The amendment has also been used by defendants and witnesses in criminal cases involving the Mafia. The Supreme Court has also used the incorporation doctrine to apply the self-incrimination clause against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fifth_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution
The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the right of a witness to "take the 5th" if called as a witness at a trial. State of New Jersey v. P.Z. (A-21-96) - Decided November 26, 1997
The Supreme Court wrote:
"The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. As explained in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 1493, 12 L. Ed.2d 653, 659 (1964), the Fifth Amendment protects “the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own free will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for such silence.” It reflects our understanding that government is “constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured, and may not by coercion prove a charge against an accused out of his own mouth.” Ibid.
In New Jersey, the privilege is derived from the common law and is codified in our statutes and rules. State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 237, 250 (1993); see N.J.S.A. 2A:84-19; N.J.R.E. 503. Its importance is not diminished by the lack of specific constitutional articulation; rather, from colonial times, “New Jersey has recognized the right against self-incrimination and has consistently and vigorously protected that right.” Reed, supra, 133 N.J. at 250.
A person invoking the privilege against self-incrimination may do so “'in any . . . proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might tend to incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.'” Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426, 104 S. Ct. 1136, 1141, 79 L. Ed.2d 409, 418 (1984) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 94 S. Ct. 316, 322, 38 L. Ed.2d 274, 281 (1973)); Banca v. Town of Phillipsburg, 181 N.J. Super. 109, 114-15 (App. Div. 1981); see New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. S.S., 275 N.J. Super. 173, 179 (App. Div. 1994). However, the privilege is not self-executing under either federal or state law and must be invoked by anyone claiming its protection. Murphy, supra, 465 U.S. at 428-29, 104 S. Ct. at 1142-43, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 419-20; Reed, supra, 133 N.J. at 251. Generally, when the privilege is not asserted and the person questioned chooses to answer, the choice to respond is considered voluntary. Murphy, supra, 465 U.S. at 429, 104 S. Ct. at 1143, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 420; State v. Fary, 19 N.J. 431, 435 (1955)."
False Reports to Law Enforcement Authority
[a. Falsely incriminating another. A person who knowingly gives or causes to be given false information to any law enforcement officer with purpose to implicate another commits a crime of the fourth degree.
b. Fictitious reports. A person commits a disorderly persons offense if he:
(1) Reports or causes to be reported to law enforcement authorities an offense or other incident within their concern knowing that it did not occur; or
(2) Pretends to furnish or causes to be furnished such authorities with information relating to an offense or incident when he knows he has no information relating to such offense or incident.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:28-4, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.]
b. Fictitious reports. A person commits a disorderly persons offense if he:
(1) Reports or causes to be reported to law enforcement authorities an offense or other incident within their concern knowing that it did not occur; or
(2) Pretends to furnish or causes to be furnished such authorities with information relating to an offense or incident when he knows he has no information relating to such offense or incident.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:28-4, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.]
No Expungement Involving Public Offense Crime. In the Matter of Expungement Application of P.A.E. , 176 NJ 218 (2003)
The expungement bar under the third paragraph of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2b does not extend to private citizens who aid and abet public officeholders in the commission of crimes involving or touching their offices.
Escape
a. Escape. A person commits an offense if he without lawful authority removes himself from official detention or fails to return to official detention following temporary leave granted for a specific purpose or limited period. "Official detention" means arrest, detention in any facility for custody of persons under charge or conviction of a crime or offense, or committed pursuant to chapter 4 of this Title, or alleged or found to be delinquent, detention for extradition or deportation, or any other detention for law enforcement purposes; but "official detention" does not include supervision of probation or parole, or constraint incidental to release on bail.
b. Absconding from parole. A person subject to parole commits a crime of the third degree if the person goes into hiding or leaves the State with a purpose of avoiding supervision. As used in this subsection, "parole" includes participation in the Intensive Supervision Program (ISP) established pursuant to the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey. Abandoning a place of residence without the prior permission of or notice to the appropriate supervising authority shall constitute prima facie evidence that the person intended to avoid such supervision.
c. Permitting or facilitating escape. A public servant concerned in detention commits an offense if he knowingly or recklessly permits an escape. Any person who knowingly causes or facilitates an escape commits an offense.
d. Effect of legal irregularity in detention. Irregularity in bringing about or maintaining detention, or lack of jurisdiction of the committing or detaining authority, shall not be a defense to prosecution under this section if the escape is from a prison or other custodial facility or from detention pursuant to commitment by official proceedings. In the case of other detentions, irregularity or lack of jurisdiction shall be a defense only if:
(1) The escape involved no substantial risk of harm to the person or property of anyone other than the detainee; or
(2) The detaining authority did not act in good faith under color of law.
e. Grading of offenses. An offense under subsection a. or c. of this section is a crime of the second degree where the actor employs force, threat, deadly weapon or other dangerous instrumentality to effect the escape. Otherwise it is a crime of the third degree.
L.1978, c.95; amended 1979,c.178,s.58A; 1981,c.290,s.30; 1991,c.34,s.1.
b. Absconding from parole. A person subject to parole commits a crime of the third degree if the person goes into hiding or leaves the State with a purpose of avoiding supervision. As used in this subsection, "parole" includes participation in the Intensive Supervision Program (ISP) established pursuant to the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey. Abandoning a place of residence without the prior permission of or notice to the appropriate supervising authority shall constitute prima facie evidence that the person intended to avoid such supervision.
c. Permitting or facilitating escape. A public servant concerned in detention commits an offense if he knowingly or recklessly permits an escape. Any person who knowingly causes or facilitates an escape commits an offense.
d. Effect of legal irregularity in detention. Irregularity in bringing about or maintaining detention, or lack of jurisdiction of the committing or detaining authority, shall not be a defense to prosecution under this section if the escape is from a prison or other custodial facility or from detention pursuant to commitment by official proceedings. In the case of other detentions, irregularity or lack of jurisdiction shall be a defense only if:
(1) The escape involved no substantial risk of harm to the person or property of anyone other than the detainee; or
(2) The detaining authority did not act in good faith under color of law.
e. Grading of offenses. An offense under subsection a. or c. of this section is a crime of the second degree where the actor employs force, threat, deadly weapon or other dangerous instrumentality to effect the escape. Otherwise it is a crime of the third degree.
L.1978, c.95; amended 1979,c.178,s.58A; 1981,c.290,s.30; 1991,c.34,s.1.
Entrapment
a. A public law enforcement official or a person engaged in cooperation with such an official or one acting as an agent of a public law enforcement official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense, he induces or encourages and, as a direct result, causes another person to engage in conduct constituting such offense by either:
(1) Making knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief that such conduct is not prohibited; or
(2) Employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those who are ready to commit it.
b. Except as provided in subsection c. of this section, a person prosecuted for an offense shall be acquitted if he proves by a preponderance of evidence that his conduct occurred in response to an entrapment. The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the trier of fact.
c. The defense afforded by this section is unavailable when causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening such injury to a person other than the person perpetrating the entrapment.
Suffice it to say, New Jersey law recognizes both statutory entrapment and due process entrapment. Under the Code of Criminal Justice, entrapment is an affirmative defense which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Florez, 134 N.J. at 583. The statutory defense, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-12, has both subjective and objective elements. State v. Rockholt, 96 N.J. 570, 579 (1994). "Subjective entrapment occurs when the police implant a criminal plan in the mind of an innocent person who would not ordinarily have committed the offense." State v. Florez, 134 N.J. at 583-84. Objective entrapment takes place when the police conduct "is so egregious as to `impugn the integrity of the court'" permitting a conviction or "causes an average citizen to commit a crime." Id. at 584 (quoting State v. Fogarty, 128 N.J. at 65). "The statutory entrapment defense based upon both subjective and objective elements is an issue that the jury must determine." Ibid.
In contrast, due process entrapment focuses exclusively on government conduct. State v. Johnson, 127 N.J. at 470. Due process entrapment occurs when government conduct is "patently wrongful in that it constitutes an abuse of lawful power, perverts the proper role of government, and offends principles of fundamental fairness." Id. at 473; see generally State v. Talbot, 71 N.J. 160 (1976). Due process entrapment poses an issue of law that must be decided by the court. State v. Florez.
(1) Making knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief that such conduct is not prohibited; or
(2) Employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those who are ready to commit it.
b. Except as provided in subsection c. of this section, a person prosecuted for an offense shall be acquitted if he proves by a preponderance of evidence that his conduct occurred in response to an entrapment. The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the trier of fact.
c. The defense afforded by this section is unavailable when causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening such injury to a person other than the person perpetrating the entrapment.
Suffice it to say, New Jersey law recognizes both statutory entrapment and due process entrapment. Under the Code of Criminal Justice, entrapment is an affirmative defense which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Florez, 134 N.J. at 583. The statutory defense, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-12, has both subjective and objective elements. State v. Rockholt, 96 N.J. 570, 579 (1994). "Subjective entrapment occurs when the police implant a criminal plan in the mind of an innocent person who would not ordinarily have committed the offense." State v. Florez, 134 N.J. at 583-84. Objective entrapment takes place when the police conduct "is so egregious as to `impugn the integrity of the court'" permitting a conviction or "causes an average citizen to commit a crime." Id. at 584 (quoting State v. Fogarty, 128 N.J. at 65). "The statutory entrapment defense based upon both subjective and objective elements is an issue that the jury must determine." Ibid.
In contrast, due process entrapment focuses exclusively on government conduct. State v. Johnson, 127 N.J. at 470. Due process entrapment occurs when government conduct is "patently wrongful in that it constitutes an abuse of lawful power, perverts the proper role of government, and offends principles of fundamental fairness." Id. at 473; see generally State v. Talbot, 71 N.J. 160 (1976). Due process entrapment poses an issue of law that must be decided by the court. State v. Florez.
COURT RULE 3:7. INDICTMENT AND ACCUSATION 3:7-1. Entitling of Papers
The indictment and all subsequent papers in connection therewith shall be entitled in the Superior Court.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-1(b). 3:7-2. Use of Indictment or Accusation
A crime punishable by death shall be prosecuted by indictment. Every other crime shall be prosecuted by indictment unless the defendant, after having been advised of the right to indictment, shall waive the right in a signed writing, in which case the defendant may be tried on accusation. Such accusation shall be prepared by the prosecuting attorney and entitled and proceeded upon in the Superior Court. Nothing herein contained, however, shall be construed as limiting the criminal jurisdiction of a municipal court over indictable offenses provided by law and these rules.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-2(a)(b). Amended August 28, 1979 to be effective September 1, 1979; amended July 13, 1994 to be effective September 1, 1994. 3:7-3. Nature and Contents of Indictment or Accusation
(a) Nature and Contents Generally. The indictment or accusation shall be a written statement of the essential facts constituting the crime charged, need not contain a formal commencement and shall be signed by the prosecuting attorney. The indictment shall be endorsed as a true bill by the foreperson and conclude: "against the peace of this State, the government and dignity of the same." Allegations made in one count of the indictment or accusation may be incorporated by reference in another count. It may be alleged in a single count either that the means by which the defendant committed the offense are unknown or that the defendant committed it by one or more specified means. An indictment or accusation or any count thereof charging the violation of a statute or statutes shall state the official or customary citation thereof, but error in the citation or its omission shall not be ground for dismissal of the indictment or accusation or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not prejudicially mislead the defendant. Surplusage in the indictment or accusation may be stricken by the court on defendant's motion. (b) Indictment for Murder or Manslaughter. Every indictment for murder shall specify whether the act is murder as defined by N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), (2) or (3) and whether the defendant is alleged: (1) to have committed the act by his or her own conduct or (2) to have procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary value or (3) to be the leader of a drug trafficking network, as defined in N.J.S.A.2C:35-3, and who, in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3, commanded or by threat or promise solicited the commission of the offense. In every indictment for aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter, it is sufficient to charge that the defendant committed aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-3(a)(b)(c), 3:4-4. Paragraphs (a) and (b) amended August 28, 1979 to be effective September 1, 1979; paragraph (b) amended September 28, 1982 to be effective immediately; paragraph (b) amended July 13, 1993 to be effective immediately; paragraphs (a) and (b) amended July 13, 1994 to be effective September 1, 1994. 3:7-4. Amendment of Indictment or Accusation
The court may amend the indictment or accusation to correct an error in form or the description of the crime intended to be charged or to charge a lesser included offense provided that the amendment does not charge another or different offense from that alleged and the defendant will not be prejudiced thereby in his or her defense on the merits. Such amendment may be made on such terms as to postponing the trial, to be had before the same or another jury, as the interest of justice requires.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-5. Amended August 28, 1979 to be effective September 1, 1979; amended July 13, 1994 to be effective September 1, 1994. 3:7-5. Bill of Particulars
A bill of particulars shall be ordered by the court if the indictment or accusation is not sufficiently specific to enable the defendant to prepare a defense. The defendant shall move therefore pursuant to Rule 3:10-2. The application shall point out clearly the particulars sought by the defense. The prosecutor shall furnish the bill of particulars within 10 days after the order of the court. Further particulars may be ordered when a demand therefor is promptly made. A bill of particulars may be amended at any time, subject to such conditions as the interest of justice requires. Any particulars that have been furnished to the defendant pursuant to R. 3:13-3 and 4 shall not be subject to an application pursuant to this rule.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-6; amended June 29, 1990, to be effective September 4, 1990; amended July 13, 1994 and December 9, 1994, to be effective January 1, 1995. 3:7-6. Joinder of Offenses
Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or accusation in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on 2 or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. Relief from prejudicial joinder shall be afforded as providedby R. 3:15-2.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-7; amended August 28, 1979 to be effective September 1, 1979. 3:7-7. Joinder of Defendants
Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or accusation if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count. The disposition of the indictment or accusation as to one or more of several defendants joined in the same indictment or accusation shall not affect the right of the State to proceed against the other defendants. Relief from prejudicial joinder shall be afforded as provided by R. 3:15-2.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-8. 3:7-8. Issuance of Warrant or Summons Upon Indictment or Accusation
Upon the return of an indictment or the filing of an accusation a summons or warrant shall be issued in accordance with R. 3:3-1 by the criminal division manager as designee of the deputy clerk of the Superior Court in the manner provided by law for each defendant named in the indictment or accusation who is not under bail. The criminal division manager as designee of the deputy clerk of the Superior Court, upon request, shall issue more than one warrant or summons for the same defendant. If the defendant fails to appear in response to a summons, a warrant shall issue. If a summons is issued upon indictment to a defendant who has not been previously held to answer a complaint, the defendant shall undergo all post-arrest identification procedures that are required by law upon arrest, on the return date of the summons, or upon written request of the appropriate law enforcement agency.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-9. Amended July 22, 1983 to be effective September 12, 1983; amended July 13, 1994 to be effective January 1, 1995. 3:7-9. Form of Warrant and Summons
The warrant shall contain the name of the defendant or, if the defendant's name is unknown, any name or description by which the defendant can be identified with reasonable certainty, shall describe the offense charged in the indictment or accusation and shall command that the defendant be arrested and brought before the court. Conditions of pretrial release shall be fixed by the court and endorsed thereon, and in such case the sheriff or warden may take any bail. The summons shall be in the same form as the warrant except that it shall be directed to thedefendant and require the defendant to appear to plead before the court at a stated time and place. The summons shall also state that if the defendant fails to so appear, a warrant for defendant's arrest shall issue.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-10(a)(b); amended July 13, 1994 to be effective January 1, 1995. 3:7-10. Execution of Service; Return
(a) Execution of Warrant. The warrant shall be executed in accordance with R. 3:3-3. (b) Summons to an Individual. The summons shall be served upon an individual in accordance with R. 4:4-4. (c) Summons to a Corporation. Service of a summons upon a defendant corporation, municipal or otherwise, shall be made in accordance with R. 4:4-4. If the defendant corporation does not appear, the court shall order the clerk to enter an appearance for said corporation and endorse the plea of not guilty on the indictment or accusation, and further proceedings may then be had thereon in the same manner as if the corporation had appeared and so pleaded. A plea to an indictment or accusation by a defendant corporation shall be made by an attorney of this State. (d) Service Upon a Corporation by Publication. If the summons directed to a corporation is returned "not served" and it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the summons could not be served, the court shall by order direct the corporation to cause its appearance and plea to be entered by a day certain. A copy of such order shall within 5 days after the date thereof be published in a newspaper in this State once, at least 2 weeks preceding the day certain so specified. If the defendant corporation does not appear within the time specified by the order, the court, if satisfied that publication has been duly made, shall direct the clerk to enter an appearance and a plea of "not guilty" for the defendant corporation, and thereupon further proceedings may be had on the indictment or accusation as provided by these rules. (e) Return. The officer executing a warrant shall make prompt return thereof to the court, and at the request of the prosecuting attorney any unexecuted warrant shall be returned and cancelled. The officer serving a summons shall make return thereof on or before the return day. At the request of the prosecuting attorney made at any time while the indictment or accusation is pending, a warrant returned unexecuted and not cancelled or a summons returned unserved or a duplicate thereof may be delivered by the clerk to the sheriff or other authorized officer for execution or service.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-11, 3:4-12(a)(b), 3:4-13. Paragraph (d) amended July 7, 1971 to be effective September 13, 1971.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-1(b). 3:7-2. Use of Indictment or Accusation
A crime punishable by death shall be prosecuted by indictment. Every other crime shall be prosecuted by indictment unless the defendant, after having been advised of the right to indictment, shall waive the right in a signed writing, in which case the defendant may be tried on accusation. Such accusation shall be prepared by the prosecuting attorney and entitled and proceeded upon in the Superior Court. Nothing herein contained, however, shall be construed as limiting the criminal jurisdiction of a municipal court over indictable offenses provided by law and these rules.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-2(a)(b). Amended August 28, 1979 to be effective September 1, 1979; amended July 13, 1994 to be effective September 1, 1994. 3:7-3. Nature and Contents of Indictment or Accusation
(a) Nature and Contents Generally. The indictment or accusation shall be a written statement of the essential facts constituting the crime charged, need not contain a formal commencement and shall be signed by the prosecuting attorney. The indictment shall be endorsed as a true bill by the foreperson and conclude: "against the peace of this State, the government and dignity of the same." Allegations made in one count of the indictment or accusation may be incorporated by reference in another count. It may be alleged in a single count either that the means by which the defendant committed the offense are unknown or that the defendant committed it by one or more specified means. An indictment or accusation or any count thereof charging the violation of a statute or statutes shall state the official or customary citation thereof, but error in the citation or its omission shall not be ground for dismissal of the indictment or accusation or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not prejudicially mislead the defendant. Surplusage in the indictment or accusation may be stricken by the court on defendant's motion. (b) Indictment for Murder or Manslaughter. Every indictment for murder shall specify whether the act is murder as defined by N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), (2) or (3) and whether the defendant is alleged: (1) to have committed the act by his or her own conduct or (2) to have procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary value or (3) to be the leader of a drug trafficking network, as defined in N.J.S.A.2C:35-3, and who, in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3, commanded or by threat or promise solicited the commission of the offense. In every indictment for aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter, it is sufficient to charge that the defendant committed aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-3(a)(b)(c), 3:4-4. Paragraphs (a) and (b) amended August 28, 1979 to be effective September 1, 1979; paragraph (b) amended September 28, 1982 to be effective immediately; paragraph (b) amended July 13, 1993 to be effective immediately; paragraphs (a) and (b) amended July 13, 1994 to be effective September 1, 1994. 3:7-4. Amendment of Indictment or Accusation
The court may amend the indictment or accusation to correct an error in form or the description of the crime intended to be charged or to charge a lesser included offense provided that the amendment does not charge another or different offense from that alleged and the defendant will not be prejudiced thereby in his or her defense on the merits. Such amendment may be made on such terms as to postponing the trial, to be had before the same or another jury, as the interest of justice requires.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-5. Amended August 28, 1979 to be effective September 1, 1979; amended July 13, 1994 to be effective September 1, 1994. 3:7-5. Bill of Particulars
A bill of particulars shall be ordered by the court if the indictment or accusation is not sufficiently specific to enable the defendant to prepare a defense. The defendant shall move therefore pursuant to Rule 3:10-2. The application shall point out clearly the particulars sought by the defense. The prosecutor shall furnish the bill of particulars within 10 days after the order of the court. Further particulars may be ordered when a demand therefor is promptly made. A bill of particulars may be amended at any time, subject to such conditions as the interest of justice requires. Any particulars that have been furnished to the defendant pursuant to R. 3:13-3 and 4 shall not be subject to an application pursuant to this rule.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-6; amended June 29, 1990, to be effective September 4, 1990; amended July 13, 1994 and December 9, 1994, to be effective January 1, 1995. 3:7-6. Joinder of Offenses
Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or accusation in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on 2 or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. Relief from prejudicial joinder shall be afforded as providedby R. 3:15-2.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-7; amended August 28, 1979 to be effective September 1, 1979. 3:7-7. Joinder of Defendants
Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or accusation if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count. The disposition of the indictment or accusation as to one or more of several defendants joined in the same indictment or accusation shall not affect the right of the State to proceed against the other defendants. Relief from prejudicial joinder shall be afforded as provided by R. 3:15-2.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-8. 3:7-8. Issuance of Warrant or Summons Upon Indictment or Accusation
Upon the return of an indictment or the filing of an accusation a summons or warrant shall be issued in accordance with R. 3:3-1 by the criminal division manager as designee of the deputy clerk of the Superior Court in the manner provided by law for each defendant named in the indictment or accusation who is not under bail. The criminal division manager as designee of the deputy clerk of the Superior Court, upon request, shall issue more than one warrant or summons for the same defendant. If the defendant fails to appear in response to a summons, a warrant shall issue. If a summons is issued upon indictment to a defendant who has not been previously held to answer a complaint, the defendant shall undergo all post-arrest identification procedures that are required by law upon arrest, on the return date of the summons, or upon written request of the appropriate law enforcement agency.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-9. Amended July 22, 1983 to be effective September 12, 1983; amended July 13, 1994 to be effective January 1, 1995. 3:7-9. Form of Warrant and Summons
The warrant shall contain the name of the defendant or, if the defendant's name is unknown, any name or description by which the defendant can be identified with reasonable certainty, shall describe the offense charged in the indictment or accusation and shall command that the defendant be arrested and brought before the court. Conditions of pretrial release shall be fixed by the court and endorsed thereon, and in such case the sheriff or warden may take any bail. The summons shall be in the same form as the warrant except that it shall be directed to thedefendant and require the defendant to appear to plead before the court at a stated time and place. The summons shall also state that if the defendant fails to so appear, a warrant for defendant's arrest shall issue.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-10(a)(b); amended July 13, 1994 to be effective January 1, 1995. 3:7-10. Execution of Service; Return
(a) Execution of Warrant. The warrant shall be executed in accordance with R. 3:3-3. (b) Summons to an Individual. The summons shall be served upon an individual in accordance with R. 4:4-4. (c) Summons to a Corporation. Service of a summons upon a defendant corporation, municipal or otherwise, shall be made in accordance with R. 4:4-4. If the defendant corporation does not appear, the court shall order the clerk to enter an appearance for said corporation and endorse the plea of not guilty on the indictment or accusation, and further proceedings may then be had thereon in the same manner as if the corporation had appeared and so pleaded. A plea to an indictment or accusation by a defendant corporation shall be made by an attorney of this State. (d) Service Upon a Corporation by Publication. If the summons directed to a corporation is returned "not served" and it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the summons could not be served, the court shall by order direct the corporation to cause its appearance and plea to be entered by a day certain. A copy of such order shall within 5 days after the date thereof be published in a newspaper in this State once, at least 2 weeks preceding the day certain so specified. If the defendant corporation does not appear within the time specified by the order, the court, if satisfied that publication has been duly made, shall direct the clerk to enter an appearance and a plea of "not guilty" for the defendant corporation, and thereupon further proceedings may be had on the indictment or accusation as provided by these rules. (e) Return. The officer executing a warrant shall make prompt return thereof to the court, and at the request of the prosecuting attorney any unexecuted warrant shall be returned and cancelled. The officer serving a summons shall make return thereof on or before the return day. At the request of the prosecuting attorney made at any time while the indictment or accusation is pending, a warrant returned unexecuted and not cancelled or a summons returned unserved or a duplicate thereof may be delivered by the clerk to the sheriff or other authorized officer for execution or service.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-11, 3:4-12(a)(b), 3:4-13. Paragraph (d) amended July 7, 1971 to be effective September 13, 1971.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)