Kenneth Vercammen is a Middlesex County trial attorney who has published 130 articles in national and New Jersey publications on Criminal Law and litigation topics. Appointments can be scheduled at 732-572-0500. He is author of the ABA's book "Criminal Law Forms".
2053 Woodbridge Avenue - Edison, NJ 08817
http://www.njlaws.com/

Friday, January 4, 2008

Underage Drinking

33:1-81. Underage Drinking

33:1-81. Underage drinking and Misrepresenting age to induce sale or delivery to minor; disorderly person Our office represents people charged with criminal and juvenile offenses. We provide representation throughout New Jersey. Criminal charges can cost you. If convicted, you can face high fines, jail, Probation and other penalties. Don't give up! Our Law Office can provide experienced attorney representation for criminal violations. Our website www.njlaws.com provides information on criminal offenses we can be retained to represent people.

The following is current criminal law plus amendments as of April. 2004 on 33:1-81. Underage drinking and Misrepresenting age to induce sale or delivery to minor

33:1-81. It shall be unlawful for:

(a) A person under the legal age for purchasing alcoholic beverages to enter any premises licensed for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages for the purpose of purchasing, or having served or delivered to him or her, any alcoholic beverage; or

(b) A person under the legal age for purchasing alcoholic beverages to consume any alcoholic beverage on premises licensed for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages, or to purchase, attempt to purchase or have another purchase for him any alcoholic beverage; or

(c) Any person to misrepresent or misstate his age, or the age of any other person for the purpose of inducing any licensee or any employee of any licensee, to sell, serve or deliver any alcoholic beverage to a person under the legal age for purchasing alcoholic beverages; or

(d) Any person to enter any premises licensed for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages for the purpose of purchasing, or to purchase alcoholic beverages, for another person who does not because of his age have the right to purchase and consume alcoholic beverages.

Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this section shall be deemed and adjudged to be a disorderly person, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not less than $500.00. In addition, the court shall suspend or postpone the person's license to operate a motor vehicle for six months.

Upon the conviction of any person under this section, the court shall forward a report to the Division of Motor Vehicles stating the first and last day of the suspension or postponement period imposed by the court pursuant to this section. If a person at the time of the imposition of a sentence is less than 17 years of age, the period of license postponement, including a suspension or postponement of the privilege of operating a motorized bicycle, shall commence on the day the sentence is imposed and shall run for a period of six months after the person reaches the age of 17 years.

If a person at the time of the imposition of a sentence has a valid driver's license issued by this State, the court shall immediately collect the license and forward it to the division along with the report. If for any reason the license cannot be collected, the court shall include in the report the complete name, address, date of birth, eye color, and sex of the person as well as the first and last date of the license suspension period imposed by the court.

The court shall inform the person orally and in writing that if the person is convicted of operating a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension or postponement, the person shall be subject to the penalties set forth in R.S. 39:3-40. A person shall be required to acknowledge receipt of the written notice in writing. Failure to receive a written notice or failure to acknowledge in writing the receipt of a written notice shall not be a defense to a subsequent charge of a violation of R.S. 39:3-40.

If the person convicted under this section is not a New Jersey resident, the court shall suspend or postpone, as appropriate given the age at the time of sentencing, the non-resident driving privilege of the person and submit to the division the required report. The court shall not collect the license of a non-resident convicted under this section. Upon receipt of a report by the court, the division shall notify the appropriate officials in the licensing jurisdiction of the suspension or postponement.

In addition to the general penalties prescribed for an offense, the court may require any person under the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages who violates this act to participate in an alcohol education or treatment program authorized by the Department of Health for a period not to exceed the maximum period of confinement prescribed by law for the offense for which the individual has been convicted.

33:1-81.1. Hearing; attendance by parent or guardian; subpoena In any hearing for a violation of section 33:1-81 of the Revised Statutes the court in its discretion may require the attendance at such hearing of a parent or guardian, if there be no parent, of the minor charged with such violation if such parent or guardian is a resident of the State and may, in its discretion, compel such attendance by subpoena.

33:1-81.1a. Violations by parent, guardian, notification, fine A parent, guardian or other person having legal custody of a person under 18 years of age found in violation of R.S. 33:1-81 or section 1 of P.L. 1979, c.264 (C. 2C:33-15) shall be notified of the violation in writing. The parent, guardian or other person having legal custody of a person under 18 years of age shall be subject to a fine in the amount of $500.00 upon any subsequent violation of R.S. 33:1-81 or section 1 of P.L. 1979, c.264 (C. 2C:33-15) on the part of such person if it is shown that the parent, guardian or other person having legal custody failed or neglected to exercise reasonable supervision or control over the conduct of the person under 18 years of age.

Trial of a Criminal Case in New Jersey

The following are the Criminal Rules of Court regarding criminal trials in New Jersey in the Superior Courts:

RULE 3:14. PLACE OF TRIAL 3:14-1. Venue

An offense shall be prosecuted in the county in which it was committed, except that (a) If it is uncertain in which one of 2 or more counties the offense has been committed or if an offense is committed in several counties prosecution may be had in any of such counties. (b) If a person dies in one county as a result of an offense committed in any other county or counties, the prosecution may be had in any of such counties. (c) Whenever the body of any person who died as a result of an offense is found in any county, prosecution may be had in such county, regardless of where the offense was committed. (d) Whenever a person dies within the jurisdiction of this State as a result of an offense committed outside the jurisdiction of this State, or dies outside the jurisdiction of this State as a result of an offense committed within the jurisdiction of this State, the prosecution shall be had in the county in which the death occurred or the offense was committed. (e) Prosecution for acts of treason against this State which were committed outside the jurisdiction of this State shall be had in any county designated by the Chief Justice. (f) Prosecutions for libel shall be had either in the county in which the publication was made or the county in which the libeled person resided at the time of the publication. (g) An accessory may be prosecuted as such either in the county in which the offense to which he or she is an accessory is triable or the county in which he or she became such accessory. (h) Any person who steals the property of another, outside this State, or receives such property knowing it to have been stolen, and brings it into this State, may be prosecuted in any county into or through which the stolen property is brought. (i) Prosecutions for acts of forgery, embezzlement, conversion or misappropriation may be had either in the county in which such offense was committed or in the county in which the offender last resided. (j) Prosecutions for desertion may be had either in the county in which the wife or any child resided at the time of the desertion or in the county in which the wife resides when the prosecution is begun. (k) The county of venue for purposes of trial of indictments returned by a State Grand Jury shall be designated by the Assignment Judge appointed to impanel and supervise the State Grand Jury or Grand Juries pursuant to R. 3:6-11(b).

3:14-2. Motion for Change of Venue or Foreign Jury

A motion for change of venue may be made only by a defendant. A motion for trial by a foreign jury may be made by any party. Such motions shall be made to the judge assigned to try the case or to the Assignment Judge of the county in which the indictment was found or the accusation filed on notice to the other party or parties on such proofs as the court directs and shall be granted if the court finds that a fair and impartial trial cannot otherwise be had.

3:14-3. Foreign Juries; Order and Selection

If a foreign jury is ordered, the order shall specify the number of jurors to be returned and a venire directed to the sheriff of the county from which such jury shall be taken, which shall be returnable to the court in the county in which the matter is to be tried. The jurors shall be selected in the same manner as the general panel of jurors is selected in the county from which they are taken.

3:14-4. Order for Change of Venue; Costs

If a change of venue is ordered, the criminal division manager's office in which the indictment or accusation is pending shall transmit to the criminal division manager's office to which the matter is transferred all papers filed therein or duplicates thereof, and the prosecution shall continue in that county. The costs of trial shall be certified to the Assignment Judge of the county in which the indictment was found or the accusation was filed.

RULE 3:15. JOINDER AND SEVERANCE 3:15-1. Trial of Indictments or Accusations Together

(a) Permissible Joinder. The court may order 2 or more indictments or accusations tried together if the offenses and the defendants, if there are 2 or more, could have been joined in a single indictment or accusation. The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under such single indictment or accusation. (b) Mandatory Joinder. Except as provided by R. 3:15-2(b), a defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple criminal offenses based on the same conduct or arising from the same episode, if such offenses are known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement of the first trial and are within the jurisdiction and venue of a single court.

3:15-2. Relief From Prejudicial Joinder

(a) Motion by State Before Trial. If two or more defendants are to be jointly tried and the prosecuting attorney intends to introduce at trial a statement, confession or admission of one defendant involving any other defendant, the prosecuting attorney shall move before trial on notice to all defendants for a determination by the court as to whether such portion of the statement, confession, or admission involving such other defendant can be effectively deleted therefrom. The court shall direct the specific deletions to be made, or, if it finds that effective deletions cannot practically be made, it shall order separate trials of the defendants. Upon failure of the prosecuting attorney to so move before trial, the court may refuse to admit such statement, confession or admission into evidence at trial, or take such other action as the interest of justice requires. (b) Motion by Defendant and State. If for any other reason it appears that a defendant or the State is prejudiced by a permissible or mandatory joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or accusation the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants, or direct other appropriate relief. (c) Time. A motion for separate trial of counts of an indictment or accusation must be made pursuant to R. 3:10-2, unless the court, for good cause shown, enlarges the time.

3:15-3. Trial of Criminal Offenses and Lesser, Related Infractions

(a) Joinder of Criminal Offense and Lesser Related Infraction. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (b), the court shall join any pending non-indictable complaint for trial with a criminal offense based on the same conduct or arising from the same episode. (2) Regardless of whether a jury sits as the finder of facts with respect to the criminal offense, and unless the complaint charges a disorderly persons offense or a petty disorderly persons offense that must be submitted to the jury in accordance with the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(e), the Superior Court judge shall sit as a municipal court judge on the complaint and shall render the verdict with respect to the complaint on the proofs adduced in the course of trial. (3) If evidence is held to be admissible with respect to the trial of the complaint but inadmissible with respect to the trial of the criminal offense, the court shall hear that evidence outside of the jury's presence and may, in its discretion, postpone such hearing until the jury has retired to deliberate. The court shall not render its verdict on the complaint until the jury has rendered its verdict or until the jury has been dismissed. (b) Relief From Joinder. If for any reason it appears that a defendant or the State is prejudiced by the joinder required by paragraph (a), the court may decline to join or may grant other appropriate relief. A defendant's request to avoid joinder shall constitute a waiver of any claim against twice being placed in jeopardy that would not have arisen had the defendant's request been denied. (c) Consequence of Failure to Join. In no event shall failure to join as required in paragraph (a) be deemed to constitute grounds for barring a subsequent prosecution of the complaint except as required by statute or by the Federal or State Constitutions.

RULE 3:16. PRESENCE OF THE DEFENDANT

(a) Pretrial. The defendant must be present for every scheduled event unless excused by the court for good cause shown. (b) At Trial or Post-conviction Proceedings. The defendant shall be present at every stage of the trial, including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, unless otherwise provided by Rule. Nothing in this Rule, however, shall prevent a defendant from waiving the right to be present at trial. A waiver may be found either from (a) the defendant's express written or oral waiver placed on the record, or (b) the defendant's conduct evidencing a knowing, voluntary, and unjustified absence after (1) the defendant has received actual notice in court or has signed a written acknowledgment of the trial date, or (2) trial has commenced in defendant's presence. A corporation shall appear by its attorney for all purposes. The defendant's presence is not required at a reduction of sentence under R. 3:21-10 or, except as provided in R. 3:22-10, at a hearing on a petition for post conviction relief.

RULE 3:18. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL 3:18-1. Motion Before Submission to Jury

At the close of the State's case or after the evidence of all parties has been closed, the court shall, on defendant's motion or its own initiative, order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment or accusation if the evidence is insufficient to warrant a conviction. A defendant may offer evidence after denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the State's case without having reserved the right.

3:18-2. Motion After Discharge of Jury

If the jury returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict, a motion for judgment of acquittal may be made, even if not earlier made pursuant to R. 3:18-1 or it may be renewed within 10 days after the jury is discharged or within such further time as the court fixes during the 10-day period. The court on such motion may set aside a verdict of guilty and order the entry of a judgment of acquittal and may so order if no verdict has been returned.

RULE 3:19. VERDICT 3:19-1. Several Defendants or Counts; Written Verdict Sheets

(a) Several Defendants or Counts. If there are 2 or more counts of an indictment or 2 or more defendants tried together, the jury may return a verdict or verdicts with respect to a defendant or defendants as to whom it has agreed, specifying the counts on which it has agreed; the defendant or defendants may be tried again on the count or counts as to which it has not agreed. (b) Written Verdict Sheets. In the discretion of the court, a written verdict sheet may be submitted to the jury in conjunction with a general verdict to facilitate the determination of the grade of the offense under the Code of Criminal Justice or otherwise simplify the determination of a verdict when multiple charges are submitted to the jury. The verdict sheet shall be marked as a court exhibit and retained by the court pursuant to Rule 1:2-3.

3:19-2. Acquittal by Reason of Insanity

If a defendant interposes the defense of insanity and is acquitted after trial on that ground, the verdict and judgment shall so state. The procedure for disposition of the defendant shall be as provided by N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8 and 2C:4-9 and by R. 4:74-7, except that in the case of defendants acquitted of murder by reason of insanity all hearings pursuant to R. 4:74-7(e) shall be in open court unless good cause is shown for a hearing in camera.

RULE 3:20. NEW TRIAL 3:20-1. Trial by Court or Jury

The trial judge on defendant's motion may grant the defendant a new trial if required in the interest of justice. If trial was by the judge without a jury, the judge may, on defendant's motion for a new trial, vacate the judgment if entered, take additional testimony and direct the entry of a new judgment. The trial judge shall not, however, set aside the verdict of the jury as against the weight of the evidence unless, having given due regard to the opportunity of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a manifest denial of justice under the law.

3:20-2. Time for Making Motion

A motion for a new trial based on the ground of newly-discovered evidence may be made at any time, but if an appeal is pending, the court may grant the motion only on remand of the case. A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the defendant did not waive his or her appearance for trial shall be made prior to sentencing. A motion for a new trial based on any other ground shall be made within 10 days after the verdict or finding of guilty, or within such further time as the court fixes during the 10-day period.

Theft by Deception

2C:20-4. Theft by deception.

A person is guilty of theft if he purposely obtains property of another by deception. A person deceives if he purposely:

a. Creates or reinforces a false impression, including false impressions as to law, value, intention or other state of mind, and including, but not limited to, a false impression that the person is soliciting or collecting funds for a charitable purpose; but deception as to a person's intention to perform a promise shall not be inferred from the fact alone that he did not subsequently perform the promise;

b. Prevents another from acquiring information which would affect his judgment of a transaction; or

c. Fails to correct a false impression which the deceiver previously created or reinforced, or which the deceiver knows to be influencing another to whom he stands in a fiduciary or confidential relationship.

The term "deceive" does not, however, include falsity as to matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing or exaggeration by statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed.

Amended 2003, c.43.

2C:20-5. Theft by extortion A person is guilty of theft by extortion if he purposely and unlawfully obtains property of another by extortion. A person extorts if he purposely threatens to:

a. Inflict bodily injury on or physically confine or restrain anyone or commit any other criminal offense;

b. Accuse anyone of an offense or cause charges of an offense to be instituted against any person;

c. Expose or publicize any secret or any asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to impair his credit or business repute;

d. Take or withhold action as an official, or cause an official to take or withhold action;

e. Bring about or continue a strike, boycott or other collective action, if the property is not demanded or received for the benefit of the group in whose interest the actor purports to act;

f. Testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with respect to another's legal claim or defense; or

g. Inflict any other harm which would not substantially benefit the actor but which is calculated to materially harm another person.

It is an affirmative defense to prosecution based on paragraphs b, c, d or f that the property obtained was honestly claimed as restitution or indemnification for harm done in the circumstances or as lawful compensation for property or services.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:20-5, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 34, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:20-6. Theft of property lost, mislaid, or delivered by mistake A person who comes into control of property of another that he knows to have been lost, mislaid, or delivered under a mistake as to the nature or amount of the property or the identity of the recipient is guilty of theft if, knowing the identity of the owner and with purpose to deprive said owner thereof, he converts the property to his own use.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:20-6, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

Theft 2C:20-1

2C:20-1. Theft

Contact the Law Office of KENNETH A VERCAMMEN for Legal Representation Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged from criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey.

2C:20-1. Definitions. In chapters 20 and 21, unless a different meaning plainly is required:

a. "Deprive" means: (1) to withhold or cause to be withheld property of another permanently or for so extended a period as to appropriate a substantial portion of its economic value, or with purpose to restore only upon payment of reward or other compensation; or (2) to dispose or cause disposal of the property so as to make it unlikely that the owner will recover it.

b. "Fiduciary" means an executor, general administrator of an intestate, administrator with the will annexed, substituted administrator, guardian, substituted guardian, trustee under any trust, express, implied, resulting or constructive, substituted trustee, executor, conservator, curator, receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, assignee for the benefit of creditors, partner, agent or officer of a corporation, public or private, temporary administrator, administrator, administrator pendente lite, administrator ad prosequendum, administrator ad litem or other person acting in a similar capacity.

c. "Financial institution" means a bank, insurance company, credit union, savings and loan association, investment trust or other organization held out to the public as a place of deposit of funds or medium of savings or collective investment.

d. "Government" means the United States, any state, county, municipality, or other political unit, or any department, agency or subdivision of any of the foregoing, or any corporation or other association carrying out the functions of government.

e. "Movable property" means property the location of which can be changed, including things growing on, affixed to, or found in land, and documents, although the rights represented thereby have no physical location. "Immovable property" is all other property.

f. "Obtain" means: (1) in relation to property, to bring about a transfer or purported transfer of a legal interest in the property, whether to the obtainer or another; or (2) in relation to labor or service, to secure performance thereof.

g. "Property" means anything of value, including real estate, tangible and intangible personal property, trade secrets, contract rights, choses in action and other interests in or claims to wealth, admission or transportation tickets, captured or domestic animals, food and drink, electric, gas, steam or other power, financial instruments, information, data, and computer software, in either human readable or computer readable form, copies or originals.

h. "Property of another" includes property in which any person other than the actor has an interest which the actor is not privileged to infringe, regardless of the fact that the actor also has an interest in the property and regardless of the fact that the other person might be precluded from civil recovery because the property was used in an unlawful transaction or was subject to forfeiture as contraband. Property in possession of the actor shall not be deemed property of another who has only a security interest therein, even if legal title is in the creditor pursuant to a conditional sales contract or other security agreement.

i. "Trade secret" means the whole or any portion or phase of any scientific or technical information, design, process, procedure, formula or improvement which is secret and of value. A trade secret shall be presumed to be secret when the owner thereof takes measures to prevent it from becoming available to persons other than those selected by the owner to have access thereto for limited purposes.

j. "Dealer in property" means a person who buys and sells property as a business.

k. "Traffic" means:

(1)To sell, transfer, distribute, dispense or otherwise dispose of property to another person; or

(2)To buy, receive, possess, or obtain control of or use property, with intent to sell, transfer, distribute, dispense or otherwise dispose of such property to another person.

l. "Broken succession of title" means lack of regular documents of purchase and transfer by any seller except the manufacturer of the subject property, or possession of documents of purchase and transfer by any buyer without corresponding documents of sale and transfer in possession of seller, or possession of documents of sale and transfer by seller without corresponding documents of purchase and transfer in possession of any buyer.

m. "Person" includes any individual or entity or enterprise, as defined herein, holding or capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.

n. "Anything of value" means any direct or indirect gain or advantage to any person.

o. "Interest in property which has been stolen" means title or right of possession to such property.

p. "Stolen property" means property that has been the subject of any unlawful taking.

q. "Enterprise" includes any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact, although not a legal entity, and it includes illicit as well as licit enterprises and governmental as well as other entities.

r. "Attorney General" includes the Attorney General of New Jersey, his assistants and deputies. The term shall also include a county prosecutor or his designated assistant prosecutor, if a county prosecutor is expressly authorized in writing by the Attorney General to carry out the powers conferred on the Attorney General by this chapter.

s. "Access device" means property consisting of any telephone calling card number, credit card number, account number, mobile identification number, electronic serial number, personal identification number, or any other data intended to control or limit access to telecommunications or other computer networks in either human readable or computer readable form, either copy or original, that can be used to obtain telephone service.

t. "Defaced access device" means any access device, in either human readable or computer readable form, either copy or original, which has been removed, erased, defaced, altered, destroyed, covered or otherwise changed in any manner from its original configuration.

u. "Domestic companion animal" means any animal commonly referred to as a pet or one that has been bought, bred, raised or otherwise acquired, in accordance with local ordinances and State and federal law for the primary purpose of providing companionship to the owner, rather than for business or agricultural purposes.

v. "Personal identifying information" means any name, number or other information that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual and includes, but is not limited to, the name, address, telephone number, date of birth, social security number, official State issued identification number, employer or taxpayer number, place of employment, employee identification number, demand deposit account number, savings account number, credit card number, mother's maiden name, unique biometric data, such as fingerprint, voice print, retina or iris image or other unique physical representation, or unique electronic identification number, address or routing code of the individual.

Amended 1981, c.167, s.5; 1984, c.184, s.1; 1997, c.6, s.1; 1998, c.100, s.1; 2002, c.85, s.1.

2C:20-1.1. Offense involving access device; presumption of unlawful purpose

6. In any prosecution for an offense enumerated in chapter 20 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes involving a defaced access device, any removal, erasure, defacement, alteration, destruction, covering or other change in such access device from its original configuration performed by any person other than an authorized manufacturer of, or service provider to access devices shall be presumed to be for an unlawful purpose.

L.1997, c.6, s.6.

2C:20-2 Consolidation of theft offenses; grading; provisions applicable to theft generally.

2C:20-2. Consolidation of Theft Offenses; Grading; Provisions Applicable to Theft Generally.

a. Consolidation of Theft and Computer Criminal Activity Offenses. Conduct denominated theft or computer criminal activity in this chapter constitutes a single offense, but each episode or transaction may be the subject of a separate prosecution and conviction. A charge of theft or computer criminal activity may be supported by evidence that it was committed in any manner that would be theft or computer criminal activity under this chapter, notwithstanding the specification of a different manner in the indictment or accusation, subject only to the power of the court to ensure fair trial by granting a bill of particulars, discovery, a continuance, or other appropriate relief where the conduct of the defense would be prejudiced by lack of fair notice or by surprise.

b. Grading of theft offenses.

(1)Theft constitutes a crime of the second degree if:

(a)The amount involved is $75,000.00 or more;

(b)The property is taken by extortion;

(c)The property stolen is a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog as defined in N.J.S. 2C:35-2 and the quantity is in excess of one kilogram;

(d)The property stolen is a person's benefits under federal or State law, or from any other source, which the Department of Human Services or an agency acting on its behalf has budgeted for the person's health care and the amount involved is $75,000 or more; or

(e)The property stolen is human remains or any part thereof.

(2)Theft constitutes a crime of the third degree if:

(a)The amount involved exceeds $500.00 but is less than $75,000.00;

(b)The property stolen is a firearm, motor vehicle, vessel, boat, horse, domestic companion animal or airplane;

(c)The property stolen is a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog as defined in N.J.S. 2C:35-2 and the amount involved is less than $75,000.00 or is undetermined and the quantity is one kilogram or less;

(d)It is from the person of the victim;

(e)It is in breach of an obligation by a person in his capacity as a fiduciary;

(f)It is by threat not amounting to extortion;

(g)It is of a public record, writing or instrument kept, filed or deposited according to law with or in the keeping of any public office or public servant;

(h)The property stolen is a person's benefits under federal or State law, or from any other source, which the Department of Human Services or an agency acting on its behalf has budgeted for the person's health care and the amount involved is less than $75,000;

(i)The property stolen is any real or personal property related to, necessary for, or derived from research, regardless of value, including, but not limited to, any sample, specimens and components thereof, research subject, including any warm-blooded or cold-blooded animals being used for research or intended for use in research, supplies, records, data or test results, prototypes or equipment, as well as any proprietary information or other type of information related to research;

(j)The property stolen is a New Jersey Prescription Blank as referred to in R.S. 45:14-14; or

(k)The property stolen consists of an access device or a defaced access device.

(3)Theft constitutes a crime of the fourth degree if the amount involved is at least $200.00 but does not exceed $500.00. If the amount involved was less than $200.00 the offense constitutes a disorderly persons offense.

(4)The amount involved in a theft or computer criminal activity shall be determined by the trier of fact. The amount shall include, but shall not be limited to, the amount of any State tax avoided, evaded or otherwise unpaid, improperly retained or disposed of. Amounts involved in thefts or computer criminal activities committed pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct, whether from the same person or several persons, may be aggregated in determining the grade of the offense.

c. Claim of right. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution for theft that the actor:

(1)Was unaware that the property or service was that of another;

(2)Acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service involved or that he had a right to acquire or dispose of it as he did; or

(3)Took property exposed for sale, intending to purchase and pay for it promptly, or reasonably believing that the owner, if present, would have consented.

d. Theft from spouse. It is no defense that theft or computer criminal activity was from or committed against the actor's spouse, except that misappropriation of household and personal effects, or other property normally accessible to both spouses, is theft or computer criminal activity only if it occurs after the parties have ceased living together.

Amended 1979, c.178, s.33; 1981, c.167, s.6; 1987, c.76, s.31; 1987, c.106, s.5; 1993, c.219, s.3; 1993, c.363; 1995, c.20, s.5; 1996, c.154, s.9; 1997, c.6, s.2; 1998, c.100, s.2; 1999, c.95, s.2; 2003, c.39, s.7.

2C:20-2.1. Additional penalties for theft or unlawful taking of motor vehicle 1. a. In addition to any other disposition authorized by law, a person convicted under the provisions of this chapter of theft or unlawful taking of a motor vehicle shall be subject:

(1) For the first offense, to a penalty of $500.00 and to the suspension or postponement of the person's license to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period of one year.

(2) For a second offense, to a penalty of $750.00 and to the suspension or postponement of the person's license to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period of two years.

(3) For a third or subsequent offense, to a penalty of $1,000.00, and to the suspension or postponement of the person's license to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for 10 years.

b. The suspension or postponement of the person's license to operate a motor vehicle pursuant to subsection a. of this section shall commence on the day the sentence is imposed. In the case of any person who at the time of the imposition of sentence is less than 17 years of age, the period of the suspension of driving privileges authorized herein, including a suspension of the privilege of operating a motorized bicycle, shall commence on the day the sentence is imposed and shall run for a period as fixed by the court of one year for a first offense, two years for a second offense or 10 years for a third offense calculated from the day after the day the person reaches the age of 17 years. If the driving privilege of any person is under revocation, suspension, or postponement for a violation of any provision of this Title or Title 39 of the Revised Statutes at the time of any conviction or adjudication of delinquency for a violation of any offense defined in this chapter or chapter 36 of this Title, the revocation, suspension, or postponement period imposed herein shall commence as of the date of termination of the existing revocation, suspension, or postponement.

Upon conviction the court shall collect forthwith the New Jersey driver's licenses of the person and forward such license or licenses to the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles along with a report indicating the first and last day of the suspension or postponement period imposed by the court pursuant to this section. If the court is for any reason unable to collect the license or licenses of the person, the court shall cause a report of the conviction or adjudication of delinquency to be filed with the director. That report shall include the complete name, address, date of birth, eye color, and sex of the person and shall indicate the first and last day of the suspension or postponement period imposed by the court pursuant to this section. The court shall inform the person orally and in writing that if the person is convicted of personally operating a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension or postponement imposed pursuant to this section the person shall, upon conviction, be subject to the penalties set forth in R.S. 39:3-40. A person shall be required to acknowledge receipt of the written notice in writing. Failure to receive a written notice or failure to acknowledge in writing the receipt of a written notice shall not be a defense to a subsequent charge of a violation of R.S. 39:3-40. If the person is the holder of a driver's license from another jurisdiction, the court shall not collect the license but shall notify the director who shall notify the appropriate officials in the licensing jurisdiction. The court shall, however, in accordance with the provisions of this section, revoke the person's non-resident driving privileges in this State.

c. All penalties provided for in this section shall be collected as provided for the collection of fines and restitutions in section 3 of P.L. 1979, c.396 (C. 2C: 46-4), and shall be distributed in accordance with the provisions of N.J.S. 2C:64-6 as if the collected monies were the proceeds of property forfeited pursuant to the provisions of chapter 64. However, the distributed monies are to be used for law enforcement activities related to auto theft.

L.1991, c.83, s.1; amended 1993, c.219, s.4.

2C:20-2.2. Additional fine for auto theft Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S. 2C:43-3, if the fair market value of the automobile and its contents at the time it was stolen exceeds $7,500.00 and the automobile is not recovered, the court may sentence the defendant to pay a fine for that higher amount.

L.1991, c.83, s.2.

2C:20-3. Theft by unlawful taking or disposition a. Movable property. A person is guilty of theft if he unlawfully takes, or exercises unlawful control over, movable property of another with purpose to deprive him thereof.

b. Immovable property. A person is guilty of theft if he unlawfully transfers any interest in immovable property of another with purpose to benefit himself or another not entitled thereto.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:20-3, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

Testifying in a Criminal Case

Testifying in a Court Case

Courts, Police and Prosecutors have an increased commitment to addressing the needs of crime victims and witnesses. As a victim or witness of a crime, their assistance is important to our system of criminal justice.
As a victim or witness, they find yourself in the same situation as do many others, you may be unfamiliar with court procedures and have fears and uncertainties about what is expected or required of witnesses. This article, compiled from suggestions of prosecutors offices, provides a brief explanation of what to expect on the witness stand. COURTROOM PROCEEDINGS:

One of the fundamental rules in a criminal case is that both the prosecution and defense have an opportunity to question the witness. There are specific rules of evidence which must be followed by the court. At times, these rules may seem unnecessary or frustrating but they are directed toward one goal- to determine the truth in the case. Some guidelines for you to remember: GUIDELINES FOR WITNESSES IN CRIMINAL TRIALS

1. Prior to testifying, try to prepare yourself by recalling the incident in your mind, but do not memorize your testimony. 2. You are sworn to tell the truth. Tell it by answering accurately about what you know. 3. Listen carefully to the questions asked and think before speaking. If you do not understand the question, ask that it be repeated or explained. Do not look for assistance from the policeman or prosecutor when you are on the stand. If you need help, ask the Judge. 4. Speak clearly and loudly. 5. Answer only the question asked, directly and simply. Do not volunteer information. 6. Do not guess or speculate. If you do not know the answer, be sure to say so. If you give an estimate, make sure everyone understands you are estimating. 7. Do not answer if there is an objection. 8. Do not lose your temper. Upon cross examination, remain calm and composed. 9. Always be courteous, even if the attorney questioning you appears to be discourteous. Being polite makes a good impression on the court and jury. Do not try to be "smart" or evasive. 10. Be serious in and around the courtroom. Avoid joking. 11. Neat appearance and proper dress are important. 12. If the question is about distance or time and your answer is only an estimate, be sure to say that it is only an estimate. 13. Leave the stand with confidence, knowing that you have presented the truth to the best of your ability.

Fears/Threats

If you have any fears about your involvement in your case, contact your own town's local police department. On extremely rare occasions, you may receive a threat. If you are threatened, immediately contact your law enforcement agency to get immediate assistance. ON BEING A WITNESS:

No crime can be solved without the help of witnesses. It is your duty as a witness to give your testimony when needed. While it may not always be convenient for you to come to court to testify, please keep in mind that some day you may be a victim and your own case may depend on the willingness of a witness to come forward and tell what he/she knows.

As your case is being prepared for trial, it may be necessary for the Prosecutor's Office to contact you. It is important to keep the Court and Police informed of your current address and telephone number. If you move, be sure to let them know. SUBPOENA

A subpoena is a court order directing you to be present at the time and place stated. You may receive your subpoena by mail or in person. When you receive a subpoena to appear in court, you are required by law to attend. Be sure to bring the subpoena to court. WHERE DO I GO?

You will find that most subpoenas will request that you report to the Court on the date set for your appearance as a witness. This is to allow the Prosecutor an opportunity to discuss the case with you prior to your actually taking the witness stand. GET COMFORTABLE

Get a good night's rest. Dress conservatively. Your normal business attire is probably about right. Be early. Give yourself a few minutes to experience the room in which you are about to testify. It is going to be a strange environment for you, so walk around. Get used to the lighting, the acoustics, the distance your voice might have to travel. JUST THE FACTS

Leave your impressions from film, television and other folklore at home. In the real world, the attorney seeking your testimony wants from you but one thing; the facts. What you saw. What you said. What you did.

In limited circumstances, what you heard. Unless you are asked to do so, do not draw conclusions. Unless you were called as an expert witness, keep your opinions for another day. RULES TO REMEMBER

* Rule 1. If you are asked what time it is, give the time. Don't offer instructions on how to build a watch.

Listen to the question, answer that question, then wait for the next one. When they run out of questions, your testimony is over. Go home.

Don't answer a question you think was asked, should be asked, or want to be asked. And take your time. As with baseball and other matters of importance, there is no clock. Your testimony is very important, that's why you were called in the first place. There is no hurry. As in golf, there are no prizes for speed, just accuracy. * Rule 2. If you do not understand a question, respond by saying "I do not understand the question.'' Have counsel rephrase the question, explain or define any word that you don't understand.

That's what you mean by ''I do not understand the question.'' It's not impolite. You are not comparing education. You just don't understand the question. If counsel can not rephrase the question so you can understand and adequately respond, that's not your problem. Being a witness is hard enough. * Rule 3. If you knew the answer some time ago, but do not recall at the moment, say ''I do not recall'' Not everyone can remember which shoes they wore the second Tuesday of last month. There is no disgrace in failing to recall certain details, especially when they are remote in time.

Your testimony is very important, that's why you were called in the first place. * Rule 4. If you are asked a question, and you do not know the answer, say ''I Do not know.''

Too many witnesses think they have to know, or are expected to know the answer to practically everything asked of them while on the stand. No one can be expected to know everything. If you seem to, your entire testimony may appear rehearsed and unconvincing. When you don't know, you don't know. SAY SO.. Such a reply is entirely appropriate. * Rule 5. Tell the truth.

You saw what you saw. You did what you did. If someone else has a different version of these events, well, someone else has a different version of these events. In the end, the judge or jury will sort it all out. * Rule 6. Be yourself.

As you would converse with a friend or neighbor, speak in your own words and use your own vocabulary. Answer the questions as naturally as you can. You don't want to sound like an actor delivering memorized lines.

There is no getting around it; while giving testimony, you are on stage. Everyone in the room, especially trial counsel, is watching you testify. They not only listen to your word, but watch how you present them. You must be as relaxed and natural as possible. Body language is a powerful communication tool. Use it properly.

HELP THE COURT REPORTER

Speak up. What you say will be taken down by the court reporter, later transcribed onto a printed page. This is called ''making a record.'' Consider two limitations in this process;

1. Your testimony has to be verbal. It is difficult to transcribe a nod of the head or shrug of the shoulders. Don't spread your hands apart and claim ''About this much.'' If the answer is ''two and one half feet,'' Say so. 2. Only one person can speak at a time. Pace your responses so as to avoid ''talking over'' the attorney asking the questions.

HELP YOURSELF

Give straight, direct and specific answers whenever possible. Depending upon the question being asked, try and avoid needless qualifiers like ''In my opinion,'' ''I guess,'' ''I think,'' and ''I believe'' JUST THE FACTS. Any reservations displayed on direct examination will come back to you on cross.

If the answer is ''yes'', ''blue'' or ''I don't know,'' SAY SO. Don't guess, exaggerate, or speak in broad, sweeping terms. Try not to generalize, and do not explain anything unless specifically instructed to do so.

If you make mistake, or give the wrong answer, STOP.. As soon as you realize you have given the wrong information, or left something out, STOP. Tell the attorney you made a mistake, say ''I made a mistake. May I correct myself.'' Clear the record then and there. It is much better than to have the opposing attorney question you about it later on cross examination.

If there is an objection, or if the judge or another attorney interrupts your testimony; FREEZE. Do not say another word until instructed to do so. The lawyers will argue out the problem on the spot. Wait until told to proceed.

There is no need to ''squeeze in'' an answer during this process. Let the lawyers work it out, that's what they do. HELP THE COURT

Some attorneys lose their manners right after the bar exam. Some have the personality of a briefcase. For others, this would be an improvement. Do your best anyway, and try to be polite. If you have a bad temper, leave it in the elevator.

Do not engage in a battle of wits. You can't win. It's not because you don't get to ask questions. You are gathered for the purpose of finding the truth, not to judge who can best exchange sarcastic remarks

Summoning the Grand Jury Rule 3:6-1

Court RULE 3:6. THE GRAND JURY 3:6-1. Summoning the Grand Jury

The Assignment Judge of each county shall order and organize according to law one or more grand juries for the county not exceeding 23 members each to be summoned at such times as the public interest requires. At least one grand jury shall be serving in each county at all times.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:3-1. 3:6-2. Objections to Grand Jury and Grand Jurors

The prosecuting attorney or a defendant, after being held to answer a complaint charging an indictable offense or after indictment, may, in writing, challenge the array of the grand jury which has returned or is expected to return the indictment on the ground that it was not selected, drawn or summoned according to law, and may challenge an individual juror on the ground that the juror is not legally qualified. All such challenges shall be made within 30 days of the service of the complaint or no later than at the arraignment/status conference. For good cause shown, the court may allow the motion to be brought at any time. Such challenges shall be tried by a judge designated by the Assignment Judge. If a defendant has already been indicted, such challenges may be the basis of a motion to dismiss the indictment.

Note: Source-R.R. 3:3-2(a)(b); amended July 13, 1994 to be effective January 1, 1995. 3:6-3. Supervising and Charging the Grand Jury

(a) Potential Bias. When appropriate, the Assignment Judge shall inquire of potential grand jurors about such aspects of their background as may reveal possible bias or interest in a matter to come before the grand jury. The Assignment Judge shall instruct the grand jury that without the Assignment Judge's approval no grand juror shall participate in any matter in which that juror has a bias or a financial, proprietary, or personal interest; and if that juror wishes to participate, the juror shall forthwith so inform the prosecutor. The prosecutor shall forthwith inform the Assignment Judge, who shall determine, in camera, whether such bias or interest exists and whether it justifies excusal. (b) Copy of Charge. When the judge designated by the Assignment Judge charges the grand jury, that judge shall cause a copy of the charge to be promptly furnished to each juror.

Note: Source-R.R. 3:3-3; caption amended paragraph (a) adopted, and former rule captioned and redesignated paragraph (b) June 29, 1990 to be effective September 4, 1990; paragraph (b) amended July 13, 1994 to be effective September 1, 1994. 3:6-4. Foreperson; Deputy Foreperson

The Assignment Judge shall appoint one of the jurors to be foreperson and another to be deputy foreperson. The foreperson shall have power to administer oaths and shall endorse all indictments. During the absence of the foreperson, the deputy foreperson shall act as foreperson.

Note: Source-R.R. 3:3-4; amended July 14, 1992, to be effective September 1, 1992. 3:6-5. Clerk

The clerk of the grand jury shall make and keep minutes of the proceedings of the grand jury as well as a record of the vote of each juror, by name, on each considered matter. If there is no clerk of the grand jury, the foreperson or another juror designated by the foreperson shall keep such a record. The record of the vote on every count of every indictment and on every presentment shall be filed with the clerk of the grand jury. The record shall not be made public except on order of the Assignment Judge.

Note: Source-R.R. 3:3-5. Amended July 14, 1972 to be effective September 5, 1972; amended July 29, 1977 to be effective September 6, 1977; amended July 13, 1994 to be effective September 1, 1994. 3:6-6. Who May Be Present; Record and Transcript

(a) Attendance at Session. No person other than the jurors, the prosecuting attorney, the clerk of the grand jury, the witness under examination, interpreters when needed and, for the purpose of recording the proceedings, a stenographer or operator of a recording device may be present while the grand jury is in session. No person other than the jurors, the clerk, the prosecuting attorney and the stenographer or operator of the recording device may be present while the grand jury is deliberating. The grand jury, however, may request either (1) the prosecuting attorney and the stenographer or operator or (2) the clerk to leave the jury room during its deliberations. (b) Record; Transcript. A stenographic record or sound recording shall be made of all testimony of witnesses, comments by the prosecuting attorney, and colloquy between the prosecuting attorney and witnesses or members of the grand jury, before the grand jury. After an indictment has been returned, at the request of the defendant, a transcript of the grand jury proceedings shall be made. The request shall designate the portion or portions of the proceedings to be transcribed and the person or persons to whom the transcript is to be furnished. A copy of the request for a transcript will be served contemporaneously by the defendant upon the prosecutor, who may move for a protective order pursuant to R. 3:13-3(f). The prosecutor may request a copy of the transcript at any time. (c) Retention of Records. If no request has been made or order entered directing a transcript of the grand jury proceedings to be made within six months after their termination, the stenographic record or sound recording shall be sealed and deposited with the operations division manager's office who shall retain it subject to the directions of the Administrative Director of the Courts.

Note: Source-R.R. 3:3-6(a)(b)(c); paragraphs (a) and (b) amended July 15, 1982 to be effective September 13, 1982; paragraph (b) amended and second paragraph added to paragraph (b) July 13, 1994, new text in paragraph (b) amended December 9, 1994, to be effective January 1, 1995; paragraph (c) amended July 5, 2000 to be effective September 5, 2000. 3:6-7. Secrecy of Proceedings

Except as otherwise provided by R. 3:13-3, the requirement as to secrecy of proceedings of the grand jury shall remain as heretofore, and all persons other than witnesses, permitted by R. 3:6-6 to be present while the grand jury is in session, shall be required to take an oath of secrecy before their admission thereto. Such oath shall also be taken by typists making transcripts of testimony given before the grand jury.

Note: Source-R.R. 3:3-7; amended July 13, 1994 and December 9, 1994, to be effective January 1, 1995. 3:6-8. Finding and Return of Indictment; No Bill

(a) Return; Secrecy. An indictment may be found only upon the concurrence of 12 or more jurors and shall be returned in open court to the Assignment Judge or, in the Assignment Judge's absence, to any Superior Court judge assigned to the Law Division in the county. With the approval of the Assignment Judge, an indictment may be returned to such judge by only the foreman or the deputy foreman rather than with all other members of the grand jury. Such judge may direct that the indictment shall be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or has given bail and in that event it shall be sealed by the clerk, and no person shall disclose its finding except as necessary for the issuance and execution of a warrant or summons. (b) No Bill. If the defendant has been held to answer a complaint and, after submission to the grand jury, no indictment has been found, the foreperson shall forthwith so report in writing to the court, who shall forthwith order the defendant's release unless the defendant's detention is required by other pending proceedings. Notice of the action of the grand jury shall also be mailed by the clerk of the court to the defendant's attorney, a defendant not in custody, and the defendant's sureties if bail has been posted.

Note: Source-R.R. 3:3-8(a)(b); paragraph (a) amended July 16, 1981 to be effective September 14, 1981; paragraph (a) amended July 26, 1984 to be effective September 10, 1984; paragraphs (a) and (b) amended July 13, 1994 to be effective September 1, 1994. 3:6-9. Finding and Return of Presentment

(a) Finding. A presentment may be made only upon the concurrence of 12 or more jurors. It may refer to public affairs or conditions, but it may censure a public official only where that public official's association with the deprecated public affairs or conditions is intimately and inescapably a part of them. (b) Return. A presentment shall be returned in open court to the Assignment Judge, who shall be notified in advance thereof by the foreperson so that the judge may arrange to be available in court to receive it. (c) Examination; Reference Back; Striking. Promptly and before the grand jury is discharged, the Assignment Judge shall examine the presentment. If it appears that a crime has been committed for which an indictment may be had, the Assignment Judge shall refer the presentment back to the grand jury with appropriate instructions. If a public official is censured the proof must be conclusive that the existence of the condemned matter is inextricably related to non-criminal failure to discharge that public official's public duty. If it appears that the presentment is false, or is based on partisan motives, or indulges in personalities without basis, or if other good cause appears, the Assignment Judge shall strike the presentment either in full or in part. As an aid in examining the presentment the Assignment Judge may call for and examine the minutes and records of the grand jury, with or without the aid of the foreperson or the prosecuting attorney, to determine if a substantial foundation exists for the public report. If the presentment censures a public official and the Assignment Judge determines not to strike, a copy of the presentment shall forthwith be served upon the public official who may, within 10 days thereafter, move for a hearing, which shall be held in camera. The public official may examine the grand jury minutes fully, under such reasonable supervision as the court deems advisable, and be permitted to introduce additional evidence to expose any deficiency. (d) Filing and Publication. Such portions of the presentment as are not referred back to the grand jury for further action or are not stricken in accordance with paragraph (c) of this rule shall be filed and made public, and the Assignment Judge shall instruct the clerk of the grand jury to send copies thereof to such public bodies or officials as may be concerned with the criticisms and recommendations made therein and to the Administrative Director of the Courts. The presentment or any portion thereof shall not be made public by any person except the Assignment Judge. The Assignment Judge shall withhold publication of the presentment until the expiration of the time for the making of a motion for a hearing by a public official pursuant to R. 3:6-9(c), and if such motion is made, shall withhold publication of the presentment pending the judge's determination. (e) Review. The action taken by the Assignment Judge pursuant to this rule is judicial in nature and is subject to review for abuse of discretion by the State or by any aggrieved person, including any member of the grand jury making the presentment.

Note: Source-R.R. 3:3-9(a)(b)(c)(d)(e); paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) amended July 13, 1994to be effective September 1, 1994. 3:6-10. Discharge; Continuance of Term

(a) Term. A grand jury shall serve until discharged by the Assignment Judge, but not longer than 20 weeks unless the Assignment Judge shall order it continued as hereinafter provided. A grand jury shall not be discharged before the expiration of its term of service except for good cause. The continuance of such grand jury shall not affect the usual drawing, selecting and serving of further grand juries. (b) Order for Continuance. Whenever it appears to the Assignment Judge that the grand jury has not completed its labors, although its ordinary term is about to expire, the Assignment Judge may, if satisfied of the necessity therefor, order that its term be continued. The order shall be made and filed within the session of court for which such grand jury shall have been drawn, and shall provide a continuance for a definite period of time not exceeding 3 calendar months, provided, however, that the Assignment Judge may make a further order, or orders, continuing such grand jury in office for a further term or terms of 3 calendar months each.

Note: Source-R.R. 3:3-10(a)(b)(c); paragraph (b) amended July 13, 1994 to be effective September 1, 1994. 3:6-11. Impanelment and Judicial Supervision of State Grand Jury

(a) Generally. All rules relating to grand juries shall apply to the State Grand Jury except as otherwise specifically provided by statute or rule. (b) Designation of Assignment Judge. The Chief Justice shall designate an Assignment Judge of the Superior Court to impanel and supervise the State Grand Jury or Grand Juries. The Chief Justice may also designate one or more Judges of the Superior Court to assist said Assignment Judge with regard to impanelment and supervision of the State Grand Jury or Grand Juries and to perform such other duties and responsibilities with regard thereto as ordered by the Chief Justice or the designated Assignment Judge.

Note: Adopted July 17, 1975 to be effective September 8, 1975.

Subscription Form NJ Municipal Court Law Review

Subscription form NJ Municipal Court Law Review

Subscription form NJ Municipal Court Law Review
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Stalking

Stalking 2C:12-10

2C:12-10. Definitions; stalking designated a crime; degrees 1. a. As used in this act:
(1)"Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical proximity to a person or repeatedly conveying, or causing to be conveyed, verbal or written threats or threats conveyed by any other means of communication or threats implied by conduct or a combination thereof directed at or toward a person.

(2)"Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions.

(3)"Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child, sibling or any other person who regularly resides in the household or who within the prior six months regularly resided in the household.

b.A person is guilty of stalking, a crime of the fourth degree, if he purposefully or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of his immediate family or to fear the death of himself or a member of his immediate family.

c.A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if he commits the crime of stalking in violation of an existing court order prohibiting the behavior.

d.A person who commits a second or subsequent offense of stalking against the same victim is guilty of a crime of the third degree.

e.A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if he commits the crime of stalking while serving a term of imprisonment or while on parole or probation as the result of a conviction for any indictable offense under the laws of this State, any other state or the United States.

f.This act shall not apply to conduct which occurs during organized group picketing.

L.1992,c.209,s.1; amended 1996, c.39, s.1; 1998, c. 17, s.3; 1999, c.47, s.1; 2001, c.220, s.2.

2C:12-10.1. Conviction for stalking, permanent restraining order

3. a. A judgment of conviction for stalking shall operate as an application for a permanent restraining order limiting the contact of the defendant and the victim who was stalked.

b. A hearing shall be held on the application for a permanent restraining order at the time of the verdict or plea of guilty unless the victim requests otherwise. This hearing shall be in Superior Court. A permanent restraining order may grant the following specific relief:

(1) An order restraining the defendant from entering the residence, property, school, or place of employment of the victim and requiring the defendant to stay away from any specified place that is named in the order and is frequented regularly by the victim.

(2) An order restraining the defendant from making contact with the victim, including an order forbidding the defendant from personally or through an agent initiating any communication likely to cause annoyance or alarm including, but not limited to, personal, written, or telephone contact with the victim, the victim's employers, employees, or fellow workers, or others with whom communication would be likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the victim.

c. The permanent restraining order entered by the court subsequent to a conviction for stalking as provided in this act may be dissolved upon the application of the stalking victim to the court which granted the order.

d. Notice of permanent restraining orders issued pursuant to this act shall be sent by the clerk of the court or other person designated by the court to the appropriate chiefs of police, members of the State Police and any other appropriate law enforcement agency or court.

e. Any permanent restraining order issued pursuant to this act shall be in effect throughout the State, and shall be enforced by all law enforcement officers.

f. A violation by the defendant of an order issued pursuant to this act shall constitute an offense under subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:29-9 and each order shall so state. Violations of these orders may be enforced in a civil or criminal action initiated by the stalking victim or by the court, on its own motion, pursuant to applicable court rules. Nothing in this act shall preclude the filing of a criminal complaint for stalking based on the same act which is the basis for the violation of the permanent restraining order.

L.1996,c.39,s.3.

At the end of the trial, the Judge will read the following Instructions and Law to the Jury: STALKING1

(N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10)

Count of this indictment charges defendant with the crime of stalking.

(Read Indictment)

The applicable statute provides, in pertinent part, that:

A person is guilty of stalking....if he purposely or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of his immediate family or to fear the death of himself or a member of his immediate family.

In order for you to find defendant guilty, the State must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

1. that defendant purposefully or knowingly engaged in a course of conduct directed at a specific person; and 2. that defendant's conduct was such that it would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily injury or death to (himself/herself) or to a member of (his/her) immediate family. 3. (Charge if applicable: that defendant's conduct did not occur during organized group picketing).

The first element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that defendant purposefully or knowingly engaged in a course of conduct directed at a specific person. A person acts purposefully with respect to the nature of (his/her) conduct or a result thereof if it is (his/her) conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result. Aperson acts purposefully with respect to attendant circumstances if (he/she) believes or hopes that they exist. A person acts purposefully if (he/she) acts with design, with a specific intent, with a particular object or purpose, or if (he/she) means to do what (he/she) does. Purpose is a condition of the mind that cannot be seen and that can be determined only by inferences from conduct, words or acts. A state of mind is rarely susceptible of direct proof but must ordinarily be inferred from the facts. Therefore, it is not necessary that the State produce witnesses to testify that an accused said that (he/she) had a certain state of mind when (he/she) engaged in a particular act. It is within your power to find that such proof has been furnished beyond a reasonable doubt by inference, which may arise from the nature of defendant's acts and conduct, from all that (he/she) said and did at the particular time and place, and from all surrounding circumstances. A person acts knowingly with respect to the nature of (his/her) conduct or the attendant circumstances if (he/she) is aware that (his/her) conduct is of that nature, or that such circumstances exist or if (he/she) is aware of a high probability of their existence. A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of (his/her) conduct if (he/she) is aware that it is practically certain that (his/her) conduct will cause such a result. As with purpose, knowledge is a condition of the mind that cannot be seen and that can be determined only by inferences from conduct, words or acts. "Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining visual or physical proximity to a person or repeatedly conveying verbal or written threats or threats implied by conduct or a combination thereof directed at or toward a person. "Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions. The second element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the course of conduct was such that it would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily injury or death to (himself/herself) or a member of (his/her) immediate family. "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition.2 "Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child, sibling or any other person who regularlyresides in the household or who within the prior six months regularly resided in the household.

(Charge if Applicable)

The third element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that defendant's conduct did not occur during organized group picketing.

If you find that the State has proved each and every element beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find defendant guilty of stalking. If, however, you find that the State has failed to prove any element of this offense beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find defendant not guilty.

[Where the degree of the offense is in question, the following should be

charged, if applicable.]3

Stalking is ordinarily a crime of the fourth degree. It is, however, a crime of the third degree if defendant, in committing the crime of stalking:

[Charge the appropriate alternative]

a. Violated an existing court order prohibiting the behavior;

or

b. Committed a second or subsequent offense of stalking against the same victim;

or

c. Was serving a term of imprisonment or was on parole or probation as the result of a conviction for any indictable offense under the laws of this State, any other state or the UnitedStates.4 If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime of stalking, but do not find that the State has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that in committing the crime, defendant (charge as appropriate: violated an existing court order prohibiting the behavior, committed a second or subsequent offense of staking against the same victim, and/or was serving a term of imprisonment or was on parole or probation as a result of a conviction for any indictable offense under the laws of this State, any other state or the United States), then your verdict must be guilty of fourth-degree stalking. If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime of stalking and further find that the State has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that in committing the crime, defendant (charge the appropriate: violated an existing court order prohibiting the behavior, committed a second or subsequent offense of staking against the same victim, and/or committed the crime while serving a term of imprisonment or while on parole or probation as a result of a conviction for any indictable offense under the laws of this State, any other state or the United States), then your verdict must be guilty of third-degree stalking.

1 This charge has been revised to reflect statutory amendments effective March 12, 1999. L. 1999 c. 47. These amendments and this charge apply only to incidents that occurred after March 12, 1999.

2 See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1

3 In most cases, where degree is in question, the trial court, after the jury returns its verdict of guilty to stalking, should then try the issue of degree before the same jury sequentially; first taking whatever additional proofs are necessary, then charging the jury with this additional language, under the principles set forth in State v. Chenique-Puey, 145 N.J. 334 (1996) and State v. Ragland, 105 N.J. 189 (1996).

4 This sentencing alternative may require the trial court to sanitize the prior conviction. State v. Brunson, 132 N.J. 377 (1993). Further, the trial court probably must grant a defendant's offer to stipulate to this custodial element. Cf. State v. Alvarez, 318 N.J. Super. 137, 150-154 (App. Div. 1999).

Speedy Trial Law

SPEEDY TRIAL LAW

Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey. Our office helps people with traffic/municipal court tickets including drivers charged with driving commercial vehicle while intoxicated, refusal and on driving while suspended with a CDL.
Motor vehicle violations can cost you. You will have to pay fines in court or receive points on your drivers license. Don't give up! The Law Office of Kenneth Vercammen can provide experienced attorney representation for motor vehicle violations.

When your driver's license is in jeopardy or you are facing thousands of dollars in fines, DMV surcharges and car insurance increases, you need excellent legal representation. The least expensive attorney is not always the answer. Please call us if you need experienced legal representation in a traffic/municipal court matter. Our web site www.njlaws.com provides information on traffic offenses we can be retained to represent people. Our
web site also provides details on jail terms for traffic violations and car insurance eligibility points. Car insurance companies increase rates or drop customers based on moving violations.

The defense of a person charged with criminal offenses and DWI is not impossible. There are a number of viable defenses and arguments which can be pursued to achieve a successful result. Advocacy, commitment, and persistence are essential to defending a client. In a DWI case, State v. Farrell NJ Super (App. Div 1999) a DWI conviction was reversed and case dismissed based on speedy trial violation. The court held: "Excessive delay in completing a prosecution can potentially violate a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial as a matter of fundamental fairness, apart from whether double jeopardy standards have been contravened. Id. at 354-55. In cases arising from municipal court DWI prosecutions, just as with criminal prosecutions, consideration whether the right to a speedy trial has been violated is guided by the four factors announced in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L. Ed.2d 101, 117-18 (1972). Gallegan, supra, [117 NJ 345, 1989] 117 N.J. at 355; State v. Prickett, 240 N.J. Super. 139, 143 (App. Div. 1990)." Farrell, supra.


Specifically, the court must engage in a multi-element balancing process of the four factors: the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, whether the defendant asserted his right to speedy trial, and any prejudice to the defendant occasioned by the delay. Gallegan, supra, 117 N.J. at 355;
State v. Marcus, 294 N.J. Super. 267, 293 (App. Div. 1996), certif. denied, 157 N.J. 543 (1997). State v Farrell NJ supra. Delay caused or requested by the defendant is not considered to weigh in favor of finding a speedy trial violation. Gallegan, supra, 117 N.J. at 355; Marcus, supra, 294 N.J. Super. at 293. Further, because the evaluative process involves a balancing of considerations, if the other factors weigh heavily enough, a speedy trial violation can be established without an affirmative showing of prejudice to the defendant. See State v. Smith, 131 N.J. Super. 354, 368 n.2 (App. Div. 1974), aff'd o.b., 70 N.J. 213 (1976). In a related vein, the defendant's demonstration of prejudice is not strictly limited to a "lessened ability to defend on the merits." Ibid. Rather, prejudice can be found from a variety of factors including "employment interruptions, public obloquy, anxieties concerning the continued and unresolved prosecution, the drain on finances, and the like." Ibid. (citing Moore v Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 94 S. Ct. 188, 38 L. Ed.2d 183 (1973)), cited by State V Farre;. supra.

The New Jersey judiciary is, as a matter of policy, committed to the quick and thorough resolution of DWI cases. In 1984, Chief Justice Wilentz issued a directive, later echoed in Municipal Court Bulletin letters from the Administrative Office of the Courts, that municipal courts should attempt to dispose of DWI cases within sixty days. See State v. Fox, 249 N.J. Super. 521, 523 & n.1 (Law Div. 1991); State v. Perkins, 219 N.J. Super. 121, 124 (Law Div. 1987).

In Perkins, supra, defendant was charged with DWI on October 10, 1986, following a car accident in which only he was injured. 219 N.J. Super. at 122. Defendant first appeared in municipal court on December 4, 1986, but the State was not prepared to proceed and sought a continuance. Id. at 123. The trial was reset for January 8, 1987, and the municipal court judge stated that defendant would be entitled to a dismissal if the State was not ready to prosecute. Ibid. Nevertheless, even though the State was not prepared on January 8 due to a change of prosecutor and subpoena problems,
the municipal court denied defendant's motion to dismiss. Perkins at 123-24. On appeal, in Perkins the Law Division dismissed the complaint against
defendant. Id. at 124. After first noting the Supreme Court's sixty-day directive, the judge stressed that the municipal court had promised that the
case would be tried or dismissed on that date. Id. at 124-25. He stated that "[a] court's promise is sacrosanct" and must be honored. Id. at 125.
Accordingly, the municipal court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss was evaluated as "an arbitrary, and therefore improper" exercise of discretion. Ibid. The municipal court's promises aside, the Law Division judge added, a substitution of prosecutor and failure to subpoena witnesses
and otherwise prepare the State's case could not justify the second adjournment. Ibid.


As a general rule in applying the evaluative features of the four-part test of Barker in fundamental fairness terms, delays of scheduling and other failures of the process for which the trial court itself was responsible are attributable to the State and not to the defendant. 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.
Ct. at 2192, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 117


"A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process. Moreover...society has a particular interest in bringing swift prosecutions, and society's representatives are the ones who should protect that interest." State v Perkins, supra at 127, quoting Barker v Wingo, supra, 497 U.S. at 527.


The Municipal Court Can Dismiss Complaints Against Defendant When the State is Not Ready to Proceed or Discovery Not Provided. Preparation of the State's case is clearly a prosecutorial function and is a responsibility that cannot be shifted to others. Any attempt by the prosecutor to place this function upon the clerk, who is an impartial judicial officer, is improper. State v. Perkins, 219 N.J. Super.121, 125, 529 A.2d 1056 (Law Div. 1987). In State v. Polasky, 216 N.J. Super. 549 (Law Div 1986) Judge Haines discussed the municipal prosecutor's role in connection with discovery, and added:

"There is further reason for requiring the prosecutor to be responsible. In our court system, the prosecutor, contrary to an ordinary advocate, has a
duty to see that justice is done. State v. D'Ippolito, 19 N.J. 450, 549-550 [117 A.2d 592] (1955). He is not to prosecute, for example, when the
evidence does not support the State's charges. Consequently, the prosecutor has an obligation to defendants as well as the State and the public. Our
discovery rules implicate that obligation, an obligation which can be discharged by no one else." [216 N.J. Super. at 555, 524 A.2d 474] As set forth in State v Prickett; 240 NJ Super 139, 146 (App. Div 1990), it is the municipal prosecutor who selects the State's witnesses, requests postponements for the State, complies with discovery rules, requests dismissal if the State cannot make out a case, and does all else necessary to prepare and present the State's cases in the municipal court. See also Position 3.11, "The Role of the Prosecutor, Report of the Supreme Court Task Force on the Improvement of Municipal Courts (1985)".

R. 1:2-4(a) provides for payment of costs to an adverse party as a condition of adjournment even where the State is the offending party in a criminal action. State v. Audette, 201 N.J. Super. 410, 493 A. 2d 540 (App. Div. 1985).

In Prickett, supra the Appellate Division agreed with the Law Division judge that the case should be remanded to the municipal court for determination and imposition of appropriate costs and for trial within 45 days of the date of this opinion.

If a party has failed to comply with this Rule [a discovery request] or with an order issued pursuant to this Rule, the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection of materials not previously disclosed, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the material not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems appropriate. State v Prickett 240 NJ Super 139, 145 App. Div (1990) "We have the problem of a part-time municipal prosecutor responsible for preparing cases for trial who abandons a prosecutorial function to the municipal court clerk who assumes it. R. 1:9-1 indicates that the court clerk may issue a subpoena, but makes no provision for service by the court clerk nor does it give the clerk the authority to excuse any witness absent instructions from the municipal court judge. The municipal court clerk should not become involved in the preparation of the State's case. " See N.J. Municipal Court Clerks' Manual, §2.3, pp. 69-70 (A.O.C. 1985) which states:

"The municipal prosecutor has the responsibility for determining what witnesses he wants and of preparing his own subpoenas. However, if the municipal prosecutor lacks secretarial help, court personnel may assistin typing the subpoenas." State v Prickett 240 NJ Super at 145. However, the
court should not ever act as the prosecutor's assistant. The court must be neutral.

If the state is not prepared, the charges should be dismissed or state sanctioned. Because the State is the municipal prosecutor's client, a failure to discharge the obligations of his office is a violation of a prosecutor's professional responsibility to represent the client diligently. When a prosecutor has available relevant evidence bearing on a prosecution, and the prosecutor's failure to present that evidence in the course of trial results in acquittal, that prosecutor has not diligently discharged his or her duty to prepare and present the State's case. Furthermore, when the failure to prepare for trial and present relevant evidence prejudices the State's case, the prosecutor's deviation from that duty may be so severe as to constitute gross negligence. Matter of Segal 130 NJ 468 (1992) Furthermore, "delay occasioned by the courts must be charged against the State, not the defendant." State v Perkins, 219 NJ Super. 121, 127 (Law Div 1987). "The court is one part of our tripartite system of government. Its failures cannot be permitted to injure a defendant who had nothing to do with them and no control over them." Id. at 127.

Sexual Assault 2C:14-2

2C:14-2. Sexual assault. a. An actor is guilty of aggravated sexual assault if he commits an act of sexual penetration with another person under any one of the following circumstances:

(1)The victim is less than 13 years old;

(2)The victim is at least 13 but less than 16 years old; and

(a)The actor is related to the victim by blood or affinity to the third degree, or

(b)The actor has supervisory or disciplinary power over the victim by virtue of the actor's legal, professional, or occupational status, or

(c)The actor is a foster parent, a guardian, or stands in loco parentis within the household;

(3)The act is committed during the commission, or attempted commission, whether alone or with one or more other persons, of robbery, kidnapping, homicide, aggravated assault on another, burglary, arson or criminal escape;

(4)The actor is armed with a weapon or any object fashioned in such a manner as to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a weapon and threatens by word or gesture to use the weapon or object;

(5)The actor is aided or abetted by one or more other persons and the actor uses physical force or coercion;

(6)The actor uses physical force or coercion and severe personal injury is sustained by the victim;

(7)The victim is one whom the actor knew or should have known was physically helpless, mentally defective or mentally incapacitated.

Aggravated sexual assault is a crime of the first degree.

b. An actor is guilty of sexual assault if he commits an act of sexual contact with a victim who is less than 13 years old and the actor is at least four years older than the victim.

c. An actor is guilty of sexual assault if he commits an act of sexual penetration with another person under any one of the following circumstances:

(1)The actor uses physical force or coercion, but the victim does not sustain severe personal injury;

(2)The victim is on probation or parole, or is detained in a hospital, prison or other institution and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary power over the victim by virtue of the actor's legal, professional or occupational status;

(3)The victim is at least 16 but less than 18 years old and:

(a)The actor is related to the victim by blood or affinity to the third degree; or

(b)The actor has supervisory or disciplinary power of any nature or in any capacity over the victim; or

(c)The actor is a foster parent, a guardian, or stands in loco parentis within the household;

(4)The victim is at least 13 but less than 16 years old and the actor is at least four years older than the victim.

Sexual assault is a crime of the second degree.

Amended 1979, c.178, s.26; 1983, c.249, s.2; 1989, c.228, s.3; 1997, c.194, s.1; 2001, c.60.

2C:14-2.1. Victim of sexual assault may consult with prosecutor on plea negotiations 1. Whenever there is a prosecution for a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2, the victim of the sexual assault shall be provided an opportunity to consult with the prosecuting authority prior to the conclusion of any plea negotiations.

Nothing contained herein shall be construed to alter or limit the authority or discretion of the prosecutor to enter into any plea agreement which the prosecutor deems appropriate.

L.2003, c.137.

2C:14-3 Aggravated criminal sexual contact; criminal sexual contact a. An actor is guilty of aggravated criminal sexual contact if he commits an act of sexual contact with the victim under any of the circumstances set forth in 2C:14-2a. (2) through(7).

Aggravated criminal sexual contact is a crime of the third degree.

b. An actor is guilty of criminal sexual contact if he commits an act of sexual contact with the victim under any of the circumstances set forth in section 2C:14-2c. (1) through(4).

Criminal sexual contact is a crime of the fourth degree.

Amended 1979, c.178, s.27; 1997, c.194, s.2.

Self-Defense

Self Defense

The United States Constitution and our State laws permit us to protect ourselves. As a homeowner, there are legal measures that can be used to keep out intruders. The Second Amendment to the US Constitution provides that we have the right to bear arms. Obviously, civilized society is permitted to have certain restrictions on gun and weapon use.
The basic question many people have is if they defend themselves and the attacker claims they are hurt, can you be liable. There are two vastly different grounds for liability: criminal liability and civil liability.

Self-Defense and Avoiding Criminal Responsibility

A person may use force against another person if he reasonably believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person. Such justifiable use of force is commonly call "self-defense." The provisions for self-defense to protect citizens from criminal charges is found in the criminal code at NJSA 2C-3-4(a), which states in part:

"... The use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor reasonably believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion."

In other words, self defense is the right of a person to defend against any unlawful force. Self defense is also the right of a person to defend against seriously threatened unlawful force that is actually pending or reasonably anticipated.

When a person is in imminent danger of bodily harm, the person has the right to use force or even deadly force when that force is necessary to prevent the use against (him/her) of unlawful force. The force used by the defender must not be significantly greater that and must be proportionate to the unlawful force threatened or used against the defender.

Unlawful force is defined as force used against a person without the person's consent in such a way that the action would be a civil wrong or a criminal offense.

If the force used by the defender was not immediately necessary for the defender's protection or if the force used by the defender was disproportionate in its intensity, then the use of such force by the defendant was not justified and the self defense claim in a criminal prosecution falls.

Deadly Force and Criminal Prosecution

The use of deadly force may be justified only to defend against force or the threat of force of nearly equally severity and is not justifiable unless the defendant reasonably believes that such force is necessary to protect (himself/herself) against death or serious bodily harm. By serious bodily harm, we mean an injury that creates substantial risk of death or which causes serious permanent disfigurement or which causes a protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.

One cannot respond with deadly force to a threat of or even an actual minor attack. For example, a slap or an imminent threat of being pushed in a crowd would not ordinarily justify the use of deadly force to defend against such unlawful conduct.

In addition, one can under limited instances use force in the protection of others (NJSA 2C:35-5). Limited force under certain instances is also afforded in the criminal code for the defense of personal property (NJSA 2C:3-6C).

Defense of Real Property (Your Home) and Criminal Liability

A section of our criminal law provides that:

"the use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable when the actor is in possession or control of premises or is licensed or privileged to be thereon and he reasonably believes such force necessary to prevent or terminate what he reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission of a criminal trespass by such other person in or upon such premises."

A person commits a criminal trespass if, knowing that (he/she) is not licensed or privileged to do so, (he/she) enters or surreptitiously remains in any structure or separately secured or occupied portion thereof.

Our criminal law further provides that, in defense of your home:

"the use of force is justifiable...only if the actor first requests the person against whom such force is used to desist from his interference with the property, unless the actor reasonably believes that (a) such request would be useless; (b) it would be dangerous to himself or another person to make the request or (c) substantial harm will be done to the physical condition of the property which is sought to be protected before the request can effectively be made."

"The use of deadly force is not justifiable in the defense of premises unless the actor reasonably believes that:

(a) The person against whom the force is used is attempting to dispossess him of his dwelling otherwise than under a claim of right to its possession; or

(b) The person against whom the force is used is attempting to commit or consummate arson, burglary, robbery or other criminal theft or property destruction; except that

(c) Deadly force does not become justifiable under subsections (a) and (b) unless

(i) The person against whom it is employed has employed or threatened deadly force against or in the presence of the actor; or

(ii) The use of force other than deadly force to prevent the commission or the consummation of the crime would expose the actor or another in his presence to substantial danger of serious bodily harm."

These are taken from portions of the Model Jury Charges - Criminal, Third Edition, published by the New Jersey Institute for Continuing Legal Education. It should be noted that these are defenses to criminal charges which will be brought against you if you defended yourself.

Even if the County Prosecutor or Police decide not to bring criminal charges against you or if you are successful in proving that you were protecting yourself as permitted under certain provisions of the criminal code, the attacker if injured still may attempt to bring a civil suit to recover for any medical expenses or injuries incurred.

Defenses to Civil Liability

Ordinarily, if someone is injured as a result of the intentional or negligent act of another, they can recover monetary damages to reimburse them for medical bills and injuries suffered. However, this is not always so when the person was injured while attacking someone else or attempting to steal from that person.

The judge in a civil case will instruct jurors in the following easy to read language: "No person has a lawful right to lay hostile and menacing hands on another. However, the law does not require anyone to submit meekly to the unlawful infliction of violence upon him. He may resist the use or threatened use of force upon him. He may meet force with force, but he may use only such force as reasonably appears to him to be necessary under all the circumstances for the purpose of self protection.

One is not ordinarily expected to exercise the same refined degree of judgment at times of great stress or excitement that he would under more placid circumstances.

Deadly Force and Civil Duty to Retreat

A deadly force is not justifiable when an opportunity to retreat with complete safety is known by the defender to be at hand. The use of such force is not justifiable if the defender knew that it could have been avoided with complete safety to himself by retreating. Where these conditions are present, the defender has a duty to retreat, and his use of a deadly force under these circumstances cannot be justified as an act of self defense.

Defense of Others

One may justifiably intervene in defense of any person who is in actual or apparent imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm, and in so doing he may use such force as he has reason to believe, and does believe, necessary under the circumstances. The defender must be reasonable in his belief that the third party is in dire peril of death or serious bodily harm. He must also have a reasonable basis to believe that the force he uses is necessary to protect the apparent victim from the threatened harm.

The defender has the burden of proving to the jurors that he inflicted the injuries complained of while acting in defense of the third party within the foregoing principles.

One is not permitted to set up traps to kill or maim individuals who attempt to trespass on their property. There is a responsibility to warn trespassers of dangerous conditions and an intenant risk of injuries. You cannot have a deep pit to catch trespassers or electric wire with one million volts of electricity to kill a trespasser.

Liability for Dog Bites

If someone hops your fence, trespasses on your land, and your dog bites him, you are not liable. However, New Jersey does impose strict liability if your dog bites someone if it is loose or if the person bitten was in a public place or permitted on your property. NJSA 4:19-16 provides,

"The owner of any dog which shall bite a person while such person is on or in a public place, or lawfully on or in a private place, including the property of the owner of the dog, shall be liable for such damages as may be suffered by the person bitten, regardless of the former viciousness of such dog or the owner's knowledge of such viciousness.

"For the purpose of this section, a person is lawfully upon the private property of such owner when he is on the property in the performance of any duty imposed upon him by the laws of this state or the laws or postal regulations of the United States, or when he is on such property upon the invitation, express or implied, of the owner thereof."

Thus, in New Jersey, a dog does not get two bites.

A person can even be liable if your dog injures someone although not biting it. Being jumped on or chased by a dog could be grounds for a civil liability. It is also strict liability if any of your dangerous animals injure someone, i.e. pet, buffalo or tiger.

Conclusion

Self defense has been recognized in both the criminal code and civil liability cases. It is common sense under the circumstances that usually controls liability. For more detailed information on self defense, you should carefully read the New Jersey statutes dealing with criminal responsibility and self defense.

It is also important to note that in intentional acts usually your insurance company will not defend you or pay another person who is injured on your property as a result of intentional acts. You should personally speak with your homeowners' insurance broker to ask them to show you specifically in your policy where you are covered for injuries to someone.


Self Defense statute 2002: 2C:3-1. Justification an affirmative defense; civil remedies unaffected a. In any prosecution based on conduct which is justifiable under this chapter, justification is an affirmative defense.

b. The fact that conduct is justifiable under this chapter does not abolish or impair any remedy for such conduct which is available in any civil action.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:3-1, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:3-2. Necessity and other justifications in general a. Necessity. Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of necessity to the extent permitted by law and as to which neither the code nor other statutory law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved and a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.

b. Other justifications in general. Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of any defense of justification provided by law for which neither the code nor other statutory law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved and a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:3-2, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:3-3. Execution of public duty a. Except as provided in subsection b. of this section, conduct is justifiable when it is required or authorized by:

(1) The law defining the duties or functions of a public officer or the assistance to be rendered to such officer in the performance of his duties;

(2) The law governing the execution of legal process;

(3) The judgment or order of a competent court or tribunal;

(4) The law governing the armed services or the lawful conduct of war; or

(5) Any other provision of law imposing a public duty.

b. The other sections of this chapter apply to:

(1) The use of force upon or toward the person of another for any of the purposes dealt with in such sections; and

(2) The use of deadly force for any purpose, unless the use of such force is otherwise expressly authorized by law.

c. The justification afforded by subsection a. of this section applies:

(1) When the actor reasonably believes his conduct to be required or authorized by the judgment or direction of a competent court or tribunal or in the lawful execution of legal process, notwithstanding lack of jurisdiction of the court or defect in the legal process; and

(2) When the actor reasonably believes his conduct to be required or authorized to assist a public officer in the performance of his duties, notwithstanding that the officer exceeded his legal authority.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:3-3, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. 2C:3-4 Use of force in self-protection.

2C:3-4. Use of Force in Self-Protection. a. Use of force justifiable for protection of the person. Subject to the provisions of this section and of section 2C:3-9, the use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor reasonably believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.

b.Limitations on justifying necessity for use of force.

(1)The use of force is not justifiable under this section:

(a)To resist an arrest which the actor knows is being made by a peace officer in the performance of his duties, although the arrest is unlawful, unless the peace officer employs unlawful force to effect such arrest; or

(b)To resist force used by the occupier or possessor of property or by another person on his behalf, where the actor knows that the person using the force is doing so under a claim of right to protect the property, except that this limitation shall not apply if:

(i)The actor is a public officer acting in the performance of his duties or a person lawfully assisting him therein or a person making or assisting in a lawful arrest;

(ii)The actor has been unlawfully dispossessed of the property and is making a reentry or recaption justified by section 2C:3-6; or

(iii) The actor reasonably believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death or serious bodily harm.

(2)The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section unless the actor reasonably believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death or serious bodily harm; nor is it justifiable if:

(a)The actor, with the purpose of causing death or serious bodily harm, provoked the use of force against himself in the same encounter; or

(b)The actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating or by surrendering possession of a thing to a person asserting a claim of right thereto or by complying with a demand that he abstain from any action which he has no duty to take, except that:

(i)The actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling, unless he was the initial aggressor; and

(ii)A public officer justified in using force in the performance of his duties or a person justified in using force in his assistance or a person justified in using force in making an arrest or preventing an escape is not obliged to desist from efforts to perform such duty, effect such arrest or prevent such escape because of resistance or threatened resistance by or on behalf of the person against whom such action is directed.

(3)Except as required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, a person employing protective force may estimate the necessity of using force when the force is used, without retreating, surrendering possession, doing any other act which he has no legal duty to do or abstaining from any lawful action.

c. (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:3-5, N.J.S.2C:3-9, or this section, the use of force or deadly force upon or toward an intruder who is unlawfully in a dwelling is justifiable when the actor reasonably believes that the force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself or other persons in the dwelling against the use of unlawful force by the intruder on the present occasion.

(2)A reasonable belief exists when the actor, to protect himself or a third person, was in his own dwelling at the time of the offense or was privileged to be thereon and the encounter between the actor and intruder was sudden and unexpected, compelling the actor to act instantly and:

(a)The actor reasonably believed that the intruder would inflict personal injury upon the actor or others in the dwelling; or

(b)The actor demanded that the intruder disarm, surrender or withdraw, and the intruder refused to do so.

(3)An actor employing protective force may estimate the necessity of using force when the force is used, without retreating, surrendering possession, withdrawing or doing any other act which he has no legal duty to do or abstaining from any lawful action.

Amended 1987, c.120, s.1; 1999, c.73.

2C:3-5. Use of force for the protection of other persons a. Subject to the provisions of this section and of section 2C:3-9, the use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable to protect a third person when:

(1) The actor would be justified under section 2C:3-4 in using such force to protect himself against the injury he believes to be threatened to the person whom he seeks to protect; and

(2) Under the circumstances as the actor reasonably believes them to be, the person whom he seeks to protect would be justified in using such protective force; and

(3) The actor reasonably believes that his intervention is necessary for the protection of such other person.

b. Notwithstanding subsection a. of this section:

(1) When the actor would be obliged under section 2C:3-4 b. (2)(b) to retreat or take other action he is not obliged to do so before using force for the protection of another person, unless he knows that he can thereby secure the complete safety of such other person, and

(2) When the person whom the actor seeks to protect would be obliged under section 2C:3-4 b. (2)(b) to retreat or take similar action if he knew that he could obtain complete safety by so doing, the actor is obliged to try to cause him to do so before using force in his protection if the actor knows that he can obtain complete safety in that way; and

(3) Neither the actor nor the person whom he seeks to protect is obliged to retreat when in the other's dwelling to any greater extent than in his own.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:3-5, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:3-6. Use of force in defense of premises or personal property Use of Force in Defense of Premises or Personal Property. a. Use of force in defense of premises. Subject to the provisions of this section and of section 2C:3-9, the use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable when the actor is in possession or control of premises or is licensed or privileged to be thereon and he reasonably believes such force necessary to prevent or terminate what he reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission of a criminal trespass by such other person in or upon such premises.

b. Limitations on justifiable use of force in defense of premises.

(1) Request to desist. The use of force is justifiable under this section only if the actor first requests the person against whom such force is used to desist from his interference with the property, unless the actor reasonably believes that:

(a) Such request would be useless;

(b) It would be dangerous to himself or another person to make the request; or

(c) Substantial harm will be done to the physical condition of the property which is sought to be protected before the request can effectively be made.

(2) Exclusion of trespasser. The use of force is not justifiable under this section if the actor knows that the exclusion of the trespasser will expose him to substantial danger of serious bodily harm.

(3) Use of deadly force. The use of deadly force is not justifiable under subsection a. of this section unless the actor reasonably believes that:

(a) The person against whom the force is used is attempting to dispossess him of his dwelling otherwise than under a claim of right to its possession; or

(b) The person against whom the force is used is attempting to commit or consummate arson, burglary, robbery or other criminal theft or property destruction; except that

(c) Deadly force does not become justifiable under subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection unless the actor reasonably believes that:

(i) The person against whom it is employed has employed or threatened deadly force against or in the presence of the actor; or

(ii) The use of force other than deadly force to terminate or prevent the commission or the consummation of the crime would expose the actor or another in his presence to substantial danger of bodily harm. An actor within a dwelling shall be presumed to have a reasonable belief in the existence of the danger. The State must rebut this presumption by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

c. Use of force in defense of personal property. Subject to the provisions of subsection d. of this section and of section 2C:3-9, the use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable when the actor reasonably believes it necessary to prevent what he reasonably believes to be an attempt by such other person to commit theft, criminal mischief or other criminal interference with personal property in his possession or in the possession of another for whose protection he acts.

d. Limitations on justifiable use of force in defense of personal property.

(1) Request to desist and exclusion of trespasser. The limitations of subsection b. (1) and (2) of this section apply to subsection c. of this section.

(2) Use of deadly force. The use of deadly force in defense of personal property is not justified unless justified under another provision of this chapter.

Amended by L. 1987, c. 120, s. 2. 2C:3-8. Use of force by persons with special responsibility for care, discipline or safety of others The use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable as permitted by law or as would be a defense in a civil action based thereon where the actor has been vested or entrusted with special responsibility for the care, supervision, discipline or safety of another or of others and the force is used for the purpose of and, subject to section 2C:3-9(b), to the extent necessary to further that responsibility, unless:

a. The code or the law defining the offense deals with the specific situation involved; or

b. A legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed otherwise plainly appears; or

c. Deadly force is used, in which case such force must be otherwise justifiable under the provisions of this chapter.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:3-8, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:3-9. Mistake of law as to unlawfulness of force or legality of arrest; reckless or negligent use of excessive but otherwise justifiable force; reckless or negligent injury or risk of injury to innocent persons a. The justification afforded by sections 2C:3-4 to 2C:3-7 is unavailable when:

(1) The actor's belief in the unlawfulness of the force or conduct against which he employs protective force or his belief in the lawfulness of an arrest which he endeavors to effect by force is erroneous; and

(2) His error is due to ignorance or mistake as to the provisions of the code, any other provisions of the criminal law or the law governing the legality of an arrest or search.

b. (Deleted by amendment; P.L.1981, c. 290.)

c. When the actor is justified under sections 2C:3-3 to 2C:3-8 in using force upon or toward the person of another but he recklessly or negligently injures or creates a risk of injury to innocent persons, the justification afforded by those sections is unavailable in a prosecution for such recklessness or negligence towards innocent persons.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:3-9, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1981, c. 290, s. 6, eff. Sept. 24, 1981.

2C:3-10. Justification in property crimes Conduct involving the appropriation, seizure or destruction of, damage to, intrusion on, or interference with, property is justifiable under circumstances which would establish a defense of privilege in a civil action based thereon, unless:

a. The code or the law defining the offense deals with the specific situation involved; or

b. A legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed otherwise plainly appears.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:3-10, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:3-11. Definitions Definitions. In this chapter, unless a different meaning plainly is required: a. "Unlawful force" means force, including confinement, which is employed without the consent of the person against whom it is directed and the employment of which constitutes an offense or actionable tort or would constitute such offense or tort except for a defense (such as the absence of intent, negligence, or mental capacity; duress, youth, or diplomatic status) not amounting to a privilege to use the force. Assent constitutes consent, within the meaning of this section, whether or not it otherwise is legally effective, except assent to the infliction of death or serious bodily harm.

b. "Deadly force" means force which the actor uses with the purpose of causing or which he knows to create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm. Purposely firing a firearm in the direction of another person or at a vehicle, building or structure in which another person is believed to be constitutes deadly force. A threat to cause death or serious bodily harm, by the production of a weapon or otherwise, so long as the actor's purpose is limited to creating an apprehension that he will use deadly force if necessary, does not constitute deadly force.

c. "Dwelling" means any building or structure, though movable or temporary, or a portion thereof, which is for the time being the actor's home or place of lodging except that, as used in 2C:3-7, the building or structure need not be the actor's own home or place of lodging.

d. "Serious bodily harm" means bodily harm which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ or which results from aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault.

e. "Bodily harm" means physical pain, or temporary disfigurement, or impairment of physical condition.

Amended by L. 1979, c. 178, s. 11; 1981, c. 290, s. 7; 1987, c. 120, s. 3.