Kenneth Vercammen is a Middlesex County trial attorney who has published 130 articles in national and New Jersey publications on Criminal Law and litigation topics. Appointments can be scheduled at 732-572-0500. He is author of the ABA's book "Criminal Law Forms".
2053 Woodbridge Avenue - Edison, NJ 08817
http://www.njlaws.com/

Tuesday, June 30, 2009

Shoplifting Defense

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Criminal Court System

Criminal Court System
The following contains some pertinent information that might be of help to you as you become involved in the criminal justice system as a victim or witness.
Apprehension and Arrest of the Accused

There are three basic routes a case can take in order to be brought to court:

1. Arrest of the accused at the scene of the crime;
2. Arrest based on a warrant issued by the court in response to a sworn complaint;
3. Arrest based on indictment by a Grand Jury as the result of its investigation.

In all three instances, the evidence available must show that there is "probable cause" to believe that a crime was committed and that the person to be charged took part in committing the crime.

What is a complaint?

A complaint is a statement of facts about an alleged crime which, when filed in court formally charges a person. Facts about a crime are submitted to the County Prosecutor's Office by a local law enforcement agency. Upon review, if the evidence is deemed sufficient for prosecution, a complaint is filed in the court.

This is the initial stage in the prosecution of a criminal matter. If there is not enough information at this time, no complaint is filed.

What is a Warrant of Arrest?

A warrant of arrest is an order signed by a judge, authorizing the police to arrest a person believed to have committed a serious crime.

Case Review and Filing of Charges by the Prosecutor

Following the arrest of the accused by the Police, the case is presented to the prosecutor. The prosecutor, as the people's representative in our system of criminal justice, has the sole responsibility for determining whether or not charges will be presented to the Grand Jury. The initial processing of the case by the prosecutor is often referred to as "screening". At this stage the case is discussed with police, evidence is reviewed and witnesses are interviewed.

The prosecutor then decides whether to do one or more of the following:

1. Charge the accused with the same charge or charges made by the police or used in issuing the arrest warrant.
2. Increase a given charge to a more serious charge, reduce the charge, or add new charges.

The accused is often charged with more than one criminal offense so the filing of charges with the court can be complex legal procedure. The prosecutor must consider all applicable laws, as well as the decisions of the State and Federal Courts.

If the prosecutor determines there is not sufficient evidence or there is no legal basis for charging the accused with a crime, the case is closed and the accused released.

What Happens to the Accused?

The person accused of the crime is now called the defendant. The defendant will make his/her first appearance before a judge soon after the arrest. The appearance is for the purpose of reviewing the amount set for bail, furnishing the defendant with a copy of the complaint, confirming legal counsel, and setting a date for hearing.

What is the Purpose of Bail?

Bail is set by the court, not by the prosecutor. It is used to assure a defendant's appearance in court. The primary factor considered by the court is whether the defendant is likely to appear for trial. Within that context the court will also take into consideration the defendant's background and the seriousness of the offense charged.

Why Would a Case Get Dismissed?

There are a number of reasons why a criminal case may be dismissed or dropped by the prosecutor or the court before trial. For example, the prosecution may decide probable cause has not been established or the defendant may make full restitution or compensation for property loss. The case may also have to be dismissed because of some technical failure of the evidence, or because the defendant cannot be found or is considered incompetent to stand trial. None of the reasons means that the witness are unimportant or unnecessary, or that their willingness to testify is not appreciated. The presence and willingness of witnesses to testify may be the deciding factor in determining what will be done in the case, particularly in getting the accused to plead guilty.

What If Someone Threatens a Witness To Drop the Charges?

Such a person is obstructing justice and may be committing a crime. Call the law enforcement officer in charge of the case. Police can ask the judge to issue a new warrant, or to revoke the defendant's bail.

What If The Defense Attorney Contacts a Witness About The Case?

You may be asked by the defense attorney to talk to him/her about the case. The witness may refuse or can talk. It is the decision of a witness.

Pleas Of Guilty

The defendant in the case may decide to plead guilty. The plea may only come at the last moment before trial, often because the defendant's attorney is hoping that a witness will not show up, or that the case will be dropped for other reasons.

What Happens In A Trial?

In a trial, the prosecutor presents the case for the State, attempting to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did commit the crime as charged. The defendant may present his or her side through the use of an attorney.

What Do the Witnesses Do At The Trial?

As a witness for the State, they have an important part in the trial. They may be questioned by the assistant prosecutor about who they are and what they know about the case. The defendant's attorney may then cross-examine them or question them about their knowledge of the case. They may feel during the questioning that their personal motives are doubted, but the process of cross-examination is not meant as a personal attack upon them. It is to ensure that all sides of the case are told and to establish the truth. Witnesses need NOT be present during the entire trial and will be called only when needed.

GLOSSARY

ARRAIGNMENT- Usually the following actions occur at this court event: The defendant is officially notified of the charges against him/her; the defendant is asked whether he/she pleads innocent or guilty, whether there will be trial demand and whether by jury or a trial by judge, if that is an option; and the terms of the defendant's release pending trial is set.

BAIL- Release on bond. The defendant may be released if he/she has put money or a percentage of a sum of money required by the court, formally charges a person.

COMPLAINT- A statement of facts about an alleged crime which, when filed in court, formally charges a person.

CONTEMPT OF COURT- This is an offense that can occur in one of two ways: (1) disrespect or unacceptable behavior in the presence of the court which can be punished immediately by the judge; or (2) outside the presence of the court the failure to abide by an order of the court in which a hearing will be held and unless the defendant can show cause why he/she should not be held in contempt, he/she will be sentenced.

CONTINUANCE- A postponement of a case for trial or hearing to a later date which usually can be granted only by the court.

CRIMINAL CONDUCT- The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, effective September 1, 1979 grades criminal conduct into first, second, third or fourth degree offenses, all requiring an indictment by the Grand Jury and entitling the defendant to a trial by jury. These offenses were previously referred to in New Jersey as misdemeanors and high misdemeanors or as misdemeanors and felonies in other jurisdictions.

DEFENDANT- A person formally accused of a crime.

DISMISSAL- The dropping of a case by a judge sometimes at the request of the prosecutor.

DISORDERLY PERSON OFFENSE- A minor violation of the law for which a person may be jailed for no more than six months, does not require a Grand Jury indictment and is ordinarily tried in the municipal court without a jury. This class of offense is New Jersey's equivalent of what are commonly referred to as "misdemeanors" in other jurisdictions.

GRAND JURY- A body of 23 citizens which hears evidence presented by the prosecutor to determine whether there is enough evidence to justify an indictment.

INDICTMENT- A formal criminal charge made by a Grand Jury after considering evidence presented by the prosecutor. Also called a True Bill.

NO BILL- A determination by the Grand Jury that the evidence presented by the prosecution is not sufficient to justify an indictment.

OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE- The use of force or threat of force to influence or intimidate a juror or witness. Under N.J.'s new criminal code obstruction of justice will also be referred to as "hindering apprehension or prosecution" and carries a severe penalty.

PAROLE- The early release under conditions of supervision of a person who has been convicted of a crime, sentenced to prison and has served some of that sentence.

PERJURY- Deliberate lying under oath. Perjury is a crime of the third degree punishable by a severe penalty.

PETIT OR PETTY JURY- A jury that hears the evidence presented by both prosecution and defense at a trial, comes to a decision concerning the facts and presents a verdict of guilty or not guilty.

PERSONAL RECOGNIZANCE- The method by which an arrested person is released on his/her word that he/she will return at the designated time for further court appearance.

PLEA- When the defendant is asked by the judge whether he/she wishes to admit guilt or to deny it and go to trial on the charges. The answer is the plea which may be either guilty or not guilty.

PLEA BARGAINING- A necessary aspect of the criminal justice process which promotes the speedy disposition of cases without the necessity of trial. Usually, the defendant will plead guilty to SOME of the charges with the prosecutor often recommending a certain sentence and/or the dismissal of other charges. The goal of the prosecutor in plea bargaining is to try to achieve approximately the same result as would have occurred if the defendant had been convicted after trial.

PROBATION- The release under "good behavior" of a person convicted of a crime as an alternative to imprisonment.

SUBPOENA AD TESTIFICANDUM- A written official summons to appear in court to give testimony under possible penalty of law for failure to appear.

SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM- subpoena that directs the witness to bring to court certain named documents or other evidence.

TRUE BILL- A formal criminal charge made by a Grand Jury after considering evidence presented by the prosecutor. Also called an indictment.

2C:13-5. Criminal Coercion

2C:13-5. Criminal Coercion
a. Offense defined. A person is guilty of criminal coercion if, with purpose unlawfully to restrict another's freedom of action to engage or refrain from engaging in conduct, he threatens to:

(1) Inflict bodily injury on anyone or commit any other offense;

(2) Accuse anyone of an offense;

(3) Expose any secret which would tend to subject any person to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to impair his credit or business repute;

(4) Take or withhold action as an official, or cause an official to take or withhold action;

(5) Bring about or continue a strike, boycott or other collective action, except that such a threat shall not be deemed coercive when the restriction compelled is demanded in the course of negotiation for the benefit of the group in whose interest the actor acts;

(6) Testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with respect to another's legal claim or defense; or

(7) Perform any other act which would not in itself substantially benefit the actor but which is calculated to substantially harm another person with respect to his health, safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, reputation or personal relationships.

It is an affirmative defense to prosecution based on paragraphs (2), (3), (4), (6) and (7) that the actor believed the accusation or secret to be true or the proposed official action justified and that his purpose was limited to compelling the other to behave in a way reasonably related to the circumstances which were the subject of the accusation, exposure or proposed official action, as by desisting from further misbehavior, making good a wrong done, or refraining from taking any action or responsibility for which the actor believes the other disqualified.

b. Grading. Criminal coercion is a crime of the fourth degree unless the threat is to commit a crime more serious than one of the fourth degree or the actor's purpose is criminal, in which cases the offense is a crime of the third degree.

2C:44-7. Criminal Appeals

2C:44-7. Criminal Appeals- Appellate review of actions of sentencing court

Any action taken by the court in imposing sentence shall be subject to review by an appellate court. The court shall specifically have the authority to review findings of fact by the sentencing court in support of its findings of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and to modify the defendant's sentence upon his application where such findings are not fairly supported on the record before the trial court.

Fines for Criminal Charges in New Jersey

Fines for Criminal Charges in New Jersey
Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged from criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey. The following are potential fines if found guilty in New Jersey
2C:43-3. Fines and Restitutions. A person who has been convicted of an offense may be sentenced to pay a fine, to make restitution, or both, such fine not to exceed:

a. (1) $200,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the first degree;

(2) $150,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the second degree;

b. (1) $15,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the third degree;

(2) $10,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the fourth degree;

c. $1,000.00, when the conviction is of a disorderly persons offense;

d. $500.00, when the conviction is of a petty disorderly persons offense;

e. Any higher amount equal to double the pecuniary gain to the offender or loss to the victim caused by the conduct constituting the offense by the offender. In such case the court shall make a finding as to the amount of the gain or loss, and if the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support such a finding the court may conduct a hearing upon the issue. For purposes of this section the term "gain" means the amount of money or the value of property derived by the offender and "loss" means the amount of value separated from the victim or the amount of any payment owed to the victim and avoided or evaded and includes any reasonable and necessary expense incurred by the owner in recovering or replacing lost, stolen or damaged property, or recovering any payment avoided or evaded, and, with respect to property of a research facility, includes the cost of repeating an interrupted or invalidated experiment or loss of profits. The term "victim" shall mean a person who suffers a personal physical or psychological injury or death or incurs loss of or injury to personal or real property as a result of a crime committed against that person, or in the case of a homicide, the nearest relative of the victim. The terms "gain" and "loss" shall also mean, where appropriate, the amount of any tax, fee, penalty and interest avoided, evaded, or otherwise unpaid or improperly retained or disposed of;

f. Any higher amount specifically authorized by another section of this code or any other statute;

g. Up to twice the amounts authorized in subsection a., b., c. or d. of this section, in the case of a second or subsequent conviction of any tax offense defined in Title 54 of the Revised Statutes or Title 54A of the New Jersey Statutes, as amended and supplemented, or of any offense defined in chapter 20 or 21 of this code;

h. In the case of violations of chapter 35, any higher amount equal to three times the street value of the controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog. The street value for purposes of this section shall be determined pursuant to subsection e. of N.J.S. 2C:44-2.

The restitution ordered paid to the victim shall not exceed the victim's loss, except that in any case involving the failure to pay any State tax, the amount of restitution to the State shall be the full amount of the tax avoided or evaded, including full civil penalties and interest as provided by law. In any case where the victim of the offense is any department or division of State government, the court shall order restitution to the victim. Any restitution imposed on a person shall be in addition to any fine which may be imposed pursuant to this section.

Amended 1979, c.178, s.83; 1981, c.290, s.37; 1987, c.76, s.34; 1987, c.106, s.10; 1991, c.329, s.2; 1995, c.20, s.6; 1995, c.417, s.2; 1997, c.181, s.12.

2C:43-3.1. Victim, witness, criminal disposition, and collection funds 2. a. (1) In addition to any disposition made pursuant to the provisions of N.J.S. 2C:43-2, any person convicted of a crime of violence, theft of an automobile pursuant to N.J.S. 2C:20-2, eluding a law enforcement officer pursuant to subsection b. of N.J.S. 2C:29-2 or unlawful taking of a motor vehicle pursuant to subsection b., c. or d. of N.J.S. 2C:20-10 shall be assessed at least $100.00, but not to exceed $10,000.00 for each such crime for which he was convicted which resulted in the injury or death of another person. In imposing this assessment, the court shall consider factors such as the severity of the crime, the defendant's criminal record, defendant's ability to pay and the economic impact of the assessment on the defendant's dependents.

(2) (a) In addition to any other disposition made pursuant to the provisions of N.J.S. 2C:43-2 or any other statute imposing sentences for crimes, any person convicted of any disorderly persons offense, any petty disorderly persons offense, or any crime not resulting in the injury or death of any other person shall be assessed $50.00 for each such offense or crime for which he was convicted.

(b) In addition to any other disposition made pursuant to the provisions of section 24 of P.L. 1982, c.77 (C. 2A: 4A-43) or any other statute indicating the dispositions that can be ordered for adjudications of delinquency, any juvenile adjudicated delinquent, according to the definition of "delinquency" established in section 4 of P.L. 1982, c.77 (C. 2A: 4A-23), shall be assessed at least $30.00 for each such adjudication, but not to exceed the amount which could be assessed pursuant to paragraph (1) or paragraph (2) (a) of subsection a. of this section if the offense was committed by an adult.

(c) In addition to any other assessment imposed pursuant to the provisions of R.S. 39:4-50, the provisions of section 12 of P.L. 1990, c.103 (C.39:3-10.20) relating to a violation of section 5 of P.L. 1990, c.103 (C.39:3-10.13), the provisions of section 19 of P.L. 1954, c.236 (C.12:7-34.19) or the provisions of section 3 of P.L. 1952, c.157 (C.12:7-46), any person convicted of operating a motor vehicle, commercial motor vehicle or vessel while under the influence of liquor or drugs shall be assessed $50.00.

(d) In addition to any term or condition that may be included in an agreement for supervisory treatment pursuant to N.J.S. 2C:43-13 or imposed as a term or condition of conditional discharge pursuant to N.J.S. 2C: 36A-1, a participant in either program shall be required to pay an assessment of $50.00.

(3) All assessments provided for in this section shall be collected as provided in section 3 of P.L. 1979, c.396 (C. 2C:46-4) and the court shall so order at the time of sentencing. When a defendant who is sentenced to incarceration in a State correctional facility has not, at the time of sentencing, paid an assessment for the crime for which he is being sentenced or an assessment imposed for a previous crime, the court shall specifically order the Department of Corrections to collect the assessment during the period of incarceration and to deduct the assessment from any income the inmate receives as a result of labor performed at the institution or on any work release program or from any personal account established in the institution for the benefit of the inmate. All moneys collected, whether in part or in full payment of any assessment imposed pursuant to this section, shall be forwarded monthly by the parties responsible for collection, together with a monthly accounting on forms prescribed by the Victims of Crime Compensation Board pursuant to section 19 of P.L. 1991, c.329 (C. 52:4B-8.1), to the Victims of Crime Compensation Board.

(4) The Victims of Crime Compensation Board shall forward monthly all moneys received from assessments collected pursuant to this section to the State Treasury for deposit as follows:

(a) Of moneys collected on assessments imposed pursuant to paragraph a. (1):

(i) the first $72.00 collected for deposit in the Victims of Crime Compensation Board Account,

(ii) the next $3.00 collected for deposit in the Criminal Disposition and Revenue Collection Fund,

(iii) the next $25.00 collected for deposit in the Victim Witness Advocacy Fund, and

(iv) moneys collected in excess of $100.00 for deposit in the Victims of Crime Compensation Board Account;

(b) Of moneys collected on assessments imposed pursuant to paragraph a. (2) (a), (c) or (d):

(i) the first $39.00 collected for deposit in the Victims of Crime Compensation Board Account,

(ii) the next $3.00 collected for deposit in the Criminal Disposition and Revenue Collection Fund, and

(iii) the next $8.00 collected for deposit in the Victim and Witness Advocacy Fund;

(c) Of moneys collected on assessments imposed pursuant to paragraph a. (2) (b):

(i) the first $17.00 for deposit in the Victims of Crime Compensation Board Account, and

(ii) the next $3.00 collected for deposit in the Criminal Disposition and Revenue Collection Fund, and

(iii) the next $10.00 for deposit in the Victim and Witness Advocacy Fund, and

(iv) moneys collected in excess of $30.00 for deposit in the Victims of Crime Compensation Board Account.

(5) The Victims of Crime Compensation Board shall provide the Attorney General with a monthly accounting of moneys received, deposited and identified as receivable, on forms prescribed pursuant to section 19 of P.L. 1991, c.329 (C. 52:4B-8.1).

(6) (a) The Victims of Crime Compensation Board Account shall be a separate, non lapsing, revolving account that shall be administered by the Victims of Crime Compensation Board. All moneys deposited in that Account shall be used in satisfying claims pursuant to the provisions of the "Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of 1971," P.L. 1971, c.317 (C. 52:4B-1 et seq.) and for related administrative costs.

(b) The Criminal Disposition and Revenue Collection Fund shall be a separate, non lapsing, revolving account that shall be administered by the Victims of Crime Compensation Board. All moneys deposited in that Fund shall be used as provided in section 19 of P.L. 1991, c.329 (C. 52:4B-8.1).

(c) The Victim and Witness Advocacy Fund shall be a separate, non lapsing, revolving fund and shall be administered by the Division of Criminal Justice, Department of Law and Public Safety and all moneys deposited in that Fund pursuant to this section shall be used for the benefit of victims and witnesses of crime as provided in section 20 of P.L. 1991, c.329 (C. 52:4B-43.1) and for related administrative costs.

b. (Deleted by amendment, P.L. 1991, c.329).

c. (Deleted by amendment, P.L. 1991, c.329).

d. (Deleted by amendment, P.L. 1991, c.329).

L.1979, c.396, s.2; amended 1982, c.164, s.1; 1985, c.251, s.1; 1985,c.406; 1987, c.106, s.11; 1990, c.64, s.1; 1991, c.329, s.3; 1995, c.135, s.1.

2C:43-3.2. Assessments for Safe Neighborhoods Services 11. a. (1) In addition to any other fine, fee or assessment imposed, any person convicted of a crime, disorderly or petty disorderly persons offense or violation of R.S. 39:4-50 shall be assessed $75 for each conviction.

(2) In addition to any term or condition that may be included in an agreement for supervisory treatment pursuant to N.J.S. 2C:43-13 or imposed as a term or condition of conditional discharge pursuant to section 3 of P.L. 1987, c.106 (C. 2C: 36A-1), a participant in either program shall be required to pay an assessment of $75.

b. All assessments provided for in this section shall be collected as provided for collection of fines and restitutions in section 3 of P.L. 1979, c.396 (C. 2C:46-4) and shall be forwarded to the Department of the Treasury as provided in subsection c. of this section.

c. All money collected pursuant to this section shall be forwarded to the Department of the Treasury to be deposited into the Safe Neighborhoods Services Fund created by section 5 of this act.

L.1993, c.220, s.11.

2C:43-3.3. Additional penalties for persons convicted of crime deposited in "Law Enforcement Officers Training and Equipment Fund" 9. a. In addition to any disposition made pursuant to the provisions of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes, any person convicted of a crime shall be assessed a penalty of $30.

b. In addition to any other disposition made pursuant to the provisions of section 24 of P.L. 1982, c.77 (C. 2A:4A-43) or any other statute indicating the dispositions that may be ordered for adjudications of delinquency, a juvenile adjudicated delinquent for an offense which if committed by an adult would be a crime shall be assessed a penalty of $15.

c. The penalties assessed under subsections a. and b. of this section shall be collected as provided for the collection of fines and restitution in section 3 of P.L. 1979, c.396 (C. 2C:46-4) and forwarded to the State Treasury for deposit in a separate account to be known as the "Law Enforcement Officers Training and Equipment Fund." The penalty assessed in this section shall be collected only after a penalty assessed in section 2 of P.L. 1979, c.396 (C. 2C:43-3.1) and any restitution ordered is collected.

The fund shall be used to support the development and provision of basic and in-service training courses for law enforcement officers by police training schools approved pursuant to P.L. 1961, c.56 (C. 52:17B-66 et seq.). In addition, the fund shall also be used to enable police training schools to purchase equipment needed for the training of law enforcement officers. Distributions from the fund shall only be made directly to such approved schools.

d. The Police Training Commission in the Department of Law and Public Safety shall be responsible for the administration and distribution of the fund pursuant to its authority under section 6 of P.L. 1961, c.56 (C. 52:17B-71).

e. An adult prisoner of a State correctional institution who does not pay the penalty imposed pursuant to this section shall have the penalty deducted from any income the inmate receives as a result of labor performed at the institution or any type of work release program. If any person, including an inmate, fails to pay the penalty imposed pursuant to this section, the court may order the suspension of the person's driver's license or nonresident reciprocity privilege, or prohibit the person from receiving or obtaining a license until the assessment is paid. The court shall notify the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles of such an action. Prior to any action being taken pursuant to this subsection, the person shall be given notice and a hearing before the court to contest the charge of the failure to pay the assessment.

L.1996, c.115, s.9.

2C:43-3.4 Restitution for extradition costs.

4. In addition to any fine or restitution authorized by N.J.S. 2C:43-3, the court may sentence a defendant to make restitution for costs incurred by any law enforcement entity in extraditing the defendant from another jurisdiction if the court finds that, at the time of the extradition, the defendant was located in the other jurisdiction in order to avoid prosecution for a crime committed in this State or service of a criminal sentence imposed by a court of this State.

L.1997, c.253, s.4.

2C:21-6 Credit Cards

2C:21-6 Credit Cards
[a. Definitions. As used in this section:
(1) "Cardholder" means the person or organization named on the face of a credit card to whom or for whose benefit the credit card is issued by an issuer.

(2) "Credit card" means any tangible or intangible instrument or device issued with or without fee by an issuer that can be used, alone or in connection with another means of account access, in obtaining money, goods, services or anything else of value on credit, including credit cards, credit plates, account numbers, or any other means of account access.

(3) "Expired credit card" means a credit card which is no longer valid because the term shown either on it or on documentation provided to the cardholder by the issuer has elapsed.

4) "Issuer" means the business organization or financial institution which issues a credit card or its duly authorized agent.

(5) "Receives" or "receiving" means acquiring possession or control or accepting a credit card as security for a loan.

(6) "Revoked credit card" means a credit card which is no longer valid because permission to use it has been suspended or terminated by the issuer.

b. False statements made in procuring issuance of credit card. A person who makes or causes to be made, either directly or indirectly, any false statement in writing, knowing it to be false and with intent that it be relied on, respecting his identity or that of any other person, firm or corporation, or his financial condition or that of any other person, firm or corporation, for the purpose of procuring the issuance of a credit card is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.

c. Credit card theft.

(1) A person who takes or obtains a credit card from the person, possession, custody or control of another without the cardholder's consent or who, with knowledge that it has been so taken, receives the credit card with intent to use it or to sell it, or to transfer it to a person other than the issuer or the cardholder is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree. Taking a credit card without consent includes obtaining it by any conduct defined and prescribed in Chapter 20 of this title, Theft and Related Offenses.

A person who has in his possession or under his control (a) credit cards issued in the names of two or more other persons or, (b) two or more stolen credit cards is presumed to have violated this paragraph.

(2) A person who receives a credit card that he knows to have been lost, mislaid, or delivered under a mistake as to the identity or address of the cardholder, and who retains possession with intent to use it or to sell it or to transfer it to a person other than the issuer or the cardholder is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.

(3) A person other than the issuer who sells a credit card or a person who buys a credit card from a person other than the issuer is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.

(4) A person who, with intent to defraud the issuer, a person or organization providing money, goods, services or anything else of value, or any other person, obtains control over a credit card as security for debt is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.

(5) A person who, with intent to defraud a purported issuer, a person or organization providing money, goods, services or anything else of value, or any other person, falsely makes or falsely embosses a purported credit card or utters such a credit card is guilty of a third degree offense. A person other than the purported issuer who possesses two or more credit cards which are falsely made or falsely embossed is presumed to have violated this paragraph. A person "falsely makes" a credit card when he makes or draws, in whole or in part, a device or instrument which purports to be the credit card of a named issuer but which is not such a credit card because the issuer did not authorize the making or drawing, or alters a credit card which was validly issued. A person "falsely embosses" a credit card when, without the authorization of the named issuer, he completes a credit card by adding any of the matter, other than the signature of the cardholder, which an issuer requires to appear on the credit card before it can be used by a cardholder.

(6) A person other than the cardholder or a person authorized by him who, with intent to defraud the issuer, or a person or organization providing money, goods, services or anything else of value, or any other person, signs a credit card, is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree. A person who possesses two or more credit cards which are so signed is presumed to have violated this paragraph.

d. Intent of cardholder to defraud; penalties; knowledge of revocation. A person, who, with intent to defraud the issuer, a person or organization providing money, goods, services or anything else of value, or any other person, (1) uses for the purpose of obtaining money, goods, services or anything else of value a credit card obtained or retained in violation of subsection c. of this section or a credit card which he knows is forged, expired or revoked, or (2) obtains money, goods, services or anything else of value by representing without the consent of the cardholder that he is the holder of a specified card or by representing that he is the holder of a card and such card has not in fact been issued, is guilty of a crime of the third degree. Knowledge of revocation shall be presumed to have been received by a cardholder four days after it has been mailed to him at the address set forth on the credit card or at his last known address by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, and, if the address is more than 500 miles from the place of mailing, by air mail. If the address is located outside the United States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Canal Zone and Canada, notice shall be presumed to have been received 10 days after mailing by registered or certified mail.

e. Intent to defraud by person authorized to furnish money, goods, or services; penalties.

(1) A person who is authorized by an issuer to furnish money, goods, services or anything else of value upon presentation of a credit card by the cardholder, or any agent or employees of such person, who, with intent to defraud the issuer or the cardholder, furnishes money, goods, services or anything else of value upon presentation of a credit card obtained or retained in violation of subsection c. of this section or a credit card which he knows is forged, expired or revoked violates this paragraph and is guilty of a crime of the third degree.

(2) A person who is authorized by an issuer to furnish money, goods, services or anything else of value upon presentation of a credit card by the cardholder, fails to furnish money, goods, services or anything else of value which he represents in writing to the issuer that he has furnished is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.

f. Incomplete credit cards; intent to complete without consent. A person other than the cardholder possessing two or more incomplete credit cards, with intent to complete them without the consent of the issuer or a person possessing, with knowledge of its character, machinery, plates or any other contrivance designed to reproduce instruments purporting to be the credit cards of an issuer who has not consented to the preparation of such credit cards, is guilty of a crime of the third degree. A credit card is "incomplete" if part of the matter other than the signature of the cardholder, which an issuer requires to appear on the credit card, before it can be used by a cardholder, has not yet been stamped, embossed, imprinted or written on it.

g. Receiving anything of value knowing or believing that it was obtained in violation of subsection d. of N.J.S.2C:21-6. A person who receives money, goods, services or anything else of value obtained in violation of subsection d. of this section, knowing or believing that it was so obtained is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree. A person who obtains, at a discount price a ticket issued by an airline, railroad, steamship or other transportation company which was acquired in violation of subsection d. of this section without reasonable inquiry to ascertain that the person from whom it was obtained had a legal right to possess it shall be presumed to know that such ticket was acquired under circumstances constituting a violation of subsection d. of this section.

h. Fraudulent use of credit cards.

A person who knowingly uses any counterfeit, fictitious, altered, forged, lost, stolen or fraudulently obtained credit card to obtain money, goods or services, or anything else of value; or who, with unlawful or fraudulent intent, furnishes, acquires, or uses any actual or fictitious credit card, whether alone or together with names of credit cardholders, or other information pertaining to a credit card account in any form, is guilty of a crime of the third degree.

L.1978, c.95; amended 1979,c.178,s.36; 1984,c.119; 1991,c.122,s.1. ]

2C:29-9b Contempt of Domestic Violence Restraining Order

2C:29-9b Contempt of Domestic Violence Restraining Order
b. Except as provided below, a person is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree if that person purposely or knowingly violates any provision in an order entered under the provisions of the "Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991," P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-17 et al.) or an order entered under the provisions of a substantially similar statute under the laws of another state or the United States when the conduct which constitutes the violation could also constitute a crime or a disorderly persons offense. In all other cases a person is guilty of a disorderly persons offense if that person knowingly violates an order entered under the provisions of this act or an order entered under the provisions of a substantially similar statute under the laws of another state or the United States. Orders entered pursuant to paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (8) and (9) of subsection b. of section 13 of P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-29) or substantially similar orders entered under the laws of another state or the United States shall be excluded from the provisions of this subsection.
.As used in this subsection, "state" means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The term includes an Indian tribe or band, or Alaskan native village, which is recognized by a federal law or formally acknowledged by a state.

L.1981, c.290, s.34; amended 1987, c.356, s.9; 1988, c.28, s.3; 1991, c.261, s.18; 2005, c.333.

Contempt of Court in New Jersey

Contempt of Court in New Jersey
The judge must follow the following Rules and Statutes before fining someone for contempt of court:
Rule 1:10-1. Summary Contempt in Presence of Court

A judge conducting a judicial proceeding may adjudicate contempt summarily without an order to show cause if:

(a) the conduct has obstructed, or if continued would obstruct, the proceeding;

(b) the conduct occurred in the actual presence of the judge, and was actually seen or heard by the judge;

(c) the character of the conduct or its continuation after an appropriate warning unmistakably demonstrates its willfulness;

(d) immediate adjudication is necessary to permit the proceeding to continue in an orderly and proper manner; and

(e) the judge has afforded the alleged contemnor an immediate opportunity to respond.

The order of contempt shall recite the facts and contain a certification by the judge that he or she saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that the contemnor was willfully contumacious. Punishment may be determined forthwith or deferred. Execution of sentence shall be stayed for five days following imposition and, if an appeal is taken, during the pendency of the appeal, provided, however, that the judge may require bail if reasonably necessary to assure the contemnor's appearance.

Rule 1:10-2. Summary Contempt Proceedings on Order to Show Cause or Order for Arrest

(a) Institution of Proceedings. Every summary proceeding to punish for contempt other than proceedings under R. 1:10-1 shall be on notice and instituted only by the court upon an order for arrest or an order to show cause specifying the acts or omissions alleged to have been contumacious. The proceedings shall be captioned "In the Matter of ______ Charged with Contempt of Court."

(b) Release Pending Hearings. A person charged with contempt under R. 1:10-2 shall be released on his or her own recognizance pending the hearing unless the judge determines that bail is reasonably necessary to assure appearance. The amount and sufficiency of bail shall be reviewable by a single judge of the Appellate Division.

(c) Prosecution and Trial. A proceeding under R. 1:10-2 may be prosecuted on behalf of the court only by the Attorney General, the County Prosecutor of the county or, where the court for good cause designates an attorney, then by the attorney so designated. The matter shall not be heard by the judge who instituted the prosecution if the appearance of objectivity requires trial by another judge. Unless there is a right to a trial by jury, the court in its discretion may try the matter without a jury. If there is an adjudication of contempt, the provisions of R. 1:10-1 as to stay of execution of sentence shall apply.

Rule 1:10-3. Relief to Litigant

Notwithstanding that an act or omission may also constitute a contempt of court, a litigant in any action may seek relief by application in the action. A judge shall not be disqualified because he or she signed the order sought to be enforced. If an order entered on such an application provides for commitment, it shall specify the terms of release provided, however, that no order for commitment shall be entered to enforce a judgment or order exclusively for the payment of money, except for orders and judgments based on a claim for equitable relief including orders and judgments of the Family Part and except if a judgment creditor demonstrates to the court that the judgment debtor has assets that have been secreted or otherwise placed beyond the reach of execution. The court in its discretion may make an allowance for counsel fees to be paid by any party to the action to a party accorded relief under this rule. In family actions, the court may also grant additional remedies as provided by R. 5:3-7. An application by a litigant may be tried with a proceeding under R. 1:10-2(a) only with the consent of all parties and subject to the provisions of R. 1:10-2(c).

The Supreme Court also issue a directive to Judges regarding the use of Rule 1:10-1 (Contempt in Presence of Court) Directive #8-99 In 1994, the Supreme Court amended Rule 1:10-1 to detail the basis for and procedures governing the use of the summary contempt power. The Rule, as amended, provides as follows: A judge conducting a judicial proceeding may adjudicate contempt summarily without an order to show cause if: (a) the conduct has obstructed, or if continued would obstruct the proceeding; (b) the conduct occurred in the actual presence of the judge, and was actually seen or heard by the judge; (c) the character of the conduct or its continuation after an appropriate warning unmistakably demonstrates its willfulness; (d) immediate adjudication is necessary to permit the proceeding to continue in an orderly and proper manner; and (e) the judge has afforded the alleged contemnor an immediate opportunity to respond. The order of contempt shall recite the facts and contain a certification by the judge that he or she saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that the contemnor was willfully contumacious. Punishment may be determined forthwith or deferred. Execution of sentence shall be stayed for five days following imposition and, if an appeal is taken, during the pendency of the appeal, provided, however, that the judge may require bail if reasonably necessary to assure the contemnor's appearance. All of the requirements of paragraphs (a) through (e) must be met before a judge uses the summary contempt power. In particular, you will note that the conduct must have obstructed the proceeding and have been Actually seen or heard by the judge. The Rule also provides for a warning and an opportunity for the party to respond, all of which contemplates that the offending party is actually in the presence of the judge when the conduct occurs. The significant changes to Rule 1:10-1 were the result of a report by a special Summary Contempt Subcommittee of the Civil Practice Committee. That Committee's recommendations to the Supreme Court and the Court's adoption of those recommendations make it abundantly clear that it is inappropriate for judges to use the summary contempt power when confronted by offensive comments written in letters, on checks, or on envelopes. If threatening language is used in a written communication, the court should follow the established policy contained in the 1988 Guidelines on:

Threats to Members of the Judiciary, (copy attached) rather than resorting to the use of Rule 1:10-1. (For a discussion of the Supreme Court's concerns that pre-dated the Committee's Report, see Matter of Daniels, 118 N.J. 51, 60 (1990).) Courts and court staff are obliged to process written communications, including negotiable instruments, from litigants who gratuitously include profane and scurrilous comments. This does not mean that such submissions need always go unremarked. In an egregious case, a carefully measured written response may be made. The content of such a response cannot, however, implicate the powers provided under Rule 1:10-1.

CONTEMPT (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9) The following is the Jury charge on Criminal Contempt: The defendant is charged with committing the crime of contempt. The Statutes of New Jersey describe the crime of "contempt" as follows: A person is guilty of a crime . . . if he purposely or knowingly disobeys a judicial order or hinders, obstructs or impedes the effectuation of a judicial order or the exercise of jurisdiction over any person, thing or controversy by a Court, administrative body or investigative entity. In order for the defendant to be found guilty of contempt, you must find each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: [The Judge will charge any or all of the following alternatives as appropriate.] Alternative 1: (Charge in the case of disobedience of an order.) 1. An Order of the Court had been entered. 2. That the defendant knew of the existence of the Order. 3. That the defendant purposely or knowingly disobeyed the Order. A person has disobeyed a judicial order when that person has, with knowledge of the existence of the order, purposely or knowingly refused or failed to comply with an order as entered by the Court which applies to (him/her). A court order may either be written or oral. In the case at hand the proofs indicate that the order which the defendant has been charged with disobeying was written/oral.

OR Alternative 2: Charge in the case of hindering, obstructing or impeding the effectuation of a judicial order. 1. An order of the Court had been entered. 2. That the defendant knew of the existence of the Order. 3. The defendant purposely or knowingly hindered, obstructed or impeded the fulfillment of the judicial order

KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC ATTORNEY AT LAW 2053 Woodbridge Ave. Edison, NJ 08817 (Phone) 732-572-0500 (Fax) 732-572-0030

TRIAL AND LITIGATION EXPERIENCE In his private practice, he has devoted a substantial portion of his professional time to the preparation and trial of litigated matters. He appears in Courts throughout New Jersey several times each week on many personal injury matters, Criminal and Municipal/ traffic Court trials, Probate hearings, and contested administrative law hearings.

Mr. Vercammen served as the Prosecutor for the Township of Cranbury, Middlesex County and was involved in trials on a weekly basis. He also argued all pre-trial motions and post-trial applications on behalf of the State of New Jersey.

He has also served as a Special Acting Prosecutor in Woodbridge, Perth Amboy, Berkeley Heights, Carteret, East Brunswick, Jamesburg, South Brunswick, South River and South Plainfield for conflict cases. Since 1989, he has personally handled hundreds of criminal and motor vehicle matters as a Prosecutor and now as defense counsel and has had substantial success.

Previously, Mr. Vercammen was Public Defender for the Township of Edison and Borough of Metuchen and a Designated Counsel for the Middlesex County Public Defender's Office. He represented indigent individuals facing consequences of magnitude. He was in Court trying cases and making motions in difficult criminal and DWI matters. Every case he personally handled and prepared.

His resume sets forth the numerous bar associations and activities which demonstrate his commitment to the legal profession and providing quality representation to clients.

Since 1985, his primary concentration has been on litigation matters. Mr. Vercammen gained other legal experiences as the Confidential Law Clerk to the Court of Appeals of Maryland (Supreme Court) with the Delaware County, PA District Attorney Office handling Probable Cause Hearings, Middlesex County Probation Department as a Probation Officer, and an Executive Assistant to Scranton District Magistrate, Thomas Hart, in Scranton, PA.

CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF DRUGS IN A CRIMINAL CASE

CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF DRUGS IN A CRIMINAL CASE
"For this offense the state must prove three material elements. First, it must be proved that the item is a controlled dangerous substance. Second, it must be proved that defendant either obtained or possessed the substance. Third it must be proved that defendant acted knowingly or intentionally." 33 N.J. Practice §521 p.475.
The state must prove that the defendant acted knowingly or intentionally. The state must prove that defendant knew the nature and character of the item, and it must prove that James's purpose in possessing the substance was to distribute it. 33 N.J. Practice §520 p.471 (1982).

Possession is the intentional control of an item accompanied by an awareness of its character. Constructive possession is when the defendant is aware of the substance and has an intention to exercise control over the substance. State v. Brown, 67 N.J. Super. 450, 455, 171 A. 2d 15, 18 (App. Div. 1961).

Joint possession is when people knowingly share control over the article. State v. Rajnai, 132 N.J. Super. 530, 536, 334 A. 2d 364, 367 (App. Div. 1975).

It is an offense to knowingly or intentionally obtain or possess a controlled dangerous substance. N.J.S.A. 24:21-20a. "The state must prove knowledge or intent on the part of the defendant. Knowledge means that the defendant was aware of the existence of the object and was aware of its character. Intent means it was the defendant's purpose to obtain or possess the item while being aware of its character. State v. McMenamin, 133 N.J. Super. 521, 524, 337 A. 2d 630, 631 (App. Div. 1975); State v. Brown, 67 N.J. Super. 450, 455, 171 A. 2d 15, 18 (App. Div. 1961).

Mere presence in a premises with other persons where controlled dangerous substances are found is not sufficient to justify an inference that a particular defendant was in sole or joint possession of the substance. State v. Sapp, 71 N.J. 476, 477, 366 A. 2d 334, 335 (1976), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 80 N.J. 587, 404 A. 2d 1111 (1979).

The state must prove that the defendant was aware of the character of the substance to prove that the defendant acted with knowledge. State v. Reed, 34 N.J. 554, 557, 170 A. 2d 419, 421 (1961); State v. Rajnai, 132 N.J. Super. 530, 536, 334 A. 2d 364, 367 (App. Div. 1975).

2C:5-2. Conspiracy Conspiracy

2C:5-2. Conspiracy Conspiracy. a. Definition of conspiracy. A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he:
(1) Agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or

(2) Agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.

b. Scope of conspiratorial relationship. If a person guilty of conspiracy, as defined by subsection a. of this section, knows that a person with whom he conspires to commit a crime has conspired with another person or persons to commit the same crime, he is guilty of conspiring with such other person or persons, whether or not he knows their identity, to commit such crime.

c. Conspiracy with multiple objectives. If a person conspires to commit a number of crimes, he is guilty of only one conspiracy so long as such multiple crimes are the object of the same agreement or continuous conspiratorial relationship. It shall not be a defense to a charge under this section that one or more of the objectives of the conspiracy was not criminal; provided that one or more of its objectives or the means of promoting or facilitating an objective of the conspiracy is criminal.

d. Overt act. No person may be convicted of conspiracy to commit a crime other than a crime of the first or second degree or distribution or possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog as defined in chapter 35 of this title, unless an overt act in pursuance of such conspiracy is proved to have been done by him or by a person with whom he conspired.

e. Renunciation of purpose. It is an affirmative defense which the actor must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he, after conspiring to commit a crime, informed the authority of the existence of the conspiracy and his participation therein, and thwarted or caused to be thwarted the commission of any offense in furtherance of the conspiracy, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of criminal purpose as defined in 2C:5-1d.; provided, however, that an attempt as defined in 2C:5-1 shall not be considered an offense for purposes of renunciation under this subsection.

f. Duration of conspiracy. For the purpose of section 2C:1-6d.:

(1) Conspiracy is a continuing course of conduct which terminates when the crime or crimes which are its object are committed or the agreement that they be committed is abandoned by the defendant and by those with whom he conspired; and

(2) Such abandonment is presumed with respect to a crime other than one of the first or second degree if neither the defendant nor anyone with whom he conspired does any overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy during the applicable period of limitation; and

(3) If an individual abandons the agreement, the conspiracy is terminated as to him only if and when he advises those with whom he conspired of his abandonment or he informs the law enforcement authorities of the existence of the conspiracy and of his participation therein.

g. Leader of organized crime. A person is a leader of organized crime if he purposefully conspires with others as an organizer, supervisor or manager, to commit a continuing series of crimes which constitute a pattern of racketeering activity under the provisions of N.J.S. 2C:41-1, provided, however, that notwithstanding 2C:1-8a. (2), a conviction of leader of organized crime shall not merge with the conviction of any other crime which constitutes racketeering activity under 2C:41-1.

L. 1978, c. 95; amended by L. 1979, c. 178, s. 17; 1981, c. 167, s. 3; 1981, c. 290, s. 10; 1981, c. 511, s. 1; 1987, c. 106, s. 4.

If someone is charged with CONSPIRACY (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2), the Judge will read the following instructions and law to the jury:

Under the __________ count of the indictment the defendant(s) is (are) charged with the crime of conspiracy to commit _____________. N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 provides as follows:

A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he/she:

(SELECT APPROPRIATE SECTION)

(1) Agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or

(2) Agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.

A conspiracy to commit the crime of ________________is a crime in itself separate and distinct from the crime of _______________. In other words, a defendant may be found guilty of the crime of conspiracy regardless of whether that defendant is guilty or not guilty of the crime of _____________________. In order for you to find a defendant guilty of the crime of conspiracy, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following elements:

(1) That the defendant agreed with another person or persons that they or one or more of them would engage in conduct which constitutes a crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime;

OR

That the defendant agreed to aid another person or persons in the planning or commission of a crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.

(2) That the defendant's purpose was to promote or facilitate the commission of the crime of (Identify substantive offense).

A person acts purposely with respect to the nature of (his/her) conduct or a result thereof, if it is (his/her) conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or cause such a result. A person acts purposely with respect to attendant circumstances if (he/she) is aware of the existence of such circumstances or (he/she) believes or hopes that they exist.

(CHARGE THE FOLLOWING FOR CRIMES OF THE THIRD AND FOURTH DEGREE - EXCEPT FOR CRIMES ALLEGING DISTRIBUTION OR POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE CDS OR CDS ANALOG)1

(3) That the defendant or a person with whom he/she conspired did an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy. An overt act is any act in pursuance of the conspiracy.2

In order to find a defendant guilty of the crime of conspiracy, the State does not have to prove that (he/she) actually committed the crime of (Identify substantive offense). However, to decide whether the State has proven the crime of conspiracy you must understand what constitutes the crime of

(IF NOT PREVIOUSLY STATED GIVE MODEL CHARGE

FOR THE UNDERLYING OFFENSE)

A conspiracy may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. It is not essential that there be direct contact among all of the conspirators or that they enter the agreement at the same time. If the defendant is aware that any person (he/she) conspired with also conspired with others to commit the same crime, the defendant is guilty of conspiring with the others. He/she need not be aware of their identity. Mere association, acquaintance, or family relationship with an alleged conspirator is not enough to establish a defendant's guilt of conspiracy. Nor is mere awareness of the conspiracy. Nor would it be sufficient for the State to prove only that the defendant met with others, or that they discussed names and interests in common. However, any of these factors, if present, may be taken into consideration along with all other relevant evidence in your deliberations.

You have to decide whether the defendant's purpose was that he/she or a person with whom he/she was conspiring would commit the crime of _________________. For him/her to be found guilty of conspiracy, the State has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that when he/she agreed it was his/her conscious object or purpose to promote or make it easier to commit the crime(s) or (Identify substantive offense). The nature of the purpose with which the defendant acted is a question of fact for you the jury to decide. Purpose is a condition of the mind which cannot be seen and can only be determined by inferences from conduct, words or acts. It is not necessary for the State to produce a witness or witnesses who could testify that the defendant stated, for example, that he/she acted with a specific purpose. It is within your power to find that proof of purpose has been furnished beyond a reasonable doubt by inferences which may arise from the nature of the acts and the surrounding circumstances. It also makes no difference what the person or persons with whom the defendant actually conspired had in mind, so long as the defendant believed that he/she was furthering the commission of the crime of ____________________________.

(CHARGE THE FOLLOWING ONLY FOR THOSE CRIMES FOR WHICH IT IS NECESSARY TO PROVE OVERT ACTS, NAMELY ALL THIRD AND FOURTH DEGREE CRIMES EXCEPT THOSE ALLEGING DISTRIBUTION OR POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE CDS OR CDS ANALOG)

I have already explained that to find the defendant guilty of conspiracy you have to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he/she agreed with somebody in the manner and with the purpose I described. In addition, for this type of conspiracy, one of the conspirators must have done at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, that is, any act directed toward the objective of committing the crime of (Identify substantive offense).3 The State is not required to prove an overt act by every conspirator. The State is only obligated to prove one overt act by any conspirator.

WHERE APPLICABLE, SET FORTH THE OVERT ACTS IN EVIDENCE.

In order to convict you have to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the State has proven an overt act by a conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy.4

In summary, the State must prove the following elements:

(1) That the defendant agreed with another person or persons that they or one or more of them would engage in conduct which constitutes a crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime;

OR

That the defendant agreed to aid another person or persons in the planning or commission of a crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit a crime.

(2) That defendant's purpose was to promote or facilitate the commission of the crime of ___________________________.

(CHARGE THIRD ELEMENT BELOW - ONLY FOR CRIMES OF THE THIRD AND FOURTH DEGREE -- EXCEPT FOR CRIMES ALLEGING DISTRIBUTION OR POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE CDS OR CDS ANALOG)

(3) That defendant or a person with whom he/she conspired did an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy.

If, after consideration of all the evidence you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the State has proven all of these elements, then you must find the defendant guilty of the crime of conspiracy. On the other hand, if you find that the State has failed to prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more of these elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of the crime of conspiracy.

[CHARGE THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH WHEN APPROPRIATE]

Each offense and each defendant in this indictment should be considered by you separately. The fact that you may find a particular defendant guilty or not guilty of a particular crime should not control your verdict as to any other offense charged against that defendant, and it should not control your verdict as to the charges against any other defendant.

1 See State v. Carbone, 10 N.J. 329 (1952).

2 Under 2C:2-1(b) an omission may under certain circumstances constitute an act.

3 See footnote 2.

4 Where appropriate charge Conspiracy-Renunciation (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2e) - See Model Charge.

Attorney- Client Confidential Relationship

Attorney- Client Confidential Relationship
First, I want to thank our clients for giving me the
opportunity to assist them in their case. I am a legal professional and
I have great pride and confidence in the legal services that I perform
for clients during our relationship as attorney-client. If you have
concerns about your case, please call my office.
We feel that this case is extremely important-not only to
you, but to this office as well. This is not simply a matter of
obtaining just compensation for you, although that is very important; we
take professional pride in guiding our clients carefully through
difficult times to a satisfactory conclusion of their cases.
Confidential information includes, but is not limited to all
information gained in the professional relationship that the client has
requested be held secret or the disclosure of which would be
embarrassing or possibly detrimental to the client. This includes not
only the matter revealed by the client to us, but also the identity of
what clients have been in to interview.
New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct

RPC 1.6 Confidentiality of Information

(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to
representation of a client unless the client consents after
consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in
order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in
paragraphs (b) and (c).

Monday, June 29, 2009

2C: 36A-1. Conditional Discharge

2C: 36A-1. Conditional discharge for certain first offenses; expunging of records. a. Whenever any person who has not previously been convicted of any offense under section 20 of P.L. 1970, c.226 (C.24:21-20), or a disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense defined in chapter 35 or 36 of this title or, subsequent to the effective date of this title, under any law of the United States, this State or any other state relating to marijuana, or stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic drugs, is charged with or convicted of any disorderly persons offense or petty disorderly persons offense under chapter 35 or 36 of this title, the court upon notice to the prosecutor and subject to subsection c. of this section, may on motion of the defendant or the court:

(1) Suspend further proceedings and with the consent of the person after reference to the State Bureau of Identification criminal history record information files, place him under supervisory treatment upon such reasonable terms and conditions as it may require; or

(2) After plea of guilty or finding of guilty, and without entering a judgment of conviction, and with the consent of the person after proper reference to the State Bureau of Identification criminal history record information files, place him on supervisory treatment upon reasonable terms and conditions as it may require, or as otherwise provided by law.

b. In no event shall the court require as a term or condition of supervisory treatment under this section, referral to any residential treatment facility for a period exceeding the maximum period of confinement prescribed by law for the offense for which the individual has been charged or convicted, nor shall any term of supervisory treatment imposed under this subsection exceed a period of three years. If a person is placed under supervisory treatment under this section after a plea of guilty or finding of guilt, the court as a term and condition of supervisory treatment shall suspend the person's driving privileges for a period to be fixed by the court at not less than six months or more than two years. In the case of a person who at the time of placement under supervisory treatment under this section is less than 17 years of age, the period of suspension of driving privileges authorized herein, including a suspension of the privilege of operating a motorized bicycle, shall commence on the day the person is placed on supervisory treatment and shall run for a period as fixed by the court of not less than six months or more than two years after the day the person reaches the age of 17 years.

If the driving privilege of a person is under revocation, suspension, or postponement for a violation of this title or Title 39 of the Revised Statutes at the time of the person's placement on supervisory treatment under this section, the revocation, suspension or postponement period imposed herein shall commence as of the date of the termination of the existing revocation, suspension or postponement. The court which places a person on supervisory treatment under this section shall collect and forward the person's driver's license to the Division of Motor Vehicles and file an appropriate report with the division in accordance with the procedure set forth in N.J.S. 2C:35-16. The court shall also inform the person of the penalties for operating a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension or postponement as required in N.J.S. 2C:35-16.

Upon violation of a term or condition of supervisory treatment the court may enter a judgment of conviction and proceed as otherwise provided, or where there has been no plea of guilty or finding of guilty, resume proceedings. Upon fulfillment of the terms and conditions of supervisory treatment the court shall terminate the supervisory treatment and dismiss the proceedings against him. Termination of supervisory treatment and dismissal under this section shall be without court adjudication of guilt and shall not be deemed a conviction for purposes of disqualifications or disabilities, if any, imposed by law upon conviction of a crime or disorderly persons offense but shall be reported by the clerk of the court to the State Bureau of Identification criminal history record information files. Termination of supervisory treatment and dismissal under this section may occur only once with respect to any person. Imposition of supervisory treatment under this section shall not be deemed a conviction for the purposes of determining whether a second or subsequent offense has occurred under section 29 of P.L. 1970, c.226 (C.24:21-29), chapter 35 or 36 of this title or any law of this State.

c. Proceedings under this section shall not be available to any defendant unless the court in its discretion concludes that:

(1) The defendant's continued presence in the community, or in a civil treatment center or program, will not pose a danger to the community; or

(2) That the terms and conditions of supervisory treatment will be adequate to protect the public and will benefit the defendant by serving to correct any dependence on or use of controlled substances which he may manifest; and

(3) The person has not previously received supervisory treatment under section 27 of P.L. 1970, c.226 (C.24:21-27), N.J.S. 2C:43-12, or the provisions of this chapter.

d. A person seeking conditional discharge pursuant to this section shall pay to the court a fee of $75.00. The court shall forward all money collected under this subsection to the treasurer of the county in which the court is located. This money shall be used to defray the cost of juror compensation within that county. A person may apply for a waiver of this fee, by reason of poverty, pursuant to the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey. Of the moneys collected under this subsection, $30.00 of each fee shall be deposited in the temporary reserve fund created by section 25 of P.L. 1993, c.275. After December 31, 1994, the $75.00 fee shall be paid to the court, for use by the State.

Amended 1988, c.44, s.12; 1993, c.275, s.14.

2C:11A-1 Cloning of human being illegal

2C:11A-1 Cloning of human being illegal

First degree crime; definition.

3.A person who knowingly engages or assists, directly or indirectly, in the cloning of a human being is guilty of a crime of the first degree.

As used in this section, "cloning of a human being" means the replication of a human individual by cultivating a cell with genetic material through the egg, embryo, fetal and newborn stages into a new human individual.

L.2003,c.203,s.3.

Client Testimonials

When asked if they would use our firm again if they had another legal problem, our clients have said...

"Yes, this is the third time to date." - Roseanne

"...I would use your law firm in a heartbeat." - Lawrence

"...{I am} very satisfied and you were very informative and
professional."- Joe

"...everything was done in a professional manner." - Edna

"Mr. Vercammen's knowledge of the law and prior experience as a Middlesex County Prosecutor brought a high level of credibility that furthered a quick and favorable outcome. I was impressed by his services as well as the manner in which he conducted himself. I would not hesitate to recommend him or use him again." - Rose

"I would and have already mentioned to many friends what great service I received!" - Joseph

"Most definitely. {The} staff and Mr. Vercammen made me feel confident and at ease. This is what I look for when I need to make important decisions." - Prior Client

"Yes, I was completely satisfied with my representation and extremely happy with the no-points judgment." - Susan

"Yes, willingly. From the day I called regarding my traffic ticket to the date of the court case, I was given due respect." - Prior Client

"Yes, I most certainly would. Mr. Vercammen has always done the best job he could do." - Arthur

"Absolutely -- and being in recovery (thanks to Ken's suggestion about rehab), I meet many prospective clients and give out cards." - Prior Client

"I absolutely would! Ken, you did an exceptional job!" - Prior Client

"...I would want Mr. Vercammen to represent me again -- he was very knowledgeable and always kept me abreast on what actions he would be taking." - Prior Client

"Absolutely!" - Glenn

"Yes, I would use your firm in all my legal problems. Thank you." - Prior Client

"Yes, and we will recommend to our relatives and friends." -Gil and Rachel Morejon
"Yes, we have had you represent members of our family four times. You have always responded very well to our needs." - Nick Sorrentino

"Yes, both my wife and I would use you again. We would both have you as our family attorney." - Prior Client

"Yes, I certainly would. Knowledgable firm with quick resolution." - James Basilico

"Yes, I feel that Mr. Vercammen does an outstanding job." - Prior Client

"Yes, because we won the case." - Prior Client

"Yes, Vercammen and Associates are courteous, reliable, easy to work with, explain everything so a layman can understand and they get results." - Nick Sorrentino

"The firm will be highly recommended." Kevin Allaire


When asked if they would recommend our firm to a friend, relative, or business associate who needed a lawyer, our clients have said...

"Yes, your firm was very professional and courteous." - Lawrence

"...I would feel comfortable recommending your firm to a friend. - Edna

"Yes, in fact I already have recommended you." - Dave

"Excellent quality, very professional, concise and fair." - Rose

"...I believe Mr. Vercammen would represent anyone with dignity and do his best to satisfy their claims." - Prior Client

"Yes -- Mr. Vercammen's congenial relationship with the court is very beneficial." - Susan

"...Ken is the 'master' of criminal and motor vehicle law -- he knows the ins and outs and never gives unrealistic hopes to clients, and does better than he promises." - Prior Client

"Yes -- you are a local firm, reasonable and efficient." - Diane

"Yes. Ken has a wonderful, friendly personality and he gets the job done quickly and efficiently." - Janet

"...very knowledgeable, respectful, courteous, and goes the extra mile for his client." - Prior Client

"Absolutely, already have." - Glenn

"Yes, both my wife and I would without a doubt recommend you to anyone we know." - Prior Client

"Yes, I would. I feel as though he would treat everyone as a person and fight to their satisfaction." - Prior Client

"Yes, because you treated us very well." - Prior Client

"Yes, I will and I have." - Kevin Allaire


Were you satisfied and other comments:

"Mr. Vercammen had 2 of my tickets dismissed and my other 2 tickets were given the minimum fine." - Prior Client

"Yes, because he had the charge dropped." - Janet

"We got a better deal than I ever thought we would." - Prior Client

"It was handled efficiently and expeditiously." - Diane

"Yes, because I was not expecting the outcome Mr. Vercammen was able to reach for me." - Arthur

"Thank you for being so kind and for everything else!" - Prior Client

"Yes, because it was to our satisfaction." - Prior Client

"Yes, because I received the outcome that I was after." -James Basilico

"Yes, because charges were dismissed." - Prior Client

2C:1-4. Classes of criminal offense

2C:1-4. Classes of criminal offenses a. An offense defined by this code or by any other statute of this State, for which a sentence of imprisonment in excess of 6 months is authorized, constitutes a crime within the meaning of the Constitution of this State. Crimes are designated in this code as being of the first, second, third or fourth degree.

b. An offense is a disorderly persons offense if it is so designated in this code or in a statute other than this code. An offense is a petty disorderly persons offense if it is so designated in this code or in a statute other than this code. Disorderly persons offenses and petty disorderly persons offenses are petty offenses and are not crimes within the meaning of the Constitution of this State. There shall be no right to indictment by a grand jury nor any right to trial by jury on such offenses. Conviction of such offenses shall not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a crime.

c. An offense defined by any statute of this State other than this code shall be classified as provided in this section or in section 2C:43-1 and, except as provided in section 2C:1-5b and chapter 43, the sentence that may be imposed upon conviction thereof shall hereafter be governed by this code. Insofar as any provision outside the code declares an offense to be a misdemeanor when such offense specifically provides a maximum penalty of 6 months' imprisonment or less, whether or not in combination with a fine, such provision shall constitute a disorderly persons offense.

d. Subject to the provisions of section 2C:43-1, reference in any statute, rule, or regulation outside the code to the term "high misdemeanor" shall mean crimes of the first, second, or third degree and reference to the term "misdemeanor" shall mean all crimes.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:1-4, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1979; L.1981, c.290, s. 1, eff. Sept. 24, 1981.

2C:33-13.1 Sale of cigarettes to persons under age 19

2C:33-13.1 Sale of cigarettes to persons under age 19,
3. a. A person who sells or gives to a person under 19 years of age any cigarettes made of tobacco or of any other matter or substance which can be smoked, or any cigarette paper or tobacco in any form, including smokeless tobacco, including an employee of a retail dealer licensee under P.L.1948, c.65 (C.54:40A-1 et seq.) who actually sells or otherwise provides a tobacco product to a person under 19 years of age, shall be punished by a fine as provided for a petty disorderly persons offense. A person who has been previously punished under this section and who commits another offense under it may be punishable by a fine of twice that provided for a petty disorderly persons offense.
b.The establishment of all of the following shall constitute a defense to any prosecution brought pursuant to subsection a. of this section:

(1)that the purchaser or recipient of the tobacco product falsely represented, by producing either a driver's license or non-driver identification card issued by the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission, a similar card issued pursuant to the laws of another state or the federal government of Canada, or a photographic identification card issued by a county clerk, that the purchaser or recipient was of legal age to purchase or receive the tobacco product;

(2)that the appearance of the purchaser or recipient of the tobacco product was such that an ordinary prudent person would believe the purchaser or recipient to be of legal age to purchase or receive the tobacco product; and

(3)that the sale or distribution of the tobacco product was made in good faith, relying upon the production of the identification set forth in paragraph (1) of this subsection, the appearance of the purchaser or recipient, and in the reasonable belief that the purchaser or recipient was of legal age to purchase or receive the tobacco product.

c.A penalty imposed pursuant to this section shall be in addition to any penalty that may be imposed pursuant to section 1 of P.L.2000, c.87 (C.2A:170-51.4).

Chun Facts (Judge King releases findings regarding 7110 Alcotest DWI machine)

Judge King releases findings regarding 7110 Alcotest DWI machine After months of testimony and hearing, Court Special master Michael Patrick King rederered Findings and Conclusions Submitted to Supreme Court on February 13, 2007 regarding the DWI Alcotest machine.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY The case arises from quasi-criminal actions involving twenty defendants who were arrested in Middlesex County for driving while under the influence of alcohol in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. Defendants challenged the admissibility and reliability of breath test results obtained from the Alcotest 7110 MKIII-C, firmware version NJ 3.11 (Alcotest 7110).

On October 14, 2005 the Law Division granted the State's motion to consolidate the cases pending as of May 23, 2005 in several Middlesex County municipal courts. Among other things, Judge Cantor denied the State's motion to take judicial notice of the opinion in State v. Foley, 370 N.J. Super. 341, 359 (Law Div. 2003), which ruled that the Alcotest 7110 MKIII-C was scientifically accurate and reliable and that its reported readings would be admitted into evidence without the need for expert testimony. At the time of Foley, New Jersey was using firmware version 3.8.

In her written statement of November 10, 2005 Judge Cantor explained that the Alcotest 7110 MKIII-C was a new instrument adopted throughout New Jersey on a county-by-county basis on a sequential timetable. She emphasized that only the Camden County, Law Division in Foley had found it scientifically reliable and that Judge Orlando, in dictum, had concluded that New Jersey should make certain changes in the instrument's firmware and the instructions given to its users. Ibid. Because the Alcotest 7110 MKIII-C was a novel scientific instrument which had never been vetted by an appellate court or our Supreme Court, Judge Cantor concluded that its scientific reliability remained a justiciable issue.

On December 1, 2005 the Appellate Division granted the State's motion for leave to appeal and denied its motion for a summary reversal. The Appellate Division remanded the matter to the trial court for an accelerated hearing on the validity of breath tests for alcohol, obtained through the use of Alcotest instruments.

On December 14, 2005 our Supreme Court certified the appeal pending in the Appellate Division on its own motion pursuant to R. 2:12-1. The Court vacated the remand to the Law Division and remanded the matter to retired Appellate Division Judge Michael Patrick King, to preside as a Special Master. The Court ordered the Special Master to conduct a hearing and report his findings and conclusions on an accelerated basis. The Court ordered the Special Master to:

1. Conduct a plenary hearing on the reliability of Alcotest breath test instruments, including consideration of the pertinent portions of the record in State v. Foley, 370 N.J. Super. 341 (Law Div. 2003), and the within matters in the Superior Court, Law Division, Middlesex County, together with such additional expert testimony and arguments as may be presented by the parties;

2. Determine whether the testimony presented by the parties should be supplemented by that of independent experts selected by the Special Master;

3. Grant, in the Special Master's discretion, motions by appropriate entities seeking to participate as amici curiae, said motions to be filed with the Special Master within ten days of the filing date of this Order;

4. Invite, in the Special Master's discretion, the participation of entities or persons as amici curiae or, to the extent necessary in the interests of justice, as interveners to assist the Special Master in the resolution of the issues before him; and

5. Within thirty days of the completion of the plenary hearing, file findings and conclusions with the Clerk of the Court and contemporaneously serve a copy on the 7 parties and amici curiae, which service may be effectuated by the posting of the report on the Judiciary's website . . . .

The Court also ordered the parties, and permitted all amici curiae who participated in the plenary hearing, to serve and file initial briefs within fourteen days of the filing of the Special Master's report as well as responses, if any, within ten days. It further ordered the Clerk to set the matter for oral argument on the first available date after completion of briefing by the parties. Finally, the Court ordered the stay of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 proceedings pending in Middlesex County, and directed all Superior and Municipal Court judges before whom such proceedings were pending, to ensure strict enforcement of the Court's Guidelines for Operation of Plea Agreements in the Municipal Courts of New Jersey.

On January 9, 2006 the Special Master granted to the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (ACDL) leave to appear as amicus curiae. On January 23, 2006 the Special Master also admitted the New Jersey State Bar Association (NJSBA) as amicus curiae, under R. 1:13-9, in view of the matter's public importance.

On January 10, 2006 the Court sua sponte issued an order addressing issues that affected the prosecution of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 offenses statewide. The Court ordered all prosecutions and appeals which did not involve the Alcotest 7110 to proceed in the normal course. The Court, however, ordered the stay of prosecutions and appeals involving repeat offenders and the execution of their sentences where the convictions were based solely on Alcotest readings. The Court also ordered that first- offender prosecutions proceed to trial based on clinical evidence when available and on Alcotest readings. It ordered, however, that the execution of sentences for all first offenders be stayed pending disposition of the Court's final decision on the Alcotest 7110's reliability, unless public interest required their immediate implementation.

As explained by the Administrative Director, Judge Carchman, in a clarifying memorandum to municipal court judges dated January 17, 2006, a court could admit evidence of an Alcotest reading, over the objection of defense counsel, without first holding a hearing on the instrument's scientific reliability. He further explained that under N.J.S.A. 39:4- 50(a)(2) and (3), the penalty for repeat offenders was the same whether the finding of guilt was based on observation or blood alcohol levels. However, for first offenders, the penalty could vary, making the Alcotest reliability hearing of fundamental importance.

On March 15, 2006 the Court entered an order directing the Special Master to designate an independent expert or experts. Upon deliberation and consultation with the parties and amici curiae, the Special Master determined that a court-appointed expert was not necessary for proof purposes, especially because of the quasi-criminal nature of the proceedings. Meanwhile, discovery proceeded. On February 3, 2006 the Special Master entered an order directing the State to give defendants certain information, documents and materials pertaining to the Alcotest 7110's firmware, software, algorithms, electronic schematics, and source codes. Among other things, the discovery order recognized that the exchange of firmware and software might require a protective order to be submitted by the State or manufacturer for court approval. On February 17, 2006 the Special Master entered a supplemental discovery order directing the State to lend three Alcotest 7110s to defense counsel and one to counsel for the amicus NJSBA.

Among other things, the supplemental discovery order also allowed the manufacturer Draeger Safety Diagnostics, Inc. (Draeger) to apply to intervene in this matter, especially because of the issue of "trade secrets."

Draeger objected to the discovery orders claiming that they permitted the release of trade secrets and proprietary information. On February 23, 2006 Draeger's intellectual property counsel prepared a proposed protective order and sent it to the State for submission to the court.

Draeger's proposal included a request for indemnification from defense counsel. In response to defendants' objections to Draeger's initial draft especially to the request for indemnity and a revised proposal by the State, the Special Master requested defense counsel to submit a proposed protective order.

Draeger then offered to make copies of the Alcotest7110's source codes available to the Special Master and explain them to him during an in camera session provided there would be no testimonial record and the data would be returned after his inspection and decision. Again, defense counsel objected, explaining that the purpose of requesting the source codes and algorithms was to allow their expert to review and test them.

On April 19, 2006 defendants submitted their proposed protective order. In anticipation of a court-issued protective order, the State provided to defense counsel and the amicus the four Alcotest 7110 instruments for their inspection.

On April 26, 2006 the Special Master entered a protective order which required all discovery information in which Draeger asserted an intellectual property right so marked. With regard to the marked discovery, the protective order required: (1) that the information could not be disclosed by parties or amici curiae, or by consultants and experts given access to it; and (2) that the information must be returned to Draeger following the conclusion of all litigation. The protective order also extended its terms and restrictions for three years from the termination of litigation or until such time as the marked discovery information entered the public domain, whichever came first, and stated that the violation or breach of any condition would be grounds for court contempt action, civil damages or other appropriate sanctions after a hearing where the accused would be afforded due process under R. 1:10. Additionally, if Draeger did not cooperate with discovery, the protective order allowed the Special Master to draw any appropriate negative inferences in his decision on the Alcotest 7110's reliability. The protective order did not include an indemnification provision.

Shortly after, on April 28, 2006, the State submitted comments on its revised proposed protective order. In part, the State explained that the indemnification provision would require those defendants who received the instruments to indemnify and hold harmless the State from any damage that might result from the firmware's use or installation.

On May 15, 2006 Draeger wrote to the State with its objections noting that it would not cooperate with discovery unless the court entered a "satisfactory" protective order. On May 22, 2006, after consideration of Draeger's expressed objections, the Special Master amended the protective order by: further limiting access to the information disclosed; extending the term and restrictions from three years to as long as the marked discovery information remained a trade secret or until it entered the public domain; and providing that other sanctions might be appropriate in cases where Draeger demonstrated at a hearing that it would suffer irreparable harm and there was no adequate remedy at law.

On June 15, 2006 Draeger wrote again to the State indicating that the amended protective order was an "improvement" but still did not provide adequate protection. Draeger continued to insist that the Special Master adopt an order substantially similar to its initial proposal. For example, Draeger contended: it should be provided with the identity of experts who would be given the marked information in discovery; it should not have to appear before the Special Master at a hearing to demonstrate irreparable harm; it should be allowed to demonstrate its intellectual property rights or prove its need for injunctive relief in a forum other than before Judge King; and it should not be forced to comply with an order essentially based upon a proposal by defendants who did not have any trade secrets or proprietary information to be protected.

Draeger also advised the Special Master and the State that it "recently" had adopted a "new policy" regarding confidential disclosure of the Alcotest 7110's source codes and other trade secrets to those individuals including parties involved in the Chun litigation who accepted the following conditions: (1) individuals who agreed to sign appropriate non-disclosure and confidentiality agreements prepared by Draeger; (2) individuals who agreed to review the information in a room at Draeger's offices in Durango, Colorado; (3) individuals who agreed to allow a Draeger representative to be present in the room when they reviewed the information; and (4) individuals who agreed not to take photographs, make copies by writing or other means, or make any recordings of the information. To maintain its "non-party status," Draeger again declined the Special Master's offer to meet with him or participate in any conferences. Incidentally, Draeger has no United States or foreign patent protection on the Alcotest 7110.

2C:20-16. Chop Shop

2C:20-16. Chop Shop

Operation of facility for sale of stolen automobile parts; penalties

a. A person who knowingly maintains or operates any premises, place or facility used for the remodeling, repainting, or separating of automobile parts for resale of any stolen automobile is guilty of a crime of the second degree.

b. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, any person convicted of a violation of this section shall forthwith forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle in this State for a period to be fixed by the court at not less than three nor more than five years. The court shall cause a report of the conviction to be filed with the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles.

L.1991,c.80,s.1.

Child Abuse NJSA 9:6-1

NJSA 9:6-1. Abuse, abandonment, cruelty and neglect of child; what constitutes
9:6-1. Abuse, abandonment, cruelty and neglect of child; what constitutes. Abuse of a child shall consist in any of the following acts: (a) disposing of the custody of a child contrary to law; (b) employing or permitting a child to be employed in any vocation or employment injurious to its health or dangerous to its life or limb, or contrary to the laws of this State; (c) employing or permitting a child to be employed in any occupation, employment or vocation dangerous to the morals of such child; (d) the habitual use by the parent or by a person having the custody and control of a child, in the hearing of such child, of profane, indecent or obscene language; (e) the performing of any indecent, immoral or unlawful act or deed, in the presence of a child, that may tend to debauch or endanger or degrade the morals of the child; (f) permitting or allowing any other person to perform any indecent, immoral or unlawful act in the presence of the child that may tend to debauch or endanger the morals of such child; (g) using excessive physical restraint on the child under circumstances which do not indicate that the child's behavior is harmful to himself, others or property; or (h) in an institution as defined in section 1 of P.L. 1974, c. 119 (C. 9:6-8.21), willfully isolating the child from ordinary social contact under circumstances which indicate emotional or social deprivation.

Abandonment of a child shall consist in any of the following acts by anyone having the custody or control of the child: (a) willfully forsaking a child; (b) failing to care for and keep the control and custody of a child so that the child shall be exposed to physical or moral risk without proper and sufficient protection; (c) failing to care for and keep the control and custody of a child so that the child shall be liable to be supported and maintained at the expense of the public, or by child caring societies or private persons not legally chargeable with its or their care, custody and control.

Cruelty to a child shall consist in any of the following acts: (a) inflicting unnecessarily severe corporal punishment upon a child; (b) inflicting upon a child unnecessary suffering or pain, either mental or physical; (c) habitually tormenting, vexing or afflicting a child; (d) any willful act of omission or commission whereby unnecessary pain and suffering, whether mental or physical, is caused or permitted to be inflicted on a child; (e) or exposing a child to unnecessary hardship, fatigue or mental or physical strains that may tend to injure the health or physical or moral well-being of such child.

Neglect of a child shall consist in any of the following acts, by anyone having the custody or control of the child: (a) willfully failing to provide proper and sufficient food, clothing, maintenance, regular school education as required by law, medical attendance or surgical treatment, and a clean and proper home, or (b) failure to do or permit to be done any act necessary for the child's physical or moral well-being. Neglect also means the continued inappropriate placement of a child in an institution, as defined in section 1 of P.L. 1974, c. 119 (C. 9:6-8.21), with the knowledge that the placement has resulted and may continue to result in harm to the child's mental or physical well-being.

9:6-1.1. Treatment of ill children according to religious tenets of church

The article to which this act is a supplement shall not be construed to deny the right of a parent, guardian or person having the care, custody and control of any child to treat or provide treatment for an ill child in accordance with the religious tenets of any church as authorized by other statutes of this State; provided , that the laws, rules, and regulations relating to communicable diseases and sanitary matters are not violated.

9:6-2 "Parent" and "custodian" defined.

9:6-2. "Parent", as used in this chapter, shall include the stepfather and stepmother and the adoptive or resource family parent. "The person having the care, custody and control of any child", as used in this chapter, shall mean any person who has assumed the care of a child, or any person with whom a child is living at the time the offense is committed, and shall include a teacher, employee or volunteer, whether compensated or uncompensated, of an institution as defined in section 1 of P.L. 1974, c.119 (C.9:6-8.21) who is responsible for the child's welfare, and a person who legally or voluntarily assumes the care, custody, maintenance or support of the child. Custodian also includes any other staff person of an institution regardless of whether or not the person is responsible for the care or supervision of the child. Custodian also includes a teaching staff member or other employee, whether compensated or uncompensated, of a day school as defined in section 1 of P.L. 1974, c.119 (C.9:6-8.21).

Amended 1987, c.341, s.2; 2004, c.130, s.20.

9:6-3. Cruelty and neglect of children; crime of fourth degree; remedies

9:6-3. Any parent, guardian or person having the care, custody or control of any child, who shall abuse, abandon, be cruel to or neglectful of such child, or any person who shall abuse, be cruel to or neglectful of any child shall be deemed to be guilty of a crime of the fourth degree. If a fine be imposed, the court may direct the same to be paid in whole or in part to the parent, or to the guardian, custodian or trustee of such minor child or children; provided, however, that whenever in the judgment of the court it shall appear to the best interest of the child to place it in the temporary care or custody of a society or corporation, organized or incorporated under the laws of this State, having as one of its objects the prevention of cruelty to children, and the society or corporation is willing to assume such custody and control, the court may postpone sentence and place the child in the custody of such society or corporation, and may place defendant on probation, either with the county probation officers or an officer of the society or corporation to which the child is ordered, and may order the parent, guardian or person having the custody and control of such child to pay to such society or corporation a certain stated sum for the maintenance of such child. When, however, a child is so placed in the custody of such society or corporation, and defendant fails to make the payments as ordered by the court, the court shall cause the arrest and arraignment before it of such defendant, and shall impose upon the defendant the penalty provided in this section.