2C:43-11. Program of intensive supervision, ISP eligibility a. No custodial sentence imposed pursuant to Chapters 43, 44 or 45 of Title 2C shall be changed to permit entry into any program of intensive supervision established pursuant to the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey if the inmate:
(1) Is serving a sentence for a conviction of any crime of the first degree; or
(2) Is serving a sentence for a conviction of any offense in which the sentencing court found that there is a substantial likelihood that the defendant is involved in organized criminal activity pursuant to N.J.S. 2C:44-1a(5); or
(3) Is serving any statutorily mandated parole ineligibility, or any parole ineligibility imposed by the court pursuant to subsection b. of N.J.S. 2C:43-6; or
(4) Has previously completed a program of intensive supervision established pursuant to the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey; or
(5) Has previously been convicted of a crime of the first degree, or of any offense in any other jurisdiction which, if committed in New Jersey, would constitute a crime of the first degree and the inmate was released from incarceration on the first degree offense within five years of the commission of the offense for which the inmate is applying for intensive supervision.
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to preclude the program of intensive supervision from imposing more restrictive standards for admission.
b. Unless the inmate is within nine months of parole eligibility and has served at least six months of the sentence, no custodial sentence of an inmate serving a sentence for conviction of any crime of the second degree shall be changed to permit entry into any program of intensive supervision established pursuant to the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey, if, within 20 days of receipt of notice of the inmate's application, the county prosecutor or Attorney General objects in writing.
c. If an inmate's application for a change of custodial sentence to permit entry into any program of intensive supervision established pursuant to the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey is granted over the objection of the county prosecutor or the Attorney General, the order shall not become final for 20 days or until reconsideration by the Intensive Supervision Re sentencing Panel in order to permit the county prosecutor or the Attorney General to appear personally or in writing, with notice to defense counsel, to request reconsideration of the application approval.
d. A victim of the offense for which the inmate was sentenced shall have the right to make a written statement or to appear at a proceeding regarding the application for a change of custodial sentence imposed pursuant to Chapters 43, 44 or 45 of Title 2C for entry into any program of intensive supervision established pursuant to the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey.
Tuesday, July 28, 2009
2C:2-8. Intoxication as a possible defense to a criminal char
2C:2-8. Intoxication
as a possible defense to a criminal charge
a. Except as provided in subsection d. of this section, intoxication of the actor is not a defense unless it negatives an element of the offense.
b. When recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have been aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial.
c. Intoxication does not, in itself, constitute mental disease within the meaning of chapter 4.
d. Intoxication which (1) is not self-induced or (2) is pathological is an affirmative defense if by reason of such intoxication the actor at the time of his conduct did not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong. Intoxication under this subsection must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
e. Definitions. In this section unless a different meaning plainly is required:
(1) "Intoxication" means a disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of substances into the body;
(2) "Self-induced intoxication" means intoxication caused by substances which the actor knowingly introduces into his body, the tendency of which to cause intoxication he knows or ought to know, unless he introduces them pursuant to medical advice or under such circumstances as would afford a defense to a charge of crime;
(3) "Pathological intoxication" means intoxication grossly excessive in degree, given the amount of the intoxicant, to which the actor does not know he is susceptible. ? a. Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is a defense if the defendant reasonably arrived at the conclusion underlying the mistake and:
(1) It negatives the culpable mental state required to establish the offense; or
(2) The law provides that the state of mind established by such ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense.
b. Although ignorance or mistake would otherwise afford a defense to the offense charged, the defense is not available if the defendant would be guilty of another offense had the situation been as he supposed. In such case, however, the ignorance or mistake of the defendant shall reduce the grade and degree of the offense of which he may be convicted to those of the offense of which he would be guilty had the situation been as he supposed.
c. A belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense is a defense to a prosecution for that offense based upon such conduct when:
(1) The statute defining the offense is not known to the actor and has not been published or otherwise reasonably made available prior to the conduct alleged; or
(2) The actor acts in reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law, afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous, contained in (a) a statute, (b) judicial decision, opinion, judgment, or rule, (c) an administrative order or grant of permission, or (d) an official interpretation of the public officer or body charged by law with responsibility for the interpretation, administration or enforcement of the law defining the offense; or
(3) The actor otherwise diligently pursues all means available to ascertain the meaning and application of the offense to his conduct and honestly and in good faith concludes his conduct is not an offense in circumstances in which a law-abiding and prudent person would also so conclude.
The defendant must prove a defense arising under subsection c. of this section by clear and convincing evidence.
as a possible defense to a criminal charge
a. Except as provided in subsection d. of this section, intoxication of the actor is not a defense unless it negatives an element of the offense.
b. When recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have been aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial.
c. Intoxication does not, in itself, constitute mental disease within the meaning of chapter 4.
d. Intoxication which (1) is not self-induced or (2) is pathological is an affirmative defense if by reason of such intoxication the actor at the time of his conduct did not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong. Intoxication under this subsection must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
e. Definitions. In this section unless a different meaning plainly is required:
(1) "Intoxication" means a disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of substances into the body;
(2) "Self-induced intoxication" means intoxication caused by substances which the actor knowingly introduces into his body, the tendency of which to cause intoxication he knows or ought to know, unless he introduces them pursuant to medical advice or under such circumstances as would afford a defense to a charge of crime;
(3) "Pathological intoxication" means intoxication grossly excessive in degree, given the amount of the intoxicant, to which the actor does not know he is susceptible. ? a. Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is a defense if the defendant reasonably arrived at the conclusion underlying the mistake and:
(1) It negatives the culpable mental state required to establish the offense; or
(2) The law provides that the state of mind established by such ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense.
b. Although ignorance or mistake would otherwise afford a defense to the offense charged, the defense is not available if the defendant would be guilty of another offense had the situation been as he supposed. In such case, however, the ignorance or mistake of the defendant shall reduce the grade and degree of the offense of which he may be convicted to those of the offense of which he would be guilty had the situation been as he supposed.
c. A belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense is a defense to a prosecution for that offense based upon such conduct when:
(1) The statute defining the offense is not known to the actor and has not been published or otherwise reasonably made available prior to the conduct alleged; or
(2) The actor acts in reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law, afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous, contained in (a) a statute, (b) judicial decision, opinion, judgment, or rule, (c) an administrative order or grant of permission, or (d) an official interpretation of the public officer or body charged by law with responsibility for the interpretation, administration or enforcement of the law defining the offense; or
(3) The actor otherwise diligently pursues all means available to ascertain the meaning and application of the offense to his conduct and honestly and in good faith concludes his conduct is not an offense in circumstances in which a law-abiding and prudent person would also so conclude.
The defendant must prove a defense arising under subsection c. of this section by clear and convincing evidence.
2C:13-4. Interference with custody.
2C:13-4. Interference with custody.
a.Custody of children. A person, including a parent, guardian or other lawful custodian, is guilty of interference with custody if he:
(1)Takes or detains a minor child with the purpose of concealing the minor child and thereby depriving the child's other parent of custody or parenting time with the minor child; or
(2)After being served with process or having actual knowledge of an action affecting marriage or custody but prior to the issuance of a temporary or final order determining custody and parenting time rights to a minor child, takes, detains, entices or conceals the child within or outside the State for the purpose of depriving the child's other parent of custody or parenting time, or to evade the jurisdiction of the courts of this State; or
(3)After being served with process or having actual knowledge of an action affecting the protective services needs of a child pursuant to Title 9 of the Revised Statutes in an action affecting custody, but prior to the issuance of a temporary or final order determining custody rights of a minor child, takes, detains, entices or conceals the child within or outside the State for the purpose of evading the jurisdiction of the courts of this State; or
(4)After the issuance of a temporary or final order specifying custody, joint custody rights or parenting time, takes, detains, entices or conceals a minor child from the other parent in violation of the custody or parenting time order.
Interference with custody is a crime of the second degree if the child is taken, detained, enticed or concealed: (i) outside the United States or (ii) for more than 24 hours. Otherwise, interference with custody is a crime of the third degree but the presumption of non-imprisonment set forth in subsection e. of N.J.S.2C:44-1 for a first offense of a crime of the third degree shall not apply.
b.Custody of committed persons. A person is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree if he knowingly takes or entices any committed person away from lawful custody when he is not privileged to do so. "Committed person" means, in addition to anyone committed under judicial warrant, any orphan, neglected or delinquent child, mentally defective or insane person, or other dependent or incompetent person entrusted to another's custody by or through a recognized social agency or otherwise by authority of law.
c.It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under subsection a. of this section, which must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, that:
(1)The actor reasonably believed that the action was necessary to preserve the child from imminent danger to his welfare. However, no defense shall be available pursuant to this subsection if the actor does not, as soon as reasonably practicable but in no event more than 24 hours after taking a child under his protection, give notice of the child's location to the police department of the municipality where the child resided, the office of the county prosecutor in the county where the child resided, or the Division of Youth and Family Services in the Department of Children and Families;
(2)The actor reasonably believed that the taking or detaining of the minor child was consented to by the other parent, or by an authorized State agency; or
(3)The child, being at the time of the taking or concealment not less than 14 years old, was taken away at his own volition and without purpose to commit a criminal offense with or against the child.
d.It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under subsection a. of this section that a parent having the right of custody reasonably believed he was fleeing from imminent physical danger from the other parent, provided that the parent having custody, as soon as reasonably practicable:
(1)Gives notice of the child's location to the police department of the municipality where the child resided, the office of the county prosecutor in the county where the child resided, or the Division of Youth and Family Services in the Department of Children and Families; or
(2)Commences an action affecting custody in an appropriate court.
e.The offenses enumerated in this section are continuous in nature and continue for so long as the child is concealed or detained.
f.(1) In addition to any other disposition provided by law, a person convicted under subsection a. of this section shall make restitution of all reasonable expenses and costs, including reasonable counsel fees, incurred by the other parent in securing the child's return.
(2)In imposing sentence under subsection a. of this section the court shall consider, in addition to the factors enumerated in chapter 44 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes:
(a)Whether the person returned the child voluntarily; and
(b)The length of time the child was concealed or detained.
g. As used in this section, "parent" means a parent, guardian or other lawful custodian of a minor child.
a.Custody of children. A person, including a parent, guardian or other lawful custodian, is guilty of interference with custody if he:
(1)Takes or detains a minor child with the purpose of concealing the minor child and thereby depriving the child's other parent of custody or parenting time with the minor child; or
(2)After being served with process or having actual knowledge of an action affecting marriage or custody but prior to the issuance of a temporary or final order determining custody and parenting time rights to a minor child, takes, detains, entices or conceals the child within or outside the State for the purpose of depriving the child's other parent of custody or parenting time, or to evade the jurisdiction of the courts of this State; or
(3)After being served with process or having actual knowledge of an action affecting the protective services needs of a child pursuant to Title 9 of the Revised Statutes in an action affecting custody, but prior to the issuance of a temporary or final order determining custody rights of a minor child, takes, detains, entices or conceals the child within or outside the State for the purpose of evading the jurisdiction of the courts of this State; or
(4)After the issuance of a temporary or final order specifying custody, joint custody rights or parenting time, takes, detains, entices or conceals a minor child from the other parent in violation of the custody or parenting time order.
Interference with custody is a crime of the second degree if the child is taken, detained, enticed or concealed: (i) outside the United States or (ii) for more than 24 hours. Otherwise, interference with custody is a crime of the third degree but the presumption of non-imprisonment set forth in subsection e. of N.J.S.2C:44-1 for a first offense of a crime of the third degree shall not apply.
b.Custody of committed persons. A person is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree if he knowingly takes or entices any committed person away from lawful custody when he is not privileged to do so. "Committed person" means, in addition to anyone committed under judicial warrant, any orphan, neglected or delinquent child, mentally defective or insane person, or other dependent or incompetent person entrusted to another's custody by or through a recognized social agency or otherwise by authority of law.
c.It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under subsection a. of this section, which must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, that:
(1)The actor reasonably believed that the action was necessary to preserve the child from imminent danger to his welfare. However, no defense shall be available pursuant to this subsection if the actor does not, as soon as reasonably practicable but in no event more than 24 hours after taking a child under his protection, give notice of the child's location to the police department of the municipality where the child resided, the office of the county prosecutor in the county where the child resided, or the Division of Youth and Family Services in the Department of Children and Families;
(2)The actor reasonably believed that the taking or detaining of the minor child was consented to by the other parent, or by an authorized State agency; or
(3)The child, being at the time of the taking or concealment not less than 14 years old, was taken away at his own volition and without purpose to commit a criminal offense with or against the child.
d.It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under subsection a. of this section that a parent having the right of custody reasonably believed he was fleeing from imminent physical danger from the other parent, provided that the parent having custody, as soon as reasonably practicable:
(1)Gives notice of the child's location to the police department of the municipality where the child resided, the office of the county prosecutor in the county where the child resided, or the Division of Youth and Family Services in the Department of Children and Families; or
(2)Commences an action affecting custody in an appropriate court.
e.The offenses enumerated in this section are continuous in nature and continue for so long as the child is concealed or detained.
f.(1) In addition to any other disposition provided by law, a person convicted under subsection a. of this section shall make restitution of all reasonable expenses and costs, including reasonable counsel fees, incurred by the other parent in securing the child's return.
(2)In imposing sentence under subsection a. of this section the court shall consider, in addition to the factors enumerated in chapter 44 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes:
(a)Whether the person returned the child voluntarily; and
(b)The length of time the child was concealed or detained.
g. As used in this section, "parent" means a parent, guardian or other lawful custodian of a minor child.
2C:4-1. Insanity defense
2C:4-1. Insanity defense
A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such conduct he was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong. Insanity is an affirmative defense which must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
2C:4-2. Evidence of mental disease or defect admissible when relevant to element of the offense ? 2C:4-2. Evidence of mental disease or defect admissible when relevant to element of the offense.
Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did not have a state of mind which is an element of the offense. In the absence of such evidence, it may be presumed that the defendant had no mental disease or defect which would negate a state of mind which is an element of the offense.
L.1978, c.95; amended 1979,c.178,s.11B; 1981,c.290,s.8; 1990,c.63.
2C:4-3. Requirement of notice? a. If a defendant intends to claim insanity pursuant to section 2C:4-1 or the absence of a requisite state of mind pursuant to section 2C:4-2, he shall serve notice of such intention upon the prosecuting attorney in accordance with the Rules of Court.
b. When a defendant is acquitted on the ground of insanity, the verdict and judgment shall so state.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:4-3, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 12, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:4-4. Mental incompetence excluding fitness to proceed? a. No person who lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense shall be tried, convicted or sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as such incapacity endures.
b. A person shall be considered mentally competent to stand trial on criminal charges if the proofs shall establish:
(1) That the defendant has the mental capacity to appreciate his presence in relation to time, place and things; and
(2) That his elementary mental processes are such that he comprehends:
(a) That he is in a court of justice charged with a criminal offense;
(b) That there is a judge on the bench;
(c) That there is a prosecutor present who will try to convict him of a criminal charge;
(d) That he has a lawyer who will undertake to defend him against that charge;
(e) That he will be expected to tell to the best of his mental ability the facts surrounding him at the time and place where the alleged violation was committed if he chooses to testify and understands the right not to testify;
(f) That there is or may be a jury present to pass upon evidence adduced as to guilt or innocence of such charge or, that if he should choose to enter into plea negotiations or to plead guilty, that he comprehend the consequences of a guilty plea and that he be able to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive those rights which are waived upon such entry of a guilty plea; and
(g) That he has the ability to participate in an adequate presentation of his defense.
2C:4-5 Psychiatric or psychological examination of defendant with respect to fitness to proceed.
2C:4-5. Psychiatric or Psychological Examination of Defendant With Respect to Fitness to Proceed.
a. Whenever there is reason to doubt the defendant's fitness to proceed, the court may on motion by the prosecutor, the defendant or on its own motion, appoint at least one qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine and report upon the mental condition of the defendant. The psychiatrist or licensed psychologist so appointed shall be either:
(1)From a list agreed to by the court, the prosecutor and the defendant; or
(2)Agreed to by the court, prosecutor and defendant.
Alternatively, the court may order examination of a defendant for fitness to proceed by the Department of Human Services. The department shall provide or arrange for examination of the defendant at a jail, prison or psychiatric hospital. However, to ensure that a defendant is not unnecessarily hospitalized for the purpose of the examination, a defendant shall not be admitted to a State psychiatric hospital for an examination regarding his fitness to proceed unless a qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist designated by the commissioner determines that hospitalization is clinically necessary to perform the examination. Whenever the qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist determines that hospitalization is clinically necessary to perform the examination, the court shall order the defendant to be committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Human Services for placement in a State psychiatric hospital designated for that purpose for a period not exceeding 30 days.
A qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist retained by the defendant or by the prosecutor shall, if requested, be permitted to examine a defendant who has been admitted to a State psychiatric hospital.
b.The report of the examination shall include at least the following: (1) a description of the nature of the examination; (2) a diagnosis of the mental condition of the defendant; (3) an opinion as to the defendant's capacity to understand the proceedings against him and to assist in his own defense. The person or persons conducting the examination may ask questions respecting the crime charged when such questions are necessary to enable formation of an opinion as to a relevant issue, however, the evidentiary character of any inculpatory statement shall be limited expressly to the question of competency and shall not be admissible on the issue of guilt.
c. If the examination cannot be conducted by reason of the unwillingness of the defendant to participate therein, the report shall so state and shall include, if possible, an opinion as to whether such unwillingness of the defendant was the result of mental incompetence. Upon the filing of such a report, the court may permit examination without cooperation, may appoint a different psychiatrist or licensed psychologist, or may commit the defendant for observation for a period not exceeding 30 days except on good cause shown, or exclude or limit testimony by the defense psychiatrist or licensed psychologist.
d. The report of the examination shall be sent by the psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to the court, the prosecutor and counsel for the defendant.
L.1978, c.95; amended 1979, c.178, s.13A; 1997, c.77, s.1; 1998, c.111, s.1.
2C:4-6. Determination of fitness to proceed; effect of finding of unfitness; proceedings if fitness is regained; post-commitment hearing?2C:4-6. Determination of Fitness to Proceed; Effect of Finding of Unfitness; Proceedings if Fitness is Regained; Post-Commitment Hearing.
a. When the issue of the defendant's fitness to proceed is raised, the issue shall be determined by the court. If neither the prosecutor nor counsel for the defendant contests the finding of the report filed pursuant to section 2C:4-5, the court may make the determination on the basis of such report. If the finding is contested or if there is no report, the court shall hold a hearing on the issue. If the report is received in evidence upon such hearing, either party shall have the right to summon and examine the psychiatrists or licensed psychologists who joined in the report and to offer evidence upon the issue.
b. If the court determines that the defendant lacks fitness to proceed, the proceeding against him shall be suspended, except as provided in subsection c. of this section. At this time, the court may commit him to the custody of the Commissioner of Human Services to be placed in an appropriate institution if it is found that the defendant is so dangerous to himself or others as to require institutionalization, or it shall proceed to determine whether placement in an out-patient setting or release is appropriate; provided, however, that no commitment to any institution shall be in excess of such period of time during which it can be determined whether it is substantially probable that the defendant could regain his competence within the foreseeable future.
If the court determines that the defendant is fit to proceed, but suffers from mental illness, as defined in section 2 of P.L.1987, c.116 (C.30:4-27.2), that does not require institutionalization, the court shall order the defendant to be provided appropriate treatment in the jail or prison in which the defendant is incarcerated. Where the defendant is incarcerated in a county correctional facility, the county shall provide or arrange for this treatment. The Department of Corrections shall reimburse the county for the reasonable costs of treatment, as determined by the Commissioner of Corrections, provided that the county has submitted to the commissioner such documentation and verification as the commissioner shall require.
c. If the defendant has not regained his fitness to proceed within three months, the court shall hold a hearing on the issue of whether the charges against him shall be dismissed with prejudice or held in abeyance.
The hearing shall be held only upon notice to the prosecutor and with an opportunity for the prosecutor to be heard. When the charges are not dismissed, each defendant's case shall be specifically reviewed by the court at six-month intervals until an order is made by the court that the defendant stand trial or that the charges be dismissed.
There shall be a presumption that charges against a defendant who is not competent to proceed shall be held in abeyance. The presumption can be overcome only if the court determines, using the factors set forth in this subsection, that continuing the criminal prosecution under the particular circumstances of the case would constitute a constitutionally significant injury to the defendant attributable to undue delay in being brought to trial.
In determining whether the charges shall be held in abeyance or dismissed, the court shall weigh the following factors: the defendant's prospects for regaining competency; the period of time during which the defendant has remained incompetent; the nature and extent of the defendant's institutionalization; the nature and gravity of the crimes charged; the effects of delay on the prosecution; the effects of delay on the defendant, including any likelihood of prejudice to the defendant in the trial arising out of the delay; and the public interest in prosecuting the charges.
d. When the court, on its own motion or upon application of the commissioner, his designee or either party, determines after a hearing, if a hearing is requested, that the defendant has regained fitness to proceed, the proceedings shall be resumed.
e.(Deleted by amendment, P.L.1996, c.133).
f. The fact that the defendant is unfit to proceed does not preclude determination of any legal objection to the prosecution which is susceptible of fair determination prior to trial and without the personal participation of the defendant.
L.1978, c.95; amended 1979, c.178, s.13B; 1996, c.133, s.1; 1997, c.77, s.2; 1999, c.16, s.1.
2C:4-7. Disposition? If a defendant is acquitted by reason of insanity the court shall dispose of the case as provided for in section 2C:4-8 of this chapter.?
2C:4-8. Commitment of a person by reason of insanity?2C:4-8. Commitment of a Person by Reason of Insanity. a. After acquittal by reason of insanity, the court shall order that the defendant undergo a psychiatric examination by a psychiatrist of the prosecutor's choice. If the examination cannot take place because of the unwillingness of the defendant to participate, the court shall proceed as in section 2C:4-5c. The defendant, pursuant to this section, may also be examined by a psychiatrist of his own choice.
b. The court shall dispose of the defendant in the following manner:
(1) If the court finds that the defendant may be released without danger to the community or himself without supervision, the court shall so release the defendant; or
(2) If the court finds that the defendant may be released without danger to the community or to himself under supervision or under conditions, the court shall so order; or
(3) If the court finds that the defendant cannot be released with or without supervision or conditions without posing a danger to the community or to himself, it shall commit the defendant to a mental health facility approved for this purpose by the Commissioner of Human Services to be treated as a person civilly committed. In all proceedings conducted pursuant to this section and pursuant to section N.J.S.2C:4-6 concerning a defendant who lacks the fitness to proceed, including any periodic review proceeding, the prosecuting attorney shall have the right to appear and be heard. The defendant's continued commitment, under the law governing civil commitment, shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence, during the maximum period of imprisonment that could have been imposed, as an ordinary term of imprisonment, for any charge on which the defendant has been acquitted by reason of insanity. Expiration of that maximum period of imprisonment shall be calculated by crediting the defendant with any time spent in confinement for the charge or charges on which the defendant has been acquitted by reason of insanity.
c. No person committed under this section shall be confined within any penal or correctional institution or any part thereof.
L.1978, c.95; amended 1979, c.178, s.15; 1981, c.290, s.9; 1996, c.133, s.2.
2C:4-9. Release of persons committed by reason of insanity?2C:4-9. Release of Persons Committed by Reason of Insanity.
a. If a person has been committed pursuant to section 2C:4-8 or section 2C:4-6 and if the commissioner, or his designee, or the superintendent of the institution to which the person has been committed, is of the view that a person committed to his custody, pursuant to section 2C:4-8 or section 2C:4-6, may be discharged or released on condition without danger to himself or to others, or that he may be transferred to a less restrictive setting for treatment, the commissioner or superintendent shall make application for the discharge or release of such person in a report to the court by which such person was committed and shall transmit a copy of such application and report to the prosecutor, the court, and defense counsel. The court may, in its discretion, appoint at least two qualified psychiatrists, neither of whom may be on the staff of the hospital to which the defendant had been committed, to examine such person and to report within 30 days, or such longer period as the court determines to be necessary for the purpose, their opinion as to his mental condition.
b. The court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the committed person may be safely discharged, released on condition without danger to himself or others, or treated as in civil commitment. The hearing shall be held upon notice to the prosecutor and with the prosecutor's opportunity to be heard. Any such hearing shall be deemed a civil proceeding. According to the determination of the court upon the hearing, the court shall proceed as in section 2C:4-8b. (1), (2) or (3).
c. A committed person may make application for his discharge or release to the court by which he was committed, and the procedure to be followed upon such application shall be the same as that prescribed above in the case of an application by the commissioner.
d. Each defendant's case shall be specifically reviewed as provided by the law governing civil commitment.
A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such conduct he was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong. Insanity is an affirmative defense which must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
2C:4-2. Evidence of mental disease or defect admissible when relevant to element of the offense ? 2C:4-2. Evidence of mental disease or defect admissible when relevant to element of the offense.
Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did not have a state of mind which is an element of the offense. In the absence of such evidence, it may be presumed that the defendant had no mental disease or defect which would negate a state of mind which is an element of the offense.
L.1978, c.95; amended 1979,c.178,s.11B; 1981,c.290,s.8; 1990,c.63.
2C:4-3. Requirement of notice? a. If a defendant intends to claim insanity pursuant to section 2C:4-1 or the absence of a requisite state of mind pursuant to section 2C:4-2, he shall serve notice of such intention upon the prosecuting attorney in accordance with the Rules of Court.
b. When a defendant is acquitted on the ground of insanity, the verdict and judgment shall so state.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:4-3, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 12, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:4-4. Mental incompetence excluding fitness to proceed? a. No person who lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense shall be tried, convicted or sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as such incapacity endures.
b. A person shall be considered mentally competent to stand trial on criminal charges if the proofs shall establish:
(1) That the defendant has the mental capacity to appreciate his presence in relation to time, place and things; and
(2) That his elementary mental processes are such that he comprehends:
(a) That he is in a court of justice charged with a criminal offense;
(b) That there is a judge on the bench;
(c) That there is a prosecutor present who will try to convict him of a criminal charge;
(d) That he has a lawyer who will undertake to defend him against that charge;
(e) That he will be expected to tell to the best of his mental ability the facts surrounding him at the time and place where the alleged violation was committed if he chooses to testify and understands the right not to testify;
(f) That there is or may be a jury present to pass upon evidence adduced as to guilt or innocence of such charge or, that if he should choose to enter into plea negotiations or to plead guilty, that he comprehend the consequences of a guilty plea and that he be able to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive those rights which are waived upon such entry of a guilty plea; and
(g) That he has the ability to participate in an adequate presentation of his defense.
2C:4-5 Psychiatric or psychological examination of defendant with respect to fitness to proceed.
2C:4-5. Psychiatric or Psychological Examination of Defendant With Respect to Fitness to Proceed.
a. Whenever there is reason to doubt the defendant's fitness to proceed, the court may on motion by the prosecutor, the defendant or on its own motion, appoint at least one qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine and report upon the mental condition of the defendant. The psychiatrist or licensed psychologist so appointed shall be either:
(1)From a list agreed to by the court, the prosecutor and the defendant; or
(2)Agreed to by the court, prosecutor and defendant.
Alternatively, the court may order examination of a defendant for fitness to proceed by the Department of Human Services. The department shall provide or arrange for examination of the defendant at a jail, prison or psychiatric hospital. However, to ensure that a defendant is not unnecessarily hospitalized for the purpose of the examination, a defendant shall not be admitted to a State psychiatric hospital for an examination regarding his fitness to proceed unless a qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist designated by the commissioner determines that hospitalization is clinically necessary to perform the examination. Whenever the qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist determines that hospitalization is clinically necessary to perform the examination, the court shall order the defendant to be committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Human Services for placement in a State psychiatric hospital designated for that purpose for a period not exceeding 30 days.
A qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist retained by the defendant or by the prosecutor shall, if requested, be permitted to examine a defendant who has been admitted to a State psychiatric hospital.
b.The report of the examination shall include at least the following: (1) a description of the nature of the examination; (2) a diagnosis of the mental condition of the defendant; (3) an opinion as to the defendant's capacity to understand the proceedings against him and to assist in his own defense. The person or persons conducting the examination may ask questions respecting the crime charged when such questions are necessary to enable formation of an opinion as to a relevant issue, however, the evidentiary character of any inculpatory statement shall be limited expressly to the question of competency and shall not be admissible on the issue of guilt.
c. If the examination cannot be conducted by reason of the unwillingness of the defendant to participate therein, the report shall so state and shall include, if possible, an opinion as to whether such unwillingness of the defendant was the result of mental incompetence. Upon the filing of such a report, the court may permit examination without cooperation, may appoint a different psychiatrist or licensed psychologist, or may commit the defendant for observation for a period not exceeding 30 days except on good cause shown, or exclude or limit testimony by the defense psychiatrist or licensed psychologist.
d. The report of the examination shall be sent by the psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to the court, the prosecutor and counsel for the defendant.
L.1978, c.95; amended 1979, c.178, s.13A; 1997, c.77, s.1; 1998, c.111, s.1.
2C:4-6. Determination of fitness to proceed; effect of finding of unfitness; proceedings if fitness is regained; post-commitment hearing?2C:4-6. Determination of Fitness to Proceed; Effect of Finding of Unfitness; Proceedings if Fitness is Regained; Post-Commitment Hearing.
a. When the issue of the defendant's fitness to proceed is raised, the issue shall be determined by the court. If neither the prosecutor nor counsel for the defendant contests the finding of the report filed pursuant to section 2C:4-5, the court may make the determination on the basis of such report. If the finding is contested or if there is no report, the court shall hold a hearing on the issue. If the report is received in evidence upon such hearing, either party shall have the right to summon and examine the psychiatrists or licensed psychologists who joined in the report and to offer evidence upon the issue.
b. If the court determines that the defendant lacks fitness to proceed, the proceeding against him shall be suspended, except as provided in subsection c. of this section. At this time, the court may commit him to the custody of the Commissioner of Human Services to be placed in an appropriate institution if it is found that the defendant is so dangerous to himself or others as to require institutionalization, or it shall proceed to determine whether placement in an out-patient setting or release is appropriate; provided, however, that no commitment to any institution shall be in excess of such period of time during which it can be determined whether it is substantially probable that the defendant could regain his competence within the foreseeable future.
If the court determines that the defendant is fit to proceed, but suffers from mental illness, as defined in section 2 of P.L.1987, c.116 (C.30:4-27.2), that does not require institutionalization, the court shall order the defendant to be provided appropriate treatment in the jail or prison in which the defendant is incarcerated. Where the defendant is incarcerated in a county correctional facility, the county shall provide or arrange for this treatment. The Department of Corrections shall reimburse the county for the reasonable costs of treatment, as determined by the Commissioner of Corrections, provided that the county has submitted to the commissioner such documentation and verification as the commissioner shall require.
c. If the defendant has not regained his fitness to proceed within three months, the court shall hold a hearing on the issue of whether the charges against him shall be dismissed with prejudice or held in abeyance.
The hearing shall be held only upon notice to the prosecutor and with an opportunity for the prosecutor to be heard. When the charges are not dismissed, each defendant's case shall be specifically reviewed by the court at six-month intervals until an order is made by the court that the defendant stand trial or that the charges be dismissed.
There shall be a presumption that charges against a defendant who is not competent to proceed shall be held in abeyance. The presumption can be overcome only if the court determines, using the factors set forth in this subsection, that continuing the criminal prosecution under the particular circumstances of the case would constitute a constitutionally significant injury to the defendant attributable to undue delay in being brought to trial.
In determining whether the charges shall be held in abeyance or dismissed, the court shall weigh the following factors: the defendant's prospects for regaining competency; the period of time during which the defendant has remained incompetent; the nature and extent of the defendant's institutionalization; the nature and gravity of the crimes charged; the effects of delay on the prosecution; the effects of delay on the defendant, including any likelihood of prejudice to the defendant in the trial arising out of the delay; and the public interest in prosecuting the charges.
d. When the court, on its own motion or upon application of the commissioner, his designee or either party, determines after a hearing, if a hearing is requested, that the defendant has regained fitness to proceed, the proceedings shall be resumed.
e.(Deleted by amendment, P.L.1996, c.133).
f. The fact that the defendant is unfit to proceed does not preclude determination of any legal objection to the prosecution which is susceptible of fair determination prior to trial and without the personal participation of the defendant.
L.1978, c.95; amended 1979, c.178, s.13B; 1996, c.133, s.1; 1997, c.77, s.2; 1999, c.16, s.1.
2C:4-7. Disposition? If a defendant is acquitted by reason of insanity the court shall dispose of the case as provided for in section 2C:4-8 of this chapter.?
2C:4-8. Commitment of a person by reason of insanity?2C:4-8. Commitment of a Person by Reason of Insanity. a. After acquittal by reason of insanity, the court shall order that the defendant undergo a psychiatric examination by a psychiatrist of the prosecutor's choice. If the examination cannot take place because of the unwillingness of the defendant to participate, the court shall proceed as in section 2C:4-5c. The defendant, pursuant to this section, may also be examined by a psychiatrist of his own choice.
b. The court shall dispose of the defendant in the following manner:
(1) If the court finds that the defendant may be released without danger to the community or himself without supervision, the court shall so release the defendant; or
(2) If the court finds that the defendant may be released without danger to the community or to himself under supervision or under conditions, the court shall so order; or
(3) If the court finds that the defendant cannot be released with or without supervision or conditions without posing a danger to the community or to himself, it shall commit the defendant to a mental health facility approved for this purpose by the Commissioner of Human Services to be treated as a person civilly committed. In all proceedings conducted pursuant to this section and pursuant to section N.J.S.2C:4-6 concerning a defendant who lacks the fitness to proceed, including any periodic review proceeding, the prosecuting attorney shall have the right to appear and be heard. The defendant's continued commitment, under the law governing civil commitment, shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence, during the maximum period of imprisonment that could have been imposed, as an ordinary term of imprisonment, for any charge on which the defendant has been acquitted by reason of insanity. Expiration of that maximum period of imprisonment shall be calculated by crediting the defendant with any time spent in confinement for the charge or charges on which the defendant has been acquitted by reason of insanity.
c. No person committed under this section shall be confined within any penal or correctional institution or any part thereof.
L.1978, c.95; amended 1979, c.178, s.15; 1981, c.290, s.9; 1996, c.133, s.2.
2C:4-9. Release of persons committed by reason of insanity?2C:4-9. Release of Persons Committed by Reason of Insanity.
a. If a person has been committed pursuant to section 2C:4-8 or section 2C:4-6 and if the commissioner, or his designee, or the superintendent of the institution to which the person has been committed, is of the view that a person committed to his custody, pursuant to section 2C:4-8 or section 2C:4-6, may be discharged or released on condition without danger to himself or to others, or that he may be transferred to a less restrictive setting for treatment, the commissioner or superintendent shall make application for the discharge or release of such person in a report to the court by which such person was committed and shall transmit a copy of such application and report to the prosecutor, the court, and defense counsel. The court may, in its discretion, appoint at least two qualified psychiatrists, neither of whom may be on the staff of the hospital to which the defendant had been committed, to examine such person and to report within 30 days, or such longer period as the court determines to be necessary for the purpose, their opinion as to his mental condition.
b. The court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the committed person may be safely discharged, released on condition without danger to himself or others, or treated as in civil commitment. The hearing shall be held upon notice to the prosecutor and with the prosecutor's opportunity to be heard. Any such hearing shall be deemed a civil proceeding. According to the determination of the court upon the hearing, the court shall proceed as in section 2C:4-8b. (1), (2) or (3).
c. A committed person may make application for his discharge or release to the court by which he was committed, and the procedure to be followed upon such application shall be the same as that prescribed above in the case of an application by the commissioner.
d. Each defendant's case shall be specifically reviewed as provided by the law governing civil commitment.
COURT RULE 3:7. INDICTMENT AND ACCUSATION 3:7-1.
COURT RULE 3:7. INDICTMENT AND ACCUSATION 3:7-1. Entitling of Papers
The indictment and all subsequent papers in connection therewith shall be entitled in the Superior Court.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-1(b). 3:7-2. Use of Indictment or Accusation
A crime punishable by death shall be prosecuted by indictment. Every other crime shall be prosecuted by indictment unless the defendant, after having been advised of the right to indictment, shall waive the right in a signed writing, in which case the defendant may be tried on accusation. Such accusation shall be prepared by the prosecuting attorney and entitled and proceeded upon in the Superior Court. Nothing herein contained, however, shall be construed as limiting the criminal jurisdiction of a municipal court over indictable offenses provided by law and these rules.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-2(a)(b). Amended August 28, 1979 to be effective September 1, 1979; amended July 13, 1994 to be effective September 1, 1994. 3:7-3. Nature and Contents of Indictment or Accusation
(a) Nature and Contents Generally. The indictment or accusation shall be a written statement of the essential facts constituting the crime charged, need not contain a formal commencement and shall be signed by the prosecuting attorney. The indictment shall be endorsed as a true bill by the foreperson and conclude: "against the peace of this State, the government and dignity of the same." Allegations made in one count of the indictment or accusation may be incorporated by reference in another count. It may be alleged in a single count either that the means by which the defendant committed the offense are unknown or that the defendant committed it by one or more specified means. An indictment or accusation or any count thereof charging the violation of a statute or statutes shall state the official or customary citation thereof, but error in the citation or its omission shall not be ground for dismissal of the indictment or accusation or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not prejudicially mislead the defendant. Surplusage in the indictment or accusation may be stricken by the court on defendant's motion. (b) Indictment for Murder or Manslaughter. Every indictment for murder shall specify whether the act is murder as defined by N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), (2) or (3) and whether the defendant is alleged: (1) to have committed the act by his or her own conduct or (2) to have procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary value or (3) to be the leader of a drug trafficking network, as defined in N.J.S.A.2C:35-3, and who, in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3, commanded or by threat or promise solicited the commission of the offense. In every indictment for aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter, it is sufficient to charge that the defendant committed aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-3(a)(b)(c), 3:4-4. Paragraphs (a) and (b) amended August 28, 1979 to be effective September 1, 1979; paragraph (b) amended September 28, 1982 to be effective immediately; paragraph (b) amended July 13, 1993 to be effective immediately; paragraphs (a) and (b) amended July 13, 1994 to be effective September 1, 1994. 3:7-4. Amendment of Indictment or Accusation
The court may amend the indictment or accusation to correct an error in form or the description of the crime intended to be charged or to charge a lesser included offense provided that the amendment does not charge another or different offense from that alleged and the defendant will not be prejudiced thereby in his or her defense on the merits. Such amendment may be made on such terms as to postponing the trial, to be had before the same or another jury, as the interest of justice requires.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-5. Amended August 28, 1979 to be effective September 1, 1979; amended July 13, 1994 to be effective September 1, 1994. 3:7-5. Bill of Particulars
A bill of particulars shall be ordered by the court if the indictment or accusation is not sufficiently specific to enable the defendant to prepare a defense. The defendant shall move therefore pursuant to Rule 3:10-2. The application shall point out clearly the particulars sought by the defense. The prosecutor shall furnish the bill of particulars within 10 days after the order of the court. Further particulars may be ordered when a demand therefor is promptly made. A bill of particulars may be amended at any time, subject to such conditions as the interest of justice requires. Any particulars that have been furnished to the defendant pursuant to R. 3:13-3 and 4 shall not be subject to an application pursuant to this rule.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-6; amended June 29, 1990, to be effective September 4, 1990; amended July 13, 1994 and December 9, 1994, to be effective January 1, 1995. 3:7-6. Joinder of Offenses
Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or accusation in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on 2 or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. Relief from prejudicial joinder shall be afforded as providedby R. 3:15-2.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-7; amended August 28, 1979 to be effective September 1, 1979. 3:7-7. Joinder of Defendants
Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or accusation if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count. The disposition of the indictment or accusation as to one or more of several defendants joined in the same indictment or accusation shall not affect the right of the State to proceed against the other defendants. Relief from prejudicial joinder shall be afforded as provided by R. 3:15-2.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-8. 3:7-8. Issuance of Warrant or Summons Upon Indictment or Accusation
Upon the return of an indictment or the filing of an accusation a summons or warrant shall be issued in accordance with R. 3:3-1 by the criminal division manager as designee of the deputy clerk of the Superior Court in the manner provided by law for each defendant named in the indictment or accusation who is not under bail. The criminal division manager as designee of the deputy clerk of the Superior Court, upon request, shall issue more than one warrant or summons for the same defendant. If the defendant fails to appear in response to a summons, a warrant shall issue. If a summons is issued upon indictment to a defendant who has not been previously held to answer a complaint, the defendant shall undergo all post-arrest identification procedures that are required by law upon arrest, on the return date of the summons, or upon written request of the appropriate law enforcement agency.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-9. Amended July 22, 1983 to be effective September 12, 1983; amended July 13, 1994 to be effective January 1, 1995. 3:7-9. Form of Warrant and Summons
The warrant shall contain the name of the defendant or, if the defendant's name is unknown, any name or description by which the defendant can be identified with reasonable certainty, shall describe the offense charged in the indictment or accusation and shall command that the defendant be arrested and brought before the court. Conditions of pretrial release shall be fixed by the court and endorsed thereon, and in such case the sheriff or warden may take any bail. The summons shall be in the same form as the warrant except that it shall be directed to thedefendant and require the defendant to appear to plead before the court at a stated time and place. The summons shall also state that if the defendant fails to so appear, a warrant for defendant's arrest shall issue.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-10(a)(b); amended July 13, 1994 to be effective January 1, 1995. 3:7-10. Execution of Service; Return
(a) Execution of Warrant. The warrant shall be executed in accordance with R. 3:3-3. (b) Summons to an Individual. The summons shall be served upon an individual in accordance with R. 4:4-4. (c) Summons to a Corporation. Service of a summons upon a defendant corporation, municipal or otherwise, shall be made in accordance with R. 4:4-4. If the defendant corporation does not appear, the court shall order the clerk to enter an appearance for said corporation and endorse the plea of not guilty on the indictment or accusation, and further proceedings may then be had thereon in the same manner as if the corporation had appeared and so pleaded. A plea to an indictment or accusation by a defendant corporation shall be made by an attorney of this State. (d) Service Upon a Corporation by Publication. If the summons directed to a corporation is returned "not served" and it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the summons could not be served, the court shall by order direct the corporation to cause its appearance and plea to be entered by a day certain. A copy of such order shall within 5 days after the date thereof be published in a newspaper in this State once, at least 2 weeks preceding the day certain so specified. If the defendant corporation does not appear within the time specified by the order, the court, if satisfied that publication has been duly made, shall direct the clerk to enter an appearance and a plea of "not guilty" for the defendant corporation, and thereupon further proceedings may be had on the indictment or accusation as provided by these rules. (e) Return. The officer executing a warrant shall make prompt return thereof to the court, and at the request of the prosecuting attorney any unexecuted warrant shall be returned and cancelled. The officer serving a summons shall make return thereof on or before the return day. At the request of the prosecuting attorney made at any time while the indictment or accusation is pending, a warrant returned unexecuted and not cancelled or a summons returned unserved or a duplicate thereof may be delivered by the clerk to the sheriff or other authorized officer for execution or service.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-11, 3:4-12(a)(b), 3:4-13. Paragraph (d) amended July 7, 1971 to be effective September 13, 1971.
The indictment and all subsequent papers in connection therewith shall be entitled in the Superior Court.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-1(b). 3:7-2. Use of Indictment or Accusation
A crime punishable by death shall be prosecuted by indictment. Every other crime shall be prosecuted by indictment unless the defendant, after having been advised of the right to indictment, shall waive the right in a signed writing, in which case the defendant may be tried on accusation. Such accusation shall be prepared by the prosecuting attorney and entitled and proceeded upon in the Superior Court. Nothing herein contained, however, shall be construed as limiting the criminal jurisdiction of a municipal court over indictable offenses provided by law and these rules.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-2(a)(b). Amended August 28, 1979 to be effective September 1, 1979; amended July 13, 1994 to be effective September 1, 1994. 3:7-3. Nature and Contents of Indictment or Accusation
(a) Nature and Contents Generally. The indictment or accusation shall be a written statement of the essential facts constituting the crime charged, need not contain a formal commencement and shall be signed by the prosecuting attorney. The indictment shall be endorsed as a true bill by the foreperson and conclude: "against the peace of this State, the government and dignity of the same." Allegations made in one count of the indictment or accusation may be incorporated by reference in another count. It may be alleged in a single count either that the means by which the defendant committed the offense are unknown or that the defendant committed it by one or more specified means. An indictment or accusation or any count thereof charging the violation of a statute or statutes shall state the official or customary citation thereof, but error in the citation or its omission shall not be ground for dismissal of the indictment or accusation or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not prejudicially mislead the defendant. Surplusage in the indictment or accusation may be stricken by the court on defendant's motion. (b) Indictment for Murder or Manslaughter. Every indictment for murder shall specify whether the act is murder as defined by N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), (2) or (3) and whether the defendant is alleged: (1) to have committed the act by his or her own conduct or (2) to have procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary value or (3) to be the leader of a drug trafficking network, as defined in N.J.S.A.2C:35-3, and who, in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3, commanded or by threat or promise solicited the commission of the offense. In every indictment for aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter, it is sufficient to charge that the defendant committed aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-3(a)(b)(c), 3:4-4. Paragraphs (a) and (b) amended August 28, 1979 to be effective September 1, 1979; paragraph (b) amended September 28, 1982 to be effective immediately; paragraph (b) amended July 13, 1993 to be effective immediately; paragraphs (a) and (b) amended July 13, 1994 to be effective September 1, 1994. 3:7-4. Amendment of Indictment or Accusation
The court may amend the indictment or accusation to correct an error in form or the description of the crime intended to be charged or to charge a lesser included offense provided that the amendment does not charge another or different offense from that alleged and the defendant will not be prejudiced thereby in his or her defense on the merits. Such amendment may be made on such terms as to postponing the trial, to be had before the same or another jury, as the interest of justice requires.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-5. Amended August 28, 1979 to be effective September 1, 1979; amended July 13, 1994 to be effective September 1, 1994. 3:7-5. Bill of Particulars
A bill of particulars shall be ordered by the court if the indictment or accusation is not sufficiently specific to enable the defendant to prepare a defense. The defendant shall move therefore pursuant to Rule 3:10-2. The application shall point out clearly the particulars sought by the defense. The prosecutor shall furnish the bill of particulars within 10 days after the order of the court. Further particulars may be ordered when a demand therefor is promptly made. A bill of particulars may be amended at any time, subject to such conditions as the interest of justice requires. Any particulars that have been furnished to the defendant pursuant to R. 3:13-3 and 4 shall not be subject to an application pursuant to this rule.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-6; amended June 29, 1990, to be effective September 4, 1990; amended July 13, 1994 and December 9, 1994, to be effective January 1, 1995. 3:7-6. Joinder of Offenses
Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or accusation in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on 2 or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. Relief from prejudicial joinder shall be afforded as providedby R. 3:15-2.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-7; amended August 28, 1979 to be effective September 1, 1979. 3:7-7. Joinder of Defendants
Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or accusation if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count. The disposition of the indictment or accusation as to one or more of several defendants joined in the same indictment or accusation shall not affect the right of the State to proceed against the other defendants. Relief from prejudicial joinder shall be afforded as provided by R. 3:15-2.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-8. 3:7-8. Issuance of Warrant or Summons Upon Indictment or Accusation
Upon the return of an indictment or the filing of an accusation a summons or warrant shall be issued in accordance with R. 3:3-1 by the criminal division manager as designee of the deputy clerk of the Superior Court in the manner provided by law for each defendant named in the indictment or accusation who is not under bail. The criminal division manager as designee of the deputy clerk of the Superior Court, upon request, shall issue more than one warrant or summons for the same defendant. If the defendant fails to appear in response to a summons, a warrant shall issue. If a summons is issued upon indictment to a defendant who has not been previously held to answer a complaint, the defendant shall undergo all post-arrest identification procedures that are required by law upon arrest, on the return date of the summons, or upon written request of the appropriate law enforcement agency.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-9. Amended July 22, 1983 to be effective September 12, 1983; amended July 13, 1994 to be effective January 1, 1995. 3:7-9. Form of Warrant and Summons
The warrant shall contain the name of the defendant or, if the defendant's name is unknown, any name or description by which the defendant can be identified with reasonable certainty, shall describe the offense charged in the indictment or accusation and shall command that the defendant be arrested and brought before the court. Conditions of pretrial release shall be fixed by the court and endorsed thereon, and in such case the sheriff or warden may take any bail. The summons shall be in the same form as the warrant except that it shall be directed to thedefendant and require the defendant to appear to plead before the court at a stated time and place. The summons shall also state that if the defendant fails to so appear, a warrant for defendant's arrest shall issue.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-10(a)(b); amended July 13, 1994 to be effective January 1, 1995. 3:7-10. Execution of Service; Return
(a) Execution of Warrant. The warrant shall be executed in accordance with R. 3:3-3. (b) Summons to an Individual. The summons shall be served upon an individual in accordance with R. 4:4-4. (c) Summons to a Corporation. Service of a summons upon a defendant corporation, municipal or otherwise, shall be made in accordance with R. 4:4-4. If the defendant corporation does not appear, the court shall order the clerk to enter an appearance for said corporation and endorse the plea of not guilty on the indictment or accusation, and further proceedings may then be had thereon in the same manner as if the corporation had appeared and so pleaded. A plea to an indictment or accusation by a defendant corporation shall be made by an attorney of this State. (d) Service Upon a Corporation by Publication. If the summons directed to a corporation is returned "not served" and it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the summons could not be served, the court shall by order direct the corporation to cause its appearance and plea to be entered by a day certain. A copy of such order shall within 5 days after the date thereof be published in a newspaper in this State once, at least 2 weeks preceding the day certain so specified. If the defendant corporation does not appear within the time specified by the order, the court, if satisfied that publication has been duly made, shall direct the clerk to enter an appearance and a plea of "not guilty" for the defendant corporation, and thereupon further proceedings may be had on the indictment or accusation as provided by these rules. (e) Return. The officer executing a warrant shall make prompt return thereof to the court, and at the request of the prosecuting attorney any unexecuted warrant shall be returned and cancelled. The officer serving a summons shall make return thereof on or before the return day. At the request of the prosecuting attorney made at any time while the indictment or accusation is pending, a warrant returned unexecuted and not cancelled or a summons returned unserved or a duplicate thereof may be delivered by the clerk to the sheriff or other authorized officer for execution or service.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:4-11, 3:4-12(a)(b), 3:4-13. Paragraph (d) amended July 7, 1971 to be effective September 13, 1971.
2C:43-6. Sentence of Imprisonment for Crime in New Jersey
2C:43-6. Sentence of Imprisonment for Crime in New Jersey
Ordinary Terms; Mandatory Terms. a. Except as otherwise provided, a person who has been convicted of a crime may be sentenced to imprisonment, as follows:
(1) In the case of a crime of the first degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between 10 years and 20 years;
(2) In the case of a crime of the second degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between five years and 10 years;
(3) In the case of a crime of the third degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between three years and five years;
(4) In the case of a crime of the fourth degree, for a specific term which shall be fixed by the court and shall not exceed 18 months.
b. As part of a sentence for any crime, where the court is clearly convinced that the aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors, as set forth in subsections a. and b. of 2C:44-1, the court may fix a minimum term not to exceed one-half of the term set pursuant to subsection a., or one-half of the term set pursuant to a maximum period of incarceration for a crime set forth in any statute other than this code, during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole; provided that no defendant shall be eligible for parole at a date earlier than otherwise provided by the law governing parole.
c. A person who has been convicted under 2C:39-4a. of possession of a firearm with intent to use it against the person of another, or of a crime under any of the following sections: 2C:11-3, 2C:11-4, 2C:12-1b., 2C:13-1, 2C:14-2a., 2C:14-3a., 2C:15-1, 2C:18-2, 2C:29-5, who, while in the course of committing or attempting to commit the crime, including the immediate flight therefrom, used or was in possession of a firearm as defined in 2C:39-1f., shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the court. The term of imprisonment shall include the imposition of a minimum term. The minimum term shall be fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed by the court or three years, whichever is greater, or 18 months in the case of a fourth degree crime, during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole.
The minimum terms established by this section shall not prevent the court from imposing presumptive terms of imprisonment pursuant to 2C:44-1f. (1) except in cases of crimes of the fourth degree.
A person who has been convicted of an offense enumerated by this subsection and who used or possessed a firearm during its commission, attempted commission or flight therefrom and who has been previously convicted of an offense involving the use or possession of a firearm as defined in 2C:44-3d., shall be sentenced by the court to an extended term as authorized by 2C:43-7c., notwithstanding that extended terms are ordinarily discretionary with the court.
d. The court shall not impose a mandatory sentence pursuant to subsection c. of this section, 2C:43-7c. or 2C:44-3d., unless the ground therefor has been established at a hearing. At the hearing, which may occur at the time of sentencing, the prosecutor shall establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the weapon used or possessed was a firearm. In making its finding, the court shall take judicial notice of any evidence, testimony or information adduced at the trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings and shall also consider the presentence report and any other relevant information.
e. A person convicted of a third or subsequent offense involving State taxes under N.J.S.2C:20-9, N.J.S.2C:21-15, any other provision of this code, or under any of the provisions of Title 54 of the Revised Statutes, or Title 54A of the New Jersey Statutes, as amended and supplemented, shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the court. This shall not preclude an application for and imposition of an extended term of imprisonment under N.J.S.2C:44-3 if the provisions of that section are applicable to the offender.
f. A person convicted of manufacturing, distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute any dangerous substance or controlled substance analog under N.J.S.2C:35-5, of maintaining or operating a controlled dangerous substance production facility under N.J.S.2C:35-4, of employing a juvenile in a drug distribution scheme under N.J.S.2C:35-6, leader of a narcotics trafficking network under N.J.S.2C:35-3, or of distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute on or near school property or buses under section 1 of P.L.1987, c.101 (C.2C:35-7), who has been previously convicted of manufacturing, distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog, shall upon application of the prosecuting attorney be sentenced by the court to an extended term as authorized by subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:43-7, notwithstanding that extended terms are ordinarily discretionary with the court. The term of imprisonment shall, except as may be provided in N.J.S.2C:35-12, include the imposition of a minimum term. The minimum term shall be fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed by the court or three years, whichever is greater, not less than seven years if the person is convicted of a violation of N.J.S.2C:35-6, or 18 months in the case of a fourth degree crime, during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole.
The court shall not impose an extended term pursuant to this subsection unless the ground therefor has been established at a hearing. At the hearing, which may occur at the time of sentencing, the prosecutor shall establish the ground therefor by a preponderance of the evidence. In making its finding, the court shall take judicial notice of any evidence, testimony or information adduced at the trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings and shall also consider the presentence report and any other relevant information.
For the purpose of this subsection, a previous conviction exists where the actor has at any time been convicted under chapter 35 of this title or Title 24 of the Revised Statutes or under any similar statute of the United States, this State, or any other state for an offense that is substantially equivalent to N.J.S.2C:35-3, N.J.S.2C:35-4, N.J.S.2C:35-5, N.J.S.2C:35-6 or section 1 of P.L.1987, c.101 (C.2C:35-7).
g. Any person who has been convicted under subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:39-4 of possessing a machine gun or assault firearm with intent to use it against the person of another, or of a crime under any of the following sections: N.J.S.2C:11-3, N.J.S.2C:11-4, N.J.S.2C:12-1b., N.J.S.2C:13-1, N.J.S.2C:14-2a., N.J.S.2C:14-3a., N.J.S.2C:15-1, N.J.S.2C:18-2, N.J.S.2C:29-5, N.J.S.2C:35-5, who, while in the course of committing or attempting to commit the crime, including the immediate flight therefrom, used or was in possession of a machine gun or assault firearm shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the court. The term of imprisonment shall include the imposition of a minimum term. The minimum term shall be fixed at 10 years for a crime of the first or second degree, five years for a crime of the third degree, or 18 months in the case of a fourth degree crime, during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole.
The minimum terms established by this section shall not prevent the court from imposing presumptive terms of imprisonment pursuant to paragraph (1) of subsection f. of N.J.S.2C:44-1 for crimes of the first degree.
A person who has been convicted of an offense enumerated in this subsection and who used or possessed a machine gun or assault firearm during its commission, attempted commission or flight therefrom and who has been previously convicted of an offense involving the use or possession of any firearm as defined in subsection d. of N.J.S.2C:44-3, shall be sentenced by the court to an extended term as authorized by subsection d. of N.J.S.2C:43-7, notwithstanding that extended terms are ordinarily discretionary with the court.
h. The court shall not impose a mandatory sentence pursuant to subsection g. of this section, subsections d. of N.J.S.2C:43-7 or N.J.S.2C:44-3, unless the ground therefor has been established at a hearing. At the hearing, which may occur at the time of sentencing, the prosecutor shall establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the weapon used or possessed was a machine gun or assault firearm. In making its finding, the court shall take judicial notice of any evidence, testimony or information adduced at the trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings and shall also consider the presentence report and any other relevant information.
i. A person who has been convicted under paragraph (6) of subsection b. of 2C:12-1 of causing bodily injury while eluding shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the court. The term of imprisonment shall include the imposition of a minimum term. The minimum term shall be fixed at, or between one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed by the court. The minimum term established by this subsection shall not prevent the court from imposing a presumptive term of imprisonment pursuant to paragraph (1) of subsection f. of 2C:44-1
2C:43-6.5 Mandatory minimum prison term for public officer, employee convicted of certain crimes; waiver, reduction.
6. a. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:43-6 and except as otherwise provided in subsection c. of this section, a person who serves or has served as a public officer or employee under the government of this State, or any political subdivision thereof, who is convicted of a crime that involves or touches such office or employment as set forth in subsection b. of this section, shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment without eligibility for parole as follows: for a crime of the fourth degree, the mandatory minimum term shall be one year; for a crime of the third degree, two years; for a crime of the second degree, five years; and for a crime of the first degree, 10 years; unless the provisions of any other law provide for a higher mandatory minimum term. As used in this subsection, "a crime that involves or touches such office or employment" means that the crime was related directly to the person's performance in, or circumstances flowing from, the specific public office or employment held by the person.
b. Subsection a. of this section applies to a conviction of any of the following crimes:
(1)Paragraph (4) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:13-5, criminal coercion;
(2)N.J.S.2C:20-4, theft by deception, if the amount involved exceeds $10,000;
(3)Subsection d. of N.J.S.2C:20-5, theft by extortion;
(4)N.J.S.2C:20-9, theft by failure to make required disposition of property received, if the amount involved exceeds $10,000;
(5)N.J.S.2C:21-10, commercial bribery;
(6)Section 3 of P.L.1994, c.121 (C.2C:21-25), money laundering;
(7)Section 97 of P.L.1999, c.440 (C.2C:21-34), false contract payment claims;
(8)N.J.S.2C:27-2, bribery in official matters;
(9)N.J.S.2C:27-3, threats and other improper influence in official and political matters;
(10) Section 100 of P.L.1999, c.440 (C.2C:27-9), unlawful official business transaction where interest is involved;
(11) Section 5 of P.L.2003, c.255 (C.2C:27-10), acceptance or receipt of unlawful benefit by public servant for official behavior;
(12) Section 6 of P.L.2003, c.255 (C.2C:27-11), offer of unlawful benefit to public servant for official behavior;
(13) N.J.S.2C:28-1, perjury;
(14) N.J.S.2C:28-5, tampering with witnesses;
(15) N.J.S.2C:28-7, tampering with public records or information;
(16) N.J.S.2C:29-4, compounding;
(17) N.J.S.2C:30-2, official misconduct;
(18) N.J.S.2C:30-3, speculating or wagering on official action or information; or
(19) Section 3 of P.L.2003, c.31 (C.2C:30-7), pattern of official misconduct.
c. (1) On motion by the prosecutor stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in a criminal investigation or prosecution of another person, the court may waive or reduce the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment required by subsection a. of this section. The appropriate waiver or reduction shall be determined by the court for reasons stated that may include, but are not limited to, consideration of the following:
(i)the court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defendant's assistance, giving substantial weight to the prosecutor's evaluation of the assistance rendered;
(ii)the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by the defendant;
(iii) the nature and extent of the defendant's assistance;
(iv)any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his family resulting from his assistance;
(v)the timeliness of the defendant's assistance.
In making such a determination, the court shall give substantial weight to the prosecutor's evaluation of the extent of the defendant's assistance, particularly where the extent and value of the assistance are difficult to ascertain.
(2)If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that extraordinary circumstances exist such that imposition of a mandatory minimum term would be a serious injustice which overrides the need to deter such conduct in others, the court may waive or reduce the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment required by subsection a. of this section. In making any such finding, the court must state with specificity its reasons for waiving or reducing the mandatory minimum sentence that would otherwise apply.
(3)If, pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection, the court waives or reduces the mandatory minimum term required by subsection a. of this section, such sentence shall not become final for 10 days in order to permit the appeal of the sentence by the prosecution.
d. (1) A prosecutor shall not recommend the admission into or consent to the referral to a pretrial intervention program of a person who serves or has served as a public officer or employee under the government of this State, or any political subdivision thereof, who is charged with a crime that involves or touches such office or employment as set forth in subsection b. of this section, without the prior approval of the Attorney General.
(2)A person who serves or has served as a public officer or employee under the government of this State, or any political subdivision thereof, who is convicted of a crime that involves or touches such office or employment as set forth in subsection b. of this section shall be ineligible for participation in any program of intensive supervision during any period of parole ineligibility .
e .The Attorney General shall develop guidelines to ensure the uniform exercise of discretion in making determinations regarding the waiver or reduction of a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment pursuant to paragraph (1) of subsection c. of this section and participation in a pretrial intervention program pursuant to paragraph (1) of subsection d. of this section.
L.2007, c.49, s.6.
2C:43-7 Sentence of imprisonment for crime; extended terms.
2C:43-7. Sentence of Imprisonment for Crime; Extended Terms.
a. In the cases designated in section 2C:44-3, a person who has been convicted of a crime may be sentenced, and in the cases designated in subsection e. of section 2 of P.L.1994, c.130 (C.2C:43-6.4), in subsection b. of section 2 of P.L.1995, c.126 (C.2C:43-7.1) and in the cases designated in section 1 of P.L.1997, c.410 (C.2C:44-5.1), a person who has been convicted of a crime shall be sentenced, to an extended term of imprisonment, as follows:
(1)In case of aggravated manslaughter sentenced under subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:11-4; or kidnapping when sentenced as a crime of the first degree under paragraph (1) of subsection c. of 2C:13-1; or aggravated sexual assault if the person is eligible for an extended term pursuant to the provisions of subsection g. of N.J.S.2C:44-3 for a specific term of years which shall be between 30 years and life imprisonment;
(2)Except for the crime of murder and except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection, in the case of a crime of the first degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between 20 years and life imprisonment;
(3)In the case of a crime of the second degree, for a term which shall be fixed by the court between 10 and 20 years;
(4)In the case of a crime of the third degree, for a term which shall be fixed by the court between five and 10 years;
(5)In the case of a crime of the fourth degree pursuant to 2C:43-6c, 2C:43-6g and 2C:44-3d for a term of five years, and in the case of a crime of the fourth degree pursuant to any other provision of law for a term which shall be fixed by the court between three and five years;
(6)In the case of the crime of murder, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court between 35 years and life imprisonment, of which the defendant shall serve 35 years before being eligible for parole;
(7)In the case of kidnapping under paragraph (2) of subsection c. of 2C:13-1, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court between 30 years and life imprisonment, of which the defendant shall serve 30 years before being eligible for parole.
b. As part of a sentence for an extended term and notwithstanding the provisions of 2C:43-9, the court may fix a minimum term not to exceed one-half of the term set pursuant to subsection a. during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole or a term of 25 years during which time the defendant shall not be eligible for parole where the sentence imposed was life imprisonment; provided that no defendant shall be eligible for parole at a date earlier than otherwise provided by the law governing parole.
c .In the case of a person sentenced to an extended term pursuant to 2C:43-6c, 2C:43-6f and 2C:44-3d, the court shall impose a sentence within the ranges permitted by 2C:43-7a(2), (3), (4) or (5) according to the degree or nature of the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced, which sentence shall include a minimum term which shall, except as may be specifically provided by N.J.S.2C:43-6f, be fixed at or between one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed by the court or five years, whichever is greater, during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole. Where the sentence imposed is life imprisonment, the court shall impose a minimum term of 25 years during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole, except that where the term of life imprisonment is imposed on a person convicted for a violation of N.J.S.2C:35-3, the term of parole ineligibility shall be 30 years.
d. In the case of a person sentenced to an extended term pursuant to N.J.S.2C:43-6g, the court shall impose a sentence within the ranges permitted by N.J.S.2C:43-7a(2), (3), (4) or (5) according to the degree or nature of the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced, which sentence shall include a minimum term which shall be fixed at 15 years for a crime of the first or second degree, eight years for a crime of the third degree, or five years for a crime of the fourth degree during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole. Where the sentence imposed is life imprisonment, the court shall impose a minimum term of 25 years during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole, except that where the term of life imprisonment is imposed on a person convicted of a violation of N.J.S.2C:35-3, the term of parole eligibility shall be 30 years.
2C:43-7.2 Mandatory service of 85% of sentence for certain offenses.
2. a. A court imposing a sentence of incarceration for a crime of the first or second degree enumerated in subsection d. of this section shall fix a minimum term of 85% of the sentence imposed, during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole.
b. The minimum term required by subsection a. of this section shall be fixed as a part of every sentence of incarceration imposed upon every conviction of a crime enumerated in subsection d. of this section, whether the sentence of incarceration is determined pursuant to N.J.S.2C:43-6, N.J.S.2C:43-7, N.J.S.2C:11-3 or any other provision of law, and shall be calculated based upon the sentence of incarceration actually imposed. The provisions of subsection a. of this section shall not be construed or applied to reduce the time that must be served before eligibility for parole by an inmate sentenced to a mandatory minimum period of incarceration. Solely for the purpose of calculating the minimum term of parole ineligibility pursuant to subsection a. of this section, a sentence of life imprisonment shall be deemed to be 75 years
c. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary and in addition to any other sentence imposed, a court imposing a minimum period of parole ineligibility of 85 percent of the sentence pursuant to this section shall also impose a five-year term of parole supervision if the defendant is being sentenced for a crime of the first degree, or a three-year term of parole supervision if the defendant is being sentenced for a crime of the second degree. The term of parole supervision shall commence upon the completion of the sentence of incarceration imposed by the court pursuant to subsection a. of this section unless the defendant is serving a sentence of incarceration for another crime at the time he completes the sentence of incarceration imposed pursuant to subsection a., in which case the term of parole supervision shall commence immediately upon the defendant's release from incarceration. During the term of parole supervision the defendant shall remain in release status in the community in the legal custody of the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections and shall be supervised by the State Parole Board as if on parole and shall be subject to the provisions and conditions of section 3 of P.L.1997, c.117 (C.30:4-123.51b).
d. The court shall impose sentence pursuant to subsection a. of this section upon conviction of the following crimes or an attempt or conspiracy to commit any of these crimes:
(1)N.J.S.2C:11-3, murder;
(2)N.J.S.2C:11-4, aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter;
(3)N.J.S.2C:11-5, vehicular homicide;
(4)subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:12-1, aggravated assault;
(5)subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:12-11, disarming a law enforcement officer;
(6)N.J.S.2C:13-1, kidnapping;
(7)subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:14-2, aggravated sexual assault;
(8)subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:14-2 and paragraph (1) of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:14-2, sexual assault;
(9)N.J.S.2C:15-1, robbery;
(10) section 1 of P.L.1993, c.221 (C.2C:15-2), carjacking;
(11) paragraph (1) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:17-1, aggravated arson;
(12) N.J.S.2C:18-2, burglary;
(13) subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:20-5, extortion;
(14) subsection b. of section 1 of P.L.1997, c.185 (C.2C:35-4.1), booby traps in manufacturing or distribution facilities; or
(15) N.J.S.2C:35-9, strict liability for drug induced deaths.
(16) section 2 of P.L.2002, c.26 (C.2C:38-2), terrorism; or
(17) section 3 of P.L.2002, c.26 (C.2C:38-3), producing or possessing chemical weapons, biological agents or nuclear or radiological devices.
e.(Deleted by amendment, P.L.2001, c.129).
L.1997,c.117,s.2; amended 2001, c.79, s.16; 2001, c.129, s.1; 2002, c.26, s.19.
2C:43-8. Sentence of imprisonment for disorderly persons offenses and petty disorderly persons offenses
A person who has been convicted of a disorderly persons offense or a petty disorderly persons offense may be sentenced to imprisonment for a definite term which shall be fixed by the court and shall not exceed 6 months in the case of a disorderly persons offense or 30 days in the case of a petty disorderly persons offense.
Ordinary Terms; Mandatory Terms. a. Except as otherwise provided, a person who has been convicted of a crime may be sentenced to imprisonment, as follows:
(1) In the case of a crime of the first degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between 10 years and 20 years;
(2) In the case of a crime of the second degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between five years and 10 years;
(3) In the case of a crime of the third degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between three years and five years;
(4) In the case of a crime of the fourth degree, for a specific term which shall be fixed by the court and shall not exceed 18 months.
b. As part of a sentence for any crime, where the court is clearly convinced that the aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors, as set forth in subsections a. and b. of 2C:44-1, the court may fix a minimum term not to exceed one-half of the term set pursuant to subsection a., or one-half of the term set pursuant to a maximum period of incarceration for a crime set forth in any statute other than this code, during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole; provided that no defendant shall be eligible for parole at a date earlier than otherwise provided by the law governing parole.
c. A person who has been convicted under 2C:39-4a. of possession of a firearm with intent to use it against the person of another, or of a crime under any of the following sections: 2C:11-3, 2C:11-4, 2C:12-1b., 2C:13-1, 2C:14-2a., 2C:14-3a., 2C:15-1, 2C:18-2, 2C:29-5, who, while in the course of committing or attempting to commit the crime, including the immediate flight therefrom, used or was in possession of a firearm as defined in 2C:39-1f., shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the court. The term of imprisonment shall include the imposition of a minimum term. The minimum term shall be fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed by the court or three years, whichever is greater, or 18 months in the case of a fourth degree crime, during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole.
The minimum terms established by this section shall not prevent the court from imposing presumptive terms of imprisonment pursuant to 2C:44-1f. (1) except in cases of crimes of the fourth degree.
A person who has been convicted of an offense enumerated by this subsection and who used or possessed a firearm during its commission, attempted commission or flight therefrom and who has been previously convicted of an offense involving the use or possession of a firearm as defined in 2C:44-3d., shall be sentenced by the court to an extended term as authorized by 2C:43-7c., notwithstanding that extended terms are ordinarily discretionary with the court.
d. The court shall not impose a mandatory sentence pursuant to subsection c. of this section, 2C:43-7c. or 2C:44-3d., unless the ground therefor has been established at a hearing. At the hearing, which may occur at the time of sentencing, the prosecutor shall establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the weapon used or possessed was a firearm. In making its finding, the court shall take judicial notice of any evidence, testimony or information adduced at the trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings and shall also consider the presentence report and any other relevant information.
e. A person convicted of a third or subsequent offense involving State taxes under N.J.S.2C:20-9, N.J.S.2C:21-15, any other provision of this code, or under any of the provisions of Title 54 of the Revised Statutes, or Title 54A of the New Jersey Statutes, as amended and supplemented, shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the court. This shall not preclude an application for and imposition of an extended term of imprisonment under N.J.S.2C:44-3 if the provisions of that section are applicable to the offender.
f. A person convicted of manufacturing, distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute any dangerous substance or controlled substance analog under N.J.S.2C:35-5, of maintaining or operating a controlled dangerous substance production facility under N.J.S.2C:35-4, of employing a juvenile in a drug distribution scheme under N.J.S.2C:35-6, leader of a narcotics trafficking network under N.J.S.2C:35-3, or of distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute on or near school property or buses under section 1 of P.L.1987, c.101 (C.2C:35-7), who has been previously convicted of manufacturing, distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog, shall upon application of the prosecuting attorney be sentenced by the court to an extended term as authorized by subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:43-7, notwithstanding that extended terms are ordinarily discretionary with the court. The term of imprisonment shall, except as may be provided in N.J.S.2C:35-12, include the imposition of a minimum term. The minimum term shall be fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed by the court or three years, whichever is greater, not less than seven years if the person is convicted of a violation of N.J.S.2C:35-6, or 18 months in the case of a fourth degree crime, during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole.
The court shall not impose an extended term pursuant to this subsection unless the ground therefor has been established at a hearing. At the hearing, which may occur at the time of sentencing, the prosecutor shall establish the ground therefor by a preponderance of the evidence. In making its finding, the court shall take judicial notice of any evidence, testimony or information adduced at the trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings and shall also consider the presentence report and any other relevant information.
For the purpose of this subsection, a previous conviction exists where the actor has at any time been convicted under chapter 35 of this title or Title 24 of the Revised Statutes or under any similar statute of the United States, this State, or any other state for an offense that is substantially equivalent to N.J.S.2C:35-3, N.J.S.2C:35-4, N.J.S.2C:35-5, N.J.S.2C:35-6 or section 1 of P.L.1987, c.101 (C.2C:35-7).
g. Any person who has been convicted under subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:39-4 of possessing a machine gun or assault firearm with intent to use it against the person of another, or of a crime under any of the following sections: N.J.S.2C:11-3, N.J.S.2C:11-4, N.J.S.2C:12-1b., N.J.S.2C:13-1, N.J.S.2C:14-2a., N.J.S.2C:14-3a., N.J.S.2C:15-1, N.J.S.2C:18-2, N.J.S.2C:29-5, N.J.S.2C:35-5, who, while in the course of committing or attempting to commit the crime, including the immediate flight therefrom, used or was in possession of a machine gun or assault firearm shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the court. The term of imprisonment shall include the imposition of a minimum term. The minimum term shall be fixed at 10 years for a crime of the first or second degree, five years for a crime of the third degree, or 18 months in the case of a fourth degree crime, during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole.
The minimum terms established by this section shall not prevent the court from imposing presumptive terms of imprisonment pursuant to paragraph (1) of subsection f. of N.J.S.2C:44-1 for crimes of the first degree.
A person who has been convicted of an offense enumerated in this subsection and who used or possessed a machine gun or assault firearm during its commission, attempted commission or flight therefrom and who has been previously convicted of an offense involving the use or possession of any firearm as defined in subsection d. of N.J.S.2C:44-3, shall be sentenced by the court to an extended term as authorized by subsection d. of N.J.S.2C:43-7, notwithstanding that extended terms are ordinarily discretionary with the court.
h. The court shall not impose a mandatory sentence pursuant to subsection g. of this section, subsections d. of N.J.S.2C:43-7 or N.J.S.2C:44-3, unless the ground therefor has been established at a hearing. At the hearing, which may occur at the time of sentencing, the prosecutor shall establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the weapon used or possessed was a machine gun or assault firearm. In making its finding, the court shall take judicial notice of any evidence, testimony or information adduced at the trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings and shall also consider the presentence report and any other relevant information.
i. A person who has been convicted under paragraph (6) of subsection b. of 2C:12-1 of causing bodily injury while eluding shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the court. The term of imprisonment shall include the imposition of a minimum term. The minimum term shall be fixed at, or between one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed by the court. The minimum term established by this subsection shall not prevent the court from imposing a presumptive term of imprisonment pursuant to paragraph (1) of subsection f. of 2C:44-1
2C:43-6.5 Mandatory minimum prison term for public officer, employee convicted of certain crimes; waiver, reduction.
6. a. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:43-6 and except as otherwise provided in subsection c. of this section, a person who serves or has served as a public officer or employee under the government of this State, or any political subdivision thereof, who is convicted of a crime that involves or touches such office or employment as set forth in subsection b. of this section, shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment without eligibility for parole as follows: for a crime of the fourth degree, the mandatory minimum term shall be one year; for a crime of the third degree, two years; for a crime of the second degree, five years; and for a crime of the first degree, 10 years; unless the provisions of any other law provide for a higher mandatory minimum term. As used in this subsection, "a crime that involves or touches such office or employment" means that the crime was related directly to the person's performance in, or circumstances flowing from, the specific public office or employment held by the person.
b. Subsection a. of this section applies to a conviction of any of the following crimes:
(1)Paragraph (4) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:13-5, criminal coercion;
(2)N.J.S.2C:20-4, theft by deception, if the amount involved exceeds $10,000;
(3)Subsection d. of N.J.S.2C:20-5, theft by extortion;
(4)N.J.S.2C:20-9, theft by failure to make required disposition of property received, if the amount involved exceeds $10,000;
(5)N.J.S.2C:21-10, commercial bribery;
(6)Section 3 of P.L.1994, c.121 (C.2C:21-25), money laundering;
(7)Section 97 of P.L.1999, c.440 (C.2C:21-34), false contract payment claims;
(8)N.J.S.2C:27-2, bribery in official matters;
(9)N.J.S.2C:27-3, threats and other improper influence in official and political matters;
(10) Section 100 of P.L.1999, c.440 (C.2C:27-9), unlawful official business transaction where interest is involved;
(11) Section 5 of P.L.2003, c.255 (C.2C:27-10), acceptance or receipt of unlawful benefit by public servant for official behavior;
(12) Section 6 of P.L.2003, c.255 (C.2C:27-11), offer of unlawful benefit to public servant for official behavior;
(13) N.J.S.2C:28-1, perjury;
(14) N.J.S.2C:28-5, tampering with witnesses;
(15) N.J.S.2C:28-7, tampering with public records or information;
(16) N.J.S.2C:29-4, compounding;
(17) N.J.S.2C:30-2, official misconduct;
(18) N.J.S.2C:30-3, speculating or wagering on official action or information; or
(19) Section 3 of P.L.2003, c.31 (C.2C:30-7), pattern of official misconduct.
c. (1) On motion by the prosecutor stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in a criminal investigation or prosecution of another person, the court may waive or reduce the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment required by subsection a. of this section. The appropriate waiver or reduction shall be determined by the court for reasons stated that may include, but are not limited to, consideration of the following:
(i)the court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defendant's assistance, giving substantial weight to the prosecutor's evaluation of the assistance rendered;
(ii)the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by the defendant;
(iii) the nature and extent of the defendant's assistance;
(iv)any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his family resulting from his assistance;
(v)the timeliness of the defendant's assistance.
In making such a determination, the court shall give substantial weight to the prosecutor's evaluation of the extent of the defendant's assistance, particularly where the extent and value of the assistance are difficult to ascertain.
(2)If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that extraordinary circumstances exist such that imposition of a mandatory minimum term would be a serious injustice which overrides the need to deter such conduct in others, the court may waive or reduce the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment required by subsection a. of this section. In making any such finding, the court must state with specificity its reasons for waiving or reducing the mandatory minimum sentence that would otherwise apply.
(3)If, pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection, the court waives or reduces the mandatory minimum term required by subsection a. of this section, such sentence shall not become final for 10 days in order to permit the appeal of the sentence by the prosecution.
d. (1) A prosecutor shall not recommend the admission into or consent to the referral to a pretrial intervention program of a person who serves or has served as a public officer or employee under the government of this State, or any political subdivision thereof, who is charged with a crime that involves or touches such office or employment as set forth in subsection b. of this section, without the prior approval of the Attorney General.
(2)A person who serves or has served as a public officer or employee under the government of this State, or any political subdivision thereof, who is convicted of a crime that involves or touches such office or employment as set forth in subsection b. of this section shall be ineligible for participation in any program of intensive supervision during any period of parole ineligibility .
e .The Attorney General shall develop guidelines to ensure the uniform exercise of discretion in making determinations regarding the waiver or reduction of a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment pursuant to paragraph (1) of subsection c. of this section and participation in a pretrial intervention program pursuant to paragraph (1) of subsection d. of this section.
L.2007, c.49, s.6.
2C:43-7 Sentence of imprisonment for crime; extended terms.
2C:43-7. Sentence of Imprisonment for Crime; Extended Terms.
a. In the cases designated in section 2C:44-3, a person who has been convicted of a crime may be sentenced, and in the cases designated in subsection e. of section 2 of P.L.1994, c.130 (C.2C:43-6.4), in subsection b. of section 2 of P.L.1995, c.126 (C.2C:43-7.1) and in the cases designated in section 1 of P.L.1997, c.410 (C.2C:44-5.1), a person who has been convicted of a crime shall be sentenced, to an extended term of imprisonment, as follows:
(1)In case of aggravated manslaughter sentenced under subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:11-4; or kidnapping when sentenced as a crime of the first degree under paragraph (1) of subsection c. of 2C:13-1; or aggravated sexual assault if the person is eligible for an extended term pursuant to the provisions of subsection g. of N.J.S.2C:44-3 for a specific term of years which shall be between 30 years and life imprisonment;
(2)Except for the crime of murder and except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection, in the case of a crime of the first degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between 20 years and life imprisonment;
(3)In the case of a crime of the second degree, for a term which shall be fixed by the court between 10 and 20 years;
(4)In the case of a crime of the third degree, for a term which shall be fixed by the court between five and 10 years;
(5)In the case of a crime of the fourth degree pursuant to 2C:43-6c, 2C:43-6g and 2C:44-3d for a term of five years, and in the case of a crime of the fourth degree pursuant to any other provision of law for a term which shall be fixed by the court between three and five years;
(6)In the case of the crime of murder, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court between 35 years and life imprisonment, of which the defendant shall serve 35 years before being eligible for parole;
(7)In the case of kidnapping under paragraph (2) of subsection c. of 2C:13-1, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court between 30 years and life imprisonment, of which the defendant shall serve 30 years before being eligible for parole.
b. As part of a sentence for an extended term and notwithstanding the provisions of 2C:43-9, the court may fix a minimum term not to exceed one-half of the term set pursuant to subsection a. during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole or a term of 25 years during which time the defendant shall not be eligible for parole where the sentence imposed was life imprisonment; provided that no defendant shall be eligible for parole at a date earlier than otherwise provided by the law governing parole.
c .In the case of a person sentenced to an extended term pursuant to 2C:43-6c, 2C:43-6f and 2C:44-3d, the court shall impose a sentence within the ranges permitted by 2C:43-7a(2), (3), (4) or (5) according to the degree or nature of the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced, which sentence shall include a minimum term which shall, except as may be specifically provided by N.J.S.2C:43-6f, be fixed at or between one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed by the court or five years, whichever is greater, during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole. Where the sentence imposed is life imprisonment, the court shall impose a minimum term of 25 years during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole, except that where the term of life imprisonment is imposed on a person convicted for a violation of N.J.S.2C:35-3, the term of parole ineligibility shall be 30 years.
d. In the case of a person sentenced to an extended term pursuant to N.J.S.2C:43-6g, the court shall impose a sentence within the ranges permitted by N.J.S.2C:43-7a(2), (3), (4) or (5) according to the degree or nature of the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced, which sentence shall include a minimum term which shall be fixed at 15 years for a crime of the first or second degree, eight years for a crime of the third degree, or five years for a crime of the fourth degree during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole. Where the sentence imposed is life imprisonment, the court shall impose a minimum term of 25 years during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole, except that where the term of life imprisonment is imposed on a person convicted of a violation of N.J.S.2C:35-3, the term of parole eligibility shall be 30 years.
2C:43-7.2 Mandatory service of 85% of sentence for certain offenses.
2. a. A court imposing a sentence of incarceration for a crime of the first or second degree enumerated in subsection d. of this section shall fix a minimum term of 85% of the sentence imposed, during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole.
b. The minimum term required by subsection a. of this section shall be fixed as a part of every sentence of incarceration imposed upon every conviction of a crime enumerated in subsection d. of this section, whether the sentence of incarceration is determined pursuant to N.J.S.2C:43-6, N.J.S.2C:43-7, N.J.S.2C:11-3 or any other provision of law, and shall be calculated based upon the sentence of incarceration actually imposed. The provisions of subsection a. of this section shall not be construed or applied to reduce the time that must be served before eligibility for parole by an inmate sentenced to a mandatory minimum period of incarceration. Solely for the purpose of calculating the minimum term of parole ineligibility pursuant to subsection a. of this section, a sentence of life imprisonment shall be deemed to be 75 years
c. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary and in addition to any other sentence imposed, a court imposing a minimum period of parole ineligibility of 85 percent of the sentence pursuant to this section shall also impose a five-year term of parole supervision if the defendant is being sentenced for a crime of the first degree, or a three-year term of parole supervision if the defendant is being sentenced for a crime of the second degree. The term of parole supervision shall commence upon the completion of the sentence of incarceration imposed by the court pursuant to subsection a. of this section unless the defendant is serving a sentence of incarceration for another crime at the time he completes the sentence of incarceration imposed pursuant to subsection a., in which case the term of parole supervision shall commence immediately upon the defendant's release from incarceration. During the term of parole supervision the defendant shall remain in release status in the community in the legal custody of the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections and shall be supervised by the State Parole Board as if on parole and shall be subject to the provisions and conditions of section 3 of P.L.1997, c.117 (C.30:4-123.51b).
d. The court shall impose sentence pursuant to subsection a. of this section upon conviction of the following crimes or an attempt or conspiracy to commit any of these crimes:
(1)N.J.S.2C:11-3, murder;
(2)N.J.S.2C:11-4, aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter;
(3)N.J.S.2C:11-5, vehicular homicide;
(4)subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:12-1, aggravated assault;
(5)subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:12-11, disarming a law enforcement officer;
(6)N.J.S.2C:13-1, kidnapping;
(7)subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:14-2, aggravated sexual assault;
(8)subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:14-2 and paragraph (1) of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:14-2, sexual assault;
(9)N.J.S.2C:15-1, robbery;
(10) section 1 of P.L.1993, c.221 (C.2C:15-2), carjacking;
(11) paragraph (1) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:17-1, aggravated arson;
(12) N.J.S.2C:18-2, burglary;
(13) subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:20-5, extortion;
(14) subsection b. of section 1 of P.L.1997, c.185 (C.2C:35-4.1), booby traps in manufacturing or distribution facilities; or
(15) N.J.S.2C:35-9, strict liability for drug induced deaths.
(16) section 2 of P.L.2002, c.26 (C.2C:38-2), terrorism; or
(17) section 3 of P.L.2002, c.26 (C.2C:38-3), producing or possessing chemical weapons, biological agents or nuclear or radiological devices.
e.(Deleted by amendment, P.L.2001, c.129).
L.1997,c.117,s.2; amended 2001, c.79, s.16; 2001, c.129, s.1; 2002, c.26, s.19.
2C:43-8. Sentence of imprisonment for disorderly persons offenses and petty disorderly persons offenses
A person who has been convicted of a disorderly persons offense or a petty disorderly persons offense may be sentenced to imprisonment for a definite term which shall be fixed by the court and shall not exceed 6 months in the case of a disorderly persons offense or 30 days in the case of a petty disorderly persons offense.
2C:2-4. Ignorance or mistake as a defense to a crime
2C:2-4. Ignorance or mistake as a defense to a crime
a. Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is a defense if the defendant reasonably arrived at the conclusion underlying the mistake and:
(1) It negatives the culpable mental state required to establish the offense; or
(2) The law provides that the state of mind established by such ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense.
b. Although ignorance or mistake would otherwise afford a defense to the offense charged, the defense is not available if the defendant would be guilty of another offense had the situation been as he supposed. In such case, however, the ignorance or mistake of the defendant shall reduce the grade and degree of the offense of which he may be convicted to those of the offense of which he would be guilty had the situation been as he supposed.
c. A belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense is a defense to a prosecution for that offense based upon such conduct when:
(1) The statute defining the offense is not known to the actor and has not been published or otherwise reasonably made available prior to the conduct alleged; or
(2) The actor acts in reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law, afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous, contained in (a) a statute, (b) judicial decision, opinion, judgment, or rule, (c) an administrative order or grant of permission, or (d) an official interpretation of the public officer or body charged by law with responsibility for the interpretation, administration or enforcement of the law defining the offense; or
(3) The actor otherwise diligently pursues all means available to ascertain the meaning and application of the offense to his conduct and honestly and in good faith concludes his conduct is not an offense in circumstances in which a law-abiding and prudent person would also so conclude.
The defendant must prove a defense arising under subsection c. of this section by clear and convincing evidence.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-4, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:2-5. Defenses generally
Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is excused or alleviated by reason of any defense now provided by law for which neither the code nor other statutory law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved and a legislative purpose to exclude the defense claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-5, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
a. Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is a defense if the defendant reasonably arrived at the conclusion underlying the mistake and:
(1) It negatives the culpable mental state required to establish the offense; or
(2) The law provides that the state of mind established by such ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense.
b. Although ignorance or mistake would otherwise afford a defense to the offense charged, the defense is not available if the defendant would be guilty of another offense had the situation been as he supposed. In such case, however, the ignorance or mistake of the defendant shall reduce the grade and degree of the offense of which he may be convicted to those of the offense of which he would be guilty had the situation been as he supposed.
c. A belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense is a defense to a prosecution for that offense based upon such conduct when:
(1) The statute defining the offense is not known to the actor and has not been published or otherwise reasonably made available prior to the conduct alleged; or
(2) The actor acts in reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law, afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous, contained in (a) a statute, (b) judicial decision, opinion, judgment, or rule, (c) an administrative order or grant of permission, or (d) an official interpretation of the public officer or body charged by law with responsibility for the interpretation, administration or enforcement of the law defining the offense; or
(3) The actor otherwise diligently pursues all means available to ascertain the meaning and application of the offense to his conduct and honestly and in good faith concludes his conduct is not an offense in circumstances in which a law-abiding and prudent person would also so conclude.
The defendant must prove a defense arising under subsection c. of this section by clear and convincing evidence.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-4, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:2-5. Defenses generally
Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is excused or alleviated by reason of any defense now provided by law for which neither the code nor other statutory law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved and a legislative purpose to exclude the defense claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-5, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:11-3 Homicide Murder
2C:11-3 Homicide Murder
2C:11-1.Definitions
2C:11-3 Homicide Murder
2C:11-1. Definitions.
In chapters 11 through 15, unless a different meaning plainly is required:
a. "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition;
b. "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ;
c. "Deadly weapon" means any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used, is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury or which in the manner it is fashioned would lead the victim reasonably to believe it to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury;
d. "Significant bodily injury" means bodily injury which creates a temporary loss of the function of any bodily member or organ or temporary loss of any one of the five senses.
L.1978, c.95; amended 1979,c.178,s.19; 1981,c.384,s.1; 1995,c.307,s.1.
?2C:11-2. Criminal homicide
a. A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he purposely, knowingly, recklessly or, under the circumstances set forth in section 2C:11-5, causes the death of another human being
b. Criminal homicide is murder, manslaughter or death by auto.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:11-2, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 20, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:11-2.1. Elapse of time between assault and death, prosecution for criminal homicide
The length of time which has elapsed between the initial assault and the death of the victim shall not be a bar to prosecution of the actor for criminal homicide.
2C:11-3 Murder.
2C:11-3. Murder.
a. Except as provided in N.J.S.2C:11-4, criminal homicide constitutes murder when:
(1)The actor purposely causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death; or
(2)The actor knowingly causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death; or
(3)It is committed when the actor, acting either alone or with one or more other persons, is engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping, carjacking, criminal escape or terrorism pursuant to section 2 of P.L.2002, c.26 (C.2C:38-2), and in the course of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, any person causes the death of a person other than one of the participants; except that in any prosecution under this subsection, in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant:
(a)Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof; and
(b)Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article or substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons; and
(c)Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article or substance; and
(d)Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury.
b. (1) Murder is a crime of the first degree but a person convicted of murder shall be sentenced, except as provided in subsection c. of this section, by the court to a term of 30 years, during which the person shall not be eligible for parole, or be sentenced to a specific term of years which shall be between 30 years and life imprisonment of which the person shall serve 30 years before being eligible for parole.
(2)If the victim was a law enforcement officer and was murdered while performing his official duties or was murdered because of his status as a law enforcement officer, the person convicted of that murder shall be sentenced, except as otherwise provided in subsection c. of this section, by the court to a term of life imprisonment, during which the person shall not be eligible for parole.
(3)A person convicted of murder and who is not sentenced to death under this section shall be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole if the murder was committed under all of the following circumstances:
(a)The victim is less than 14 years old; and
(b)The act is committed in the course of the commission, whether alone or with one or more persons, of a violation of N.J.S.2C:14-2 or N.J.S.2C:14-3.
(4)If the defendant was subject to sentencing pursuant to subsection c. and the jury or court found the existence of one or more aggravating factors, but that such factors did not outweigh the mitigating factors found to exist by the jury or court or the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to the weight of the factors, the defendant shall be sentenced by the court to a term of life imprisonment during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole.
With respect to a sentence imposed pursuant to this subsection, the defendant shall not be entitled to a deduction of commutation and work credits from that sentence.
c. Any person convicted under subsection a.(1) or (2) who committed the homicidal act by his own conduct; or who as an accomplice procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value; or who, as a leader of a narcotics trafficking network as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 and in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3, commanded or by threat or promise solicited the commission of the offense, or, if the murder occurred during the commission of the crime of terrorism, any person who committed the crime of terrorism, shall be sentenced as provided hereinafter:
(1)The court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or pursuant to the provisions of subsection b. of this section.
Where the defendant has been tried by a jury, the proceeding shall be conducted by the judge who presided at the trial and before the jury which determined the defendant's guilt, except that, for good cause, the court may discharge that jury and conduct the proceeding before a jury empaneled for the purpose of the proceeding. Where the defendant has entered a plea of guilty or has been tried without a jury, the proceeding shall be conducted by the judge who accepted the defendant's plea or who determined the defendant's guilt and before a jury empaneled for the purpose of the proceeding. On motion of the defendant and with consent of the prosecuting attorney the court may conduct a proceeding without a jury. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prevent the participation of an alternate juror in the sentencing proceeding if one of the jurors who rendered the guilty verdict becomes ill or is otherwise unable to proceed before or during the sentencing proceeding.
(2) (a) At the proceeding, the State shall have the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of any aggravating factors set forth in paragraph (4) of this subsection. The defendant shall have the burden of producing evidence of the existence of any mitigating factors set forth in paragraph (5) of this subsection but shall not have a burden with regard to the establishment of a mitigating factor.
(b)The admissibility of evidence offered by the State to establish any of the aggravating factors shall be governed by the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials. The defendant may offer, without regard to the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials, reliable evidence relevant to any of the mitigating factors. If the defendant produces evidence in mitigation which would not be admissible under the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials, the State may rebut that evidence without regard to the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials
(c)Evidence admitted at the trial, which is relevant to the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in paragraphs (4) and (5) of this subsection, shall be considered without the necessity of reintroducing that evidence at the sentencing proceeding; provided that the fact finder at the sentencing proceeding was present as either the fact finder or the judge at the trial.
(d)The State and the defendant shall be permitted to rebut any evidence presented by the other party at the sentencing proceeding and to present argument as to the adequacy of the evidence to establish the existence of any aggravating or mitigating factor.
(e)Prior to the commencement of the sentencing proceeding, or at such time as he has knowledge of the existence of an aggravating factor, the prosecuting attorney shall give notice to the defendant of the aggravating factors which he intends to prove in the proceeding.
(f)Evidence offered by the State with regard to the establishment of a prior homicide conviction pursuant to paragraph (4)(a) of this subsection may include the identity and age of the victim, the manner of death and the relationship, if any, of the victim to the defendant.
(3)The jury or, if there is no jury, the court shall return a special verdict setting forth in writing the existence or nonexistence of each of the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in paragraphs (4) and (5) of this subsection. If any aggravating factor is found to exist, the verdict shall also state whether it outweighs beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more mitigating factors.
(a)If the jury or the court finds that any aggravating factors exist and that all of the aggravating factors outweigh beyond a reasonable doubt all of the mitigating factors, the court shall sentence the defendant to death.
(b)If the jury or the court finds that no aggravating factors exist, or that all of the aggravating factors which exist do not outweigh all of the mitigating factors, the court shall sentence the defendant pursuant to subsection b.
(c)If the jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict, the court shall sentence the defendant pursuant to subsection b.
(4)The aggravating factors which may be found by the jury or the court are:
(a)The defendant has been convicted, at any time, of another murder. For purposes of this section, a conviction shall be deemed final when sentence is imposed and may be used as an aggravating factor regardless of whether it is on appeal;
(b)In the commission of the murder, the defendant purposely or knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim;
(c)The murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated assault to the victim;
(d)The defendant committed the murder as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt of anything of pecuniary value;
(e)The defendant procured the commission of the murder by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value;
(f)The murder was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, punishment or confinement for another offense committed by the defendant or another;
(g)The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit murder, robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping, carjacking or the crime of contempt in violation of N.J.S.2C:29-9b.;
(h)The defendant murdered a public servant, as defined in N.J.S.2C:27-1, while the victim was engaged in the performance of his official duties, or because of the victim's status as a public servant;
(i)The defendant: (i) as a leader of a narcotics trafficking network as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 and in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3, committed, commanded or by threat or promise solicited the commission of the murder or (ii) committed the murder at the direction of a leader of a narcotics trafficking network as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3;
(j)The homicidal act that the defendant committed or procured was in violation of paragraph (1) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:17-2;
(k)The victim was less than 14 years old; or
(l)The murder was committed during the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, terrorism pursuant to section 2 of P.L.2002, c.26 (C.2C:38-2).
(5)The mitigating factors which may be found by the jury or the court are:
(a)The defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution;
(b)The victim solicited, participated in or consented to the conduct which resulted in his death;
(c)The age of the defendant at the time of the murder;
(d)The defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired as the result of mental disease or defect or intoxication, but not to a degree sufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution;
(e)The defendant was under unusual and substantial duress insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution;
(f)The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity;
(g)The defendant rendered substantial assistance to the State in the prosecution of another person for the crime of murder; or
(h)Any other factor which is relevant to the defendant's character or record or to the circumstances of the offense.
(6)When a defendant at a sentencing proceeding presents evidence of the defendant's character or record pursuant to subparagraph (h) of paragraph (5) of this subsection, the State may present evidence of the murder victim's character and background and of the impact of the murder on the victim's survivors. If the jury finds that the State has proven at least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt and the jury finds the existence of a mitigating factor pursuant to subparagraph (h) of paragraph (5) of this subsection, the jury may consider the victim and survivor evidence presented by the State pursuant to this paragraph in determining the appropriate weight to give mitigating evidence presented pursuant to subparagraph (h) of paragraph (5) of this subsection. As used in this paragraph "victim and survivor evidence" may include the display of a photograph of the victim taken before the homicide.
d. The sentencing proceeding set forth in subsection c. of this section shall not be waived by the prosecuting attorney.
e. Every judgment of conviction which results in a sentence of death under this section shall be appealed, pursuant to the Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. Upon the request of the defendant, the Supreme Court shall also determine whether the sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. Proportionality review under this section shall be limited to a comparison of similar cases in which a sentence of death has been imposed under subsection c. of this section. In any instance in which the defendant fails, or refuses to appeal, the appeal shall be taken by the Office of the Public Defender or other counsel appointed by the Supreme Court for that purpose.
f. Prior to the jury's sentencing deliberations, the trial court shall inform the jury of the sentences which may be imposed pursuant to subsection b. of this section on the defendant if the defendant is not sentenced to death. The jury shall also be informed that a failure to reach a unanimous verdict shall result in sentencing by the court pursuant to subsection b.
g. A juvenile who has been tried as an adult and convicted of murder shall not be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of subsection c. but shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of subsection b. of this section.
h. In a sentencing proceeding conducted pursuant to this section, no evidence shall be admissible concerning the method or manner of execution which would be imposed on a defendant sentenced to death.
i. For purposes of this section the term "homicidal act" shall mean conduct that causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death.
j. In a sentencing proceeding conducted pursuant to this section, the display of a photograph of the victim taken before the homicide shall be permitted.
L.1978, c.95; amended 1979, c.178, s.21; 1981, c.290, s.12; 1982, c.111, s.1; 1985, c.178, s.2; 1985, c.478; 1992, c.5; 1992, c.76; 1993, c.27; 1993, c.111; 1993, c.206; 1994, c.132; 1995, c.123; 1996, c.115, s.1; 1997, c.60, s.1; 1998, c.25; 1999, c.209; 1999, c.294, s.1; 2000, c.88; 2002, c.26, s.10
?2C:11-3a. Adoption of court rules concerning photo of homicide victim
3.The Supreme Court may adopt court rules pertaining to the display of a photograph of a homicide victim in court as permitted in N.J.S.2C:11-3 concerning murder and in section 3 of P.L.1985, c.249 (C.52:4B-36) concerning other homicide prosecutions. These court rules may include, but shall not be limited to, the following matters to ensure uniformity in all homicide prosecutions:
a. the size of the photograph;
b. the duration of the display;
c. the location of the photograph in the courtroom.
2C:11-1.Definitions
2C:11-3 Homicide Murder
2C:11-1. Definitions.
In chapters 11 through 15, unless a different meaning plainly is required:
a. "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition;
b. "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ;
c. "Deadly weapon" means any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used, is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury or which in the manner it is fashioned would lead the victim reasonably to believe it to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury;
d. "Significant bodily injury" means bodily injury which creates a temporary loss of the function of any bodily member or organ or temporary loss of any one of the five senses.
L.1978, c.95; amended 1979,c.178,s.19; 1981,c.384,s.1; 1995,c.307,s.1.
?2C:11-2. Criminal homicide
a. A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he purposely, knowingly, recklessly or, under the circumstances set forth in section 2C:11-5, causes the death of another human being
b. Criminal homicide is murder, manslaughter or death by auto.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:11-2, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 20, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:11-2.1. Elapse of time between assault and death, prosecution for criminal homicide
The length of time which has elapsed between the initial assault and the death of the victim shall not be a bar to prosecution of the actor for criminal homicide.
2C:11-3 Murder.
2C:11-3. Murder.
a. Except as provided in N.J.S.2C:11-4, criminal homicide constitutes murder when:
(1)The actor purposely causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death; or
(2)The actor knowingly causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death; or
(3)It is committed when the actor, acting either alone or with one or more other persons, is engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping, carjacking, criminal escape or terrorism pursuant to section 2 of P.L.2002, c.26 (C.2C:38-2), and in the course of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, any person causes the death of a person other than one of the participants; except that in any prosecution under this subsection, in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant:
(a)Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof; and
(b)Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article or substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons; and
(c)Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article or substance; and
(d)Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury.
b. (1) Murder is a crime of the first degree but a person convicted of murder shall be sentenced, except as provided in subsection c. of this section, by the court to a term of 30 years, during which the person shall not be eligible for parole, or be sentenced to a specific term of years which shall be between 30 years and life imprisonment of which the person shall serve 30 years before being eligible for parole.
(2)If the victim was a law enforcement officer and was murdered while performing his official duties or was murdered because of his status as a law enforcement officer, the person convicted of that murder shall be sentenced, except as otherwise provided in subsection c. of this section, by the court to a term of life imprisonment, during which the person shall not be eligible for parole.
(3)A person convicted of murder and who is not sentenced to death under this section shall be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole if the murder was committed under all of the following circumstances:
(a)The victim is less than 14 years old; and
(b)The act is committed in the course of the commission, whether alone or with one or more persons, of a violation of N.J.S.2C:14-2 or N.J.S.2C:14-3.
(4)If the defendant was subject to sentencing pursuant to subsection c. and the jury or court found the existence of one or more aggravating factors, but that such factors did not outweigh the mitigating factors found to exist by the jury or court or the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to the weight of the factors, the defendant shall be sentenced by the court to a term of life imprisonment during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole.
With respect to a sentence imposed pursuant to this subsection, the defendant shall not be entitled to a deduction of commutation and work credits from that sentence.
c. Any person convicted under subsection a.(1) or (2) who committed the homicidal act by his own conduct; or who as an accomplice procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value; or who, as a leader of a narcotics trafficking network as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 and in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3, commanded or by threat or promise solicited the commission of the offense, or, if the murder occurred during the commission of the crime of terrorism, any person who committed the crime of terrorism, shall be sentenced as provided hereinafter:
(1)The court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or pursuant to the provisions of subsection b. of this section.
Where the defendant has been tried by a jury, the proceeding shall be conducted by the judge who presided at the trial and before the jury which determined the defendant's guilt, except that, for good cause, the court may discharge that jury and conduct the proceeding before a jury empaneled for the purpose of the proceeding. Where the defendant has entered a plea of guilty or has been tried without a jury, the proceeding shall be conducted by the judge who accepted the defendant's plea or who determined the defendant's guilt and before a jury empaneled for the purpose of the proceeding. On motion of the defendant and with consent of the prosecuting attorney the court may conduct a proceeding without a jury. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prevent the participation of an alternate juror in the sentencing proceeding if one of the jurors who rendered the guilty verdict becomes ill or is otherwise unable to proceed before or during the sentencing proceeding.
(2) (a) At the proceeding, the State shall have the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of any aggravating factors set forth in paragraph (4) of this subsection. The defendant shall have the burden of producing evidence of the existence of any mitigating factors set forth in paragraph (5) of this subsection but shall not have a burden with regard to the establishment of a mitigating factor.
(b)The admissibility of evidence offered by the State to establish any of the aggravating factors shall be governed by the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials. The defendant may offer, without regard to the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials, reliable evidence relevant to any of the mitigating factors. If the defendant produces evidence in mitigation which would not be admissible under the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials, the State may rebut that evidence without regard to the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials
(c)Evidence admitted at the trial, which is relevant to the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in paragraphs (4) and (5) of this subsection, shall be considered without the necessity of reintroducing that evidence at the sentencing proceeding; provided that the fact finder at the sentencing proceeding was present as either the fact finder or the judge at the trial.
(d)The State and the defendant shall be permitted to rebut any evidence presented by the other party at the sentencing proceeding and to present argument as to the adequacy of the evidence to establish the existence of any aggravating or mitigating factor.
(e)Prior to the commencement of the sentencing proceeding, or at such time as he has knowledge of the existence of an aggravating factor, the prosecuting attorney shall give notice to the defendant of the aggravating factors which he intends to prove in the proceeding.
(f)Evidence offered by the State with regard to the establishment of a prior homicide conviction pursuant to paragraph (4)(a) of this subsection may include the identity and age of the victim, the manner of death and the relationship, if any, of the victim to the defendant.
(3)The jury or, if there is no jury, the court shall return a special verdict setting forth in writing the existence or nonexistence of each of the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in paragraphs (4) and (5) of this subsection. If any aggravating factor is found to exist, the verdict shall also state whether it outweighs beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more mitigating factors.
(a)If the jury or the court finds that any aggravating factors exist and that all of the aggravating factors outweigh beyond a reasonable doubt all of the mitigating factors, the court shall sentence the defendant to death.
(b)If the jury or the court finds that no aggravating factors exist, or that all of the aggravating factors which exist do not outweigh all of the mitigating factors, the court shall sentence the defendant pursuant to subsection b.
(c)If the jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict, the court shall sentence the defendant pursuant to subsection b.
(4)The aggravating factors which may be found by the jury or the court are:
(a)The defendant has been convicted, at any time, of another murder. For purposes of this section, a conviction shall be deemed final when sentence is imposed and may be used as an aggravating factor regardless of whether it is on appeal;
(b)In the commission of the murder, the defendant purposely or knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim;
(c)The murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated assault to the victim;
(d)The defendant committed the murder as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt of anything of pecuniary value;
(e)The defendant procured the commission of the murder by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value;
(f)The murder was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, punishment or confinement for another offense committed by the defendant or another;
(g)The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit murder, robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping, carjacking or the crime of contempt in violation of N.J.S.2C:29-9b.;
(h)The defendant murdered a public servant, as defined in N.J.S.2C:27-1, while the victim was engaged in the performance of his official duties, or because of the victim's status as a public servant;
(i)The defendant: (i) as a leader of a narcotics trafficking network as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 and in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3, committed, commanded or by threat or promise solicited the commission of the murder or (ii) committed the murder at the direction of a leader of a narcotics trafficking network as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3;
(j)The homicidal act that the defendant committed or procured was in violation of paragraph (1) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:17-2;
(k)The victim was less than 14 years old; or
(l)The murder was committed during the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, terrorism pursuant to section 2 of P.L.2002, c.26 (C.2C:38-2).
(5)The mitigating factors which may be found by the jury or the court are:
(a)The defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution;
(b)The victim solicited, participated in or consented to the conduct which resulted in his death;
(c)The age of the defendant at the time of the murder;
(d)The defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired as the result of mental disease or defect or intoxication, but not to a degree sufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution;
(e)The defendant was under unusual and substantial duress insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution;
(f)The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity;
(g)The defendant rendered substantial assistance to the State in the prosecution of another person for the crime of murder; or
(h)Any other factor which is relevant to the defendant's character or record or to the circumstances of the offense.
(6)When a defendant at a sentencing proceeding presents evidence of the defendant's character or record pursuant to subparagraph (h) of paragraph (5) of this subsection, the State may present evidence of the murder victim's character and background and of the impact of the murder on the victim's survivors. If the jury finds that the State has proven at least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt and the jury finds the existence of a mitigating factor pursuant to subparagraph (h) of paragraph (5) of this subsection, the jury may consider the victim and survivor evidence presented by the State pursuant to this paragraph in determining the appropriate weight to give mitigating evidence presented pursuant to subparagraph (h) of paragraph (5) of this subsection. As used in this paragraph "victim and survivor evidence" may include the display of a photograph of the victim taken before the homicide.
d. The sentencing proceeding set forth in subsection c. of this section shall not be waived by the prosecuting attorney.
e. Every judgment of conviction which results in a sentence of death under this section shall be appealed, pursuant to the Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. Upon the request of the defendant, the Supreme Court shall also determine whether the sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. Proportionality review under this section shall be limited to a comparison of similar cases in which a sentence of death has been imposed under subsection c. of this section. In any instance in which the defendant fails, or refuses to appeal, the appeal shall be taken by the Office of the Public Defender or other counsel appointed by the Supreme Court for that purpose.
f. Prior to the jury's sentencing deliberations, the trial court shall inform the jury of the sentences which may be imposed pursuant to subsection b. of this section on the defendant if the defendant is not sentenced to death. The jury shall also be informed that a failure to reach a unanimous verdict shall result in sentencing by the court pursuant to subsection b.
g. A juvenile who has been tried as an adult and convicted of murder shall not be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of subsection c. but shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of subsection b. of this section.
h. In a sentencing proceeding conducted pursuant to this section, no evidence shall be admissible concerning the method or manner of execution which would be imposed on a defendant sentenced to death.
i. For purposes of this section the term "homicidal act" shall mean conduct that causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death.
j. In a sentencing proceeding conducted pursuant to this section, the display of a photograph of the victim taken before the homicide shall be permitted.
L.1978, c.95; amended 1979, c.178, s.21; 1981, c.290, s.12; 1982, c.111, s.1; 1985, c.178, s.2; 1985, c.478; 1992, c.5; 1992, c.76; 1993, c.27; 1993, c.111; 1993, c.206; 1994, c.132; 1995, c.123; 1996, c.115, s.1; 1997, c.60, s.1; 1998, c.25; 1999, c.209; 1999, c.294, s.1; 2000, c.88; 2002, c.26, s.10
?2C:11-3a. Adoption of court rules concerning photo of homicide victim
3.The Supreme Court may adopt court rules pertaining to the display of a photograph of a homicide victim in court as permitted in N.J.S.2C:11-3 concerning murder and in section 3 of P.L.1985, c.249 (C.52:4B-36) concerning other homicide prosecutions. These court rules may include, but shall not be limited to, the following matters to ensure uniformity in all homicide prosecutions:
a. the size of the photograph;
b. the duration of the display;
c. the location of the photograph in the courtroom.
2C:29-3 Hindering Apprehension or Prosecution
2C:29-3 Hindering Apprehension or Prosecution
a. A person commits an offense if, with purpose to hinder the detention, apprehension, investigation, prosecution, conviction or punishment of another for an offense or violation of Title 39 of the New Jersey Statutes or a violation of chapter 33A of Title 17 of the Revised Statutes he:
(1)Harbors or conceals the other;
(2)Provides or aids in providing a weapon, money, transportation, disguise or other means of avoiding discovery or apprehension or effecting escape;
(3)Suppresses, by way of concealment or destruction, any evidence of the crime, or tampers with a witness, informant, document or other source of information, regardless of its admissibility in evidence, which might aid in the discovery or apprehension of such person or in the lodging of a charge against him;
(4)Warns the other of impending discovery or apprehension, except that this paragraph does not apply to a warning given in connection with an effort to bring another into compliance with law;
(5)Prevents or obstructs, by means of force, intimidation or deception, anyone from performing an act which might aid in the discovery or apprehension of such person or in the lodging of a charge against him;
(6)Aids such person to protect or expeditiously profit from an advantage derived from such crime; or
(7)Gives false information to a law enforcement officer or a civil State investigator assigned to the Office of the Insurance Fraud Prosecutor established by section 32 of P.L.1998, c.21 (C.17:33A-16).
The offense is a crime of the third degree if the conduct which the actor knows has been charged or is liable to be charged against the person aided would constitute a crime of the second degree or greater, unless the actor is a spouse, parent or child of the person aided, in which case the offense is a crime of the fourth degree. The offense is a crime of the fourth degree if such conduct would constitute a crime of the third degree. Otherwise it is a disorderly persons offense.
b.A person commits an offense if, with purpose to hinder his own detention, apprehension, investigation, prosecution, conviction or punishment for an offense or violation of Title 39 of the New Jersey Statutes or a violation of chapter 33A of Title 17 of the Revised Statutes, he:
(1)Suppresses, by way of concealment or destruction, any evidence of the crime or tampers with a document or other source of information, regardless of its admissibility in evidence, which might aid in his discovery or apprehension or in the lodging of a charge against him; or
(2)Prevents or obstructs by means of force or intimidation anyone from performing an act which might aid in his discovery or apprehension or in the lodging of a charge against him; or
(3)Prevents or obstructs by means of force, intimidation or deception any witness or informant from providing testimony or information, regardless of its admissibility, which might aid in his discovery or apprehension or in the lodging of a charge against him; or
(4)Gives false information to a law enforcement officer or a civil State investigator assigned to the Office of the Insurance Fraud Prosecutor established by section 32 of P.L.1998, c.21 (C.17:33A-16).
The offense is a crime of the third degree if the conduct which the actor knows has been charged or is liable to be charged against him would constitute a crime of the second degree or greater. The offense is a crime of the fourth degree if such conduct would constitute a crime of the third degree. Otherwise it is a disorderly persons offense.
L.1978, c.95; amended 1981, c.290, s.29; amended 1999, c.297.
a. A person commits an offense if, with purpose to hinder the detention, apprehension, investigation, prosecution, conviction or punishment of another for an offense or violation of Title 39 of the New Jersey Statutes or a violation of chapter 33A of Title 17 of the Revised Statutes he:
(1)Harbors or conceals the other;
(2)Provides or aids in providing a weapon, money, transportation, disguise or other means of avoiding discovery or apprehension or effecting escape;
(3)Suppresses, by way of concealment or destruction, any evidence of the crime, or tampers with a witness, informant, document or other source of information, regardless of its admissibility in evidence, which might aid in the discovery or apprehension of such person or in the lodging of a charge against him;
(4)Warns the other of impending discovery or apprehension, except that this paragraph does not apply to a warning given in connection with an effort to bring another into compliance with law;
(5)Prevents or obstructs, by means of force, intimidation or deception, anyone from performing an act which might aid in the discovery or apprehension of such person or in the lodging of a charge against him;
(6)Aids such person to protect or expeditiously profit from an advantage derived from such crime; or
(7)Gives false information to a law enforcement officer or a civil State investigator assigned to the Office of the Insurance Fraud Prosecutor established by section 32 of P.L.1998, c.21 (C.17:33A-16).
The offense is a crime of the third degree if the conduct which the actor knows has been charged or is liable to be charged against the person aided would constitute a crime of the second degree or greater, unless the actor is a spouse, parent or child of the person aided, in which case the offense is a crime of the fourth degree. The offense is a crime of the fourth degree if such conduct would constitute a crime of the third degree. Otherwise it is a disorderly persons offense.
b.A person commits an offense if, with purpose to hinder his own detention, apprehension, investigation, prosecution, conviction or punishment for an offense or violation of Title 39 of the New Jersey Statutes or a violation of chapter 33A of Title 17 of the Revised Statutes, he:
(1)Suppresses, by way of concealment or destruction, any evidence of the crime or tampers with a document or other source of information, regardless of its admissibility in evidence, which might aid in his discovery or apprehension or in the lodging of a charge against him; or
(2)Prevents or obstructs by means of force or intimidation anyone from performing an act which might aid in his discovery or apprehension or in the lodging of a charge against him; or
(3)Prevents or obstructs by means of force, intimidation or deception any witness or informant from providing testimony or information, regardless of its admissibility, which might aid in his discovery or apprehension or in the lodging of a charge against him; or
(4)Gives false information to a law enforcement officer or a civil State investigator assigned to the Office of the Insurance Fraud Prosecutor established by section 32 of P.L.1998, c.21 (C.17:33A-16).
The offense is a crime of the third degree if the conduct which the actor knows has been charged or is liable to be charged against him would constitute a crime of the second degree or greater. The offense is a crime of the fourth degree if such conduct would constitute a crime of the third degree. Otherwise it is a disorderly persons offense.
L.1978, c.95; amended 1981, c.290, s.29; amended 1999, c.297.
Harassment
Harassment
Under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, a person commits the offense of harassment if, "with purpose to harass" he:
a. Makes, or causes to be made, a communication or communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm;
b. Subjects another to striking, kicking, shoving, or other offensive touching, or threatens to do so; or
c. Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person.
Thus, "integral to a finding of harassment under either section is the establishment of the purpose to harass . . . ." Corrente v. Corrente, 281 N.J. Super. 243, 249 (App. Div. 1995).
As was emphasized in Corrente, it is not sufficient that plaintiff feel alarmed or threatened. Id. at 249. Plaintiff's subjective feelings are not a substitute for the required judicial finding of intent to harass by the defendant.
In a deeply dysfunctional marriage, it is not uncommon for emotions to boil over, and for angry words to be hurdled about, often peppered with profanities. Under similar circumstances, we have held that a husband's statement that he would bury his wife, uttered after she announced her intention to obtain a divorce, did not constitute harassment. Peranio v. Peranio, 280 N.J. Super. 47, 56 (App. Div. 1995). Even the exchange of vulgarities on numerous occasions and inappropriate expressions of anger, including kicking a garbage can in the presence of the parties' young children, is not harassment. J.N.S. v. D.B.S., 302 N.J. Super. 525, 527 (App. Div. 1997).
Finding a party guilty of having committed an act of domestic violence is a serious matter. We have repeatedly held that domestic violence restraining orders have serious consequences to a defendant, and therefore should not be entered without an adequate factual basis. Chernesky v. Fedorczyk, 346 N.J. Super. 34, 41 (App. Div. 2001). The absence of the statutorily required judicial finding compels a court to vacate the restraints imposed by the court.
Under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, a person commits the offense of harassment if, "with purpose to harass" he:
a. Makes, or causes to be made, a communication or communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm;
b. Subjects another to striking, kicking, shoving, or other offensive touching, or threatens to do so; or
c. Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person.
Thus, "integral to a finding of harassment under either section is the establishment of the purpose to harass . . . ." Corrente v. Corrente, 281 N.J. Super. 243, 249 (App. Div. 1995).
As was emphasized in Corrente, it is not sufficient that plaintiff feel alarmed or threatened. Id. at 249. Plaintiff's subjective feelings are not a substitute for the required judicial finding of intent to harass by the defendant.
In a deeply dysfunctional marriage, it is not uncommon for emotions to boil over, and for angry words to be hurdled about, often peppered with profanities. Under similar circumstances, we have held that a husband's statement that he would bury his wife, uttered after she announced her intention to obtain a divorce, did not constitute harassment. Peranio v. Peranio, 280 N.J. Super. 47, 56 (App. Div. 1995). Even the exchange of vulgarities on numerous occasions and inappropriate expressions of anger, including kicking a garbage can in the presence of the parties' young children, is not harassment. J.N.S. v. D.B.S., 302 N.J. Super. 525, 527 (App. Div. 1997).
Finding a party guilty of having committed an act of domestic violence is a serious matter. We have repeatedly held that domestic violence restraining orders have serious consequences to a defendant, and therefore should not be entered without an adequate factual basis. Chernesky v. Fedorczyk, 346 N.J. Super. 34, 41 (App. Div. 2001). The absence of the statutorily required judicial finding compels a court to vacate the restraints imposed by the court.
Wednesday, July 22, 2009
Gun Possession Charges
Gun Possession Charges
2C:39-3. Prohibited Weapons and Devices.
a. Destructive devices. Any person who knowingly has in his possession any destructive device is guilty of a crime of the third degree.
b. Sawed-off shotguns. Any person who knowingly has in his possession any sawed-off shotgun is guilty of a crime of the third degree.
c. Silencers. Any person who knowingly has in his possession any firearm silencer is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.
d. Defaced firearms. Any person who knowingly has in his possession any firearm which has been defaced, except an antique firearm or an antique handgun, is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.
e. Certain weapons. Any person who knowingly has in his possession any gravity knife, switchblade knife, dagger, dirk, stiletto, billy, blackjack, metal knuckle, sandclub, slingshot, cestus or similar leather band studded with metal filings or razor blades imbedded in wood, ballistic knife, without any explainable lawful purpose, is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.
f. Dum-dum or body armor penetrating bullets. (1) Any person, other than a law enforcement officer or persons engaged in activities pursuant to subsection f. of N.J.S. 2C:39-6, who knowingly has in his possession any hollow nose or dum-dum bullet, or (2) any person, other than a collector of firearms or ammunition as curios or relics as defined in Title 18, United States Code, section 921 (a) (13) and has in his possession a valid Collector of Curios and Relics License issued by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, who knowingly has in his possession any body armor breaching or penetrating ammunition, which means: (a) ammunition primarily designed for use in a handgun, and (b) which is comprised of a bullet whose core or jacket, if the jacket is thicker than .025 of an inch, is made of tungsten carbide, or hard bronze, or other material which is harder than a rating of 72 or greater on the Rockwell B. Hardness Scale, and (c) is therefore capable of breaching or penetrating body armor, is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree. For purposes of this section, a collector may possess not more than three examples of each distinctive variation of the ammunition described above. A distinctive variation includes a different head stamp, composition, design, or color.
g. Exceptions. (1) Nothing in subsection a., b., c., d., e., f., j. or k. of this section shall apply to any member of the Armed Forces of the United States or the National Guard, or except as otherwise provided, to any law enforcement officer while actually on duty or traveling to or from an authorized place of duty, provided that his possession of the prohibited weapon or device has been duly authorized under the applicable laws, regulations or military or law enforcement orders. Nothing in subsection h. of this section shall apply to any law enforcement officer who is exempted from the provisions of that subsection by the Attorney General. Nothing in this section shall apply to the possession of any weapon or device by a law enforcement officer who has confiscated, seized or otherwise taken possession of said weapon or device as evidence of the commission of a crime or because he believed it to be possessed illegally by the person from whom it was taken, provided that said law enforcement officer promptly notifies his superiors of his possession of such prohibited weapon or device.
(2) a. Nothing in subsection f. (1) shall be construed to prevent a person from keeping such ammunition at his dwelling, premises or other land owned or possessed by him, or from carrying such ammunition from the place of purchase to said dwelling or land, nor shall subsection f. (1) be construed to prevent any licensed retail or wholesale firearms dealer from possessing such ammunition at its licensed premises, provided that the seller of any such ammunition shall maintain a record of the name, age and place of residence of any purchaser who is not a licensed dealer, together with the date of sale and quantity of ammunition sold.
b. Nothing in subsection f.(1) shall be construed to prevent a designated employee or designated licensed agent for a nuclear power plant under the license of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission from possessing hollow nose ammunition while in the actual performance of his official duties, if the federal licensee certifies that the designated employee or designated licensed agent is assigned to perform site protection, guard, armed response or armed escort duties and is appropriately trained and qualified, as prescribed by federal regulation, to perform those duties.
(3)Nothing in paragraph (2) of subsection f. or in subsection j. shall be construed to prevent any licensed retail or wholesale firearms dealer from possessing that ammunition or large capacity ammunition magazine at its licensed premises for sale or disposition to another licensed dealer, the Armed Forces of the United States or the National Guard, or to a law enforcement agency, provided that the seller maintains a record of any sale or disposition to a law enforcement agency. The record shall include the name of the purchasing agency, together with written authorization of the chief of police or highest ranking official of the agency, the name and rank of the purchasing law enforcement officer, if applicable, and the date, time and amount of ammunition sold or otherwise disposed. A copy of this record shall be forwarded by the seller to the Superintendent of the Division of State Police within 48 hours of the sale or disposition.
(4)Nothing in subsection a. of this section shall be construed to apply to antique cannons as exempted in subsection d. of N.J.S. 2C:39-6.
(5)Nothing in subsection c. of this section shall be construed to apply to any person who is specifically identified in a special deer management permit issued by the Division of Fish and Wildlife to utilize a firearm silencer as part of an alternative deer control method implemented in accordance with a special deer management permit issued pursuant to section 4 of P.L. 2000, c.46 (C.23:4-42.6), while the person is in the actual performance of the permitted alternative deer control method and while going to and from the place where the permitted alternative deer control method is being utilized. This exception shall not, however, otherwise apply to any person to authorize the purchase or possession of a firearm silencer.
h. Stun guns. Any person who knowingly has in his possession any stun gun is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.
i. Nothing in subsection e. of this section shall be construed to prevent any guard in the employ of a private security company, who is licensed to carry a firearm, from the possession of a nightstick when in the actual performance of his official duties, provided that he has satisfactorily completed a training course approved by the Police Training Commission in the use of a nightstick.
j. Any person who knowingly has in his possession a large capacity ammunition magazine is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree unless the person has registered an assault firearm pursuant to section 11 of P.L. 1990, c.32 (C .2C:58-12) and the magazine is maintained and used in connection with participation in competitive shooting matches sanctioned by the Director of Civilian Marksmanship of the United States Department of the Army.
k. Handcuffs. Any person who knowingly has in his possession handcuffs as defined in P.L. 1991, c.437 (C. 2C:39-9.2), under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for such lawful uses as handcuffs may have, is guilty of a disorderly persons offense. A law enforcement officer shall confiscate handcuffs possessed in violation of the law.
Amended 1979, c.179, s.2; 1983, c.58, s.1; 1983, c.479, s.2; 1985, c.360, s.2; 1987, c.228, s.2; 1989, c.11; 1990, c.32, s.10; 1991, c.437, s.1; 1999, c.233, s.2; 2000, c.46, s.5; 2003, c.168, s.1.
2C:39-4. Possession of weapons for unlawful purposes 2C:39-4. Possession of weapons for unlawful purposes.
a. Firearms. Any person who has in his possession any firearm with a purpose to use it unlawfully against the person or property of another is guilty of a crime of the second degree.
b. Explosives. Any person who has in his possession or carries any explosive substance with a purpose to use it unlawfully against the person or property of another is guilty of a crime of the second degree.
c. Destructive devices. Any person who has in his possession any destructive device with a purpose to use it unlawfully against the person or property of another is guilty of a crime of the second degree.
d. Other weapons. Any person who has in his possession any weapon, except a firearm, with a purpose to use it unlawfully against the person or property of another is guilty of a crime of the third degree.
e. Imitation firearms. Any person who has in his possession an imitation firearm under circumstances that would lead an observer to reasonably believe that it is possessed for an unlawful purpose is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.
Amended 1979, c.179, s.3; 1989, c.120, s.2.
2C:39-4.1 Weapons; controlled dangerous substances and other offenses, penalties.
2C:39-4.1. Weapons; controlled dangerous substances and other offenses, penalties.
1. a. Any person who has in his possession any firearm while in the course of committing, attempting to commit, or conspiring to commit a violation of N.J.S. 2C:35-3, N.J.S. 2C:35-4, N.J.S. 2C:35-5, section 3 or section 5 of P.L. 1997, c.194 (C. 2C:35-5.2 or 2C:35-5.3), N.J.S. 2C:35-6, section 1 of P.L. 1987, c.101 (C. 2C:35-7), section 1 of P.L. 1997, c.327 (C. 2C:35-7.1), N.J.S. 2C:35-11 or N.J.S. 2C:16-1 is guilty of a crime of the second degree.
b. Any person who has in his possession any weapon, except a firearm, with a purpose to use such weapon unlawfully against the person or property of another, while in the course of committing, attempting to commit, or conspiring to commit a violation of N.J.S. 2C:35-3, N.J.S. 2C:35-4, N.J.S. 2C:35-5, section 3 or 5 of P.L. 1997, c.194 (C. 2C:35-5.2 or 2C:35-5.3), N.J.S. 2C:35-6, section 1 of P.L. 1987, c.101 (C. 2C:35-7), section 1 of P.L. 1997, c.327 (C. 2C:35-7.1), N.J.S. 2C:35-11 or N.J.S. 2C:16-1 is guilty of a crime of the second degree.
c. Any person who has in his possession any weapon, except a firearm, under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for such lawful uses as the weapon may have, while in the course of committing, attempting to commit, or conspiring to commit a violation of N.J.S. 2C:35-3, N.J.S. 2C:35-4, N.J.S. 2C:35-5, section 3 or section 5 of P.L. 1997, c.194 (C. 2C:35-5.2 or 2C:35-5.3), N.J.S. 2C:35-6, section 1 of P.L. 1987, c.101 (C. 2C:35-7), section 1 of P.L. 1997, c.327(C. 2C:35-7.1), N.J.S. 2C:35-11 or N.J.S. 2C:16-1 is guilty of a crime of the second degree.
d. Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S. 2C:1-8 or any other provision of law, a conviction arising under this section shall not merge with a conviction for a violation of any of the sections of chapter 35 or chapter 16 referred to in this section nor shall any conviction under those sections merge with a conviction under this section. Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S. 2C:44-5 or any other provision of law, the sentence imposed upon a violation of this section shall be ordered to be served consecutively to that imposed for any conviction for a violation of any of the sections of chapter 35 or chapter 16 referred to in this section or a conviction for conspiracy or attempt to violate any of those sections.
e. Nothing herein shall be deemed to preclude, if the evidence so warrants, an indictment and conviction for a violation of N.J.S. 2C:39-4 or N.J.S. 2C:39-5 or any other provision of law.
f. Nothing herein shall prevent the court from also imposing enhanced punishments, pursuant to N.J.S. 2C:35-8, section 2 of P.L. 1997, c.117 (C. 2C:43-7.2), or any other provision of law, or an extended term.
L. 1998, c.26, s.1; amended 2001, c.443, s.4.
2C:39-5. Unlawful possession of weapons 2C:39-5. Unlawful Possession of Weapons.
a. Machine guns. Any person who knowingly has in his possession a machine gun or any instrument or device adaptable for use as a machine gun, without being licensed to do so as provided in N.J.S. 2C:58-5, is guilty of a crime of the third degree.
b. Handguns. Any person who knowingly has in his possession any handgun, including any antique handgun without first having obtained a permit to carry the same as provided in N.J.S. 2C:58-4, is guilty of a crime of the third degree.
c. Rifles and shotguns. (1) Any person who knowingly has in his possession any rifle or shotgun without having first obtained a firearms purchaser identification card in accordance with the provisions of N.J.S. 2C:58-3, is guilty of a crime of the third degree.
(2)Unless otherwise permitted by law, any person who knowingly has in his possession any loaded rifle or shotgun is guilty of a crime of the third degree.
d. Other weapons. Any person who knowingly has in his possession any other weapon under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for such lawful uses as it may have is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.
e. Firearms or other weapons in educational institutions.
(1)Any person who knowingly has in his possession any firearm in or upon any part of the buildings or grounds of any school, college, university or other educational institution, without the written authorization of the governing officer of the institution, is guilty of a crime of the third degree, irrespective of whether he possesses a valid permit to carry the firearm or a valid firearms purchaser identification card.
(2)Any person who knowingly possesses any weapon enumerated in paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection r. of N.J.S. 2C:39-1 or any components which can readily be assembled into a firearm or other weapon enumerated in subsection r. of N.J.S. 2C:39-1 or any other weapon under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for such lawful use as it may have, while in or upon any part of the buildings or grounds of any school, college, university or other educational institution without the written authorization of the governing officer of the institution is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.
(3)Any person who knowingly has in his possession any imitation firearm in or upon any part of the buildings or grounds of any school, college, university or other educational institution, without the written authorization of the governing officer of the institution, or while on any school bus is a disorderly person, irrespective of whether he possesses a valid permit to carry a firearm or a valid firearms purchaser identification card.
f. Assault firearms. Any person who knowingly has in his possession an assault firearm is guilty of a crime of the third degree except if the assault firearm is licensed pursuant to N.J.S. 2C:58-5; registered pursuant to section 11 of P.L. 1990, c.32 (C .2C:58-12) or rendered inoperable pursuant to section 12 of P.L. 1990, c.32 (C .2C:58-13).
g. (1) The temporary possession of a handgun, rifle or shotgun by a person receiving, possessing, carrying or using the handgun, rifle, or shotgun under the provisions of section 1 of P.L. 1992, c.74 (C .2C:58-3.1) shall not be considered unlawful possession under the provisions of subsection b. or c. of this section.
(2)The temporary possession of a firearm by a person receiving, possessing, carrying or using the firearm under the provisions of section 1 of P.L. 1997, c.375 (C .2C:58-3.2) shall not be considered unlawful possession under the provisions of this section.
Amended 1979, c.179, s.4; 1990, c.32, s.2; 1992, c.74, s.2; 1992, c.94, s.1; 1995, c.389; 1997, c.375, s.2.
2C:39-6. Exemptions 2C:39-6. a. Provided a person complies with the requirements of subsection j. of this section, N.J.S. 2C:39-5 does not apply to:
(1)Members of the Armed Forces of the United States or of the National Guard while actually on duty, or while traveling between places of duty and carrying authorized weapons in the manner prescribed by the appropriate military authorities;
(2)Federal law enforcement officers, and any other federal officers and employees required to carry firearms in the performance of their official duties;
(3)Members of the State Police and, under conditions prescribed by the superintendent, members of the Marine Law Enforcement Bureau of the Division of State Police;
(4)A sheriff, undersheriff, sheriff's officer, county prosecutor, assistant prosecutor, prosecutor's detective or investigator, deputy attorney general or State investigator employed by the Division of Criminal Justice of the Department of Law and Public Safety, investigator employed by the State Commission of Investigation, inspector of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Enforcement Bureau of the Division of State Police in the Department of Law and Public Safety authorized to carry such weapons by the Superintendent of State Police, State park ranger, or State conservation officer;
(5)A prison or jail warden of any penal institution in this State or his deputies, or an employee of the Department of Corrections engaged in the interstate transportation of convicted offenders, while in the performance of his duties, and when required to possess the weapon by his superior officer, or a correction officer or keeper of a penal institution in this State at all times while in the State of New Jersey, provided he annually passes an examination approved by the superintendent testing his proficiency in the handling of firearms;
(6)A civilian employee of the United States Government under the supervision of the commanding officer of any post, camp, station, base or other military or naval installation located in this State who is required, in the performance of his official duties, to carry firearms, and who is authorized to carry such firearms by said commanding officer, while in the actual performance of his official duties;
(7) (a) A regularly employed member, including a detective, of the police department of any county or municipality, or of any State, interstate, municipal or county park police force or boulevard police force, at all times while in the State of New Jersey;
(b)A special law enforcement officer authorized to carry a weapon as provided in subsection b. of section 7 of P.L. 1985, c.439 (C. 40A:14-146.14);
(c)An airport security officer or a special law enforcement officer appointed by the governing body of any county or municipality, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, or by the commission, board or other body having control of a county park or airport or boulevard police force, while engaged in the actual performance of his official duties and when specifically authorized by the governing body to carry weapons;
(8)A full-time, paid member of a paid or part-paid fire department or force of any municipality who is assigned full-time or part-time to an arson investigation unit created pursuant to section 1 of P.L. 1981, c.409 (C. 40A:14-7.1) or to the county arson investigation unit in the county prosecutor's office, while either engaged in the actual performance of arson investigation duties or while actually on call to perform arson investigation duties and when specifically authorized by the governing body or the county prosecutor, as the case may be, to carry weapons. Prior to being permitted to carry a firearm, such a member shall take and successfully complete a firearms training course administered by the Police Training Commission pursuant to P.L. 1961, c.56 (C. 52:17B-66 et seq.), and shall annually qualify in the use of a revolver or similar weapon prior to being permitted to carry a firearm;
(9)A juvenile corrections officer in the employment of the Juvenile Justice Commission established pursuant to section 2 of P.L. 1995, c.284 (C. 52:17B-170) subject to the regulations promulgated by the commission;
(10) A designated employee or designated licensed agent for a nuclear power plant under license of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, while in the actual performance of his official duties, if the federal licensee certifies that the designated employee or designated licensed agent is assigned to perform site protection, guard, armed response or armed escort duties and is appropriately trained and qualified, as prescribed by federal regulation, to perform those duties. Any firearm utilized by an employee or agent for a nuclear power plant pursuant to this paragraph shall be returned each day at the end of the employee's or agent's authorized official duties to the employee's or agent's supervisor. All firearms returned each day pursuant to this paragraph shall be stored in locked containers located in a secure area. b. Subsections a., b. and c. of N.J.S. 2C:39-5 do not apply to:
(1)A law enforcement officer employed by a governmental agency outside of the State of New Jersey while actually engaged in his official duties, provided, however, that he has first notified the superintendent or the chief law enforcement officer of the municipality or the prosecutor of the county in which he is engaged; or
(2)A licensed dealer in firearms and his registered employees during the course of their normal business while traveling to and from their place of business and other places for the purpose of demonstration, exhibition or delivery in connection with a sale, provided, however, that the weapon is carried in the manner specified in subsection g. of this section.
c. Provided a person complies with the requirements of subsection j. of this section, subsections b. and c. of N.J.S. 2C:39-5 do not apply to:
(1)A special agent of the Division of Taxation who has passed an examination in an approved police training program testing proficiency in the handling of any firearm which he may be required to carry, while in the actual performance of his official duties and while going to or from his place of duty, or any other police officer, while in the actual performance of his official duties;
(2)A State deputy conservation officer or a full-time employee of the Division of Parks and Forestry having the power of arrest and authorized to carry weapons, while in the actual performance of his official duties;
(3)(Deleted by amendment, P.L. 1986, c.150.)
(4)A court attendant serving as such under appointment by the sheriff of the county or by the judge of any municipal court or other court of this State, while in the actual performance of his official duties;
(5)A guard in the employ of any railway express company, banking or building and loan or savings and loan institution of this State, while in the actual performance of his official duties;
(6)A member of a legally recognized military organization while actually under orders or while going to or from the prescribed place of meeting and carrying the weapons prescribed for drill, exercise or parade;
(7)An officer of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, while in the actual performance of his duties;
(8)An employee of a public utilities corporation actually engaged in the transportation of explosives;
(9)A railway policeman, except a transit police officer of the New Jersey Transit Police Department, at all times while in the State of New Jersey, provided that he has passed an approved police academy training program consisting of at least 280 hours. The training program shall include, but need not be limited to, the handling of firearms, community relations, and juvenile relations;
(10) A campus police officer appointed under P.L. 1970, c.211 (C. 18A:6-4.2 et seq.) at all times. Prior to being permitted to carry a firearm, a campus police officer shall take and successfully complete a firearms training course administered by the Police Training Commission, pursuant to P.L. 1961, c.56 (C. 52:17B-66 et seq.), and shall annually qualify in the use of a revolver or similar weapon prior to being permitted to carry a firearm;
(11) (Deleted by amendment, P.L. 2003, c.168).
(12) A transit police officer of the New Jersey Transit Police Department, at all times while in the State of New Jersey, provided the officer has satisfied the training requirements of the Police Training Commission, pursuant to subsection c. of section 2 of P.L. 1989, c.291 (C.27:25-15.1);
(13) A parole officer employed by the State Parole Board at all times. Prior to being permitted to carry a firearm, a parole officer shall take and successfully complete a basic course for regular police officer training administered by the Police Training Commission, pursuant to P.L. 1961, c.56 (C. 52:17B-66 et seq.), and shall annually qualify in the use of a revolver or similar weapon prior to being permitted to carry a firearm;
(14) A Human Services police officer at all times while in the State of New Jersey, as authorized by the Commissioner of Human Services;
(15) A person or employee of any person who, pursuant to and as required by a contract with a governmental entity, supervises or transports persons charged with or convicted of an offense;
(16) A housing authority police officer appointed under P.L. 1997, c.210 (C. 40A:14-146.19 et al.) at all times while in the State of New Jersey; or
(17) A probation officer assigned to the "Probation Officer Community Safety Unit" created by section 2 of P.L. 2001, c.362 (C. 2B: 10A-2) while in the actual performance of the probation officer's official duties. Prior to being permitted to carry a firearm, a probation officer shall take and successfully complete a basic course for regular police officer training administered by the Police Training Commission, pursuant to P.L. 1961, c.56 (C. 52:17B-66 et seq.), and shall annually qualify in the use of a revolver or similar weapon prior to being permitted to carry a firearm.
d. (1) Subsections c. and d. of N.J.S. 2C:39-5 do not apply to antique firearms, provided that such antique firearms are unloaded or are being fired for the purposes of exhibition or demonstration at an authorized target range or in such other manner as has been approved in writing by the chief law enforcement officer of the municipality in which the exhibition or demonstration is held, or if not held on property under the control of a particular municipality, the superintendent.
(2)Subsection a. of N.J.S. 2C:39-3 and subsection d. of N.J.S. 2C:39-5 do not apply to an antique cannon that is capable of being fired but that is unloaded and immobile, provided that the antique cannon is possessed by (a) a scholastic institution, a museum, a municipality, a county or the State, or (b) a person who obtained a firearms purchaser identification card as specified in N.J.S. 2C:58-3.
(3)Subsection a. of N.J.S. 2C:39-3 and subsection d. of N.J.S. 2C:39-5 do not apply to an unloaded antique cannon that is being transported by one eligible to possess it, in compliance with regulations the superintendent may promulgate, between its permanent location and place of purchase or repair.
(4)Subsection a. of N.J.S. 2C:39-3 and subsection d. of N.J.S. 2C:39-5 do not apply to antique cannons that are being loaded or fired by one eligible to possess an antique cannon, for purposes of exhibition or demonstration at an authorized target range or in the manner as has been approved in writing by the chief law enforcement officer of the municipality in which the exhibition or demonstration is held, or if not held on property under the control of a particular municipality, the superintendent, provided that performer has given at least 30 days' notice to the superintendent.
(5)Subsection a. of N.J.S. 2C:39-3 and subsection d. of N.J.S. 2C:39-5 do not apply to the transportation of unloaded antique cannons directly to or from exhibitions or demonstrations authorized under paragraph (4) of subsection d. of this section, provided that the transportation is in compliance with safety regulations the superintendent may promulgate. Nor do those subsections apply to transportation directly to or from exhibitions or demonstrations authorized under the law of another jurisdiction, provided that the superintendent has been given 30 days' notice and that the transportation is in compliance with safety regulations the superintendent may promulgate.
e. Nothing in subsections b., c. and d. of N.J.S. 2C:39-5 shall be construed to prevent a person keeping or carrying about his place of business, residence, premises or other land owned or possessed by him, any firearm, or from carrying the same, in the manner specified in subsection g. of this section, from any place of purchase to his residence or place of business, between his dwelling and his place of business, between one place of business or residence and another when moving, or between his dwelling or place of business and place where such firearms are repaired, for the purpose of repair. For the purposes of this section, a place of business shall be deemed to be a fixed location.
f. Nothing in subsections b., c. and d. of N.J.S. 2C:39-5 shall be construed to prevent:
(1)A member of any rifle or pistol club organized in accordance with the rules prescribed by the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice, in going to or from a place of target practice, carrying such firearms as are necessary for said target practice, provided that the club has filed a copy of its charter with the superintendent and annually submits a list of its members to the superintendent and provided further that the firearms are carried in the manner specified in subsection g. of this section;
(2)A person carrying a firearm or knife in the woods or fields or upon the waters of this State for the purpose of hunting, target practice or fishing, provided that the firearm or knife is legal and appropriate for hunting or fishing purposes in this State and he has in his possession a valid hunting license, or, with respect to fresh water fishing, a valid fishing license;
(3)A person transporting any firearm or knife while traveling:
(a)Directly to or from any place for the purpose of hunting or fishing, provided the person has in his possession a valid hunting or fishing license; or
(b)Directly to or from any target range, or other authorized place for the purpose of practice, match, target, trap or skeet shooting exhibitions, provided in all cases that during the course of the travel all firearms are carried in the manner specified in subsection g. of this section and the person has complied with all the provisions and requirements of Title 23 of the Revised Statutes and any amendments thereto and all rules and regulations promulgated thereunder; or
(c)In the case of a firearm, directly to or from any exhibition or display of firearms which is sponsored by any law enforcement agency, any rifle or pistol club, or any firearms collectors club, for the purpose of displaying the firearms to the public or to the members of the organization or club, provided, however, that not less than 30 days prior to the exhibition or display, notice of the exhibition or display shall be given to the Superintendent of the State Police by the sponsoring organization or club, and the sponsor has complied with such reasonable safety regulations as the superintendent may promulgate. Any firearms transported pursuant to this section shall be transported in the manner specified in subsection g. of this section;
(4)A person from keeping or carrying about a private or commercial aircraft or any boat, or from transporting to or from such vessel for the purpose of installation or repair a visual distress signaling device approved by the United States Coast Guard.
g. All weapons being transported under paragraph (2) of subsection b., subsection e., or paragraph (1) or (3) of subsection f. of this section shall be carried unloaded and contained in a closed and fastened case, gunbox, securely tied package, or locked in the trunk of the automobile in which it is being transported, and in the course of travel shall include only such deviations as are reasonably necessary under the circumstances.
h. Nothing in subsection d. of N.J.S. 2C:39-5 shall be construed to prevent any employee of a public utility, as defined in R.S. 48:2-13, doing business in this State or any United States Postal Service employee, while in the actual performance of duties which specifically require regular and frequent visits to private premises, from possessing, carrying or using any device which projects, releases or emits any substance specified as being noninjurious to canines or other animals by the Commissioner of Health and Senior Services and which immobilizes only on a temporary basis and produces only temporary physical discomfort through being vaporized or otherwise dispensed in the air for the sole purpose of repelling canine or other animal attacks.
The device shall be used solely to repel only those canine or other animal attacks when the canines or other animals are not restrained in a fashion sufficient to allow the employee to properly perform his duties.
Any device used pursuant to this act shall be selected from a list of products, which consist of active and inert ingredients, permitted by the Commissioner of Health and Senior Services.
i. Nothing in N.J.S. 2C:39-5 shall be construed to prevent any person who is 18 years of age or older and who has not been convicted of a felony, from possession for the purpose of personal self-defense of one pocket-sized device which contains and releases not more than three-quarters of an ounce of chemical substance not ordinarily capable of lethal use or of inflicting serious bodily injury, but rather, is intended to produce temporary physical discomfort or disability through being vaporized or otherwise dispensed in the air. Any person in possession of any device in violation of this subsection shall be deemed and adjudged to be a disorderly person, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not less than $100.00.
j. A person shall qualify for an exemption from the provisions of N.J.S. 2C:39-5, as specified under subsections a. and c. of this section, if the person has satisfactorily completed a firearms training course approved by the Police Training Commission.
Such exempt person shall not possess or carry a firearm until the person has satisfactorily completed a firearms training course and shall annually qualify in the use of a revolver or similar weapon. For purposes of this subsection, a "firearms training course" means a course of instruction in the safe use, maintenance and storage of firearms which is approved by the Police Training Commission. The commission shall approve a firearms training course if the requirements of the course are substantially equivalent to the requirements for firearms training provided by police training courses which are certified under section 6 of P.L. 1961, c.56 (C. 52:17B-71). A person who is specified in paragraph (1), (2), (3) or (6) of subsection a. of this section shall be exempt from the requirements of this subsection.
k. Nothing in subsection d. of N.J.S. 2C:39-5 shall be construed to prevent any financial institution, or any duly authorized personnel of the institution, from possessing, carrying or using for the protection of money or property, any device which projects, releases or emits tear gas or other substances intended to produce temporary physical discomfort or temporary identification.
l. Nothing in subsection b. of N.J.S. 2C:39-5 shall be construed to prevent a law enforcement officer who retired in good standing, including a retirement because of a disability pursuant to section 6 of P.L. 1944, c.255 (C. 43:16A-6), section 7 of P.L. 1944, c.255 (C. 43:16A-7), section 1 of P.L. 1989, c.103 (C. 43:16A-6.1) or any substantially similar statute governing the disability retirement of federal law enforcement officers, provided the officer was a regularly employed, full-time law enforcement officer for an aggregate of five or more years prior to his disability retirement and further provided that the disability which constituted the basis for the officer's retirement did not involve a certification that the officer was mentally incapacitated for the performance of his usual law enforcement duties and any other available duty in the department which his employer was willing to assign to him or does not subject that retired officer to any of the disabilities set forth in subsection c. of N.J.S. 2C:58-3 which would disqualify the retired officer from possessing or carrying a firearm, who semi-annually qualifies in the use of the handgun he is permitted to carry in accordance with the requirements and procedures established by the Attorney General pursuant to subsection j. of this section and pays the actual costs associated with those semi-annual qualifications, who is less than 70 years of age, and who was regularly employed as a full-time member of the State Police; a full-time member of an interstate police force; a full-time member of a county or municipal police department in this State; a full-time member of a State law enforcement agency; a full-time sheriff, undersheriff or sheriff's officer of a county of this State; a full-time State or county corrections officer; a full-time county park police officer; a full-time county prosecutor's detective or investigator; or a full-time federal law enforcement officer from carrying a handgun in the same manner as law enforcement officers exempted under paragraph (7) of subsection a. of this section under the conditions provided herein:
(1)The retired law enforcement officer, within six months after retirement, shall make application in writing to the Superintendent of State Police for approval to carry a handgun for one year. An application for annual renewal shall be submitted in the same manner.(2)Upon receipt of the written application of the retired law enforcement officer, the superintendent shall request a verification of service from the chief law enforcement officer of the organization in which the retired officer was last regularly employed as a full-time law enforcement officer prior to retiring. The verification of service shall include:
(a)The name and address of the retired officer;
(b)The date that the retired officer was hired and the date that the officer retired;
(c)A list of all handguns known to be registered to that officer;
(d)A statement that, to the reasonable knowledge of the chief law enforcement officer, the retired officer is not subject to any of the restrictions set forth in subsection c. of N.J.S. 2C:58-3; and
(e)A statement that the officer retired in good standing.
(3)If the superintendent approves a retired officer's application or reapplication to carry a handgun pursuant to the provisions of this subsection, the superintendent shall notify in writing the chief law enforcement officer of the municipality wherein that retired officer resides. In the event the retired officer resides in a municipality which has no chief law enforcement officer or law enforcement agency, the superintendent shall maintain a record of the approval.
(4)The superintendent shall issue to an approved retired officer an identification card permitting the retired officer to carry a handgun pursuant to this subsection. This identification card shall be valid for one year from the date of issuance and shall be valid throughout the State. The identification card shall not be transferable to any other person. The identification card shall be carried at all times on the person of the retired officer while the retired officer is carrying a handgun. The retired officer shall produce the identification card for review on the demand of any law enforcement officer or authority.
(5)Any person aggrieved by the denial of the superintendent of approval for a permit to carry a handgun pursuant to this subsection may request a hearing in the Superior Court of New Jersey in the county in which he resides by filing a written request for such a hearing within 30 days of the denial. Copies of the request shall be served upon the superintendent and the county prosecutor. The hearing shall be held within 30 days of the filing of the request, and no formal pleading or filing fee shall be required. Appeals from the determination of such a hearing shall be in accordance with law and the rules governing the courts of this State.
(6)A judge of the Superior Court may revoke a retired officer's privilege to carry a handgun pursuant to this subsection for good cause shown on the application of any interested person. A person who becomes subject to any of the disabilities set forth in subsection c. of N.J.S. 2C:58-3 shall surrender, as prescribed by the superintendent, his identification card issued under paragraph (4) of this subsection to the chief law enforcement officer of the municipality wherein he resides or the superintendent, and shall be permanently disqualified to carry a handgun under this subsection.
(7)The superintendent may charge a reasonable application fee to retired officers to offset any costs associated with administering the application process set forth in this subsection.
m. Nothing in subsection d. of N.J.S. 2C:39-5 shall be construed to prevent duly authorized personnel of the New Jersey Division of Fish and Wildlife, while in the actual performance of duties, from possessing, transporting or using any device that projects, releases or emits any substance specified as being non-injurious to wildlife by the Director of the Division of Animal Health in the Department of Agriculture, and which may immobilize wildlife and produces only temporary physical discomfort through being vaporized or otherwise dispensed in the air for the purpose of repelling bear or other animal attacks or for the aversive conditioning of wildlife.
n. Nothing in subsection b., c., d. or e. of N.J.S. 2C:39-5 shall be construed to prevent duly authorized personnel of the New Jersey Division of Fish and Wildlife, while in the actual performance of duties, from possessing, transporting or using hand held pistol-like devices, rifles or shotguns that launch pyrotechnic missiles for the sole purpose of frightening, hazing or aversive conditioning of nuisance or depredating wildlife; from possessing, transporting or using rifles, pistols or similar devices for the sole purpose of chemically immobilizing wild or non-domestic animals; or, provided the duly authorized person complies with the requirements of subsection j. of this section, from possessing, transporting or using rifles or shotguns, upon completion of a Police Training Commission approved training course, in order to dispatch injured or dangerous animals or for non-lethal use for the purpose of frightening, hazing or aversive conditioning of nuisance or depredating wildlife.
Amended 1979, c.179, s.5; 1979, c.332, s.8; 1981, c.108, s.1; 1981, c.219, s.1; 1981, c.294, s.1; 1981, c.409, s.2; 1981, c.480, s.1; 1981, c.511, s.4; 1982, c.154, s.1; 1982, c.173, s.1; 1983, c.479, s.3; 1983, c.552; 1985, c.76, s.8; 1985, c.150, s.1; 1985, c.324, s.1 (s.3 eff. date amended 1986, c.64); 1985, c.376, s.1; 1985, c.439, s.13,(s.15 eff. date amended 1986, c.2); 1986, c.150, ss. 7,8; 1987, c.139; 1987, c.172; 1989, c.291, s.4; 1991, c.327, s.2; 1991, c.386, s.3; 1992, c.94, s.2; 1993, c.246, s.2; 1995, c.273, s.2; 1995, c.280, s.21; 1997, c.67, s.1; 1997, c.210, s.6; 1997, c.393; 2001, c.79, s.15; 2001, c.362, s.4; 2003, c.168, s.2.
2C:39-3. Prohibited Weapons and Devices.
a. Destructive devices. Any person who knowingly has in his possession any destructive device is guilty of a crime of the third degree.
b. Sawed-off shotguns. Any person who knowingly has in his possession any sawed-off shotgun is guilty of a crime of the third degree.
c. Silencers. Any person who knowingly has in his possession any firearm silencer is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.
d. Defaced firearms. Any person who knowingly has in his possession any firearm which has been defaced, except an antique firearm or an antique handgun, is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.
e. Certain weapons. Any person who knowingly has in his possession any gravity knife, switchblade knife, dagger, dirk, stiletto, billy, blackjack, metal knuckle, sandclub, slingshot, cestus or similar leather band studded with metal filings or razor blades imbedded in wood, ballistic knife, without any explainable lawful purpose, is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.
f. Dum-dum or body armor penetrating bullets. (1) Any person, other than a law enforcement officer or persons engaged in activities pursuant to subsection f. of N.J.S. 2C:39-6, who knowingly has in his possession any hollow nose or dum-dum bullet, or (2) any person, other than a collector of firearms or ammunition as curios or relics as defined in Title 18, United States Code, section 921 (a) (13) and has in his possession a valid Collector of Curios and Relics License issued by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, who knowingly has in his possession any body armor breaching or penetrating ammunition, which means: (a) ammunition primarily designed for use in a handgun, and (b) which is comprised of a bullet whose core or jacket, if the jacket is thicker than .025 of an inch, is made of tungsten carbide, or hard bronze, or other material which is harder than a rating of 72 or greater on the Rockwell B. Hardness Scale, and (c) is therefore capable of breaching or penetrating body armor, is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree. For purposes of this section, a collector may possess not more than three examples of each distinctive variation of the ammunition described above. A distinctive variation includes a different head stamp, composition, design, or color.
g. Exceptions. (1) Nothing in subsection a., b., c., d., e., f., j. or k. of this section shall apply to any member of the Armed Forces of the United States or the National Guard, or except as otherwise provided, to any law enforcement officer while actually on duty or traveling to or from an authorized place of duty, provided that his possession of the prohibited weapon or device has been duly authorized under the applicable laws, regulations or military or law enforcement orders. Nothing in subsection h. of this section shall apply to any law enforcement officer who is exempted from the provisions of that subsection by the Attorney General. Nothing in this section shall apply to the possession of any weapon or device by a law enforcement officer who has confiscated, seized or otherwise taken possession of said weapon or device as evidence of the commission of a crime or because he believed it to be possessed illegally by the person from whom it was taken, provided that said law enforcement officer promptly notifies his superiors of his possession of such prohibited weapon or device.
(2) a. Nothing in subsection f. (1) shall be construed to prevent a person from keeping such ammunition at his dwelling, premises or other land owned or possessed by him, or from carrying such ammunition from the place of purchase to said dwelling or land, nor shall subsection f. (1) be construed to prevent any licensed retail or wholesale firearms dealer from possessing such ammunition at its licensed premises, provided that the seller of any such ammunition shall maintain a record of the name, age and place of residence of any purchaser who is not a licensed dealer, together with the date of sale and quantity of ammunition sold.
b. Nothing in subsection f.(1) shall be construed to prevent a designated employee or designated licensed agent for a nuclear power plant under the license of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission from possessing hollow nose ammunition while in the actual performance of his official duties, if the federal licensee certifies that the designated employee or designated licensed agent is assigned to perform site protection, guard, armed response or armed escort duties and is appropriately trained and qualified, as prescribed by federal regulation, to perform those duties.
(3)Nothing in paragraph (2) of subsection f. or in subsection j. shall be construed to prevent any licensed retail or wholesale firearms dealer from possessing that ammunition or large capacity ammunition magazine at its licensed premises for sale or disposition to another licensed dealer, the Armed Forces of the United States or the National Guard, or to a law enforcement agency, provided that the seller maintains a record of any sale or disposition to a law enforcement agency. The record shall include the name of the purchasing agency, together with written authorization of the chief of police or highest ranking official of the agency, the name and rank of the purchasing law enforcement officer, if applicable, and the date, time and amount of ammunition sold or otherwise disposed. A copy of this record shall be forwarded by the seller to the Superintendent of the Division of State Police within 48 hours of the sale or disposition.
(4)Nothing in subsection a. of this section shall be construed to apply to antique cannons as exempted in subsection d. of N.J.S. 2C:39-6.
(5)Nothing in subsection c. of this section shall be construed to apply to any person who is specifically identified in a special deer management permit issued by the Division of Fish and Wildlife to utilize a firearm silencer as part of an alternative deer control method implemented in accordance with a special deer management permit issued pursuant to section 4 of P.L. 2000, c.46 (C.23:4-42.6), while the person is in the actual performance of the permitted alternative deer control method and while going to and from the place where the permitted alternative deer control method is being utilized. This exception shall not, however, otherwise apply to any person to authorize the purchase or possession of a firearm silencer.
h. Stun guns. Any person who knowingly has in his possession any stun gun is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.
i. Nothing in subsection e. of this section shall be construed to prevent any guard in the employ of a private security company, who is licensed to carry a firearm, from the possession of a nightstick when in the actual performance of his official duties, provided that he has satisfactorily completed a training course approved by the Police Training Commission in the use of a nightstick.
j. Any person who knowingly has in his possession a large capacity ammunition magazine is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree unless the person has registered an assault firearm pursuant to section 11 of P.L. 1990, c.32 (C .2C:58-12) and the magazine is maintained and used in connection with participation in competitive shooting matches sanctioned by the Director of Civilian Marksmanship of the United States Department of the Army.
k. Handcuffs. Any person who knowingly has in his possession handcuffs as defined in P.L. 1991, c.437 (C. 2C:39-9.2), under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for such lawful uses as handcuffs may have, is guilty of a disorderly persons offense. A law enforcement officer shall confiscate handcuffs possessed in violation of the law.
Amended 1979, c.179, s.2; 1983, c.58, s.1; 1983, c.479, s.2; 1985, c.360, s.2; 1987, c.228, s.2; 1989, c.11; 1990, c.32, s.10; 1991, c.437, s.1; 1999, c.233, s.2; 2000, c.46, s.5; 2003, c.168, s.1.
2C:39-4. Possession of weapons for unlawful purposes 2C:39-4. Possession of weapons for unlawful purposes.
a. Firearms. Any person who has in his possession any firearm with a purpose to use it unlawfully against the person or property of another is guilty of a crime of the second degree.
b. Explosives. Any person who has in his possession or carries any explosive substance with a purpose to use it unlawfully against the person or property of another is guilty of a crime of the second degree.
c. Destructive devices. Any person who has in his possession any destructive device with a purpose to use it unlawfully against the person or property of another is guilty of a crime of the second degree.
d. Other weapons. Any person who has in his possession any weapon, except a firearm, with a purpose to use it unlawfully against the person or property of another is guilty of a crime of the third degree.
e. Imitation firearms. Any person who has in his possession an imitation firearm under circumstances that would lead an observer to reasonably believe that it is possessed for an unlawful purpose is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.
Amended 1979, c.179, s.3; 1989, c.120, s.2.
2C:39-4.1 Weapons; controlled dangerous substances and other offenses, penalties.
2C:39-4.1. Weapons; controlled dangerous substances and other offenses, penalties.
1. a. Any person who has in his possession any firearm while in the course of committing, attempting to commit, or conspiring to commit a violation of N.J.S. 2C:35-3, N.J.S. 2C:35-4, N.J.S. 2C:35-5, section 3 or section 5 of P.L. 1997, c.194 (C. 2C:35-5.2 or 2C:35-5.3), N.J.S. 2C:35-6, section 1 of P.L. 1987, c.101 (C. 2C:35-7), section 1 of P.L. 1997, c.327 (C. 2C:35-7.1), N.J.S. 2C:35-11 or N.J.S. 2C:16-1 is guilty of a crime of the second degree.
b. Any person who has in his possession any weapon, except a firearm, with a purpose to use such weapon unlawfully against the person or property of another, while in the course of committing, attempting to commit, or conspiring to commit a violation of N.J.S. 2C:35-3, N.J.S. 2C:35-4, N.J.S. 2C:35-5, section 3 or 5 of P.L. 1997, c.194 (C. 2C:35-5.2 or 2C:35-5.3), N.J.S. 2C:35-6, section 1 of P.L. 1987, c.101 (C. 2C:35-7), section 1 of P.L. 1997, c.327 (C. 2C:35-7.1), N.J.S. 2C:35-11 or N.J.S. 2C:16-1 is guilty of a crime of the second degree.
c. Any person who has in his possession any weapon, except a firearm, under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for such lawful uses as the weapon may have, while in the course of committing, attempting to commit, or conspiring to commit a violation of N.J.S. 2C:35-3, N.J.S. 2C:35-4, N.J.S. 2C:35-5, section 3 or section 5 of P.L. 1997, c.194 (C. 2C:35-5.2 or 2C:35-5.3), N.J.S. 2C:35-6, section 1 of P.L. 1987, c.101 (C. 2C:35-7), section 1 of P.L. 1997, c.327(C. 2C:35-7.1), N.J.S. 2C:35-11 or N.J.S. 2C:16-1 is guilty of a crime of the second degree.
d. Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S. 2C:1-8 or any other provision of law, a conviction arising under this section shall not merge with a conviction for a violation of any of the sections of chapter 35 or chapter 16 referred to in this section nor shall any conviction under those sections merge with a conviction under this section. Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S. 2C:44-5 or any other provision of law, the sentence imposed upon a violation of this section shall be ordered to be served consecutively to that imposed for any conviction for a violation of any of the sections of chapter 35 or chapter 16 referred to in this section or a conviction for conspiracy or attempt to violate any of those sections.
e. Nothing herein shall be deemed to preclude, if the evidence so warrants, an indictment and conviction for a violation of N.J.S. 2C:39-4 or N.J.S. 2C:39-5 or any other provision of law.
f. Nothing herein shall prevent the court from also imposing enhanced punishments, pursuant to N.J.S. 2C:35-8, section 2 of P.L. 1997, c.117 (C. 2C:43-7.2), or any other provision of law, or an extended term.
L. 1998, c.26, s.1; amended 2001, c.443, s.4.
2C:39-5. Unlawful possession of weapons 2C:39-5. Unlawful Possession of Weapons.
a. Machine guns. Any person who knowingly has in his possession a machine gun or any instrument or device adaptable for use as a machine gun, without being licensed to do so as provided in N.J.S. 2C:58-5, is guilty of a crime of the third degree.
b. Handguns. Any person who knowingly has in his possession any handgun, including any antique handgun without first having obtained a permit to carry the same as provided in N.J.S. 2C:58-4, is guilty of a crime of the third degree.
c. Rifles and shotguns. (1) Any person who knowingly has in his possession any rifle or shotgun without having first obtained a firearms purchaser identification card in accordance with the provisions of N.J.S. 2C:58-3, is guilty of a crime of the third degree.
(2)Unless otherwise permitted by law, any person who knowingly has in his possession any loaded rifle or shotgun is guilty of a crime of the third degree.
d. Other weapons. Any person who knowingly has in his possession any other weapon under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for such lawful uses as it may have is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.
e. Firearms or other weapons in educational institutions.
(1)Any person who knowingly has in his possession any firearm in or upon any part of the buildings or grounds of any school, college, university or other educational institution, without the written authorization of the governing officer of the institution, is guilty of a crime of the third degree, irrespective of whether he possesses a valid permit to carry the firearm or a valid firearms purchaser identification card.
(2)Any person who knowingly possesses any weapon enumerated in paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection r. of N.J.S. 2C:39-1 or any components which can readily be assembled into a firearm or other weapon enumerated in subsection r. of N.J.S. 2C:39-1 or any other weapon under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for such lawful use as it may have, while in or upon any part of the buildings or grounds of any school, college, university or other educational institution without the written authorization of the governing officer of the institution is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.
(3)Any person who knowingly has in his possession any imitation firearm in or upon any part of the buildings or grounds of any school, college, university or other educational institution, without the written authorization of the governing officer of the institution, or while on any school bus is a disorderly person, irrespective of whether he possesses a valid permit to carry a firearm or a valid firearms purchaser identification card.
f. Assault firearms. Any person who knowingly has in his possession an assault firearm is guilty of a crime of the third degree except if the assault firearm is licensed pursuant to N.J.S. 2C:58-5; registered pursuant to section 11 of P.L. 1990, c.32 (C .2C:58-12) or rendered inoperable pursuant to section 12 of P.L. 1990, c.32 (C .2C:58-13).
g. (1) The temporary possession of a handgun, rifle or shotgun by a person receiving, possessing, carrying or using the handgun, rifle, or shotgun under the provisions of section 1 of P.L. 1992, c.74 (C .2C:58-3.1) shall not be considered unlawful possession under the provisions of subsection b. or c. of this section.
(2)The temporary possession of a firearm by a person receiving, possessing, carrying or using the firearm under the provisions of section 1 of P.L. 1997, c.375 (C .2C:58-3.2) shall not be considered unlawful possession under the provisions of this section.
Amended 1979, c.179, s.4; 1990, c.32, s.2; 1992, c.74, s.2; 1992, c.94, s.1; 1995, c.389; 1997, c.375, s.2.
2C:39-6. Exemptions 2C:39-6. a. Provided a person complies with the requirements of subsection j. of this section, N.J.S. 2C:39-5 does not apply to:
(1)Members of the Armed Forces of the United States or of the National Guard while actually on duty, or while traveling between places of duty and carrying authorized weapons in the manner prescribed by the appropriate military authorities;
(2)Federal law enforcement officers, and any other federal officers and employees required to carry firearms in the performance of their official duties;
(3)Members of the State Police and, under conditions prescribed by the superintendent, members of the Marine Law Enforcement Bureau of the Division of State Police;
(4)A sheriff, undersheriff, sheriff's officer, county prosecutor, assistant prosecutor, prosecutor's detective or investigator, deputy attorney general or State investigator employed by the Division of Criminal Justice of the Department of Law and Public Safety, investigator employed by the State Commission of Investigation, inspector of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Enforcement Bureau of the Division of State Police in the Department of Law and Public Safety authorized to carry such weapons by the Superintendent of State Police, State park ranger, or State conservation officer;
(5)A prison or jail warden of any penal institution in this State or his deputies, or an employee of the Department of Corrections engaged in the interstate transportation of convicted offenders, while in the performance of his duties, and when required to possess the weapon by his superior officer, or a correction officer or keeper of a penal institution in this State at all times while in the State of New Jersey, provided he annually passes an examination approved by the superintendent testing his proficiency in the handling of firearms;
(6)A civilian employee of the United States Government under the supervision of the commanding officer of any post, camp, station, base or other military or naval installation located in this State who is required, in the performance of his official duties, to carry firearms, and who is authorized to carry such firearms by said commanding officer, while in the actual performance of his official duties;
(7) (a) A regularly employed member, including a detective, of the police department of any county or municipality, or of any State, interstate, municipal or county park police force or boulevard police force, at all times while in the State of New Jersey;
(b)A special law enforcement officer authorized to carry a weapon as provided in subsection b. of section 7 of P.L. 1985, c.439 (C. 40A:14-146.14);
(c)An airport security officer or a special law enforcement officer appointed by the governing body of any county or municipality, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, or by the commission, board or other body having control of a county park or airport or boulevard police force, while engaged in the actual performance of his official duties and when specifically authorized by the governing body to carry weapons;
(8)A full-time, paid member of a paid or part-paid fire department or force of any municipality who is assigned full-time or part-time to an arson investigation unit created pursuant to section 1 of P.L. 1981, c.409 (C. 40A:14-7.1) or to the county arson investigation unit in the county prosecutor's office, while either engaged in the actual performance of arson investigation duties or while actually on call to perform arson investigation duties and when specifically authorized by the governing body or the county prosecutor, as the case may be, to carry weapons. Prior to being permitted to carry a firearm, such a member shall take and successfully complete a firearms training course administered by the Police Training Commission pursuant to P.L. 1961, c.56 (C. 52:17B-66 et seq.), and shall annually qualify in the use of a revolver or similar weapon prior to being permitted to carry a firearm;
(9)A juvenile corrections officer in the employment of the Juvenile Justice Commission established pursuant to section 2 of P.L. 1995, c.284 (C. 52:17B-170) subject to the regulations promulgated by the commission;
(10) A designated employee or designated licensed agent for a nuclear power plant under license of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, while in the actual performance of his official duties, if the federal licensee certifies that the designated employee or designated licensed agent is assigned to perform site protection, guard, armed response or armed escort duties and is appropriately trained and qualified, as prescribed by federal regulation, to perform those duties. Any firearm utilized by an employee or agent for a nuclear power plant pursuant to this paragraph shall be returned each day at the end of the employee's or agent's authorized official duties to the employee's or agent's supervisor. All firearms returned each day pursuant to this paragraph shall be stored in locked containers located in a secure area. b. Subsections a., b. and c. of N.J.S. 2C:39-5 do not apply to:
(1)A law enforcement officer employed by a governmental agency outside of the State of New Jersey while actually engaged in his official duties, provided, however, that he has first notified the superintendent or the chief law enforcement officer of the municipality or the prosecutor of the county in which he is engaged; or
(2)A licensed dealer in firearms and his registered employees during the course of their normal business while traveling to and from their place of business and other places for the purpose of demonstration, exhibition or delivery in connection with a sale, provided, however, that the weapon is carried in the manner specified in subsection g. of this section.
c. Provided a person complies with the requirements of subsection j. of this section, subsections b. and c. of N.J.S. 2C:39-5 do not apply to:
(1)A special agent of the Division of Taxation who has passed an examination in an approved police training program testing proficiency in the handling of any firearm which he may be required to carry, while in the actual performance of his official duties and while going to or from his place of duty, or any other police officer, while in the actual performance of his official duties;
(2)A State deputy conservation officer or a full-time employee of the Division of Parks and Forestry having the power of arrest and authorized to carry weapons, while in the actual performance of his official duties;
(3)(Deleted by amendment, P.L. 1986, c.150.)
(4)A court attendant serving as such under appointment by the sheriff of the county or by the judge of any municipal court or other court of this State, while in the actual performance of his official duties;
(5)A guard in the employ of any railway express company, banking or building and loan or savings and loan institution of this State, while in the actual performance of his official duties;
(6)A member of a legally recognized military organization while actually under orders or while going to or from the prescribed place of meeting and carrying the weapons prescribed for drill, exercise or parade;
(7)An officer of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, while in the actual performance of his duties;
(8)An employee of a public utilities corporation actually engaged in the transportation of explosives;
(9)A railway policeman, except a transit police officer of the New Jersey Transit Police Department, at all times while in the State of New Jersey, provided that he has passed an approved police academy training program consisting of at least 280 hours. The training program shall include, but need not be limited to, the handling of firearms, community relations, and juvenile relations;
(10) A campus police officer appointed under P.L. 1970, c.211 (C. 18A:6-4.2 et seq.) at all times. Prior to being permitted to carry a firearm, a campus police officer shall take and successfully complete a firearms training course administered by the Police Training Commission, pursuant to P.L. 1961, c.56 (C. 52:17B-66 et seq.), and shall annually qualify in the use of a revolver or similar weapon prior to being permitted to carry a firearm;
(11) (Deleted by amendment, P.L. 2003, c.168).
(12) A transit police officer of the New Jersey Transit Police Department, at all times while in the State of New Jersey, provided the officer has satisfied the training requirements of the Police Training Commission, pursuant to subsection c. of section 2 of P.L. 1989, c.291 (C.27:25-15.1);
(13) A parole officer employed by the State Parole Board at all times. Prior to being permitted to carry a firearm, a parole officer shall take and successfully complete a basic course for regular police officer training administered by the Police Training Commission, pursuant to P.L. 1961, c.56 (C. 52:17B-66 et seq.), and shall annually qualify in the use of a revolver or similar weapon prior to being permitted to carry a firearm;
(14) A Human Services police officer at all times while in the State of New Jersey, as authorized by the Commissioner of Human Services;
(15) A person or employee of any person who, pursuant to and as required by a contract with a governmental entity, supervises or transports persons charged with or convicted of an offense;
(16) A housing authority police officer appointed under P.L. 1997, c.210 (C. 40A:14-146.19 et al.) at all times while in the State of New Jersey; or
(17) A probation officer assigned to the "Probation Officer Community Safety Unit" created by section 2 of P.L. 2001, c.362 (C. 2B: 10A-2) while in the actual performance of the probation officer's official duties. Prior to being permitted to carry a firearm, a probation officer shall take and successfully complete a basic course for regular police officer training administered by the Police Training Commission, pursuant to P.L. 1961, c.56 (C. 52:17B-66 et seq.), and shall annually qualify in the use of a revolver or similar weapon prior to being permitted to carry a firearm.
d. (1) Subsections c. and d. of N.J.S. 2C:39-5 do not apply to antique firearms, provided that such antique firearms are unloaded or are being fired for the purposes of exhibition or demonstration at an authorized target range or in such other manner as has been approved in writing by the chief law enforcement officer of the municipality in which the exhibition or demonstration is held, or if not held on property under the control of a particular municipality, the superintendent.
(2)Subsection a. of N.J.S. 2C:39-3 and subsection d. of N.J.S. 2C:39-5 do not apply to an antique cannon that is capable of being fired but that is unloaded and immobile, provided that the antique cannon is possessed by (a) a scholastic institution, a museum, a municipality, a county or the State, or (b) a person who obtained a firearms purchaser identification card as specified in N.J.S. 2C:58-3.
(3)Subsection a. of N.J.S. 2C:39-3 and subsection d. of N.J.S. 2C:39-5 do not apply to an unloaded antique cannon that is being transported by one eligible to possess it, in compliance with regulations the superintendent may promulgate, between its permanent location and place of purchase or repair.
(4)Subsection a. of N.J.S. 2C:39-3 and subsection d. of N.J.S. 2C:39-5 do not apply to antique cannons that are being loaded or fired by one eligible to possess an antique cannon, for purposes of exhibition or demonstration at an authorized target range or in the manner as has been approved in writing by the chief law enforcement officer of the municipality in which the exhibition or demonstration is held, or if not held on property under the control of a particular municipality, the superintendent, provided that performer has given at least 30 days' notice to the superintendent.
(5)Subsection a. of N.J.S. 2C:39-3 and subsection d. of N.J.S. 2C:39-5 do not apply to the transportation of unloaded antique cannons directly to or from exhibitions or demonstrations authorized under paragraph (4) of subsection d. of this section, provided that the transportation is in compliance with safety regulations the superintendent may promulgate. Nor do those subsections apply to transportation directly to or from exhibitions or demonstrations authorized under the law of another jurisdiction, provided that the superintendent has been given 30 days' notice and that the transportation is in compliance with safety regulations the superintendent may promulgate.
e. Nothing in subsections b., c. and d. of N.J.S. 2C:39-5 shall be construed to prevent a person keeping or carrying about his place of business, residence, premises or other land owned or possessed by him, any firearm, or from carrying the same, in the manner specified in subsection g. of this section, from any place of purchase to his residence or place of business, between his dwelling and his place of business, between one place of business or residence and another when moving, or between his dwelling or place of business and place where such firearms are repaired, for the purpose of repair. For the purposes of this section, a place of business shall be deemed to be a fixed location.
f. Nothing in subsections b., c. and d. of N.J.S. 2C:39-5 shall be construed to prevent:
(1)A member of any rifle or pistol club organized in accordance with the rules prescribed by the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice, in going to or from a place of target practice, carrying such firearms as are necessary for said target practice, provided that the club has filed a copy of its charter with the superintendent and annually submits a list of its members to the superintendent and provided further that the firearms are carried in the manner specified in subsection g. of this section;
(2)A person carrying a firearm or knife in the woods or fields or upon the waters of this State for the purpose of hunting, target practice or fishing, provided that the firearm or knife is legal and appropriate for hunting or fishing purposes in this State and he has in his possession a valid hunting license, or, with respect to fresh water fishing, a valid fishing license;
(3)A person transporting any firearm or knife while traveling:
(a)Directly to or from any place for the purpose of hunting or fishing, provided the person has in his possession a valid hunting or fishing license; or
(b)Directly to or from any target range, or other authorized place for the purpose of practice, match, target, trap or skeet shooting exhibitions, provided in all cases that during the course of the travel all firearms are carried in the manner specified in subsection g. of this section and the person has complied with all the provisions and requirements of Title 23 of the Revised Statutes and any amendments thereto and all rules and regulations promulgated thereunder; or
(c)In the case of a firearm, directly to or from any exhibition or display of firearms which is sponsored by any law enforcement agency, any rifle or pistol club, or any firearms collectors club, for the purpose of displaying the firearms to the public or to the members of the organization or club, provided, however, that not less than 30 days prior to the exhibition or display, notice of the exhibition or display shall be given to the Superintendent of the State Police by the sponsoring organization or club, and the sponsor has complied with such reasonable safety regulations as the superintendent may promulgate. Any firearms transported pursuant to this section shall be transported in the manner specified in subsection g. of this section;
(4)A person from keeping or carrying about a private or commercial aircraft or any boat, or from transporting to or from such vessel for the purpose of installation or repair a visual distress signaling device approved by the United States Coast Guard.
g. All weapons being transported under paragraph (2) of subsection b., subsection e., or paragraph (1) or (3) of subsection f. of this section shall be carried unloaded and contained in a closed and fastened case, gunbox, securely tied package, or locked in the trunk of the automobile in which it is being transported, and in the course of travel shall include only such deviations as are reasonably necessary under the circumstances.
h. Nothing in subsection d. of N.J.S. 2C:39-5 shall be construed to prevent any employee of a public utility, as defined in R.S. 48:2-13, doing business in this State or any United States Postal Service employee, while in the actual performance of duties which specifically require regular and frequent visits to private premises, from possessing, carrying or using any device which projects, releases or emits any substance specified as being noninjurious to canines or other animals by the Commissioner of Health and Senior Services and which immobilizes only on a temporary basis and produces only temporary physical discomfort through being vaporized or otherwise dispensed in the air for the sole purpose of repelling canine or other animal attacks.
The device shall be used solely to repel only those canine or other animal attacks when the canines or other animals are not restrained in a fashion sufficient to allow the employee to properly perform his duties.
Any device used pursuant to this act shall be selected from a list of products, which consist of active and inert ingredients, permitted by the Commissioner of Health and Senior Services.
i. Nothing in N.J.S. 2C:39-5 shall be construed to prevent any person who is 18 years of age or older and who has not been convicted of a felony, from possession for the purpose of personal self-defense of one pocket-sized device which contains and releases not more than three-quarters of an ounce of chemical substance not ordinarily capable of lethal use or of inflicting serious bodily injury, but rather, is intended to produce temporary physical discomfort or disability through being vaporized or otherwise dispensed in the air. Any person in possession of any device in violation of this subsection shall be deemed and adjudged to be a disorderly person, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not less than $100.00.
j. A person shall qualify for an exemption from the provisions of N.J.S. 2C:39-5, as specified under subsections a. and c. of this section, if the person has satisfactorily completed a firearms training course approved by the Police Training Commission.
Such exempt person shall not possess or carry a firearm until the person has satisfactorily completed a firearms training course and shall annually qualify in the use of a revolver or similar weapon. For purposes of this subsection, a "firearms training course" means a course of instruction in the safe use, maintenance and storage of firearms which is approved by the Police Training Commission. The commission shall approve a firearms training course if the requirements of the course are substantially equivalent to the requirements for firearms training provided by police training courses which are certified under section 6 of P.L. 1961, c.56 (C. 52:17B-71). A person who is specified in paragraph (1), (2), (3) or (6) of subsection a. of this section shall be exempt from the requirements of this subsection.
k. Nothing in subsection d. of N.J.S. 2C:39-5 shall be construed to prevent any financial institution, or any duly authorized personnel of the institution, from possessing, carrying or using for the protection of money or property, any device which projects, releases or emits tear gas or other substances intended to produce temporary physical discomfort or temporary identification.
l. Nothing in subsection b. of N.J.S. 2C:39-5 shall be construed to prevent a law enforcement officer who retired in good standing, including a retirement because of a disability pursuant to section 6 of P.L. 1944, c.255 (C. 43:16A-6), section 7 of P.L. 1944, c.255 (C. 43:16A-7), section 1 of P.L. 1989, c.103 (C. 43:16A-6.1) or any substantially similar statute governing the disability retirement of federal law enforcement officers, provided the officer was a regularly employed, full-time law enforcement officer for an aggregate of five or more years prior to his disability retirement and further provided that the disability which constituted the basis for the officer's retirement did not involve a certification that the officer was mentally incapacitated for the performance of his usual law enforcement duties and any other available duty in the department which his employer was willing to assign to him or does not subject that retired officer to any of the disabilities set forth in subsection c. of N.J.S. 2C:58-3 which would disqualify the retired officer from possessing or carrying a firearm, who semi-annually qualifies in the use of the handgun he is permitted to carry in accordance with the requirements and procedures established by the Attorney General pursuant to subsection j. of this section and pays the actual costs associated with those semi-annual qualifications, who is less than 70 years of age, and who was regularly employed as a full-time member of the State Police; a full-time member of an interstate police force; a full-time member of a county or municipal police department in this State; a full-time member of a State law enforcement agency; a full-time sheriff, undersheriff or sheriff's officer of a county of this State; a full-time State or county corrections officer; a full-time county park police officer; a full-time county prosecutor's detective or investigator; or a full-time federal law enforcement officer from carrying a handgun in the same manner as law enforcement officers exempted under paragraph (7) of subsection a. of this section under the conditions provided herein:
(1)The retired law enforcement officer, within six months after retirement, shall make application in writing to the Superintendent of State Police for approval to carry a handgun for one year. An application for annual renewal shall be submitted in the same manner.(2)Upon receipt of the written application of the retired law enforcement officer, the superintendent shall request a verification of service from the chief law enforcement officer of the organization in which the retired officer was last regularly employed as a full-time law enforcement officer prior to retiring. The verification of service shall include:
(a)The name and address of the retired officer;
(b)The date that the retired officer was hired and the date that the officer retired;
(c)A list of all handguns known to be registered to that officer;
(d)A statement that, to the reasonable knowledge of the chief law enforcement officer, the retired officer is not subject to any of the restrictions set forth in subsection c. of N.J.S. 2C:58-3; and
(e)A statement that the officer retired in good standing.
(3)If the superintendent approves a retired officer's application or reapplication to carry a handgun pursuant to the provisions of this subsection, the superintendent shall notify in writing the chief law enforcement officer of the municipality wherein that retired officer resides. In the event the retired officer resides in a municipality which has no chief law enforcement officer or law enforcement agency, the superintendent shall maintain a record of the approval.
(4)The superintendent shall issue to an approved retired officer an identification card permitting the retired officer to carry a handgun pursuant to this subsection. This identification card shall be valid for one year from the date of issuance and shall be valid throughout the State. The identification card shall not be transferable to any other person. The identification card shall be carried at all times on the person of the retired officer while the retired officer is carrying a handgun. The retired officer shall produce the identification card for review on the demand of any law enforcement officer or authority.
(5)Any person aggrieved by the denial of the superintendent of approval for a permit to carry a handgun pursuant to this subsection may request a hearing in the Superior Court of New Jersey in the county in which he resides by filing a written request for such a hearing within 30 days of the denial. Copies of the request shall be served upon the superintendent and the county prosecutor. The hearing shall be held within 30 days of the filing of the request, and no formal pleading or filing fee shall be required. Appeals from the determination of such a hearing shall be in accordance with law and the rules governing the courts of this State.
(6)A judge of the Superior Court may revoke a retired officer's privilege to carry a handgun pursuant to this subsection for good cause shown on the application of any interested person. A person who becomes subject to any of the disabilities set forth in subsection c. of N.J.S. 2C:58-3 shall surrender, as prescribed by the superintendent, his identification card issued under paragraph (4) of this subsection to the chief law enforcement officer of the municipality wherein he resides or the superintendent, and shall be permanently disqualified to carry a handgun under this subsection.
(7)The superintendent may charge a reasonable application fee to retired officers to offset any costs associated with administering the application process set forth in this subsection.
m. Nothing in subsection d. of N.J.S. 2C:39-5 shall be construed to prevent duly authorized personnel of the New Jersey Division of Fish and Wildlife, while in the actual performance of duties, from possessing, transporting or using any device that projects, releases or emits any substance specified as being non-injurious to wildlife by the Director of the Division of Animal Health in the Department of Agriculture, and which may immobilize wildlife and produces only temporary physical discomfort through being vaporized or otherwise dispensed in the air for the purpose of repelling bear or other animal attacks or for the aversive conditioning of wildlife.
n. Nothing in subsection b., c., d. or e. of N.J.S. 2C:39-5 shall be construed to prevent duly authorized personnel of the New Jersey Division of Fish and Wildlife, while in the actual performance of duties, from possessing, transporting or using hand held pistol-like devices, rifles or shotguns that launch pyrotechnic missiles for the sole purpose of frightening, hazing or aversive conditioning of nuisance or depredating wildlife; from possessing, transporting or using rifles, pistols or similar devices for the sole purpose of chemically immobilizing wild or non-domestic animals; or, provided the duly authorized person complies with the requirements of subsection j. of this section, from possessing, transporting or using rifles or shotguns, upon completion of a Police Training Commission approved training course, in order to dispatch injured or dangerous animals or for non-lethal use for the purpose of frightening, hazing or aversive conditioning of nuisance or depredating wildlife.
Amended 1979, c.179, s.5; 1979, c.332, s.8; 1981, c.108, s.1; 1981, c.219, s.1; 1981, c.294, s.1; 1981, c.409, s.2; 1981, c.480, s.1; 1981, c.511, s.4; 1982, c.154, s.1; 1982, c.173, s.1; 1983, c.479, s.3; 1983, c.552; 1985, c.76, s.8; 1985, c.150, s.1; 1985, c.324, s.1 (s.3 eff. date amended 1986, c.64); 1985, c.376, s.1; 1985, c.439, s.13,(s.15 eff. date amended 1986, c.2); 1986, c.150, ss. 7,8; 1987, c.139; 1987, c.172; 1989, c.291, s.4; 1991, c.327, s.2; 1991, c.386, s.3; 1992, c.94, s.2; 1993, c.246, s.2; 1995, c.273, s.2; 1995, c.280, s.21; 1997, c.67, s.1; 1997, c.210, s.6; 1997, c.393; 2001, c.79, s.15; 2001, c.362, s.4; 2003, c.168, s.2.
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