BAD CHECKS N.J.S.A. 2C:21-5 NJ

BAD CHECKS N.J.S.A. 2C:21-5

Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey. Model Jury charge (N.J.S.A. 2C:21-5) If someone is Indicted for BAD CHECKS, the Judge will read portions of the following to the Jury. They are called Request to Charge. If the amount of check is less than $200.00, the case will be heard in the municipal court "The defendant (name) has been charged with the crime of issuing (or passing) a bad check (or similar sight order), in that the defendant allegedly: (Read Indictment)The pertinent part of the statute on which this indictment is based reads as follows: "A person who issues or passes a check or similar sight order for the payment of money, knowing that it will not be honored by the drawee, commits an offense." As used in the statute, the word "issue" means to put into circulation.1 The word "pass" means to move from one , person to another, or hand from one person to another.2 A "check" is a draft drawn on a bank payable on demand.3 , [Where appropriate, charge the following: A "sight order" is an instrument for an immediate collection of money.4 A , "drawee" is the financial institution at which the issuer had, or made representation (he/she) had, an account at the , time the check or order was issued or passed. , The State must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1) The defendant knowingly issued or passed a check [or, where appropriate, "sight order"] for the , payment of money; and (2) The defendant knew at the time (he/she) issued or passed it, that it would not be honored by the drawee.5 Knowingly. A person acts knowingly with respect to the nature of (his/her) conduct or the attendant circumstances , if the person is aware that (his/her) conduct is of that nature, or that such circumstances exist, or the person is aware , of a high probability of their existence. A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of (his/her) conduct if the person is aware that it is practically certain that (his/her) conduct will cause such a result. You may infer that the issuer knew that the check [or, where appropriate, "sight order"] would not be paid, if you , find, either: (a) The issuer had no account with the drawee at the time the check [or, where appropriate, "sight order"] , was issued; or (b) Payment was refused by the drawee for lack of funds, upon presentation within 30 days after issue, and , the issuer failed to make good within 10 days after receiving notice of that refusal or after notice has been , sent to the issuer's last known address. Notice of refusal may be given to the issuer orally or in writing in , any reasonable manner by any person.6 That is, if you find that the issuer had no account with the drawee at the time the check [or, where appropriate, "sight order"] was issued, or payment was refused by the drawee for lack of funds, upon presentation of the check , [or, where appropriate, "order"] within 30 days of issue, and the issuer failed to make good within 10 days after , receiving reasonable written or oral notice of that refusal or after reasonable notice has been sent to the issuer's last , known address, you may then conclude, but are not required to conclude, that the issuer had knowledge the check , [or, where appropriate, "sight order"] would not be paid., If you find that the State has proven all these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you may return a verdict of, guilty. On the other hand, if you find that the State has failed to prove any of these elements beyond a reasonable , doubt, then you must return a verdict of not guilty., If you find that the State has proven each of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, then the State has , the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt, the amount of the check [or, where appropriate, "sight order"]. , You must specify if the amount of the check [or, where appropriate, "sight order"] is: (a) $75, 000.00 or more; (b) $1, 000.00 or more but less than $75, 000.00; (c) $200.00 or more but less than $1, 000.00; or (d) Less than $200.00." 1 N.J.S.A. 12A:3-102. 2 Black's Law Dictionary. 3 N.J.S.A. 12A:3-104. 4 United Benefit Fire Insurance Co. v. First National Bank of Arizona, Phoenix, 405 P.2d 488 (l965). 5 These inferences do not apply in the case of a post-dated check or similar sight order. 6 Contrary to pre-Code law, the State is not required to prove that the defendant intended to defraud the victim. The State need only prove that the defendant knew that the check (or similar sight order) would not be honored. See, Commonwealth v. Frank, 468 A.2d 1131 (Pa. Super. 1983) and Commonwealth v. Mutnik, 486 Pa. 428, 406 A.2d 516 (1979) which define the Pennsylvania bad check statute which, as the Code statute, is based upon the Model Penal Code. See, also, State v. Passafiume, 184 N.J. Super. 447, 449 (App. Div. 1982). Consequences of a Criminal Guilty Plea 1. You will have to appear in open court and tell the judge what you did that makes you guilty of the particular offense(s) 2. Do you understand that if you plead guilty: a. You will have a criminal record b. You may go to Jail or Prison. c. You will have to pay Fines and Court Costs. 3. If you are on Probation, you will have to submit to random drug and urine testing. If you violate Probation, you often go to jail. 4. In indictable matters, you will be required to provide a DNA sample, which could be used by law enforcement for the investigation of criminal activity, and pay for the cost of testing. 5. You must pay restitution if the court finds there is a victim who has suffered a loss and if the court finds that you are able or will be able in the future to pay restitution. 6. If you are a public office holder or employee, you can be required to forfeit your office or job by virtue of your plea of guilty. 7. If you are not a United States citizen or national, you may be deported by virtue of your plea of guilty. 8. You must wait 5-10 years to expunge a first offense. 2C:52-3 9. You could be put on Probation. 10. In Drug Cases, a mandatory DEDR penalty of $500-$1,000, and lose your driver's license for 6 months - 2years. You must pay a Law Enforcement Officers Training and Equipment Fund penalty of $30. 11. You may be required to do Community Service. 12. You must pay a minimum Violent Crimes Compensation Board assessment of $50 ($100 minimum if you are convicted of a crime of violence) for each count to which you plead guilty. 13. You must pay a $75 Safe Neighborhood Services Fund assessment for each conviction. 14. If you are being sentenced to probation, you must pay a fee of up to $25 per month for the term of probation. 15. You lose the presumption against incarceration in future cases. 2C:44-1 16. You may lose your right to vote. The defense of a person charged with a criminal offense is not impossible. There are a number of viable defenses and arguments which can be pursued to achieve a successful result. Advocacy, commitment, and persistence are essential to defending a client accused of a criminal offense. more info at http://www.kennethvercammen.com/bad_checks.html

Authority to issue Search Warrants Rule 3:5-1

Court Rule 3:5. SEARCH WARRANTS 3:5-1. Authority to Issue A search warrant may be issued by a judge of a court having jurisdiction in the municipality where the property sought is located. Note: Source-R.R. 3:2A-1. 3:5-2. Grounds for Issuance A search warrant may be issued to search for and seize any property, including documents, books, papers and any other tangible objects, obtained in violation of the penal laws of this State or any other state; or possessed, controlled, designed or intended for use or which has been used in connection with any such violation; or constituting evidence of or tending to show any such violation. Note: Source-R.R. 3:2A-2, 3:2A-7. 3:5-3. Issuance and Contents (a) An applicant for a search warrant shall appear personally before the judge, who must take the applicant's affidavit or testimony before issuing the warrant. The judge may also examine, under oath, any witness the applicant produces, and may require that any person upon whose information the applicant relies appear personally and be examined under oath concerning such information. If the judge is satisfied that grounds for granting the application exist or that there is probable cause to believe they exist, the judge shall date and issue the warrant identifying the property to be seized, naming or describing the person or place to be searched and specifying the hours when it may be executed. The warrant shall be directed to any law enforcement officer, without naming an officer, and it shall state the basis for its issuance and the names of the persons whose affidavits or testimony have been taken in support thereof. The warrant shall direct that it be returned to the judge who issued it. (b) A Superior Court judge may issue a search warrant upon sworn oral testimony of an applicant who is not physically present. Such sworn oral testimony may be communicated to the judge by telephone, radio or other means of electronic communication. The judge shall contemporaneously record such sworn oral testimony by means of a tape-recording device or stenographic machine if such are available; otherwise, adequate longhand notes summarizing what is said shall be made by the judge. Subsequent to taking the oath, the applicant must identify himself or herself, specify the purpose of the request and disclose the basis of his or her information. This sworn testimony shall be deemed to be an affidavit for the purposes of issuance of a search warrant. A warrant may issue if the judge is satisfied that exigent circumstances exist sufficient to excuse the failure to obtain a written warrant, and that sufficient grounds for granting the application have been shown. Upon approval, the judge shall memorialize the specific terms of the authorization to search and shall direct the applicant to enter this authorization verbatim on a form, or other appropriate paper, designated the duplicate original search warrant. This warrant shall be deemed a search warrant for the purpose of R. 3:5. The judge shall direct the applicant to print the judge's name on the warrant. The judge shall also contemporaneously record factual determinations as to exigent circumstances. If a recording is made, the judge shall direct that the testimony be transcribed as soon as practicable. more info at http://www.kennethvercammen.com/authority_to_issue.html

Assault Victim Recovery

Edited by Kenneth Vercammen Many people are injured when attacked on a business property, when the property owner fails to provide adequate security. Injured persons may be able to recover damages plus payment of medical bills. The New Jersey Supreme Court in Kuzmicz v. Ivy Hill Park Apartments, 147 N.J. 510. (1997) recently reviewed liability for injuries suffered by people attacked. The duty of landowners for injuries that occur on their premises, the analysis no longer relies exclusively on the status of the injured party. Instead "[t]he issue is whether, 'in light of the actual relationship between the parties under all of the surrounding circumstances,' the imposition of a duty on the landowner is 'fair and just.'" Brett v. Great Am. Recreation, 144 N.J. 479, 509 (1996) (quoting Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 438 (1993)). For off-premises liability, the issue is substantially the same. In both contexts, however, the analysis is fact-sensitive. Hopkins, supra, 132 N.J. at 439. Ultimately, the determination of the existence of a duty is a question of fairness and public policy. Snyder v. American Ass'n of Blood Banks, 144 N.J. 269, 292 (1996); Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494, 501 (1994); Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 108 (1994); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 544 (1984); Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 583 (1962). Foreseeability of injury to another is important, but not dispositive. Snyder, supra, 144 N.J. at 292; Carter Lincoln-Mercury v. EMOR Group, 135 N.J. 182, 194 (1994). Fairness, not foreseeability alone, is the test. Relevant to the determination of the fairness of the imposition of a duty on a landowner is the nature of the risk, the relationship of the parties, the opportunity to exercise care, and the effect on the public of the imposition of the duty. Dunphy, supra, 136 N.J. at 108; Hopkins, supra, 132 N.J. at 439; Goldberg, supra, 38 N.J. at 583. Landlord liable to Tenant Consistent with that analysis, the Court has found a landlord liable to a tenant for damages resulting from a burglary when the landlord failed to replace a broken dead-bolt lock on the tenant's apartment. See Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corp., 68 N.J. 368 (1975). The apartment house was in an area where break-ins were common, and the landlord had assured the tenant that it would repair the lock. Id. at 371-73. Furthermore, a regulation of the Department of Community Affairs required the landlord to furnish a working lock. Id. at 383-84. In that context, the Court held, "[a] residential tenant can recover damages from his landlord upon proper proof that the latter unreasonably enhanced the risk of loss due to theft by failing to supply adequate locks to safeguard the tenant's premises after suitable notice of the defect." Id. at 383. The Court likewise have imposed liability on a landlord who provides inadequate security for common areas of rental premises for the failure to prevent a criminal assault on a tenant. See Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214 (1980). In Trentacost, the apartment was in a high crime area. Id. at 218-19. Burglars and other unauthorized persons previously had broken into the building. Id. at 219. Contrary to an administrative regulation, the landlord had not installed a lock on the front entrance. Id. at 222. On those facts, the Court held that "[b]y failing to do anything to arrest or even reduce the risk of criminal harm to his tenants, the landlord effectively and unreasonably enhanced that risk." Ibid. The Court relied in part on the implied covenant of habitability in the lease and stated that "[t]he 'premises' which the landlord must secure necessarily encompass the common areas of multiple dwellings." Id. at 228. In both Braitman and Trentacost, the criminal act resulting in the imposition of liability on the landlord occurred in the apartment house. Supermarket Liability Similarly, the Court has held that the owner of a supermarket may be liable to a customer who is mugged at night in the market's parking lot. See Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270 (1982). In Butler, unknown to the customer, seven muggings had occurred in the lot during the preceding year, five in the evenings during the four months preceding the attack in question. Id. at 274. To combat the muggings, the market had hired off-duty policeman. Ibid. At the time of the attack, however, the only guard was inside the market; no one was on duty in the parking lot. Id. at 275. In that setting, the Court held that the market had a duty to protect the customer from foreseeable criminal activity. Id. at 284. Uniting Braitman, Trentacost, and Butler is the premise that landlords and business owners should be liable for foreseeable injuries that occur on their premises. The underlying rationale is that they are in the best position to control the risk of harm. See Butler, supra, 89 N.J. at 284. Ownership or control of the premises, for example, enables a party to prevent the harm. Accord Steinmetz v. Stockton City Chamber of Commerce, 214 Cal. Rptr. 405, 408 (Ct. App. 1985) (reasoning that duty is grounded in possession of premises and right to control and manage premises); LaFleur v. Astrodome-Astrohall Stadium Corp., 751 S.W. 2d 563, 565 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that duty to provide protection arises from defendant's power of control). Usually there is no liability in off - premise assault. Courts from other states likewise have refused to impose liability on commercial landowners for off-premises murder or assault. See, e.g., Steinmetz, supra, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 408 (declining to impose liability because of difficulty in defining scope of any duty owed by landowner off premises and not controlled by him); Wofford v. Kennedy's 2nd St. Co., 649 S.W. 2d 912, 914 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (declining to impose liability on tavern owner for injuries suffered by patron assaulted on adjacent public street because otherwise "line which would cut off the landowner's liability becomes nearly impossible to draw"). Generally, a possessor of land is not liable for off-premises injuries merely because those injuries are foreseeable. See, e.g., MacGrath v. Levin Properties, 256 N.J. Super. 247 (App. Div. 1992), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 19 (1992); Simpson v. Big Bear Stores Co., 652 N.E.2d 702, 705 (Ohio 1995); see generally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A comment c (1965) (indicating possessor of land is not under duty to person endangered or injured when one has ceased to be an invitee). That general rule protects an abutting property owner from liability for injuries that occur on a public way. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 349 (1965); see also MacGrath, supra, 256 N.J. Super. at 251-52 (noting court follows Restatement § 349 unless exception applies). Sidewalk Fall down Liability A narrow exception imposes liability on commercial landowners for injuries to pedestrians on abutting sidewalks. See Stewart v. 104 Wallace St., Inc., 87 N.J. 146 (1981). The duty to maintain the sidewalks flows from the economic benefit that a commercial landowner receives from the abutting sidewalk and from the landowner's ability to control the risk of injury. Id. at 158; Davis v. Pecoreno, 69 N.J. 1, 8 (1975) (holding gas station owner liable for injury caused by packed snow and ice on abutting sidewalk because "traffic was directly beneficial to his business and enured to his economic benefit"). Several decisions of the Appellate Division delineate the appropriate limits of a commercial property owner's liability for off-premises injuries. Critical to those decisions is the premise that a landowner's liability may extend beyond the premises for activities that directly benefit the landowner. Thus, the owner of a shopping center was not liable to a woman who fell on a dirt path leading from the shopping center to a parking lot. See Chimiente v. Adam Corp., 221 N.J. Super. 580 (1987). In Chimiente, sidewalks provided a safe alternative route. Id. at 584. The dirt path conferred no direct economic benefit on the shopping center. Ibid. Similarly, a shopping center on Route 22 was not liable to a customer who was struck by a car while crossing the highway. See MacGrath, supra, 256 N.J. Super. at 250-51, 253. A restaurant that provided parking on the opposite side of the street, however, had a duty to provide safe passage from the lot to the restaurant. See Warrington v. Bird, 204 N.J. Super. 611 (1985), certif. denied, 103 N.J. 473 (1986). The restaurant knew that its patrons would cross the street, and derived a direct economic benefit from their use of the path. Id. at 617. Finally, a caterer was found liable for the death of a business invitee who was killed crossing a county highway after parking her car in a lot the caterer knew or should have known the invitee would use. See Mulraney v. Auletto's Catering, 293 N.J. Super. 315, certif. denied, _ N.J. _ (1996). Prominent among the reasons for the imposition of liability was the proposition that the use of the lot furthered the caterer's economic interest. Id. at 321. Critical to the imposition of liability is a direct economic benefit to the commercial landowner from the path taken by the injured party and the absence of an alternative route. Courts from other states likewise have concluded that a landowner does not owe a duty to protect people from criminal activity on adjacent premises that the landowner does not own or control. See, e.g., Donnell v. California W. Sch. of Law, 246 Cal. Rptr. 199, 201 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding law school not liable merely because it took no action to remedy dangerous condition on adjoining property); Steinmetz, supra, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 408-09 (holding tenant in industrial park not liable to business invitee who was mugged a block away from tenant's premises but within park); National Property Investors, II, Ltd. v. Attardo, 639 So.2d 691 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding no duty for store owner to protect customer from assault in apartment premises when assailant followed customer from convenience store to apartment house across street); Simpson, supra, 652 N.E.2d 702 (holding supermarket owner's duty to warn or protect business invitees from foreseeable criminal activity extends to premises in possession and control of owner and therefore owner not liable for injuries suffered by patron attacked in common area of shopping center). Southland Corp. v. Superior Court, 250 Cal. Rptr. 57 (Ct. App. 1988), is consistent with that premise. In Southland, three assailants attacked a customer from a convenience store in a parking lot ten feet away from the store's property line. 250 Cal. Rptr. at 58. The customer sued the lessee and sub-lessee, who were the franchisor and franchisee of the store. Id. at 59. The master lease provided that the store could use the adjacent lot for parking, and the injured customer believed that the store controlled the lot. Id. at 58 n.1, 59. Many customers parked in the lot. Id. at 58. The lessees did not erect a fence or do anything else to discourage the customers from using the lot. Id. at 59. Denying summary judgment for the lessee and sub-lessee, the court relied on the fact that the store controlled the lot and "realized a significant commercial benefit from their customers' use of the lot . . . ." Id. at 62-63. Absent a landlord's control of an adjacent lot or realization of "a significant commercial benefit" from tenants' use of the lot, the landlord does not owe a duty to warn tenants of the risk of criminal assault on the lot. See Ibid. Conclusion There is a possibility of imposing on a landlord a duty to pay a tenant for injuries sustained in a criminal attack on its property to help compensate the tenant. In appropriate circumstances, property owners may be liable if they negligently conduct activities that expose others to foreseeable criminal attacks. Contact a Civil Trial Attorney to discuss your rights. more info at http://www.kennethvercammen.com/assault_victim_recovery.html

Assault and Battery NJ

Assault and Battery

2C:12-1. Assault. a. Simple assault. A person is guilty of assault if he: (1)Attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or (2)Negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or (3)Attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. Simple assault is a disorderly persons offense unless committed in a fight or scuffle entered into by mutual consent, in which case it is a petty disorderly persons offense. b.Aggravated assault. A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he: (1)Attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely or knowingly or under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly causes such injury; or (2)Attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or (3)Recklessly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or (4)Knowingly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life points a firearm, as defined in section 2C:39-1f., at or in the direction of another, whether or not the actor believes it to be loaded; or (5)Commits a simple assault as defined in subsection a. (1), (2) or (3) of this section upon: (a)Any law enforcement officer acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of his authority or because of his status as a law enforcement officer; or (b)Any paid or volunteer fireman acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or otherwise clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of the duties of a fireman; or (c)Any person engaged in emergency first-aid or medical services acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or otherwise clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of emergency first-aid or medical services; or (d)Any school board member, school administrator, teacher, school bus driver or other employee of a school board while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of his duties or because of his status as a member or employee of a school board or any school bus driver employed by an operator under contract to a school board while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of his duties or because of his status as a school bus driver; or (e)Any employee of the Division of Youth and Family Services while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of his duties or because of his status as an employee of the division; or (f)Any justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Superior Court, judge of the Tax Court or municipal judge while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of judicial duties or because of his status as a member of the judiciary; or (g)Any operator of a motorbus or the operator's supervisor or any employee of a rail passenger service while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of his duties or because of his status as an operator of a motorbus or as the operator's supervisor or as an employee of a rail passenger service; or (6)Causes bodily injury to another person while fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer in violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2 or while operating a motor vehicle in violation of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:20-10. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a person shall be strictly liable for a violation of this subsection upon proof of a violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2 or while operating a motor vehicle in violation of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:20-10 which resulted in bodily injury to another person; or (7)Attempts to cause significant bodily injury to another or causes significant bodily injury purposely or knowingly or, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly causes such significant bodily injury; or (8)Causes bodily injury by knowingly or purposely starting a fire or causing an explosion in violation of N.J.S.2C:17-1 which results in bodily injury to any emergency services personnel involved in fire suppression activities, rendering emergency medical services resulting from the fire or explosion or rescue operations, or rendering any necessary assistance at the scene of the fire or explosion, including any bodily injury sustained while responding to the scene of a reported fire or explosion. For purposes of this subsection, "emergency services personnel" shall include, but not be limited to, any paid or volunteer fireman, any person engaged in emergency first-aid or medical services and any law enforcement officer. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a person shall be strictly liable for a violation of this paragraph upon proof of a violation of N.J.S.2C:17-1 which resulted in bodily injury to any emergency services personnel; or (9) Knowingly, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, points or displays a firearm, as defined in subsection f. of N.J.S.2C:39-1, at or in the direction of a law enforcement officer; or (10) Knowingly points, displays or uses an imitation firearm, as defined in subsection f. of N.J.S.2C:39-1, at or in the direction of a law enforcement officer with the purpose to intimidate, threaten or attempt to put the officer in fear of bodily injury or for any unlawful purpose; or (11) Uses or activates a laser sighting system or device, or a system or device which, in the manner used, would cause a reasonable person to believe that it is a laser sighting system or device, against a law enforcement officer acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of his authority. As used in this paragraph, "laser sighting system or device" means any system or device that is integrated with or affixed to a firearm and emits a laser light beam that is used to assist in the sight alignment or aiming of the firearm. Aggravated assault under subsections b. (1) and b. (6) is a crime of the second degree; under subsections b. (2), b. (7), b. (9) and b. (10) is a crime of the third degree; under subsections b. (3) and b. (4) is a crime of the fourth degree; and under subsection b. (5) is a crime of the third degree if the victim suffers bodily injury, otherwise it is a crime of the fourth degree. Aggravated assault under subsection b.(8) is a crime of the third degree if the victim suffers bodily injury; if the victim suffers significant bodily injury or serious bodily injury it is a crime of the second degree. Aggravated assault under subsection b.(11) is a crime of the third degree. c. (1) A person is guilty of assault by auto or vessel when the person drives a vehicle or vessel recklessly and causes either serious bodily injury or bodily injury to another. Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the fourth degree if serious bodily injury results and is a disorderly persons offense if bodily injury results.

Assault NJ

Assault

Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey. 2C:12-1 Assault. 2C:12-1. Assault. a. Simple assault. A person is guilty of assault if he: (1)Attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or (2)Negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or (3)Attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. Simple assault is a disorderly persons offense unless committed in a fight or scuffle entered into by mutual consent, in which case it is a petty disorderly persons offense. b.Aggravated assault. A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he: (1)Attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely or knowingly or under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly causes such injury; or (2)Attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or (3)Recklessly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or (4)Knowingly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life points a firearm, as defined in section 2C:39-1f., at or in the direction of another, whether or not the actor believes it to be loaded; or (5)Commits a simple assault as defined in subsection a. (1), (2) or (3) of this section upon: (a)Any law enforcement officer acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of his authority or because of his status as a law enforcement officer; or (b)Any paid or volunteer fireman acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or otherwise clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of the duties of a fireman; or (c)Any person engaged in emergency first-aid or medical services acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or otherwise clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of emergency first-aid or medical services; or (d)Any school board member, school administrator, teacher, school bus driver or other employee of a school board while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of his duties or because of his status as a member or employee of a school board or any school bus driver employed by an operator under contract to a school board while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of his duties or because of his status as a school bus driver; or (e)Any employee of the Division of Youth and Family Services while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of his duties or because of his status as an employee of the division; or (f)Any justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Superior Court, judge of the Tax Court or municipal judge while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of judicial duties or because of his status as a member of the judiciary; or (g)Any operator of a motorbus or the operator's supervisor or any employee of a rail passenger service while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of his duties or because of his status as an operator of a motorbus or as the operator's supervisor or as an employee of a rail passenger service; or (6)Causes bodily injury to another person while fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer in violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2 or while operating a motor vehicle in violation of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:20-10. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a person shall be strictly liable for a violation of this subsection upon proof of a violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2 or while operating a motor vehicle in violation of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:20-10 which resulted in bodily injury to another person; or (7)Attempts to cause significant bodily injury to another or causes significant bodily injury purposely or knowingly or, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly causes such significant bodily injury; or (8)Causes bodily injury by knowingly or purposely starting a fire or causing an explosion in violation of N.J.S.2C:17-1 which results in bodily injury to any emergency services personnel involved in fire suppression activities, rendering emergency medical services resulting from the fire or explosion or rescue operations, or rendering any necessary assistance at the scene of the fire or explosion, including any bodily injury sustained while responding to the scene of a reported fire or explosion. For purposes of this subsection, "emergency services personnel" shall include, but not be limited to, any paid or volunteer fireman, any person engaged in emergency first-aid or medical services and any law enforcement officer. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a person shall be strictly liable for a violation of this paragraph upon proof of a violation of N.J.S.2C:17-1 which resulted in bodily injury to any emergency services personnel; or --........ more info at http://www.kennethvercammen.com/assault.html

Arson and related offenses 2C:17-1 NJ

Arson and related offenses 2C:17-1

Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey. Arson and related offenses 2C:17-1. a. Aggravated arson. A person is guilty of aggravated arson, a crime of the second degree, if he starts a fire or causes an explosion, whether on his own property or another's: (1) Thereby purposely or knowingly placing another person in danger of death or bodily injury; or (2) With the purpose of destroying a building or structure of another; or (3) With the purpose of collecting insurance for the destruction or damage to such property under circumstances which recklessly place any other person in danger of death or bodily injury; or (4) With the purpose of destroying or damaging a structure in order to exempt the structure, completely or partially, from the provisions of any State, county or local zoning, planning or building law, regulation, ordinance or enactment under circumstances which recklessly place any other person in danger of death or bodily injury; or (5) With the purpose of destroying or damaging any forest. b. Arson. A person is guilty of arson, a crime of the third degree, if he purposely starts a fire or causes an explosion, whether on his own property or another's: (1) Thereby recklessly placing another person in danger of death or bodily injury; or (2) Thereby recklessly placing a building or structure of another in danger of damage or destruction; or (3) With the purpose of collecting insurance for the destruction or damage to such property; or (4) With the purpose of destroying or damaging a structure in order to exempt the structure, completely or partially, from the provisions of any State, county or local zoning, planning or building law, regulation, ordinance or enactment; or (5) Thereby recklessly placing a forest in danger of damage or destruction. c. Failure to control or report dangerous fire. A person who knows that a fire is endangering life or a substantial amount of property of another and either fails to take reasonable measures to put out or control the fire, when he can do so without substantial risk to himself, or to give prompt fire alarm, commits a crime of the fourth degree if: (1) He knows that he is under an official, contractual, or other legal duty to prevent or combat the fire; or (2) The fire was started, albeit lawfully, by him or with his assent, or on property in his custody or control. d. Any person who, directly or indirectly, pays or accepts or offers to pay or accept any form of consideration including, but not limited to, money or any other pecuniary benefit, regardless of whether any consideration is actually exchanged for the purpose of starting a fire or causing an explosion in violation of this section commits a crime of the first degree. e. Notwithstanding the provisions of any section of this Title to the contrary, if a person is convicted of aggravated arson pursuant to the provisions of subsection a. of this section and the structure which was the target of the offense was a health care facility or a physician's office, the sentence imposed shall include a term of imprisonment. The court may not suspend or make any other non custodial disposition of a person sentenced pursuant to the provisions of this subsection. f. Definitions. "Structure" is defined in section 2C:18-1. Property is that of another, for the purpose of this section, if any one other than the actor has a possessory, or legal or equitable proprietary interest therein. Property is that of another for the purpose of this section, if anyone other than the actor has a legal or equitable interest in the property including, but not limited to, a mortgage, pledge, lien or security interest therein. If a building or structure is divided into separately occupied units, any unit not occupied by the actor is an occupied structure of another. As used in this section, "forest" means and includes any forest, brush land, grass land, salt marsh, wooded area and any combination thereof, including but not limited to, an open space area, public lands, wetlands, park lands, natural habitats, a State conservation area, a wildlife refuge area or any other designated undeveloped open space whether or not it is subject to specific protection under law. As used in this section, "health care facility" means health care facility as defined in section 2 of P.L. 1971, c.136 (C. 26:2H-2). g. Notwithstanding the provisions of any section of this Title to the contrary, if a person is convicted pursuant to the provisions of subsection a., b. or d. of this section and the structure which was the target of the offense was a church, synagogue, temple or other place of public worship, that person commits a crime of the first degree and the sentence imposed shall include a term of imprisonment. The term of imprisonment shall include a minimum term of 15 years, during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole. The court may not suspend or make any other non custodial disposition of a person sentenced pursuant to the provisions of this subsection. Amended 1979, c.178, s.29; 1981, c.290, s.16; 1991, c.498; 1997, c.108; 1997, c.109. 2C:17-2. Causing or Risking Widespread Injury or Damage. a. (1) A person who, purposely or knowingly, unlawfully causes an explosion, flood, avalanche, collapse of a building, release or abandonment of poison gas, radioactive material or any other harmful or destructive substance commits a crime of the second degree. A person who, purposely or knowingly, unlawfully causes widespread injury or damage in any manner commits a crime of the second degree. (2)A person who, purposely or knowingly, unlawfully causes a hazardous discharge required to be reported pursuant to the "Spill Compensation and Control Act," P.L. 1976, c.141 (C.58:10-23.11 et seq.) or any rules and regulations adopted pursuant thereto, or who, purposely or knowingly, unlawfully causes a release or abandonment of hazardous waste as defined in section 1 of P.L. 1976, c.99 (C. 13:1E-38) or a toxic pollutant as defined in section 3 of P.L. 1977, c.74 (C. 58:10A-3) commits a crime of the second degree. Any person who recklessly violates the provisions of this paragraph is guilty of a crime of the third degree. b. A person who recklessly causes widespread injury or damage is guilty of a crime of the third degree. c. A person who recklessly creates a risk of widespread injury or damage commits a crime of the fourth degree, even if no such injury or damage occurs. A violation of this subsection is a crime of the third degree if the risk of widespread injury or damage results from the reckless handling or storage of hazardous materials. A violation of this subsection is a crime of the second degree if the handling or storage of hazardous materials violated any law, rule or regulation intended to protect the public health and safety. d. A person who knowingly or recklessly fails to take reasonable measures to prevent or mitigate widespread injury or damage commits a crime of the fourth degree, if: (1)He knows that he is under an official, contractual or other legal duty to take such measures; or (2)He did or assented to the act causing or threatening the injury or damage. e. For purposes of this section, widespread injury or damage means serious bodily injury to five or more people or damage to five or more habitations or to a building which would normally have contained 25 or more persons at the time of the offense. Amended 1979, c.178, s. 29A; 1985, c.348, s.1; 1997, c.325, s.2; 2002, c.26, s.12. Consequences of a Criminal Guilty Plea 1. You will have to appear in open court and tell the judge what you did that makes you guilty of the particular offense(s) 2. Do you understand that if you plead guilty: a. You will have a criminal record b. You may go to Jail or Prison. c. You will have to pay Fines and Court Costs. 3. If you are on Probation, you will have to submit to random drug and urine testing. If you violate Probation, you often go to jail. 4. In indictable matters, you will be required to provide a DNA sample, which could be used by law enforcement for the investigation of criminal activity, and pay for the cost of testing. 5. You must pay restitution if the court finds there is a victim who has suffered a loss and if the court finds that you are able or will be able in the future to pay restitution. 6. If you are a public office holder or employee, you can be required to forfeit your office or job by virtue of your plea of guilty. 7. If you are not a United States citizen or national, you may be deported by virtue of your plea of guilty. 8. You must wait 5-10 years to expunge a first offense. 2C:52-3 9. You could be put on Probation. 10. In Drug Cases, a mandatory DEDR penalty of $500-$1,000, and lose your driver's license for 6 months - 2years. You must pay a Law Enforcement Officers Training and Equipment Fund penalty of $30. 11. You may be required to do Community Service. 12. You must pay a minimum Violent Crimes Compensation Board assessment of $50 ($100 minimum if you are convicted of a crime of violence) for each count to which you plead guilty. 13. You must pay a $75 Safe Neighborhood Services Fund assessment for each conviction. 14. If you are being sentenced to probation, you must pay a fee of up to $25 per month for the term of probation. 15. You lose the presumption against incarceration in future cases. 2C:44-1 16. You may lose your right to vote. The defense of a person charged with a criminal offense is not impossible. There are a number of viable defenses and arguments which can be pursued to achieve a successful result. Advocacy, commitment, and persistence are essential to defending a client accused of a criminal offense. Jail for Crimes and Disorderly Conduct: If someone pleads Guilty or is found Guilty of a criminal offense, the following is the statutory Prison/Jail terms. NJSA 2C: 43-8 (1) In the case of a crime of the first degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between 10 years and 20 years; (2) In the case of a crime of the second degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between five years and 10 years; (3) In the case of a crime of the third degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between three years and five years; (4) In the case of a crime of the fourth degree, for a specific term which shall be fixed by the court and shall not exceed 18 months. 2C:43-3 Fines have been increased recently! 2C:43-3. Fines and Restitutions. A person who has been convicted of an offense may be sentenced to pay a fine, to make restitution, or both, such fine not to exceed: a. (1) $200,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the first degree; (2) $150,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the second degree; b. (1) $15,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the third degree; (2) $10,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the fourth degree; c. $1,000.00, when the conviction is of a disorderly persons offense; d. $500.00, when the conviction is of a petty disorderly persons offense; If facing any criminal charge, retain an experienced attorney immediately to determine you rights and obligations to the court. Current criminal charge researched by Kenneth Vercammen, Esq. 732-572-0500

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Arrest for a Criminal Violation and Right to Remain Silent "Miranda Rights"

1. Tell The Police Officer or Detective that you wish to talk to your Lawyer. Repeat this request to every officer who speaks to you. 2. Identify yourself, if asked. If the incident is related to a motor vehicle, produce your license, registration, and insurance card. 3. Beyond identifying yourself, give no other information. Answer NO other questions. SIGN NOTHING. If you are asked any other questions, reply politely, "I would rather not discuss it”. 4. Call your lawyer at the first opportunity. NOTE: If you are arrested for Drunk Driving in New Jersey, you must give breath samples before you call your Lawyer. You are not required to do field sobriety tests such as walking a straight line, Remember: Even a fish would not get caught if they kept their mouth closed. OJ remained silent and is playing golf today. [Copyright 1985-1986 Alan Marain] The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the use of involuntary statements and confessions at trial. The State bears the burden of proof in a motion to suppress a statement allegedly obtained in violation of the Miranda doctrine. New Jersey requires the higher standard of beyond a reasonable doubt when the court determines if Miranda has not been fully complied with. State v Yough 49 NJ 587, 600-601 (1967), State v Whittington 142 NJ Super. 45, 49-50 (App. Div. 1976), State v Flower 224 NJ Super. 208, 213 (Law Div 1987) aff'd per curiam 224 NJ Super. 90 (App. Div. 1988). WHAT IS INTERROGATION? As set forth in NJ Practice , Vol. 32 Criminal Practice and Procedure (West 1998) Section 755, the United States Supreme Court in Rhode Island V Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) held that the term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express questioning but also to any words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. It is "an established principle of our federalist system" that states may afford "individual liberties more expansive than those afforded by the federal constitution." State v Novembrino 105 NJ 95, 144-145 (1987). Generally, a statement given by a defendant is not admissible in a criminal case unless the court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was informed of his Miranda rights before giving the statement and "in light of all the circumstances attending the confession it was given voluntarily." State v Hampton 61 NJ 250, 272 (1972). What is at stake is ensuring the use of effective procedural safeguards to secure the right of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution that " no person shall be.... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," which is now made applicable to state action by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, once informed of his rights " a defendant may waive effectuation of these rights provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." State v Flower 224 NJ Super. 208, 213 (Law Div 1987) aff'd per curiam 224 NJ Super. 90 (App. Div. 1988). citing Miranda v Arizona 384 US 436, 444, 86 S. Ct 1602, 1612, 16 L. Ed 2d 694 (1966); emphasis in Flower. In State v Flower 224 NJ Super. 208, 213 (Law Div 1987) aff'd per curiam 224 NJ Super. 90 (App. Div. 1988), the defendant had a low IQ and limited vocabulary. He gave confessions to police and a confession to DYFS. The court excluded the confession to the police, even though Miranda warnings were given and there was lack of coercion and an admitted waiver of rights by the defendant. The court concluded that since the Defendant could not understand his Miranda rights, he could not waive them. One cannot knowingly and intelligently waive a right that he cannot understand or appreciate. 224 NJ Super. at 216. The court also excluded confessions to a DYFS investigator on the same grounds since she was acting in a law enforcement capacity and failed to inform Defendant of his Miranda rights. Id at 220. Where it is charged that a confession was given under the influence of narcotics or during a withdrawal period, the central question of voluntariness remains the same, and the trial court must scrutinize all the pertinent facts attending the confession with particular focus on Defendant's demeanor, coherence, articulateness, capacity to full use of his faculties, his memory and his overall intelligence. State v Arcediano 371 F. Supp. 457 (D. NJ 1974); See also Wade v Yeager 245 F. Supp 62 (D. NJ 1964). The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the waiver was made knowingly and intelligently. If the suspect is intoxicated or under the influence of drugs to the point that he cannot understand his constitutional rights, then any waiver is void. If the suspect is suffering from a mental disability which renders him incapable of understanding his constitutional rights, then any waiver is void. The level of mental disability which would render a suspect incapable of understanding his constitutional rights is probably close to the point at which the suspect could be said to be incapable of managing his own affairs. Where circumstances cast doubt on knowing and intelligent quality of alleged waiver of right to counsel, there can be no waiver. State vs. Dickens 192 NJ Super. 290 (App. Div. 1983). Intoxication is grounds to suppress statements. See e.g. Common vs. Brithsher 563 A.2d 502, App granted 575 A.2d 107. (If Defendant's intoxication combined to render him incapable of understanding Miranda warning waiver of Miranda rights would be invalid); Common vs. Andel 477 A.2d 13 56 (1984); (Defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was vitiated by his intoxication, his eyes glaring and had a strong odor of alcohol. Statements made by defendant while in custody should suppressed.) more info at http://www.kennethvercammen.com/Arrest_Criminal_Violation.html

Affirmative defenses to criminal charges 2C:2-5

Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey. Affirmative defenses 2C:2-5. Defenses generally Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is excused or alleviated by reason of any defense now provided by law for which neither the code nor other statutory law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved and a legislative purpose to exclude the defense claimed does not otherwise plainly appear. L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-5, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. 2C:2-6. Liability for conduct of another; complicity a. A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both. b. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when: (1) Acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct; (2) He is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by the code or by the law defining the offense; (3) He is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of an offense; or (4) He is engaged in a conspiracy with such other person. c. A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if: (1) With the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense; he (a) Solicits such other person to commit it; (b) Aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or (c) Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make proper effort so to do; or (2) His conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity. d. A person who is legally incapable of committing a particular offense himself may be guilty thereof if it is committed by another person for whose conduct he is legally accountable, unless such liability is inconsistent with the purpose of the provision establishing his incapacity. e. Unless otherwise provided by the code or by the law defining the offense, a person is not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person if: (1) He is a victim of that offense; (2) The offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to its commission; or (3) He terminates his complicity under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation as defined in section 2C:5-1 d. prior to the commission of the offense. Termination by renunciation is an affirmative defense which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of evidence. f. An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted. more info at http://www.kennethvercammen.com/Affirmativedefenses2c2-5.html

Affirmative defenses 2C:2-5

Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey. Affirmative defenses 2C:2-5. Defenses generally Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is excused or alleviated by reason of any defense now provided by law for which neither the code nor other statutory law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved and a legislative purpose to exclude the defense claimed does not otherwise plainly appear. L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-5, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. 2C:2-6. Liability for conduct of another; complicity a. A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both. b. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when: (1) Acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct; (2) He is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by the code or by the law defining the offense; (3) He is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of an offense; or (4) He is engaged in a conspiracy with such other person. c. A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if: (1) With the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense; he (a) Solicits such other person to commit it; (b) Aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or (c) Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make proper effort so to do; or (2) His conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity. d. A person who is legally incapable of committing a particular offense himself may be guilty thereof if it is committed by another person for whose conduct he is legally accountable, unless such liability is inconsistent with the purpose of the provision establishing his incapacity. e. Unless otherwise provided by the code or by the law defining the offense, a person is not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person if: (1) He is a victim of that offense; (2) The offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to its commission; or (3) He terminates his complicity under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation as defined in section 2C:5-1 d. prior to the commission of the offense. Termination by renunciation is an affirmative defense which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of evidence. f. An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted. L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-6, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. 2C:2-7. Liability of corporations and persons acting, or under a duty to act, in their behalf a. A corporation may be convicted of the commission of an offense if: (1) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in by an agent of the corporation while acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation unless the offense is one defined by a statute which indicates a legislative purpose not to impose criminal liability on corporations. If the law governing the offense designates the agents for whose conduct the corporation is accountable or the circumstances under which it is accountable, such provisions shall apply; (2) The offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on corporations by law; or (3) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in, authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation. b. As used in this section: (1) "Corporation" does not include an entity organized as or by a governmental agency for the execution of a governmental program; (2) "Agent" means any director, officer, servant, employee or other person authorized to act in behalf of the corporation; (3) "High managerial agent" means an officer of a corporation or any other agent of a corporation having duties of such responsibility that his conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the policy of the corporation. c. In any prosecution of a corporation for the commission of an offense included within the terms of subsection a. (1) of this section, other than an offense for which absolute liability has been imposed, it shall be a defense if the defendant proves by a preponderance of evidence that the high managerial agent having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the offense employed due diligence to prevent its commission. This paragraph shall not apply if it is plainly inconsistent with the legislative purpose in defining the particular offense. d. Nothing in this section imposing liability upon a corporation shall be construed as limiting the liability for an offense of an individual by reason of his being an agent of the corporation. L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-7, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. 2C:2-8. Intoxication a. Except as provided in subsection d. of this section, intoxication of the actor is not a defense unless it negatives an element of the offense. b. When recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have been aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial. c. Intoxication does not, in itself, constitute mental disease within the meaning of chapter 4. d. Intoxication which (1) is not self-induced or (2) is pathological is an affirmative defense if by reason of such intoxication the actor at the time of his conduct did not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong. Intoxication under this subsection must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. e. Definitions. In this section unless a different meaning plainly is required: (1) "Intoxication" means a disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of substances into the body; (2) "Self-induced intoxication" means intoxication caused by substances which the actor knowingly introduces into his body, the tendency of which to cause intoxication he knows or ought to know, unless he introduces them pursuant to medical advice or under such circumstances as would afford a defense to a charge of crime; (3) "Pathological intoxication" means intoxication grossly excessive in degree, given the amount of the intoxicant, to which the actor does not know he is susceptible. L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-8, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1983, c. 306, s. 1, eff. Aug. 26, 1983. 2C:2-9. Duress a. Subject to subsection b. of this section, it is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another, which a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist. b. The defense provided by this section is unavailable if the actor recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be subjected to duress. The defense is also unavailable if he was criminally negligent in placing himself in such a situation, whenever criminal negligence suffices to establish culpability for the offense charged. In a prosecution for murder, the defense is only available to reduce the degree of the crime to manslaughter. c. It is not a defense that a woman acted on the command of her husband, unless she acted under such coercion as would establish a defense under this section. The presumption that a woman, acting in the presence of her husband, is coerced is abolished. L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-9, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. 2C:2-10. Consent a. In general. The consent of the victim to conduct charged to constitute an offense or to the result thereof is a defense if such consent negatives an element of the offense or precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense. b. Consent to bodily harm. When conduct is charged to constitute an offense because it causes or threatens bodily harm, consent to such conduct or to the infliction of such harm is a defense if: (1) The bodily harm consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not serious; or (2) The conduct and the harm are reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a concerted activity of a kind not forbidden by law; or (3) The consent establishes a justification for the conduct under chapter 3 of the code. c. Ineffective consent. Unless otherwise provided by the code or by the law defining the offense, assent does not constitute consent if: (1) It is given by a person who is legally incompetent to authorize the conduct charged to constitute the offense; or (2) It is given by a person who by reason of youth, mental disease or defect or intoxication is manifestly unable or known by the actor to be unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature of harmfulness of the conduct charged to constitute an offense; or (3) It is induced by force, duress or deception of a kind sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense. L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-10, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. 2C:2-11. De minimis infractions The assignment judge may dismiss a prosecution if, having regard to the nature of the conduct charged to constitute an offense and the nature of the attendant circumstances, it finds that the defendant's conduct: a. Was within a customary license or tolerance, neither expressly negated by the person whose interest was infringed nor inconsistent with the purpose of the law defining the offense; b. Did not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense or did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction; or c. Presents such other extenuations that it cannot reasonably be regarded as envisaged by the Legislature in forbidding the offense. The assignment judge shall not dismiss a prosecution under this section without giving the prosecutor notice and an opportunity to be heard. The prosecutor shall have a right to appeal any such dismissal. L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-11, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. 2C:2-12. Entrapment a. A public law enforcement official or a person engaged in cooperation with such an official or one acting as an agent of a public law enforcement official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense, he induces or encourages and, as a direct result, causes another person to engage in conduct constituting such offense by either: (1) Making knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief that such conduct is not prohibited; or (2) Employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those who are ready to commit it. b. Except as provided in subsection c. of this section, a person prosecuted for an offense shall be acquitted if he proves by a preponderance of evidence that his conduct occurred in response to an entrapment. The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the trier of fact. c. The defense afforded by this section is unavailable when causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening such injury to a person other than the person perpetrating the entrapment. L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-12, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 9, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. 2C:3-1. Justification an affirmative defense; civil remedies unaffected a. In any prosecution based on conduct which is justifiable under this chapter, justification is an affirmative defense. b. The fact that conduct is justifiable under this chapter does not abolish or impair any remedy for such conduct which is available in any civil action. L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:3-1, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. 2C:3-2. Necessity and other justifications in general a. Necessity. Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of necessity to the extent permitted by law and as to which neither the code nor other statutory law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved and a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear. b. Other justifications in general. Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of any defense of justification provided by law for which neither the code nor other statutory law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved and a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear. more info at http://www.kennethvercammen.com/affirmative_defenses.html

Receiving Stolen Property NJ

Receiving Stolen Property

Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey. 2C:20-7. Receiving stolen property 2C:20-7. Receiving Stolen Property. a. Receiving. A person is guilty of theft if he knowingly receives or brings into this State movable property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it is probably stolen. It is an affirmative defense that the property was received with purpose to restore it to the owner. "Receiving" means acquiring possession, control or title, or lending on the security of the property. b. Presumption of knowledge. The requisite knowledge or belief is presumed in the case of a person who: (1) Is found in possession or control of two or more items of property stolen on two or more separate occasions; or (2) Has received stolen property in another transaction within the year preceding the transaction charged; or (3) Being a person in the business of buying or selling property of the sort received, acquires the property without having ascertained by reasonable inquiry that the person from whom he obtained it had a legal right to possess and dispose of it ;or (4) Is found in possession of two or more defaced access devices. Amended 1979, c.178, s.35; 1981, c.290, s.19; 1997, c.6, s.3. AT THE END OF THE TRIAL, THE JUDGE WILL READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS AND LAW TO THE JURY: RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7(a)) The defendant is charged with the crime of receiving stolen property. [Describe the property allegedly involved] This charge is based on a statute which reads: "A person is guilty of theft if he knowingly receives (or brings into this State) movable property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it has probably been stolen."1 Under this statute the State must prove 3 elements to establish that a defendant is guilty of receiving stolen property. These elements are: 1. That the defendant received (or brought into this State) movable property of another; 2. That the defendant acted knowingly when he/she received (or brought into this State) the movable property of another; 3. That the defendant either knew that the property had been stolen or believed that it had probably been stolen2 at the time he/she received the property (or brought the property into this State). The first element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant received (or brought into this State) movable property of another. The term "receive" means toacquire possession, control, or title (or to lend on the security) of the property.3 (Charge Model Charge on Possession, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-1c) The term "movable property" means property, the location of which can be changed (including things growing on, affixed to, or found in land, and documents, although the rights represented thereby have no physical location).4 The term "property" means anything of value.5 "Property of another" means property in which the defendant does not have a lawful interest.6 The State need not, however, prove the identity of the owner, the identity of the original thief,7 or the identity of the person from whom the defendant received the property. The second element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant acted knowingly when (he/she) received (or brought into this State) the movable property of another. A person acts knowingly with respect to the nature of (his/her) conduct or the attendantcircumstances if (he/she) is aware that (his/her) conduct is of that nature, or that such circumstances exist, or (he/she) is aware of a high probability of their existence. A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of (his/her) conduct if (he/she) is aware that it is practically certain that (his/her) conduct will cause such a result. "Knowing," "with knowledge" or equivalent terms have the same meaning.8 The third element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant either knew that the property had been stolen or believed that it had probably been stolen at the time the defendant received the property (or brought the property into this State). Stolen property means property that has been the subject of any unlawful taking. An unlawful taking occurs when a person takes or exercises unlawful control over the property of another with the purpose, that is, the conscious object, of depriving the other of it permanently or for so extended a period as to appropriate a substantial portion of its economic value.9 I have already defined the term "knowing" to you in discussing the second element and I will not repeat it here. The State is not required to prove that the property, in fact, had been stolen. On the other hand, mere proof that the property was stolen is not sufficient to establish this element. Rather, what the State must prove is that the defendant either knew that the property was stolen or believed that it had probably been stolen. A belief that property has probably been stolen is a belief that it is more likely than not that the property had been stolen. You must realize that knowledge and belief are states of mind which cannot be seen but can only be determined by drawing inferences from one's conduct, words or actions, and from all of the surrounding circumstances. It therefore is not necessary that the State produce witnesses to testify that the defendant said (he/she) knew or believed the property was stolen. (His/her) state of mind is to be determined by you after you examine (his/her) conduct and actions, all that was said or doneat that particular time and place, and all the surrounding circumstances.10 To reiterate, the three elements which the State must prove are: 1. That the defendant received (or brought into this State) movable property of another; 2. That in so doing the defendant acted knowingly; and 3. That the defendant either knew that the property had been stolen or believed that it had probably been stolen when (he/she) received it (or brought it into this State).11 If you conclude the State has proven all three elements of this offense beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty. On the other hand, if you find that the State has failed to prove any element beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty. (NOTE: Do not charge the following for certain types of property such as an automobile or firearm. See N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2b(2)(b) and (c).) Since the value of the property involved determines the degree or severity of the crime, the State must also prove its value beyond a reasonable doubt. If you find the defendant guilty, then youmust indicate whether you find the value of the property involved: (1) exceeds $500, (2) is at least $200 but does not exceed $500, or (3) is less than $200. Value is to be determined by the fair market value of the property at the time the defendant is alleged to have received or brought into this State the movable property of another. Fair market value means the price that a buyer would be willing to pay and a seller would be willing to accept if both parties were aware of all the relevant surrounding circumstances and neither party were under any compulsion to buy or sell. 1 The language "or brings into this State" is placed in parentheses to suggest that in a case where there is nothing to indicate that this language applies, consideration might be given to deleting the language and thereby eliminating unnecessary verbiage. 2 Where the defendant is also the person who took the property, the third element must be modified. State v. Underwood, 286 N.J. Super. 129 (App. Div. 1995). In such cases, "the State must prove that the defendant intended an unlawful taking," id. at 135; that is, the defendant acted with the purpose to permanently deprive the owner of the property. Id. at 138. Thus, in such cases the third element could be phrased as follows: "The property was stolen by the defendant. In order for you to find that the defendant stole the property, the State must prove that the defendant acted with the purpose to deprive the owner of the property. To deprive means to withhold or cause to be withheld property of another permanently or for so extended a period as to appropriate a substantial portion of its economic value..." (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-1a) A person acts purposely with respect to the nature of his conduct or a result thereof if it is his or her conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or cause such a result. (N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(1)). 3 N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7a. It is suggested that the language "or to lend on the security" only be charged when it applies to the facts of the case. 4 N.J.S.A. 2C:20-1e. It is suggested that the language relating to things on land or documents be charged only when it applies to the facts of the case. 5 N.J.S.A. 2C:20-1g. The statutory definition gives examples of various types of property as being included in the definition, such as trade secrets and choses in action. Reference should be made to the statutory definition in particular cases to determine whether additional language should be charged. 6 N.J.S.A. 2C:20-1h. This is not the complete definition of "property of another," but should be sufficient in the usual case. The definition goes on to address joint ownership issues, contraband, and security interests. When applicable under the facts of a case, this language should be included. 7 Consideration should be given to deleting the language as to the identity of the thief in an Underwood situation. See fn. 2, supra. 8 N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(2). 9 N.J.S.A. 2C:20-1a and p; State v. Underwood, supra, 286 N.J. Super. at 135-136. 10 In the appropriate case, the jury may be advised that such knowledge or belief may be inferred from the presence of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7b if the evidence provides a factual basis for such an instruction. See State v. Humphrey, 183 N.J. Super. 580 (Law Div. 1982); N.J.R.E. 303; N.J.S.A. 2C:1-13e. If the jury is instructed as to an inference permitted by N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7b, care should be taken to avoid the use of the term "presumption" and it should be clearly stated that the inference is only permissive in nature. Thus, language such as the following should be charged: However, you are never required or compelled to draw this inference. It is your exclusive province to determine whether the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence support any inference and you are always free to accept them or reject them if you wish. It should also be noted that aside from the inference authorized by the statute, there is a question as to whether recent unexplained possession of stolen property permits an inference of guilty knowledge. The former receiving stolen property statute (N.J.S.A. 2A:139-1) provided for such an inference (see State v. DiRienzo, 53 N.J. 360 (1969) and one trial level court has held that a common law inference still may be drawn even in the absence of a specific statutory authorization. State in the Interest of L.L.A., 178 N.J. Super. 555 (J. & D.R. Ct. 1980); cf. State v. Burch, 179 N.J. Super. 336 (App. Div. 1981) certif. den. 89 N.J. 396 (1981) (applying inference in theft by unlawful taking prosecution under N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3.); see also State v. Ippolito, 287 N.J. Super. 375, 383 (App. Div. 1996) (holding in theft by unlawful taking case that "{t}he inference charge is given when there is a dispute concerning the identity of the person who physically took the property," but "is inappropriate where . . . defendant admits that he took the property and possessed it from the time it was taken until it was recovered but he has explained his possession as a claim of right.") In contrast, one commentator has suggested that the "common law inference does not appear to have survived the enactment of the Code," at least with respect to receiving, as opposed to unlawful taking, prosecutions. Cannel, Title 2C: CRIMINAL CODE ANNOTATED, COMMENT TO N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7 at p. 437. If the inference of guilty knowledge from recent, unexplained possession of stolen property is to be charged, care should be taken not to charge it in such a manner or under such circumstances as to violate a non-testifying defendant's right to remain silent. This issue is discussed in State v. Burch, supra, 179 N.J. Super. 336. There, the court stated that "when it isclear from the record that defendant is the only source to supply (an) explanation, the instruction is prejudicial and should not be given." Id. However, the court also noted that in a stolen property case some evidence, other than the defendant's testimony, "such as a sales slip or sales clerk," is usually available to the defense "to account for innocent possession." Id. at 343. Thus, the court concluded that the instruction concerning the inference was proper even though "there (was) an absence of a specific showing in the record as to the availability of an evidence source other than the defendant's own testimony . . ." Id. at 343-44; see also State v. DiRienzo, 53 N.J. 360 (1969) and State v. Dent, 51 N.J. 428 (1968) which are discussed in Burch. 11 If the evidence requires, any affirmative defenses should be charged at this point. See e.g. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2c. With respect to a "claim of right defense" pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2c(2), see State v. Ippolito, supra, 287 N.J. Super. 375 and separate model jury charge. NOTE ALSO that N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7a specifically says that it is an affirmative defense that the property was received with the purpose to restore it to the owner. This defense must be charged when there is a basis for it in the evidence. State v. Underwood, supra, 286 N.J. Super. at 138. Consequences of a Criminal Guilty Plea 1. You will have to appear in open court and tell the judge what you did that makes you guilty of the particular offense(s) 2. Do you understand that if you plead guilty: a. You will have a criminal record b. You may go to Jail or Prison. c. You will have to pay Fines and Court Costs. 3. If you are on Probation, you will have to submit to random drug and urine testing. If you violate Probation, you often go to jail. 4. In indictable matters, you will be required to provide a DNA sample, which could be used by law enforcement for the investigation of criminal activity, and pay for the cost of testing. 5. You must pay restitution if the court finds there is a victim who has suffered a loss and if the court finds that you are able or will be able in the future to pay restitution. 6. If you are a public office holder or employee, you can be required to forfeit your office or job by virtue of your plea of guilty. 7. If you are not a United States citizen or national, you may be deported by virtue of your plea of guilty. 8. You must wait 5-10 years to expunge a first offense. 2C:52-3 9. You could be put on Probation. 10. In Drug Cases, a mandatory DEDR penalty of $500-$1,000, and lose your driver's license for 6 months - 2years. You must pay a Law Enforcement Officers Training and Equipment Fund penalty of $30. 11. You may be required to do Community Service. 12. You must pay a minimum Violent Crimes Compensation Board assessment of $50 ($100 minimum if you are convicted of a crime of violence) for each count to which you plead guilty. 13. You must pay a $75 Safe Neighborhood Services Fund assessment for each conviction. 14. If you are being sentenced to probation, you must pay a fee of up to $25 per month for the term of probation. 15. You lose the presumption against incarceration in future cases. 2C:44-1 16. You may lose your right to vote. The defense of a person charged with a criminal offense is not impossible. There are a number of viable defenses and arguments which can be pursued to achieve a successful result. Advocacy, commitment, and persistence are essential to defending a client accused of a criminal offense. Jail for Crimes and Disorderly Conduct: If someone pleads Guilty or is found Guilty of a criminal offense, the following is the statutory Prison/Jail terms. NJSA 2C: 43-8 (1) In the case of a crime of the first degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between 10 years and 20 years; (2) In the case of a crime of the second degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between five years and 10 years; (3) In the case of a crime of the third degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between three years and five years; (4) In the case of a crime of the fourth degree, for a specific term which shall be fixed by the court and shall not exceed 18 months. 2C:43-3 Fines have been increased recently! 2C:43-3. Fines and Restitutions. A person who has been convicted of an offense may be sentenced to pay a fine, to make restitution, or both, such fine not to exceed: a. (1) $200,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the first degree; (2) $150,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the second degree; b. (1) $15,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the third degree; (2) $10,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the fourth degree; c. $1,000.00, when the conviction is of a disorderly persons offense; d. $500.00, when the conviction is of a petty disorderly persons offense; If facing any criminal charge, retain an experienced attorney immediately to determine you rights and obligations to the court. Current criminal charge researched by Kenneth Vercammen, Esq. 732-572-0500

Receiving Stolen Property NJ

Receiving Stolen Property

Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey. 2C:20-7. Receiving stolen property 2C:20-7. Receiving Stolen Property. a. Receiving. A person is guilty of theft if he knowingly receives or brings into this State movable property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it is probably stolen. It is an affirmative defense that the property was received with purpose to restore it to the owner. "Receiving" means acquiring possession, control or title, or lending on the security of the property. b. Presumption of knowledge. The requisite knowledge or belief is presumed in the case of a person who: (1) Is found in possession or control of two or more items of property stolen on two or more separate occasions; or (2) Has received stolen property in another transaction within the year preceding the transaction charged; or (3) Being a person in the business of buying or selling property of the sort received, acquires the property without having ascertained by reasonable inquiry that the person from whom he obtained it had a legal right to possess and dispose of it ;or (4) Is found in possession of two or more defaced access devices. Amended 1979, c.178, s.35; 1981, c.290, s.19; 1997, c.6, s.3. AT THE END OF THE TRIAL, THE JUDGE WILL READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS AND LAW TO THE JURY: RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7(a)) The defendant is charged with the crime of receiving stolen property. [Describe the property allegedly involved] This charge is based on a statute which reads: "A person is guilty of theft if he knowingly receives (or brings into this State) movable property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it has probably been stolen."1 Under this statute the State must prove 3 elements to establish that a defendant is guilty of receiving stolen property. These elements are: 1. That the defendant received (or brought into this State) movable property of another; 2. That the defendant acted knowingly when he/she received (or brought into this State) the movable property of another; 3. That the defendant either knew that the property had been stolen or believed that it had probably been stolen2 at the time he/she received the property (or brought the property into this State). The first element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant received (or brought into this State) movable property of another. The term "receive" means toacquire possession, control, or title (or to lend on the security) of the property.3 (Charge Model Charge on Possession, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-1c) The term "movable property" means property, the location of which can be changed (including things growing on, affixed to, or found in land, and documents, although the rights represented thereby have no physical location).4 The term "property" means anything of value.5 "Property of another" means property in which the defendant does not have a lawful interest.6 The State need not, however, prove the identity of the owner, the identity of the original thief,7 or the identity of the person from whom the defendant received the property. The second element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant acted knowingly when (he/she) received (or brought into this State) the movable property of another. A person acts knowingly with respect to the nature of (his/her) conduct or the attendantcircumstances if (he/she) is aware that (his/her) conduct is of that nature, or that such circumstances exist, or (he/she) is aware of a high probability of their existence. A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of (his/her) conduct if (he/she) is aware that it is practically certain that (his/her) conduct will cause such a result. "Knowing," "with knowledge" or equivalent terms have the same meaning.8 The third element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant either knew that the property had been stolen or believed that it had probably been stolen at the time the defendant received the property (or brought the property into this State). Stolen property means property that has been the subject of any unlawful taking. An unlawful taking occurs when a person takes or exercises unlawful control over the property of another with the purpose, that is, the conscious object, of depriving the other of it permanently or for so extended a period as to appropriate a substantial portion of its economic value.9 I have already defined the term "knowing" to you in discussing the second element and I will not repeat it here. The State is not required to prove that the property, in fact, had been stolen. On the other hand, mere proof that the property was stolen is not sufficient to establish this element. Rather, what the State must prove is that the defendant either knew that the property was stolen or believed that it had probably been stolen. A belief that property has probably been stolen is a belief that it is more likely than not that the property had been stolen. You must realize that knowledge and belief are states of mind which cannot be seen but can only be determined by drawing inferences from one's conduct, words or actions, and from all of the surrounding circumstances. It therefore is not necessary that the State produce witnesses to testify that the defendant said (he/she) knew or believed the property was stolen. (His/her) state of mind is to be determined by you after you examine (his/her) conduct and actions, all that was said or doneat that particular time and place, and all the surrounding circumstances.10 To reiterate, the three elements which the State must prove are: 1. That the defendant received (or brought into this State) movable property of another; 2. That in so doing the defendant acted knowingly; and 3. That the defendant either knew that the property had been stolen or believed that it had probably been stolen when (he/she) received it (or brought it into this State).11 If you conclude the State has proven all three elements of this offense beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty. On the other hand, if you find that the State has failed to prove any element beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty. (NOTE: Do not charge the following for certain types of property such as an automobile or firearm. See N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2b(2)(b) and (c).) Since the value of the property involved determines the degree or severity of the crime, the State must also prove its value beyond a reasonable doubt. If you find the defendant guilty, then youmust indicate whether you find the value of the property involved: (1) exceeds $500, (2) is at least $200 but does not exceed $500, or (3) is less than $200. Value is to be determined by the fair market value of the property at the time the defendant is alleged to have received or brought into this State the movable property of another. Fair market value means the price that a buyer would be willing to pay and a seller would be willing to accept if both parties were aware of all the relevant surrounding circumstances and neither party were under any compulsion to buy or sell. 1 The language "or brings into this State" is placed in parentheses to suggest that in a case where there is nothing to indicate that this language applies, consideration might be given to deleting the language and thereby eliminating unnecessary verbiage. 2 Where the defendant is also the person who took the property, the third element must be modified. State v. Underwood, 286 N.J. Super. 129 (App. Div. 1995). In such cases, "the State must prove that the defendant intended an unlawful taking," id. at 135; that is, the defendant acted with the purpose to permanently deprive the owner of the property. Id. at 138. Thus, in such cases the third element could be phrased as follows: "The property was stolen by the defendant. In order for you to find that the defendant stole the property, the State must prove that the defendant acted with the purpose to deprive the owner of the property. To deprive means to withhold or cause to be withheld property of another permanently or for so extended a period as to appropriate a substantial portion of its economic value..." (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-1a) A person acts purposely with respect to the nature of his conduct or a result thereof if it is his or her conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or cause such a result. (N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(1)). 3 N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7a. It is suggested that the language "or to lend on the security" only be charged when it applies to the facts of the case. 4 N.J.S.A. 2C:20-1e. It is suggested that the language relating to things on land or documents be charged only when it applies to the facts of the case. 5 N.J.S.A. 2C:20-1g. The statutory definition gives examples of various types of property as being included in the definition, such as trade secrets and choses in action. Reference should be made to the statutory definition in particular cases to determine whether additional language should be charged. 6 N.J.S.A. 2C:20-1h. This is not the complete definition of "property of another," but should be sufficient in the usual case. The definition goes on to address joint ownership issues, contraband, and security interests. When applicable under the facts of a case, this language should be included. 7 Consideration should be given to deleting the language as to the identity of the thief in an Underwood situation. See fn. 2, supra. 8 N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(2). 9 N.J.S.A. 2C:20-1a and p; State v. Underwood, supra, 286 N.J. Super. at 135-136. 10 In the appropriate case, the jury may be advised that such knowledge or belief may be inferred from the presence of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7b if the evidence provides a factual basis for such an instruction. See State v. Humphrey, 183 N.J. Super. 580 (Law Div. 1982); N.J.R.E. 303; N.J.S.A. 2C:1-13e. If the jury is instructed as to an inference permitted by N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7b, care should be taken to avoid the use of the term "presumption" and it should be clearly stated that the inference is only permissive in nature. Thus, language such as the following should be charged: However, you are never required or compelled to draw this inference. It is your exclusive province to determine whether the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence support any inference and you are always free to accept them or reject them if you wish. It should also be noted that aside from the inference authorized by the statute, there is a question as to whether recent unexplained possession of stolen property permits an inference of guilty knowledge. The former receiving stolen property statute (N.J.S.A. 2A:139-1) provided for such an inference (see State v. DiRienzo, 53 N.J. 360 (1969) and one trial level court has held that a common law inference still may be drawn even in the absence of a specific statutory authorization. State in the Interest of L.L.A., 178 N.J. Super. 555 (J. & D.R. Ct. 1980); cf. State v. Burch, 179 N.J. Super. 336 (App. Div. 1981) certif. den. 89 N.J. 396 (1981) (applying inference in theft by unlawful taking prosecution under N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3.); see also State v. Ippolito, 287 N.J. Super. 375, 383 (App. Div. 1996) (holding in theft by unlawful taking case that "{t}he inference charge is given when there is a dispute concerning the identity of the person who physically took the property," but "is inappropriate where . . . defendant admits that he took the property and possessed it from the time it was taken until it was recovered but he has explained his possession as a claim of right.") In contrast, one commentator has suggested that the "common law inference does not appear to have survived the enactment of the Code," at least with respect to receiving, as opposed to unlawful taking, prosecutions. Cannel, Title 2C: CRIMINAL CODE ANNOTATED, COMMENT TO N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7 at p. 437. If the inference of guilty knowledge from recent, unexplained possession of stolen property is to be charged, care should be taken not to charge it in such a manner or under such circumstances as to violate a non-testifying defendant's right to remain silent. This issue is discussed in State v. Burch, supra, 179 N.J. Super. 336. There, the court stated that "when it isclear from the record that defendant is the only source to supply (an) explanation, the instruction is prejudicial and should not be given." Id. However, the court also noted that in a stolen property case some evidence, other than the defendant's testimony, "such as a sales slip or sales clerk," is usually available to the defense "to account for innocent possession." Id. at 343. Thus, the court concluded that the instruction concerning the inference was proper even though "there (was) an absence of a specific showing in the record as to the availability of an evidence source other than the defendant's own testimony . . ." Id. at 343-44; see also State v. DiRienzo, 53 N.J. 360 (1969) and State v. Dent, 51 N.J. 428 (1968) which are discussed in Burch. 11 If the evidence requires, any affirmative defenses should be charged at this point. See e.g. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2c. With respect to a "claim of right defense" pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2c(2), see State v. Ippolito, supra, 287 N.J. Super. 375 and separate model jury charge. NOTE ALSO that N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7a specifically says that it is an affirmative defense that the property was received with the purpose to restore it to the owner. This defense must be charged when there is a basis for it in the evidence. State v. Underwood, supra, 286 N.J. Super. at 138. Consequences of a Criminal Guilty Plea 1. You will have to appear in open court and tell the judge what you did that makes you guilty of the particular offense(s) 2. Do you understand that if you plead guilty: a. You will have a criminal record b. You may go to Jail or Prison. c. You will have to pay Fines and Court Costs. 3. If you are on Probation, you will have to submit to random drug and urine testing. If you violate Probation, you often go to jail. 4. In indictable matters, you will be required to provide a DNA sample, which could be used by law enforcement for the investigation of criminal activity, and pay for the cost of testing. 5. You must pay restitution if the court finds there is a victim who has suffered a loss and if the court finds that you are able or will be able in the future to pay restitution. 6. If you are a public office holder or employee, you can be required to forfeit your office or job by virtue of your plea of guilty. 7. If you are not a United States citizen or national, you may be deported by virtue of your plea of guilty. 8. You must wait 5-10 years to expunge a first offense. 2C:52-3 9. You could be put on Probation. 10. In Drug Cases, a mandatory DEDR penalty of $500-$1,000, and lose your driver's license for 6 months - 2years. You must pay a Law Enforcement Officers Training and Equipment Fund penalty of $30. 11. You may be required to do Community Service. 12. You must pay a minimum Violent Crimes Compensation Board assessment of $50 ($100 minimum if you are convicted of a crime of violence) for each count to which you plead guilty. 13. You must pay a $75 Safe Neighborhood Services Fund assessment for each conviction. 14. If you are being sentenced to probation, you must pay a fee of up to $25 per month for the term of probation. 15. You lose the presumption against incarceration in future cases. 2C:44-1 16. You may lose your right to vote. The defense of a person charged with a criminal offense is not impossible. There are a number of viable defenses and arguments which can be pursued to achieve a successful result. Advocacy, commitment, and persistence are essential to defending a client accused of a criminal offense. Jail for Crimes and Disorderly Conduct: If someone pleads Guilty or is found Guilty of a criminal offense, the following is the statutory Prison/Jail terms. NJSA 2C: 43-8 (1) In the case of a crime of the first degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between 10 years and 20 years; (2) In the case of a crime of the second degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between five years and 10 years; (3) In the case of a crime of the third degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between three years and five years; (4) In the case of a crime of the fourth degree, for a specific term which shall be fixed by the court and shall not exceed 18 months. 2C:43-3 Fines have been increased recently! 2C:43-3. Fines and Restitutions. A person who has been convicted of an offense may be sentenced to pay a fine, to make restitution, or both, such fine not to exceed: a. (1) $200,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the first degree; (2) $150,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the second degree; b. (1) $15,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the third degree; (2) $10,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the fourth degree; c. $1,000.00, when the conviction is of a disorderly persons offense; d. $500.00, when the conviction is of a petty disorderly persons offense; If facing any criminal charge, retain an experienced attorney immediately to determine you rights and obligations to the court. Current criminal charge researched by Kenneth Vercammen, Esq. 732-572-0500