Consent to search voluntarily given based on video here.

Consent to search voluntarily given based on video here. State v. Hagans233 N.J. 30 (2018). 


       Because the trial court’s determination that the driver ultimately knowingly and voluntarily gave consent to search is supported by sufficient credible evidence, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search.

 State v. Hagans 233 N.J. 30 (2018)

  April 23, 2018 

    Because the trial court’s determination that the driver ultimately knowingly and voluntarily gave consent to search is supported by sufficient credible evidence, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search.

     In this case, the Court considered the validity of a driver’s consent to search her automobile after she initially denied a police officer’s request to search it. 

In March 2012, New Jersey State Trooper John Faust pulled over a 2002 Mercury Sable with a damaged taillight on Interstate 295 in Burlington County. The driver, Shonsheray Chandler, had changed lanes without signaling. There were passengers in Chandler’s car: her six-year-old daughter, who was in the back seat, and defendant Malcolm Hagans, sitting in the front passenger seat. Faust approached the passenger side of the vehicle and smelled the odor of burnt marijuana in the vehicle. Faust asked defendant to step out of the vehicle, arrested him, handcuffed him, called for back up, and administered Miranda warnings. Faust then asked Chandler to step out of the vehicle, administered Miranda warnings, and questioned her about the presence of marijuana in the vehicle. Faust handcuffed Chandler and placed her in the backseat of his police vehicle. Chandler denied knowing defendant had marijuana on him and denied that she had been smoking marijuana in the car. 

          Faust requested Chandler consent to a search of her vehicle. Before reading the consent form to her, Faust told Chandler that “it would be a lot easier if you would just make things easy.” Faust read the consent form aloud. He advised Chandler of her right to refuse consent and that if she refused, barring any other reason to detain her, she could leave. He also explained if she consented, she had a right to be present during the search and could withdraw her consent at any time. Faust asked whether she would give consent, and Chandler responded “no.” 

Faust then discussed his next steps. “I know, but at this time . . . we are going to apply for a search warrant, okay, and that is kinda going to prolong the inevitable. I would just like it to be easier.” Chandler replied, “Go ahead.” Faust then inquired, “What’s that ma’am?,” to which Chandler repeated “Go ahead.” Faust asked, “Are you sure?” Chandler answered, “Yeah.” Faust countered, “So you’re saying yes?” Chandler responded, “Yes.” To confirm Chandler’s decision, Faust re-read her the consent-to-search form in its entirety. Faust then again asked Chandler if she consented to the search of her vehicle; she responded “yes.” Faust repeated for the Mobile Video Recorder (MVR) in the police vehicle that Chandler had initially denied consent but changed her mind and consented because she “did not want to wait any longer.” The search produced a bag of marijuana and a loaded .22 caliber pistol. 

          Defendant admitted to ownership of the marijuana and the pistol. He was charged with unlawful possession of a weapon, fourth-degree child abuse, and a disorderly persons offense for possession of marijuana. At a suppression hearing, the trial court found that Faust had probable cause to pull the vehicle over and for a search. Although the court found that several of the factors set forth in State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352-53 (1965), militated against a finding of Chandler’s voluntary consent, it determined the totality of the circumstances indicated that the consent to search was valid and not coerced. The Appellate Division affirmed based on the totality of the evidence. 

The Court granted certification, limited to the issue of whether Chandler’s “consent to search the motor vehicle was freely and voluntarily given.” 229 N.J. 161 (2017). 

        HELD: Because the trial court’s determination that the driver ultimately knowingly and voluntarily gave consent to search is supported by sufficient credible evidence, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search. 2 

          In reviewing the grant or denial of a motion to suppress, an appellate court will uphold the trial court’s factual findings underlying that decision so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. Video-recorded evidence is reviewed under the same standard. State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 381 (2017). The panel’s decision here predated the Court’s opinion in S.S. and included findings based on the panel’s own de novo review of the MVR. The Court adheres to the principle enunciated in S.S. 

          Consent to search is a long-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Consent searches of motor vehicles that are pulled over by police are valid only if: (1) there is a reasonable and articulable basis beyond the initial valid motor vehicle stop to continue the detention after completion of the valid traffic stop; and (2) the consent is given knowingly and voluntarily. 

          Consent searches of motor vehicles that are pulled over by police are valid only if: (1) “there is a reasonable and articulable basis beyond the initial valid motor vehicle stop to continue the detention after completion of the valid traffic stop,” State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 647 (2002); and (2) the consent is “given knowingly and voluntarily,” id. at 639. The lynchpin to voluntary consent “is whether a person has knowingly waived [her] right to refuse to consent to the search.” State v. Domicz, 188 N.J. 285, 308 (2006) (citing State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 353–54 (1975) ). The burden is on the State to prove “that the individual giving consent knew that he or she ‘had a choice in the matter.’ ” Carty, 170 N.J. at 639 (quoting Johnson, 68 N.J. at 354). Specifically, the consenting individual must have been aware of her right to refuse, before giving consent. Johnson, 68 N.J. at 354.

          In the 1965 case of State v. King, this Court delineated factors for use by our courts in considering the voluntariness of consent. 44 N.J. at 352–53. Factors potentially indicating coerced consent include:

          (1) that consent was made by an individual already arrested; (2) that consent was obtained despite a denial of guilt; (3) that consent was obtained only after the accused had refused initial requests for consent to search; (4) that consent was given where the subsequent search resulted in a seizure of contraband which the accused must have known would be discovered; [and] (5) that consent was given while the defendant was handcuffed.

[Ibid. (citations omitted).]

Factors potentially indicating voluntariness of consent include:

          (1) that consent was given where the accused had reason to believe that the police would find no contraband; (2) that the defendant admitted his guilt before consent; [and] (3) that the defendant affirmatively assisted the police officers.

[Id. at 353 (citations omitted).]

          The Court emphasized that those factors were not commandments, but “guideposts to aid a trial judge in arriving at his conclusion.” Ibid. The Court cautioned that “the existence or absence of one or more of the factors mentioned above may be of great significance in the circumstances of one case, yet be of slight significance in another.” Ibid. Indeed, the Court explained, “many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested.” Ibid. Voluntariness depends on “the totality of the particular circumstances of the case” with each case “necessarily depend[ing] upon its own facts.” Ibid.

          3. In State v. King, the Court delineated factors for use in considering the voluntariness of consent. 44 N.J. at 352-53. Factors potentially indicating coerced consent include: “(1) that consent was made by an individual already arrested; (2) that consent was obtained despite a denial of guilt; (3) that consent was obtained only after the accused had refused initial requests for consent to search; (4) that consent was given where the subsequent search resulted in a seizure of contraband which the accused must have known would be discovered; [and] (5) that consent was given while the defendant was handcuffed.” Ibid. Factors potentially indicating voluntariness of consent include: “(1) that consent was given where the accused had reason to believe that the police would find no contraband; (2) that the defendant admitted his guilt before consent; [and] (3) that the defendant affirmatively assisted the police officers.” Id. at 353. The Court emphasized that those factors were not commandments, but “guideposts to aid a trial judge in arriving at his conclusion.” Ibid. Voluntariness depends on “the totality of the particular circumstances of the case” with each case “necessarily depend[ing] upon its own facts.” Ibid. 

          4. After determining the automobile stop was valid, the trial court acknowledged and evaluated the King factors but found that Chandler consented to the search voluntarily even though a majority of those factors cut against a finding of voluntariness. Notably, the court stressed the officer’s lack of insistence, the short period between the initial refusal and the consent, the officer’s non-aggressive request for clarification, and Chandler’s repeated affirmations that she did, in fact, give her consent to search. In the trial court’s view, the video evidence was more compelling than the results suggested by a mechanical application of the King factors to the facts of the case. Over fifty years ago, when King was decided, MVRs did not exist. Because of rapid developments in technology, MVRs are increasingly mounted in police vehicles, having become another important tool with the capacity to aid in the search for the truth. The MVR aided the trial court here because it permitted visual and audial evaluation of the police and driver’s interaction on the issue of consent. Specifically, the MVR footage helped the trial court determine that Chandler voluntarily consented to the search of her vehicle. Sufficient credible evidence supports that determination. 

          5. Defendant contends that Faust’s statement—“We are going to apply for a search warrant, okay, and that is just kinda going to prolong the inevitable”—coerced Chandler’s consent. Although the use of the term “inevitable” was somewhat anticipatory as to what might follow, the manner in which it was used here was not coercive. As a best practice, police officers should tell a suspect only the measures they intend to take—apply for a search warrant—and should not offer a prediction about whether a warrant will issue. Here, Faust had probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant given the odor of burnt marijuana. Faust’s statement was a candid assessment of the likelihood that a judge would grant his application for a search warrant. 

6. Sufficient credible evidence supports the trial court’s determination that Chandler’s consent was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances, despite the presence of several of the potentially coercive King factors. Here, technological advancements permitted the trial court to better evaluate the manner in which Faust obtained consent. Such possibilities—which are increasingly common today—are precisely why the King Court factors are guideposts rather than rigid absolute authority. 

The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. 

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s opinion.

Miranda warnings require police to advise those arrested.

Miranda warnings require police to advise those arrested. If police forget to give Miranda warning, statement or confessions can be used against that person. However, failure to give Miranda warnings does not invalidate an arrest.

Miranda applies not only upon arrest, but also upon custodial interrogation

It is fundamental that Miranda Warnings are required when a person is subject to "custodial interrogation." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L. Ed.2d 694, 706 (1966).

"Custodial interrogation" has been defined as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id.

In State v. Cunningham, 153 N.J. Super. 350, 352-353, (App. Div. 1977), the Court (citingPeople v. Stewart, 62 400 P.2d 97, 102 (1965)), said:

   The test ... does not propose a determination of the actual intent or subjective purpose of the police in undertaking the interrogations but a determination based upon the objective evidence.

A defendant is in "custody" for purposes of Miranda if the actions of the interrogating officers and the surrounding circumstances, fairly construed, would reasonably lead a detainee to believe he was not free to leave. State v. Barnes, 54 N.J. 1, 6 (1969) cert. den. 396 U.S. 1029, 90 S. Ct. 580, 24 L.Ed.2d 525 (1970). As such, the inquiry has been characterized as an "objective reasonable man" test. Id. 

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the use of involuntary statements and confessions at trial. The State bears the burden of proof in a motion to suppress a statement allegedly obtained in violation of the Miranda  doctrine. New Jersey requires the higher standard of beyond a reasonable doubt when the court determines if Miranda  has not been fully complies with.  State v Yough, 49 NJ 587, 600-601 (1967),  State v Whittington 142 NJ Super. 45, 49-50 (App. Div. 1976), State v Flower 224 NJ Super. 208, 213 (Law Div 1987) aff'd per curiam  224 NJ Super. 90 (App. Div. 1988).

Absent Miranda Warnings to a defendant who is in custody, the prosecution may not use a defendant's answers to questions. State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 275 (1986). A valid waiver of a defendant's constitutional rights must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently - the State bears that burden of that proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612,   State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 134 (1988)

A violation of Miranda does not throw out an arrest. The Miranda violation only makes the verbal statements not admissible at trial

 WHAT IS INTERROGATION?

         As set forth in NJ Practice, Vol. 32 Criminal Practice and Procedure  (West 1998) Section 755, in Rhode Island V Innis,  446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) the United States Supreme Court held that the term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express questioning but also to any words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit, an incriminating response from the suspect.

         It is "an established principle of our federalist system" that states may afford "individual liberties more expansive than those afforded by the federal constitution." State v Novembrino105 NJ 95, 144-145 (1987). 

           Generally, a statement given by a defendant is not admissible in a criminal case unless the court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was informed of his  Miranda rights before giving the statement and "in light of all the circumstances attending the confession it was given voluntarily." State v Hampton,61 NJ 250, 272 (1972). What is at stake is ensuring the use of effective procedural safeguards to secure the right of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution that " no person shall be.... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," which is now made applicable to state action by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, once informed of his rights " a defendant may waive effectuation of these rights provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." State v Flower224 NJ Super. 208, 213 (Law Div 1987) aff'd per curiam 224 NJ Super. 90 (App. Div. 1988). citing  Miranda v Arizona  384 US 436, 444, 86 S. Ct 1602, 1612, 16 L. Ed 2d 694 (1966); emphasis in Flowers.

         In State v Flower224 NJ Super. 208, 213 (Law Div 1987) aff'd per curiam  224 NJ Super. 90 (App. Div. 1988), the defendant had a low IQ and limited vocabulary. He gave confessions to police and a confession to DYFS. The court excluded the confession to the police, even though Miranda warnings were given and there was lack of coercion and an admitted waiver of rights by the defendant. The court concluded that   since the Defendant could not understand his  Miranda  rights, he could not waive them. One cannot knowingly and intelligently waive a right that he cannot understand or appreciate. 224 NJ Super. at 216. The court also excluded confessions to a DYFS investigator on the same grounds since she was acting in a law enforcement capacity and failed to inform Defendant of his Miranda rights. Id at 220.

         Where it is charged that a confession was given under the influence of narcotics or during a withdrawal period, central question of voluntariness remains the same, and the trial court must scrutinize all the pertinent facts attending the confession with particular focus on Defendant's demeanor, coherence, articulateness, capacity to full use of his faculties, his memory and his overall intelligence.  State v Arcediano371 F. Supp. 457 (D. NJ 1974); See also  Wade v Yeager245 F. Supp 62 (D. NJ 1964).     

         The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the waiver was made knowingly and intelligently.  If the suspect is intoxicated or under the influence of drugs to the point that he cannot understand his constitutional rights, then any waiver is void.  If the suspect is suffering from a mental disability, which renders him incapable of understanding his constitutional rights, then any waiver is void.  The level of mental disability which would render a suspect incapable of understanding his constitutional rights is probably close to the point at which the suspect could be said to be incapable of managing his own affairs.

         Where circumstances cast doubt on knowing and intelligent  quality of alleged waiver of right to counsel, there can be no waiver.  State vs. Dickens192 NJ Super. 290 (App. Div. 1983).

         Intoxication is grounds to suppress statements. See e.g.  Common vs. Brithsher  563 A.2d 502, App granted 575 A.2d 107. (If Defendant's intoxication combined to render him incapable of understanding Miranda warning waiver of Miranda rights would be invalid);  Common vs. Andel477 A.2d 13 56 (1984); (Defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was vitiated by his intoxication,  his eyes glaring and had a strong odor of alcohol.  Statements made by defendant while in custody should suppressed.)

         The court has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights Johnson vs. Zerbst  304 US 458 58 S. Court 1019, 82 Ed 146 (1938). In Common vs. Hosey334 NE 2d 44 ( Mass 75 ) the court reversed and remanded a matter where tried judge allowed admission of defendant's statement to police where defendant was extremely high, extremely emotional and detected from reality.

          Due process requires not only that a conviction not be based on an involuntary confession but also that a trial court hold what has become known as a Jackson Denno hearing when a defendant contests the voluntariness of his statement. Miller vs. Dugger  838 F. 2d 1530 ( 11 Cir. 1988) cert. den 486 US 1061. 1085.S. Ct.  2832 100 L. Ed 2d 933 (1988).

         A Jackson-Denno hearing refers to the court proceeding determining whether a defendant’s confession was voluntary or involuntary, based onJackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).At the Jackson- Denno hearing and at oral argument, we will explain through cross-examination and witnesses the involuntary nature of any statements the state intends to produce.  

Criminal Lawyers Job ABA p40

Issues to determine if defendant was “in custody”

Was defendant free to leave?

Was defendant put  in handcuffs?

Was he in patrol car?

Was he in police station?

Was he free to leave police station?

Was he given Miranda warning?

                                                    Respectfully submitted

                                                  KENNETH A. VERCAMMEN

                                                      ATTORNEY AT LAW

Metuchen NJ Public Defender Volunteer Internships available for college students and recent grads 2019

   Metuchen NJ Public Defender Volunteer Internships available for college students and recent grads 2019  

      The Public Defenders provide Indigent individuals charged with criminal or serious motor vehicle charges with free or limited cost legal defense. The Public Defender of Metuchen invites students interested in attending law school or a career in law enforcement to apply to serve as volunteer interns. Volunteer Law Clerk interns will attend Wednesday evening and occasional Friday morning court sessions. Please post for your students. If your law school uses Handshake or Simplicity and this is not currently posted, please email us at Vercammenlaw@njlaws.com

      Information regarding our program plus bio information can be found on the website.

www.njlaws.com/public-defender-volunteer.html

      Interested students must mail or fax a cover letter indicating the internship they are applying for and resume. If no personal cover letter by student, the resume will not be considered. Emails not accepted. After sending the resume and cover letter, call the office. The Public Defender does not have a paid staff so it is difficult to post to multiple websites. 

Mail or fax cover letter and resume to

Kenneth Vercammen, Esq.

Public Defender for the Borough of Metuchen

c/o 2053 Woodbridge Ave.

Edison, NJ 08817

Fax 732-572-0030

Very truly yours,

KENNETH   VERCAMMEN,

Metuchen Public Defender Volunteer Internship Mentor Program Director

 PUBLIC DEFENDER OF METUCHEN VOLUNTEER LEGAL INTERNS NEEDED

  Court times: WEDNESDAY 1pm PM [approx]- 7:30 PM,   once a month Friday 9-12, plus hearing preparation work.

             Volunteer Internship Description:

-Interview Clients facing charges in Municipal Court including Drug Possession, Drunk Driving, Assault, Driving While Suspended and other criminal and traffic offenses

-Make demands for Discovery on Prosecutor and review police reports

-Attend hearings and learn from experienced trial attorneys

-Prepare Motions to Suppress Evidence and Motions to Compel Discovery

-Conduct appropriate Legal research

-Acquire skills in Criminal Law and Procedure by active participation

-Participate in Public Relations activities for NJ State Bar Association, American Bar Association ABA and help organize seminars

- Update Lists of Prosecutors, Judges and Attorneys for publication of

    NJ Municipal Court Law Review

-      Revise criminal and traffic law Articles and submit to Law Journals and criminal law websites.

-      Add new criminal cases, criminal statutes and criminal articles to our Public Defender blog: http://criminal-jury.blogspot.comand other legal blogs and websites for use of clients and the general public.

-      Add Motor vehicle statutes, criminal court rules to websites to assist persons charged with criminal, traffic, DWI and municipal court complaints

-    Revise criminal and traffic law Articles and submit to Law Journals and criminal law websites.

-     -Help edit the  new book “Handling DUI and Drug Possession Defense” written by Kenneth Vercammen

        Volunteer to help indigent people charged with criminal and motor vehicle offenses of magnitude. In additional to time in court, you will be given research assignments. You can work more hours if you want. Help people less fortunate than you who are down on their luck.

        Program lasts 12 weeks Minimum Volunteer time commitment in summer- 18 hours per week. For Summer- Law students only. Fall & Spring 12 hours per week. Send cover letter and resume. After sending resume, call to schedule interview  732-572-0500.

         Mail or fax cover letter and resume to

Kenneth Vercammen, Esq.

Public Defender for the Borough of Metuchen

c/o 2053 Woodbridge Ave.

Edison, NJ 08817      

 Fax 732-572-0030

   No emails

Kenneth Vercammen Esq. of Edison was appointed Chair of the Criminal Law Committee of the ABA GP Solo Division for the 2018- 2019 by Division Chair Melanie Bragg.

 Kenneth Vercammen Esq. of Edison was appointed Chair of the Criminal Law Committee of the ABA GP Solo Division for the 2018- 2019 by Division Chair Melanie Bragg.

  Kenneth Vercammenis an Edison, Middlesex County, NJ trial attorney where he handles Criminal, Municipal Court, Probate, Civil Litigation and Estate Administration matters. Ken is author of the American Bar Association's award winning book “Criminal Law Forms” and often lectures to trial lawyers of the American Bar Association, NJ State Bar Association and Middlesex County Bar Association.  As the Past Chair of the Municipal Court Section he has served on its board for 10 years.  He is admitted to the Supreme Court of the United States.

Awarded the Municipal Court Attorney of the Year by both the NJSBA and Middlesex County Bar Association, he also received the NJSBA- YLD Service to the Bar Award and the General Practitioner Attorney of the Year, now Solo Attorney of the Year.

Ken Vercammen is a highly regarded lecturer on both Municipal Court/ DWI and Estate/ Probate Law issues for the NJICLE- New Jersey State Bar Association, American Bar Association, and Middlesex County Bar Association. His articles have been published by NJ Law Journal, ABA Law Practice Management Magazine, YLD Dictum, GP Gazette and New Jersey Lawyer magazine.  He was a speaker at the 2013 ABA Annual meeting program “Handling the Criminal Misdemeanor and Traffic Case” and serves as is the Editor in Chief of the NJ Municipal Court Law Review. 

         For nine years he served as the Cranbury Township Prosecutor and also was a Special Acting Prosecutor in nine different towns. Ken has successfully handled over one thousand Municipal Court and Superior Court matters in the past 27 years. 

His private practice has devoted a substantial portion of professional time to the preparation and trial of litigated matters. Appearing in Courts throughout New Jersey several times each week on Criminal and Municipal Court trials, civil and contested Probate hearings.  Ken also serves as the Editor of the popular legal website and related blogs. In Law School he was a member of the Law Review, winner of the ATLA trial competition and top ten in class.

         Throughout his career he has served the NJSBA in many leadership and volunteer positions. Ken has testified for the NJSBA before the Senate Judiciary Committee to support changes in the DWI law to permit restricted use driver license and interlock legislation. Ken also testified before the Assembly Judiciary Committee in favor of the first-time criminal offender “Conditional Dismissal” legislation which permits dismissal of some criminal charges. He is the voice of the Solo and Small firm attorneys who juggle active court practice with bar and community activities. In his private life he has been a member of the NJ State champion Raritan Valley Road Runners master’s team and is a 4^thdegree black belt. 

NJSA 2C:34-1 Prostitution Penalties

 NJSA 2C:34-1 Prostitution Penalties

www.njlaws.com/prostitution_penalties.html

Kenneth Vercammen'sLaw office represents individuals charged with criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey

2C:34-1 Prostitution and related offenses.
   

 Prostitution and Related Offenses.

a.As used in this section:



      (1)"Prostitution" is sexual activity with another person in exchange for something of economic value, or the offer or acceptance of an offer to engage in sexual activity in exchange for something of economic value.

(2)"Sexual activity" includes, but is not limited to, sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, and oral-anal contact, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex; masturbation; touching of the genitals, buttocks, or female breasts; sadistic or masochistic abuse and other deviate sexual relations.

(3)"House of prostitution" is any place where prostitution or promotion of prostitution is regularly carried on by one person under the control, management or supervision of another.

(4)

      "Promoting prostitution" is:

(a)Owning, controlling, managing, supervising or otherwise keeping, alone or in association with another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business;

(b)Procuring an inmate for a house of prostitution or place in a house of prostitution for one who would be an inmate;

(c)Encouraging, inducing, or otherwise purposely causing another to become or remain a prostitute;

(d)Soliciting a person to patronize a prostitute;

(e)Procuring a prostitute for a patron;

(f)Transporting a person into or within this State with purpose to promote that person's engaging in prostitution, or procuring or paying for transportation with that purpose; or

(g)Knowingly leasing or otherwise permitting a place controlled by the actor, alone or in association with others, to be regularly used for prostitution or promotion of prostitution, or failure to make a reasonable effort to abate such use by ejecting the tenant, notifying law enforcement authorities, or other legally available means.



      

      b.A person commits an offense if:



      å(1)The actor engages in prostitution;



      

      (2)The actor promotes prostitution;

(3)The actor knowingly promotes prostitution of a child under 18 whether or not the actor mistakenly believed that the child was 18 years of age or older, even if such mistaken belief was reasonable;

(4)The actor knowingly promotes prostitution of the actor's child, ward, or any other person for whose care the actor is responsible;

(5)The actor compels another to engage in or promote prostitution;

(6)The actor promotes prostitution of the actor's spouse; or

(7)The actor knowingly engages in prostitution with a person under the age of 18, or if the actor enters into or remains in a house of prostitution for the purpose of engaging in sexual activity with a child under the age of 18, or if the actor solicits or requests a child under the age of 18 to engage in sexual activity. It shall be no defense to a prosecution under this paragraph that the actor mistakenly believed that the child was 18 years of age or older, even if such mistaken belief was reasonable. 



      

      c.Grading of offenses under subsection b.

(1)An offense under subsection b. constitutes a crime of the second degree if the offense falls within paragraph (3) or (4) of that subsection.



      (2)An offense under subsection b. constitutes a crime of the third degree if the offense falls within paragraph (5), (6) or (7) of that subsection.



      (3)An offense under paragraph (2) of subsection b. constitutes a crime of the third degree if the conduct falls within subparagraph (a), (b), or (c) of paragraph (4) of subsectiona.Otherwise the offense is a crime of the fourth degree.



      

      (4)An offense under subsection b. constitutes a disorderly persons offense if the offense falls within paragraph (1) of that subsection except that a second or subsequent conviction for such an offense constitutes a crime of the fourth degree.  In addition, where a motor vehicle was used in the commission of any offense under paragraph (1) of subsection b. the court shall suspend for six months the driving privilege of any such offender who has a valid driver's license issued by this State.  Upon conviction, the court shall immediately collect the offender's driver's license and shall forward it, along with a report stating the first and last day of the suspension imposed pursuant to this paragraph, to the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission.



      d.Presumption from living off prostitutes.  A person, other than the prostitute or the prostitute's minor child or other legal dependent incapable of self-support, who is supported in whole or substantial part by the proceeds of prostitution is presumed to be knowingly promoting prostitution. 



      e.It is an affirmative defense to prosecution for a violation of this section that, during the time of the alleged commission of the offense, the defendant was a victim of human trafficking pursuant to section 1 of P.L.2005, c.77 (C.2C:13-8) or the defendant was under the age of 18.

KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC

ATTORNEY AT LAW

2053 Woodbridge Ave.

Edison, NJ 08817

732-572-0500

www.njlaws.com

   Criminal Indictable and Disorderly Offense Penalties

Disorderly person criminal offenses- ex Simple Assault, shoplifting & cases in Municipal Court

Jail 2C: 43- 8            jail 6 month maximum 

                                probation 1-2 year max                                         

                                community service  180 days maximum  

                               

Disorderly- fines:    $1,000 Fine maximum  under 2C: 43- 3

                                    plus mandatory costs, VCCO and other penalties                          

         There are many other penalties that the court must impose in criminal cases, including DNA testing. There are dozens of other penalties a court can impose, depending on the type of matter.         

         Drug offenses: in addition to above penalties, mandatory minimum $500 DEDR penalty, mandatory lab fee and other court costs over $200, mandatory 6 month- 2 year loss of license, plus usual Probation, drug testing, DNA testing and other penalties. If attorney's Conditional Discharge motion is granted for first time offender. penalty can be reduced. In certain drug cases, the fine can be up to $75,000. 

-Petty Disorderly person- 30 days jail   maximum

Petty DP $500 max Fine, VCCB and other penalties

         Indictable Crime Penalties    [Felony type]  [ Superior Court]

                  Jail  potential       Fine max            Probation

1st degree  10- 20 years       $200,000           [presumption of jail]

2nd degree5-10 years         $150,000           [presumption of jail]

3rd degree  3- 5 years           $15,000             1 year- 5 year

4th degree  0- 18 months       $10,000             1 year- 5 year

  There are dozens of other penalties a court can impose, depending on the type of matter. Read www.njlaws.com/jail_for_crimes_and_disorderly_conduct.html

         If you or a family member are charged with a criminal offense, you should retain an experienced criminal attorney to argue to reduce the penalties!  

Research by:  KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC

ATTORNEY AT LAW

 2053 Woodbridge Ave.

Edison, NJ 08817

(Phone) 732-572-0500

More information on Fines, jail and penalties on website: www.njlaws.com

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