Kenneth Vercammen is a Middlesex County trial attorney who has published 130 articles in national and New Jersey publications on Criminal Law and litigation topics. Appointments can be scheduled at 732-572-0500. He is author of the ABA's book "Criminal Law Forms".
2053 Woodbridge Avenue - Edison, NJ 08817
http://www.njlaws.com/

Wednesday, April 4, 2018

no expungement here for endangering welfare IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR THE EXPUNGEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL RECORD BELONGING TO J.W.


IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION
FOR THE EXPUNGEMENT OF THE
CRIMINAL RECORD BELONGING TO J.W.
_____________________________

           Submitted January 25, 2018 รข€“ Decided February 26, 2018

           Before Judges Simonelli and Haas.

           On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
           Law Division, Bergen County.SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                     APPELLATE DIVISION
                                     DOCKET NO. A-1730-16T3

            NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                   APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM

      The State of New Jersey appeals from the November 17, 2016

Law   Division   order    granting     respondent     J.W.'s    petition        for

expungement of all records relating to her arrest and conviction

for third-degree endangering the welfare of a child for causing
the child harm that would make the child an abused or neglected

child, 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a).           We conclude that the 2016 amendment

to   the    expungement         statute,    

expungement of J.W.'s conviction.                Accordingly, we reverse.

     J.W. was a nanny for two children, ages one and three.                       On

August     10,    2007,    she    dosed    the    children    with   Benadryl,    an

antihistamine drug, by adding it to their apple juice.                           The

incident came to light when a friend of J.W. divulged the incident

to his therapist.         J.W. was charged under 

two counts of second-degree endangering the welfare of a child by

abuse or neglect.         On February 27, 2008, J.W. pled guilty to one

count of third-degree endangering the welfare of a child by abuse

or neglect. The trial court imposed a three-year term of probation

subject to 180 days in the county jail.

     At     the    time    of    J.W.'s    conviction,       

provided as follows:

             Any person having a legal duty for the care
             of a child or who has assumed responsibility
             for the care of a child who engages in sexual
             conduct which would impair or debauch the
             morals of a child, or who causes the child
             harm that would make the child an abused or
             neglected child as defined in [
             1, 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-3 and N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21] is
             guilty of a crime of the second degree. Any
             other person who engages in conduct or who
             causes harm as described in this subsection
             to a child under the age of [sixteen] is guilty
             of a crime of the third degree.

                                           2                               A-1730-16T3
          [(Emphasis added).]

The expungement statute in effect at the time of J.W.'s conviction

provided as follows:

          Records of conviction for the following crimes
          specified in the New Jersey Code of Criminal
          Justice shall not be subject to expungement:
          [
N.J.S.A.]     2C:11-1     et   seq.    (Criminal
          Homicide), except death by auto as specified
          in [
          (Kidnapping); section 1 of [N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6]
          (Luring or Enticing); section 1 of [N.J.S.A.]
          2C:13-8    (Human    Trafficking);     [N.J.S.A.]
          2C:14-2 (Sexual Assault or Aggravated Sexual
          Assault); [
N.J.S.A.] 2C:14-3 a. (Aggravated
          Criminal Sexual Contact); if the victim is a
          minor, [
N.J.S.A.] 2C:14-3b (Criminal Sexual
          Contact); if the victim is a minor and the
          offender is not the parent of the victim,
          [
N.J.S.A.] 2C:13-2 (Criminal Restraint) or
          [
N.J.S.A.]    2C:13-3    (False    Imprisonment);
          [
N.J.S.A.]    2C:15-1     (Robbery);    [N.J.S.A.
          2C:17-1    (Arson    and    Related    Offenses);
          [
N.J.S.A.] 2C:24-4 a. (Endangering the welfare
          of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which
          would impair or debauch the morals of the
          child); [
N.J.S.A.] 2C:24-4 b(4) (Endangering
          the welfare of a child); [
          b.(3) (Causing or permitting a child to engage
          in a prohibited sexual act); [
          4 b.(5)(a) (Distributing, possessing with
          intent to distribute or using a file-sharing
          program to store items depicting the sexual
          exploitation or abuse of a child); [N.J.S.A.]
          2C:24-4 b.(5)(b) (Possessing items depicting
          the sexual exploitation or abuse of a child);
          [
N.J.S.A.]    2C:28-1    (Perjury);    [N.J.S.A.]
          2C:28-2 (False Swearing); [
          b.(4) (Knowingly promoting the prostitution of
          the actor's child); section 2 of [N.J.S.A.
          2C:38-2] (Terrorism); subsection a. of section
          3   of   [N.J.S.A.    2C:38-3]    (Producing   or
          Possessing    Chemical     Weapons,    Biological

                                 3                            A-1730-16T3
          Agents or Nuclear or Radiological Devices);
          and conspiracies or attempts to commit such
          crimes.

          [
N.J.S.A. 2C:52-29(b) (emphasis added).]

    In 2013, the Legislature amended 

forth the crime of endangering the welfare of a child in two

separate paragraphs:

          (1) Any person having a legal duty for the
          care   of  a   child   or  who   has   assumed
          responsibility for the care of a child who
          engages in sexual conduct which would impair
          or debauch the morals of the child is guilty
          of a crime of the second degree. Any other
          person who engages in conduct or who causes
          harm as described in this paragraph to a child
          is guilty of a crime of the third degree.

          (2) Any person having a legal duty for the
          care   of  a   child   or  who   has   assumed
          responsibility for the care of a child who
          causes the child harm that would make the
          child an abused or neglected child as defined
          in [
          N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21] is guilty of a crime of the
          second degree. Any other person who engages
          in conduct or who causes harm as described in
          this paragraph to a child is guilty of a crime
          of the third degree.

          [(Emphasis added.)]

    In   2016,   the   Legislature   amended   

provide as follow:

          Records of conviction for the following crimes
          specified in the New Jersey Code of Criminal
          Justice shall not be subject to expungement:
          [
N.J.S.A.]    2C:11-1   et    seq.   (Criminal
          Homicide), except death by auto as specified

                                     4                          A-1730-16T3
in [
N.J.S.A.] 2C:11-5 and strict liability
vehicular homicide as specified in section 1
of [N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.3]; [
(Kidnapping); section 1 of [N.J.S.A. 2C.2C:13-
6] (Luring or Enticing); section 1 of
[N.J.S.A.   2C:13-8]     (Human    Trafficking);
[
N.J.S.A.]   2C:14-2     (Sexual    Assault    or
Aggravated Sexual Assault); subsection a. of
[
N.J.S.A.]   2C:14-3     (Aggravated     Criminal
Sexual Contact); if the victim is a minor,
subsection b. of [
Sexual Contact); if the victim is a minor and
the offender is not the parent of the victim,
[
N.J.S.A.] 2C:13-2 (Criminal Restraint) or
[
N.J.S.A.]   2C:13-3    (False    Imprisonment);
[
N.J.S.A.]   2C:15-1    (Robbery);     [
2C:17-1   (Arson    and    Related     Offenses);
subsection    a.    of    [N.J.S.A.]      2C:24-4
(Endangering the welfare of a child by
engaging in sexual conduct which would impair
or debauch the morals of the child, or causing
the child other harm); paragraph (4) of
subsection    b.    of    [N.J.S.A.]      2C:24-4
(Photographing or filming a child in a
prohibited sexual act); paragraph (3) of
subsection b. of [
or permitting a child to engage in a
prohibited sexual act); subparagraph (a) of
paragraph (5) of subsection b. of [
2C:24-4 (Distributing, possessing with intent
to distribute or using a file-sharing program
to   store   items    depicting     the    sexual
exploitation    or   abuse     of    a    child);
subparagraph   (b)    of   paragraph     (5)   of
subsection    b.    of    [N.J.S.A.]      2C:24-4
(Possessing or viewing items depicting the
sexual exploitation or abuse of a child);
[
N.J.S.A.]   2C:28-1    (Perjury);     [
2C:28-2 (False Swearing); paragraph (4) of
subsection b. of [
promoting the prostitution of the actorรข€™s
child); section 2 of [N.J.S.A. 2C:38-2]
(Terrorism); subsection a. of section 3 of
[
N.J.S.A. 2C:38-3) (Producing or Possessing
Chemical Weapons, Biological Agents or Nuclear

                       5                            A-1730-16T3
              or Radiological Devices); and conspiracies or
              attempts to commit such crimes.

              [(Emphasis added).]

       In August 2016, J.W. filed a petition for expungement pursuant

to 
N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a)(2).       The trial court granted the petition,

finding the 2016 amendment to 
N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(b) did not prohibit

expungement      for   convictions    for     the   nonsexual      offense     of

endangering      the   welfare   of   a   child     by   abuse    or   neglect.

Distinguishing In re Expungement of W.S., 

(App. Div. 2004), the court noted that the crime of endangering

the welfare of a child by abuse or neglect was not a lesser

included offense of endangering the welfare of a child by sexual

conduct, and the two crimes differed in both the nature of the

offense, collateral consequences, and penalties.                The court found

that    the   pre-amended   expungement      statute     only    prohibited     a

conviction for endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in

sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the moral of a child.

       The court noted that the Legislature amended 

4(a) into two subsections and inserted the term "causes harm" in

both, meaning the "harm" in subsection (1) refers to harm caused

by sexual conduct, whereas the "harm" in subsection (2) refers to

harm caused by nonsexual conduct.           The court then interpreted the

parenthetical language in the 2016 amendment to 


                                      6                                 A-1730-16T3
2(b), "or causing the child other harm," as referring only to

other harm resulting from sexual conduct under 

4(a)(1).     In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the

Senate     Judiciary     Committee's   statement     commenting    that      the

function of the 2016 amendment was to "update, using the accepted

current citation format, the statutory citations for the list of

criminal convictions that are not subject to expungement; such

updating    does   not   add   any   additional    crimes   to   this    list."

Statement of the Senate Judiciary Committee to Assembly Bills 206,

471, 1663, 2879, 3060 and 3108 (May 7, 2015).          The court concluded

that if a conviction for a nonsexual offense under 

4(a) was eligible for expungement prior to the 2016 amendment and

the Legislature's intent was not to add any additional crimes to

the list of crimes barred from expungement, a conviction for a

crime under 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) for nonsexual conduct which makes

the child abused or neglected is still eligible for expungement.

We disagree.

     Our review of a trial court's statutory interpretation is de

novo.    Beim v. Hulfish, 
216 N.J. 484, 497 (2014).          "In construing

a statute, our 'overriding goal is to determine as best we can the

intent of the Legislature, and to give effect to that intent.'"

Bermudez v. Kessler Inst. for Rehab., 



                                       7                                A-1730-16T
3 Div. 2015) (quoting State v. Hudson, 
209 N.J. 513, 529 (2012)).

As our Supreme has held:

            When   interpreting    a  statute,   our  main
            objective is to further the Legislature's
            intent. To discern the Legislature's intent,
            courts first turn to the plain language of the
            statute in question. In reading the language
            used by the Legislature, the court will give
            words their ordinary meaning absent any
            direction   from   the   Legislature   to  the
            contrary. 'If the plain language leads to a
            clear and unambiguous result, then [the]
            interpretive process is over.'

                 Where the plain meaning does not point
            the court to a 'clear and unambiguous result,'
            it then considers extrinsic evidence from
            which it hopes to glean the Legislature's
            intent. Included within the extrinsic evidence
            rubric are legislative history and statutory
            context, which may shed light on the drafters'
            motives. Likewise, interpretations of the
            statute and cognate enactments by agencies
            empowered   to    enforce   them   are   given
            substantial deference in the context of
            statutory interpretation.

            [TAC Assocs. v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot.,
            
202 N.J. 533, 540-41 (2010) (alteration in
            original) (citations omitted).]

     "The    Legislature's   intent   is    the   paramount   goal   when

interpreting a statute and, generally, the best indicator of that

intent is the statutory language."         DiProspero v. Penn, 
 477, 492 (2005).    Thus, "[t]he plain language of the statute is

our starting point."   Patel v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 200 N.J.




                                  8                              A-1730-16T3
413, 418 (2009).        In considering a statute's language, we are

guided by the legislative directive that

           words and phrases shall be read and construed
           with   their   context,  and   shall,   unless
           inconsistent with the manifest intent of the
           legislature or unless another or different
           meaning is expressly indicated, be given their
           generally accepted meaning, according to the
           approved usage of the language.      Technical
           words and phrases, and words and phrases
           having a special or accepted meaning in the
           law, shall be construed in accordance with
           such technical or special and accepted
           meaning.

           [N.J.S.A. 1:1-1.]

"Courts may not rewrite a plainly written law or presume that the

Legislature intended something other than what it expressed in

plain   words."    In    re   Plan   for   Abolition   of   the   Council   on

Affordable Hous., 
214 N.J. 444, 468 (2013).            "If the language of

a statute is clear, a court's task is complete."            Ibid.

     The Legislature's stated purpose in enacting 

2 was to

           provid[e] relief to the reformed offender who
           has led a life of rectitude and disassociated
           himself with unlawful activity, but not to
           create a system whereby persistent violators
           of the law or those who associate themselves
           with continuing criminal activity have a
           regular means of expunging their police and
           criminal records.

           [N.J.S.A. 2C:52-32.]



                                      9                              A-1730-16T
3 N.J.S.A.     2C:52-2      "serves      to    'eliminate     "the   collateral

consequences imposed upon otherwise law-abiding citizens who have

had   a   minor   brush   with   the   criminal   justice    system.'"     The

Legislature intended the statute to 'provid[e] relief to the one-

time offender who has led a life of rectitude and disassociated

himself with unlawful activity[.]'"             In re Expungement of J.S.,


223 N.J. 54, 66 (2015) (quoting In re Kollman, 

(2012). Nevertheless, the statute provides a list of crimes barred

from expungement.      

      Here, the plain language of 
N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(b) unambiguously

prohibits the expungement of J.W's conviction.            The 2016 amendment

explicitly prohibits the expungement of convictions pursuant to

"subsection a. of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4[.]"              At the time of J.W.'s

conviction, 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-2(a) specified that a person was guilty

of endangering the welfare of a child if he or she "engage[d] in

sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of a child,

or . . . [caused] the child harm that would make the child an

abused or neglected child[.]"               The parenthetical in the 2016

amendment to 
N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(b) refers to endangering the welfare

of a child by either engaging in sexual conduct that would impair

or debauch the morals of a child or causing the child "other harm."

Given that the only "other harm" referred to in the pre-amended


N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) related to conduct that made a child abused

                                       10                             A-1730-16T3
or neglected, the "other harm" specified in the parenthetical of

the 2016 amendment to 
N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(b) must refer to "harm that

would make the child an abused or neglected child" under 


     The "other harm" in the parenthetical of the 2016 amendment

cannot refer back to harm caused by sexual conduct or to the

impairment or debauchment of a child's morals because the rules

of statutory interpretation require that statutes be construed in

a manner that gives effect to every word so no part is rendered

superfluous.   Otherwise, if we adopted J.W.'s reading of 

2C:52-2(b) and found that "other harm" refers to only harm from

sexual conduct, the statute would become redundant.

     "Punctuation is part of an act and may be considered in its

interpretation." In re Estate of Fisher, 

(App. Div. 2015).   "The word 'or' in a statute is to be considered

a   disjunctive   particle   indicating   an   alternative."       Ibid.

(citation omitted).   Thus, where "items in a list are joined by a

comma . . ., with an 'or' preceding the last item, the items are

disjunctive," or "distinct and separate from each other." State

v. Frank, 
445 N.J. Super. 98, 106 (App. Div. 2016).            Here, the

phrases "who engages in sexual conduct which would impair or

debauch the morals of a child" and "who causes the child harm that

would make the child an abused or neglected child" are separated

                                 11                              A-1730-16T3
by a comma and the word "or" indicating they are disjunctive and

refer to two distinct harms.          Paragraph (1) of 

describes one harm -- the impairment and debauchment of a child's

morals, and paragraph (2) describes the other harm -- abuse and

neglect of a child.         Therefore, because J.W. was convicted under

the pre-amended 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) of endangering the welfare of

a child by abuse or neglect and 
N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(b) specifies that

convictions under 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) are barred from expungement,

the court erred in granting J.W.'s petition.

       Even if we found that 
N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(b) is ambiguous,

because it does not specify which paragraph of 

applies to the bar against expungement, the legislative history

and general statutory scheme of 
N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(b) favor a finding

that    the     statute    bars   the    expungement        of    convictions      for

endangering the welfare of a child by abuse or neglect.                     

2C:52-2(b) provides that any convictions under 

are    barred    from   expungement     because       the   Legislature     used    no

limiting language when it cited to 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a).                      "[W]hen

the Legislature includes limiting language in one part of a

statute, but leaves it out of another section in which the limit

could    have    been     included,     we    infer    that      the   omission    was

intentional."       Ryan v. Renny, 
203 N.J. 37, 58 (2010).                  

2C:52-2(b) specifies paragraphs of subsections of certain crimes

                                         12                                  A-1730-16T3
barred from expungement, but does not do so when citing to 

2C:24-4(a). For example, in listing crimes barred from expungement

under   subsection   b.   of   

specifies as follows:

           paragraph (4) of subsection b. of [N.J.S.A.]
           2C:24-4 (Photographing or filming a child in
           a prohibited sexual act); paragraph (3) of
           subsection b. of [
           or permitting a child to engage in a
           prohibited sexual act); subparagraph (a) of
           paragraph (5) of subsection b. of [N.J.S.A.]
           2C:24-4 (Distributing, possessing with intent
           to distribute or using a file-sharing program
           to   store   items   depicting    the   sexual
           exploitation    or  abuse    of    a   child);
           subparagraph   (b)   of   paragraph   (5)   of
           subsection    b.   of    [
           (Possessing or viewing items depicting the
           sexual exploitation or abuse of a child)[.]

     The Legislature made very specific and narrow references when

it chose to limit the scope of the bar to expungement for those

crimes.   The Legislature could have specified which paragraphs of

subsection a. of 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4 applied to the bar, limiting its

application to convictions arising from sexual conduct or from

nonsexual conduct resulting in abuse or neglect.            However, the

Legislature chose not to do so, indicating it did not intend to

limit the prohibition against expungement of a conviction under


N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) to only one type of harm or conduct that

endangers the welfare of a child.



                                    13                             A-1730-16T3
    Given   the    express   references     in   

paragraphs of subsections of other crimes listed in the statute,

we cannot insert limiting language that the Legislature could have

included with respect to the bar on expunging convictions under


N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a), but did not do so.           See Jersey Cent. Power &

Light Co. v. Melcar Util. Co., 
212 N.J. 576, 596 (2013) (noting

that "[i]n light of its express reference to the right to pursue

civil remedies elsewhere in . . . [N.J.S.A. 48:2-80], we cannot

insert   language   that   the   Legislature      could   have   included    in

subsection (d) -- but did not.").

     In addition, the Legislature's focus was not only on offenses

arising from sexual conduct, as 

expungement of convictions arising from nonsexual conduct, such

as kidnapping, 
N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1, false swearing, 

2, and perjury, 
N.J.S.A. 2C:28-1, and nonsexual conduct against

minors, such as criminal restraint, 

imprisonment, 
N.J.S.A. 2C:13-3.          Thus, in light of the absence of

limiting language and the inclusion of nonsexual offenses barred

from expungement, the statutory scheme of 

indicates the prohibition against expungement is not limited to a

specific type of conduct or harm underlying a conviction pursuant

to 



                                    14                                A-1730-16T3
    Furthermore, the parenthetical language in the pre-amended

or amended 
N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(b) does not limit the scope of the

prohibition against expungement.         In In re Expungement of W.S.,


367 N.J. Super. at 309, we found that 

expungement of any convictions under 
N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2 despite the

fact that the parenthetical following the citation to 

2C:14-2 only referred to "aggravated sexual assault," but not to

"sexual   assault"   generally,     because      the    parenthetical      was

descriptive only and incomplete.         Ibid.   We noted that "when the

Legislature intended to exclude a lesser degree of one of these

enumerated offenses from the prohibition against expungement, it

directly expressed that intent by specifically 'except[ing] death

by auto as specified in section 2C:11-5' from the prohibition

against expungement."      Id. at 312.        Likewise, here, when the

Legislature intended to include a subparagraph or subsection of

one of the enumerated offenses barred from expungement, it did so

by referencing specific subsections or paragraphs.

     Moreover, "the Legislature that enacted 

presumed to have been aware of the judicial construction of the

expungement   statute's   earlier    version[.]"        In   re   Expungement

Petition of J.S., 
223 N.J. 54, 75 (2015).              Given that in In re

Expungement of W.S. we interpreted the parentheticals in 

2C:52-2(b) as descriptive only and deferred to the citations when

                                    15                                A-1730-16T3
they   were   more   expansive,   we    conclude   the   Legislature     acted

deliberately when it later amended the reference to 

4(a) in 
N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(b) by adding the language "or causing the

child other harm," but not including a particular paragraph when

citing to 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) to limit the scope of the prohibition

against expungement.      The 2016 amendment to 

made the parenthetical complete and accurate to reflect the conduct

barred from expungement described in 

not alter the citation, which previously included convictions

arising from endangering the welfare of a child by sexual and

nonsexual conduct.

       Lastly, the Senate Judiciary Committee's statement commented

that the amendments to 
N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(b) "update, using the

accepted current citation format, the statutory citations for the

list    of    criminal   convictions        that   are   not   subject        to

expungement[,]" but that "such updating does not add any additional

crimes to this list."      Prior the 2016 amendment, 

2(b) specified that convictions under "N.J.S.2C:42-4 a." could not

be expunged.      The 2016 amendment altered the citation to the

statute to read "subsection a. of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4," making it

conform to the current citation format.             The amendment did not

expand or limit which part of subsection a. of 

applied to the bar against expungement, keeping in line with the

                                       16                              A-1730-16T3
Legislature's expressed intent not to add any additional crimes

to the list of crimes barred.

     Both prior to and after 2016, 

the offense of endangering the welfare of a child as engaging in

sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the

child or nonsexual conduct that causes the child harm that would

make the child an abused or neglected child.          Therefore, reading

the addition of the parenthetical language in 2016 amendment, "or

causing the child other harm[,]" as referring to conduct causing

the abuse or neglect of a child complies with the Legislature's

intent not to add additional crimes to the list of crimes barred

from expungement, as it still describes conduct included within

the scope of 
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) -- endangering the welfare of a

child.   Thus, the 2016 amendment did not limit or expand the scope

of the bar against expungement of convictions under 

4(a),    but   only   updated   the    citation   format   and   made   the

accompanying parenthetical more complete.         Accordingly, we reverse

the grant of J.W.'s petition for expungement.


     Reversed.
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Jeff Gold and Ken V at NJSBA DWI seminar


Jeff Gold and Ken V at NJSBA DWI seminar
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Saturday, March 10, 2018

Arrested at the St. Patrick parade?

Arrested at the St. Patrick parade?
  Kenneth Vercammen’s Law Office represents people charged with criminal and Municipal Court offenses. We provide representation throughout New Jersey. Criminal charges can cost you.  If convicted, you can face high fines, jail, Probation  and other penalties.  Don’t give up!  Our Law Office can provide experienced attorney representation for criminal violations. We also help represent persons who are injured at bars and restaurants.
Our website www.njlaws.com provides information on criminal offenses we can be retained to represent people. 

2C:12-1. Assault. a. Simple assault. A person is guilty of assault if he:
(1)Attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or
(2)Negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or
(3)Attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.
•     Simple assault is a disorderly persons offense unless committed in a fight or scuffle entered into by mutual consent, in which case it is a petty disorderly persons offense.
      
Disorderly person criminal offenses- ex Simple Assault, shoplifting & cases in Municipal Court
 Jail 2C: 43- 8           jail  6-month maximum max
                                probation 1-2 year                                                 
                                community service  180 days maximum 
                             mandatory costs, VCCB and other penalties
Disorderly- fines:          2C: 43- 3        $1,000 Fine  maximum              
DNA testing usually required
 There are dozens of other penalties a court can impose, depending on the type of matter.  

Resisting Arrest: Eluding Officer

It is a criminal offense in the State of New Jersey (2C: 29-2) for a person to purposely prevent a law enforcement officer from effecting a lawful arrest.
•     A crime of the fourth degree.
•     Indictable Crime Penalties    [Felony type]  [ Superior Court]
•     •       Jail  potential          Fine max                             Probation
•     •       1st degree   10- 20 years            $200,000        [presumption of jail]
•     •       2nd degree   5-10 years               $150,000        [presumption of jail]
•     •       3rd degree   3- 5 years                $15,000          1 year- 5 year
•     •       4th degree   0- 18 months           $10,000          1 year- 5 year

 Hindering Apprehension or Prosecution (2C:29-3)

A person commits an offense if with purpose to hinder the detention, apprehension, investigation, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for any crime or motor vehicle violation.
•     Depending on the circumstances, a crime of the third degree, fourth degree, or a disorderly persons offense.

    Disorderly conduct 2C:33-2. a. Improper behavior. A person is guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense, if with purpose to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof he
(1)     Engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior; or
(2)     Creates a hazardous or physically dangerous condition by any act, which serves no legitimate purpose of the actor.
b. Offensive language. A person is guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense if, in a public place, and with purpose to offend the sensibilities of a hearer or in reckless disregard of the probability of so doing, he addresses unreasonably loud and offensively coarse or abusive language, given the circumstances of the person present and the setting of the utterance, to any person present.
“Public” means affecting or likely to affect persons in a place to which the public or a substantial group has access; among the places included are highways, transport facilities, schools, prisons, apartment houses, places of business or amusement, or any neighborhood.
·      Petty Disorderly person - 30 days jail   maximum
Petty DP $500 max Fine, VCCB and other penalties
Sometimes an experienced attorney can negotiate with the prosecutor to have the charges reduced to a Municipal Ordinance. Other times for first offenders we can make a motion for the first offenders program, Conditional dismissal.
New law finally establishes a Conditional Dismissal Program in Municipal Court. Ken Vercammen testified in favor of the passage before the Assembly Judiciary Committee.
The Conditional Dismissal program in Municipal Court for certain first-time offenders permits defense counsel to make a Motion that the charge would be dismissed at the end of a one year probationary period.
“This initiative will give a broader range of first-time offenders who have committed a minor offense an opportunity to turn their lives around,”  “The program will help foster participants’ rehabilitation and future success by giving them appropriate penalties without having the offense be a part of their permanent criminal record.” This law also helps Police and Prosecutors since it requires a guilty plea, thus reducing the need for trials and officer testimony.
The law allows discharge for many non-drug offenses, such as disorderly person’s offenses, which have not been able to participate in similar programs before.
“First-time offenders who are screened to meet the eligibility requirements will be able to use the program to avoid having a record that cannot be expunged until years after the sentence is served,”   “The legislation will also help courts efficiently adjudicate cases without costly logjams.”

Possession, Use or Being Under the Influence, or Failure to Make Lawful Disposition (2C: 35-10)
It is a criminal offense for any person knowingly or purposely, to obtain, or to possess actually or constructively, a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog.
•     Depending on the circumstances, a crime of third degree, fourth degree, or a disorderly persons offense.

Drug offenses: in addition to above penalties, mandatory minimum $500 DEDR penalty, mandatory lab fee and other court costs over $200, mandatory 6 month- 2 year loss of license, Probation, drug testing and other penalties. If attorney’s Conditional Discharge motion is granted for first time offender. penalty can be reduced. In certain drug cases, the fine can be up to $75,000.

Mandatory Forfeiture or Postponement of Driving Privileges

Every person convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for a violation of certain offenses (2C:35-16) shall forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period to be fixed by the Court at not less than 6 months or more than 2 years which shall commence on the day the sentence is imposed.
There are dozens of other penalties a court can impose, depending on the type of matter. Read www.njlaws.com/jail_for_crimes_and_disorderly_conduct.html

2C:33-15 Underage Possession/Consumption Alcohol

  a.    Any person under the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages who knowingly possesses without legal authority or who knowingly consumes any alcoholic beverage in any school, public conveyance, public place, or place of public assembly, or motor vehicle, is guilty of a disorderly persons offense, and shall be fined not less than $500.00.
b.  Whenever this offense is committed in a motor vehicle, the court shall, in addition to the sentence authorized for the offense, suspend or postpone for six months the driving privilege of the defendant. Upon the conviction of any person under this section, the court shall forward a report to the Division of Motor Vehicles stating the first and last day of the suspension or postponement period imposed by the court pursuant to this section. If a person at the time of the imposition of a sentence is less than 17 years of age, the period of license postponement, including a suspension or postponement of the privilege of operating a motorized bicycle, shall commence on the day the sentence is imposed and shall run for a period of six months after the person reaches the age of 17 years.
If a person at the time of the imposition of a sentence has a valid drivers license issued by this State, the court shall immediately collect the license and forward it to the division along with the report. If for any reason the license cannot be collected, the court shall include in the report the complete name, address, date of birth, eye color, and sex of the person as well as the first and last date of the license suspension period imposed by the court.
The court shall inform the person orally and in writing that if the person is convicted of operating a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension or postponement, the person shall be subject to the penalties set forth in R.S.39:3-40. A person shall be required to acknowledge receipt of the written notice in writing. Failure to receive a written notice or failure to acknowledge in writing the receipt of a written notice shall not be a defense to a subsequent charge of a violation of R.S.39:3-40.
If the person convicted under this section is not a New Jersey resident, the court shall suspend or postpone, as appropriate, the non-resident driving privilege of the person based on the age of the person and submit to the division the required report. The court shall not collect the license of a non-resident convicted under this section. Upon receipt of a report by the court, the division shall notify the appropriate officials in the licensing jurisdiction of the suspension or postponement.
……

33:1-81. Underage drinking and Misrepresenting age to induce sale or delivery to minor; disorderly person 

Underage drinking and Misrepresenting age to induce sale or delivery to minor

33:1-81.  It shall be unlawful for:
(a)         A person under the legal age for purchasing alcoholic beverages to enter any premises licensed for the retail sale of alcoholic  beverages for the purpose of purchasing, or having served or delivered to him or her, any alcoholic beverage; or 
(b)         A person under the legal age for purchasing alcoholic beverages to consume any alcoholic beverage on premises licensed for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages, or to purchase, attempt to purchase or have another purchase for him any alcoholic beverage; or 
(c)         Any person to misrepresent or misstate his age, or the age of any other person for the purpose of inducing any licensee or any employee of any licensee, to sell, serve or deliver any alcoholic beverage to a person under the legal age for purchasing alcoholic beverages; or 
(d)         Any person to enter any premises licensed for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages for the purpose of purchasing, or to purchase alcoholic beverages, for another person who does not because of his age have the right to purchase and consume alcoholic beverages. 

Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this section shall be deemed and adjudged to be a disorderly person, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not less than $500.00. In addition, the court shall suspend or postpone the person’s license to operate a motor vehicle for six months. 
Upon the conviction of any person under this section, the court shall forward a report to the Division of Motor Vehicles stating the first and last day of the suspension or postponement period imposed by the court pursuant to this section.  If a person at the time of the imposition of a sentence is less than 17 years of age, the period of license postponement, including a suspension or postponement of the privilege of operating a motorized bicycle, shall commence on the day the sentence is imposed and shall run for a period of six months after the person reaches the age of 17 years. 
If a person at the time of the imposition of a sentence has a valid driver’s license issued by this State, the court shall immediately collect the license and forward it to the division along with the report.  If for any reason the license cannot be collected, the court shall include in the report the complete name, address, date of birth, eye color, and sex of the person as well as the first and last date of the license suspension period imposed by the court. 
The court shall inform the person orally and in writing that if the person is convicted of operating a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension or postponement, the person shall be subject to the penalties set forth in R.S. 39:3-40.  A person shall be required to acknowledge receipt of the written notice in writing.  Failure to receive a written notice or failure to acknowledge in writing the receipt of a written notice shall not be a defense to a subsequent charge of a violation of R.S. 39:3-40. 
If the person convicted under this section is not a New Jersey resident, the court shall suspend or postpone, as appropriate given the age at the time of sentencing, the non-resident driving privilege of the person and submit to the division the required report.  The court shall not collect the license of a non-resident convicted under this section. Upon receipt of a report by the court, the division shall notify the appropriate officials in the licensing jurisdiction of the suspension or postponement.
In addition to the general penalties prescribed for an offense, the court may require any person under the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages who violates this act to participate in an alcohol education or treatment program authorized by the Department of Health for a period not to exceed the maximum period of confinement prescribed by law for the offense for which the individual has been convicted. 
Arrested in NJ? Hire a real criminal defense attorney, not someone who sends you solicitation letters in the mail.

    Kenneth Vercammen's Law Office represents individuals charged with criminal, drug offenses, and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey. Kenneth Vercammen was the NJ State Bar Municipal Court Attorney of the Year and past president of the Middlesex County Municipal Prosecutor's Association.

Try to Avoid Some of the Consequences of a Criminal Guilty Plea:

1. You will have to appear in open court and tell the judge what you did that makes you guilty of the particular offense(s)

2. If you plead guilty:

a. You will have a criminal record

b. You may go to Jail or Prison.

c. You will have to pay Fines and Court Costs.

3. If you are on Probation, you will have to submit to random drug and urine testing. If you violate Probation, you often go to jail.

4. In indictable matters, you will be required to provide a DNA sample, which could be used by law enforcement for the investigation of criminal activity, and pay for the cost of testing.

5. You must pay restitution if the court finds there is a victim who has suffered a loss and if the court finds that you are able or will be able in the future to pay restitution.

6. If you are a public office holder or employee, you can be required to forfeit your office or job by virtue of your plea of guilty.

7. If you are not a United States citizen or national, you may be deported by virtue of your plea of guilty.

8. You must wait 5-10 years to expunge a first offense. 2C: 52-3

9. You could be put on Probation.

10. You may be required to do Community Service.

Don't give up! The Law Office of Kenneth Vercammen can provide experienced attorney representation for criminal and serious motor vehicle violations.

1.      Telephone consultation with client;
2.      Office consultation with client;
3.      Offer sound legal advice to client, plus access to our legal info website www.njlaws.com
4.      Preparation of Letter of Representation to Municipal Court;
5.      Preparation of Letter of Representation to Municipal Court Prosecutor;
6.      Preparation of statement to provide legal services;
7.      Copies of all correspondence to Court and Prosecutor to client;
8.      Opening of file and client may have free client case folder, Municipal      Court brochure, MVC-DMV points brochure, and Website brochure;
9.      Review of necessary statutes and case law;
10.    Follow up with Municipal Prosecutor for discovery if suspension or jail is likely;
11.    Prepare defense and mitigating factors;
12.    Miscellaneous correspondence, preparation and drafting of pleadings and legal   documents in contested serious cases;
13.    Review documents supplied by client and court;
14.    Travel to Municipal Court
15.    Negotiations with the Prosecutor and Representation in Municipal Court.
16.    Preparation of End of Case Letter and client questionnaire.
17.    Free Brochures provided on other legal topics such as Worker's Comp, Wills, Personal Injury
18.    Free  monthly update e-mail newsletter. Provide your email address;
19.    Follow up telephone advice [If you call, provide the specific questions with the message].
20.    Invitation to annual client socials/ seminars and Community events via email.
21.    Hold and maintain file for seven years in storage as free client service.

When your job or driver's license is in jeopardy or you are facing thousands of dollars in fines, surcharges and car insurance increases, you need excellent legal representation.

      CONCLUSION

If charged with any criminal offense, immediately schedule an appointment with a criminal trial attorney. Don’t rely on a real estate attorney, public defender or a family member who took a law class in school. When your life and career is on the line, hire the best attorney available.

KENNETH  VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC

ATTORNEY AT LAW
2053 Woodbridge Ave.
Edison, NJ 08817
(Phone) 732-572-0500


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