Court RULE 3:6. THE GRAND JURY 3:6-1. Summoning the Grand Jury
The Assignment Judge of each county shall order and organize according to law one or more grand juries for the county not exceeding 23 members each to be summoned at such times as the public interest requires. At least one grand jury shall be serving in each county at all times.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:3-1. 3:6-2. Objections to Grand Jury and Grand Jurors
The prosecuting attorney or a defendant, after being held to answer a complaint charging an indictable offense or after indictment, may, in writing, challenge the array of the grand jury which has returned or is expected to return the indictment on the ground that it was not selected, drawn or summoned according to law, and may challenge an individual juror on the ground that the juror is not legally qualified. All such challenges shall be made within 30 days of the service of the complaint or no later than at the arraignment/status conference. For good cause shown, the court may allow the motion to be brought at any time. Such challenges shall be tried by a judge designated by the Assignment Judge. If a defendant has already been indicted, such challenges may be the basis of a motion to dismiss the indictment.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:3-2(a)(b); amended July 13, 1994 to be effective January 1, 1995. 3:6-3. Supervising and Charging the Grand Jury
(a) Potential Bias. When appropriate, the Assignment Judge shall inquire of potential grand jurors about such aspects of their background as may reveal possible bias or interest in a matter to come before the grand jury. The Assignment Judge shall instruct the grand jury that without the Assignment Judge's approval no grand juror shall participate in any matter in which that juror has a bias or a financial, proprietary, or personal interest; and if that juror wishes to participate, the juror shall forthwith so inform the prosecutor. The prosecutor shall forthwith inform the Assignment Judge, who shall determine, in camera, whether such bias or interest exists and whether it justifies excusal. (b) Copy of Charge. When the judge designated by the Assignment Judge charges the grand jury, that judge shall cause a copy of the charge to be promptly furnished to each juror.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:3-3; caption amended paragraph (a) adopted, and former rule captioned and redesignated paragraph (b) June 29, 1990 to be effective September 4, 1990; paragraph (b) amended July 13, 1994 to be effective September 1, 1994. 3:6-4. Foreperson; Deputy Foreperson
The Assignment Judge shall appoint one of the jurors to be foreperson and another to be deputy foreperson. The foreperson shall have power to administer oaths and shall endorse all indictments. During the absence of the foreperson, the deputy foreperson shall act as foreperson.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:3-4; amended July 14, 1992, to be effective September 1, 1992. 3:6-5. Clerk
The clerk of the grand jury shall make and keep minutes of the proceedings of the grand jury as well as a record of the vote of each juror, by name, on each considered matter. If there is no clerk of the grand jury, the foreperson or another juror designated by the foreperson shall keep such a record. The record of the vote on every count of every indictment and on every presentment shall be filed with the clerk of the grand jury. The record shall not be made public except on order of the Assignment Judge.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:3-5. Amended July 14, 1972 to be effective September 5, 1972; amended July 29, 1977 to be effective September 6, 1977; amended July 13, 1994 to be effective September 1, 1994. 3:6-6. Who May Be Present; Record and Transcript
(a) Attendance at Session. No person other than the jurors, the prosecuting attorney, the clerk of the grand jury, the witness under examination, interpreters when needed and, for the purpose of recording the proceedings, a stenographer or operator of a recording device may be present while the grand jury is in session. No person other than the jurors, the clerk, the prosecuting attorney and the stenographer or operator of the recording device may be present while the grand jury is deliberating. The grand jury, however, may request either (1) the prosecuting attorney and the stenographer or operator or (2) the clerk to leave the jury room during its deliberations. (b) Record; Transcript. A stenographic record or sound recording shall be made of all testimony of witnesses, comments by the prosecuting attorney, and colloquy between the prosecuting attorney and witnesses or members of the grand jury, before the grand jury. After an indictment has been returned, at the request of the defendant, a transcript of the grand jury proceedings shall be made. The request shall designate the portion or portions of the proceedings to be transcribed and the person or persons to whom the transcript is to be furnished. A copy of the request for a transcript will be served contemporaneously by the defendant upon the prosecutor, who may move for a protective order pursuant to R. 3:13-3(f). The prosecutor may request a copy of the transcript at any time. (c) Retention of Records. If no request has been made or order entered directing a transcript of the grand jury proceedings to be made within six months after their termination, the stenographic record or sound recording shall be sealed and deposited with the operations division manager's office who shall retain it subject to the directions of the Administrative Director of the Courts.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:3-6(a)(b)(c); paragraphs (a) and (b) amended July 15, 1982 to be effective September 13, 1982; paragraph (b) amended and second paragraph added to paragraph (b) July 13, 1994, new text in paragraph (b) amended December 9, 1994, to be effective January 1, 1995; paragraph (c) amended July 5, 2000 to be effective September 5, 2000. 3:6-7. Secrecy of Proceedings
Except as otherwise provided by R. 3:13-3, the requirement as to secrecy of proceedings of the grand jury shall remain as heretofore, and all persons other than witnesses, permitted by R. 3:6-6 to be present while the grand jury is in session, shall be required to take an oath of secrecy before their admission thereto. Such oath shall also be taken by typists making transcripts of testimony given before the grand jury.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:3-7; amended July 13, 1994 and December 9, 1994, to be effective January 1, 1995. 3:6-8. Finding and Return of Indictment; No Bill
(a) Return; Secrecy. An indictment may be found only upon the concurrence of 12 or more jurors and shall be returned in open court to the Assignment Judge or, in the Assignment Judge's absence, to any Superior Court judge assigned to the Law Division in the county. With the approval of the Assignment Judge, an indictment may be returned to such judge by only the foreman or the deputy foreman rather than with all other members of the grand jury. Such judge may direct that the indictment shall be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or has given bail and in that event it shall be sealed by the clerk, and no person shall disclose its finding except as necessary for the issuance and execution of a warrant or summons. (b) No Bill. If the defendant has been held to answer a complaint and, after submission to the grand jury, no indictment has been found, the foreperson shall forthwith so report in writing to the court, who shall forthwith order the defendant's release unless the defendant's detention is required by other pending proceedings. Notice of the action of the grand jury shall also be mailed by the clerk of the court to the defendant's attorney, a defendant not in custody, and the defendant's sureties if bail has been posted.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:3-8(a)(b); paragraph (a) amended July 16, 1981 to be effective September 14, 1981; paragraph (a) amended July 26, 1984 to be effective September 10, 1984; paragraphs (a) and (b) amended July 13, 1994 to be effective September 1, 1994. 3:6-9. Finding and Return of Presentment
(a) Finding. A presentment may be made only upon the concurrence of 12 or more jurors. It may refer to public affairs or conditions, but it may censure a public official only where that public official's association with the deprecated public affairs or conditions is intimately and inescapably a part of them. (b) Return. A presentment shall be returned in open court to the Assignment Judge, who shall be notified in advance thereof by the foreperson so that the judge may arrange to be available in court to receive it. (c) Examination; Reference Back; Striking. Promptly and before the grand jury is discharged, the Assignment Judge shall examine the presentment. If it appears that a crime has been committed for which an indictment may be had, the Assignment Judge shall refer the presentment back to the grand jury with appropriate instructions. If a public official is censured the proof must be conclusive that the existence of the condemned matter is inextricably related to non-criminal failure to discharge that public official's public duty. If it appears that the presentment is false, or is based on partisan motives, or indulges in personalities without basis, or if other good cause appears, the Assignment Judge shall strike the presentment either in full or in part. As an aid in examining the presentment the Assignment Judge may call for and examine the minutes and records of the grand jury, with or without the aid of the foreperson or the prosecuting attorney, to determine if a substantial foundation exists for the public report. If the presentment censures a public official and the Assignment Judge determines not to strike, a copy of the presentment shall forthwith be served upon the public official who may, within 10 days thereafter, move for a hearing, which shall be held in camera. The public official may examine the grand jury minutes fully, under such reasonable supervision as the court deems advisable, and be permitted to introduce additional evidence to expose any deficiency. (d) Filing and Publication. Such portions of the presentment as are not referred back to the grand jury for further action or are not stricken in accordance with paragraph (c) of this rule shall be filed and made public, and the Assignment Judge shall instruct the clerk of the grand jury to send copies thereof to such public bodies or officials as may be concerned with the criticisms and recommendations made therein and to the Administrative Director of the Courts. The presentment or any portion thereof shall not be made public by any person except the Assignment Judge. The Assignment Judge shall withhold publication of the presentment until the expiration of the time for the making of a motion for a hearing by a public official pursuant to R. 3:6-9(c), and if such motion is made, shall withhold publication of the presentment pending the judge's determination. (e) Review. The action taken by the Assignment Judge pursuant to this rule is judicial in nature and is subject to review for abuse of discretion by the State or by any aggrieved person, including any member of the grand jury making the presentment.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:3-9(a)(b)(c)(d)(e); paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) amended July 13, 1994to be effective September 1, 1994. 3:6-10. Discharge; Continuance of Term
(a) Term. A grand jury shall serve until discharged by the Assignment Judge, but not longer than 20 weeks unless the Assignment Judge shall order it continued as hereinafter provided. A grand jury shall not be discharged before the expiration of its term of service except for good cause. The continuance of such grand jury shall not affect the usual drawing, selecting and serving of further grand juries. (b) Order for Continuance. Whenever it appears to the Assignment Judge that the grand jury has not completed its labors, although its ordinary term is about to expire, the Assignment Judge may, if satisfied of the necessity therefor, order that its term be continued. The order shall be made and filed within the session of court for which such grand jury shall have been drawn, and shall provide a continuance for a definite period of time not exceeding 3 calendar months, provided, however, that the Assignment Judge may make a further order, or orders, continuing such grand jury in office for a further term or terms of 3 calendar months each.
Note: Source-R.R. 3:3-10(a)(b)(c); paragraph (b) amended July 13, 1994 to be effective September 1, 1994. 3:6-11. Impanelment and Judicial Supervision of State Grand Jury
(a) Generally. All rules relating to grand juries shall apply to the State Grand Jury except as otherwise specifically provided by statute or rule. (b) Designation of Assignment Judge. The Chief Justice shall designate an Assignment Judge of the Superior Court to impanel and supervise the State Grand Jury or Grand Juries. The Chief Justice may also designate one or more Judges of the Superior Court to assist said Assignment Judge with regard to impanelment and supervision of the State Grand Jury or Grand Juries and to perform such other duties and responsibilities with regard thereto as ordered by the Chief Justice or the designated Assignment Judge.
Note: Adopted July 17, 1975 to be effective September 8, 1975.
Wednesday, July 22, 2009
2C:33-8.1 Definitions relative to disruption of funerals
2C:33-8.1 Definitions relative to disruption of funerals
violations, disorderly persons offense.
2. a. As used in this act:
"funeral" means the ceremonies, processions and memorial services held in connection with the burial or cremation of the dead; and
"demonstration" includes the following:
(1)any picketing or similar conduct,
(2)any oration, speech, use of sound amplification equipment or device, or similar conduct that is not part of a funeral,
(3)the display of any placard, banner, flag, or similar device, unless such a display is part of a funeral, or
(4)the distribution of any handbill, pamphlet, leaflet, or other written or printed matter other than a program distributed as part of a funeral.
b.A person is guilty of disrupting a funeral if, during the period beginning one hour prior to the scheduled commencement of a funeral, and until one hour following the actual completion of the funeral, with the purpose of causing inconvenience, annoyance or alarm to the funeral or its participants, or of recklessly creating the risk thereof, the person knowingly:
(1)obstructs, hinders, impedes or blocks another person's entry to or exit from the funeral, the funeral procession, the funeral home, church, synagogue, temple or other place of public worship or other location at which a funeral takes place as part of demonstration activities, or
(2)engages in demonstration activities within 500 feet of the funeral, the funeral procession, the funeral home, church, synagogue, temple or other place of public worship or other location at which a funeral takes place and makes or assists in the making of noise, diversions, or threatening gestures, or engages in any other disruptive conduct, that disrupts or tends to disrupt the peace or good order of the funeral.
c.Disrupting a funeral is a disorderly persons offense.
L. 2006, c.93, s.2.
violations, disorderly persons offense.
2. a. As used in this act:
"funeral" means the ceremonies, processions and memorial services held in connection with the burial or cremation of the dead; and
"demonstration" includes the following:
(1)any picketing or similar conduct,
(2)any oration, speech, use of sound amplification equipment or device, or similar conduct that is not part of a funeral,
(3)the display of any placard, banner, flag, or similar device, unless such a display is part of a funeral, or
(4)the distribution of any handbill, pamphlet, leaflet, or other written or printed matter other than a program distributed as part of a funeral.
b.A person is guilty of disrupting a funeral if, during the period beginning one hour prior to the scheduled commencement of a funeral, and until one hour following the actual completion of the funeral, with the purpose of causing inconvenience, annoyance or alarm to the funeral or its participants, or of recklessly creating the risk thereof, the person knowingly:
(1)obstructs, hinders, impedes or blocks another person's entry to or exit from the funeral, the funeral procession, the funeral home, church, synagogue, temple or other place of public worship or other location at which a funeral takes place as part of demonstration activities, or
(2)engages in demonstration activities within 500 feet of the funeral, the funeral procession, the funeral home, church, synagogue, temple or other place of public worship or other location at which a funeral takes place and makes or assists in the making of noise, diversions, or threatening gestures, or engages in any other disruptive conduct, that disrupts or tends to disrupt the peace or good order of the funeral.
c.Disrupting a funeral is a disorderly persons offense.
L. 2006, c.93, s.2.
2A:156-2 Fresh Pursuit
2A:156-2 Fresh Pursuit
2A:155-1. Short title
This chapter may be cited as the "uniform law on fresh pursuit."
L.1951 (1st SS), c.344
?2A:156-2. "Fresh pursuit" defined
The term "fresh pursuit" as used in this chapter shall include fresh pursuit as defined by the common law, and also the pursuit of a person who has committed a high misdemeanor or is reasonably suspected of having committed a high misdemeanor in this state, or who has committed or attempted to commit any criminal offense in this state in the presence of the arresting officer referred to in section 2A:156-1 of this title, or for whom such officer holds a warrant of arrest for a criminal offense. It shall also include the pursuit of a person suspected of having committed a supposed high misdemeanor in this state, though no high misdemeanor has actually been committed, if there is reasonable ground for so believing. Fresh pursuit as used herein shall not necessarily imply instant pursuit, but pursuit without unreasonable delay.
?2A:155-2. Definitions? As used in this chapter:
"State" shall include the District of Columbia.
"Fresh pursuit" shall include fresh pursuit as defined by the common law, and also the pursuit of a person who has committed a felony or who is reasonably suspected of having committed a felony. It shall also include the pursuit of a person suspected of having committed a supposed felony, though no felony has actually been committed, if there is reasonable ground for believing that a felony has been committed. Fresh pursuit as used herein shall not necessarily imply instant pursuit, but pursuit without unreasonable delay.
"Felony" shall include high misdemeanor
L.1951 (1st SS), c.344.
2A:155-3. Application and construction of chapter
The provisions of this chapter shall be applicable only to such officers of a state which has enacted a statute similar to the provisions hereof, and this chapter shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate the general purpose of making uniform the laws of the states which enact it
2A:155-4. Officers of other states in fresh pursuit; authority to make arrests in this state
Any member of a duly organized state, county or municipal peace unit of another state of the United States who enters this state in fresh pursuit, and continues within this state in such fresh pursuit, of a person in order to arrest him on the ground that he is believed to have committed a felony in such other state, shall have the same authority to arrest and hold such person in custody, as has any member of any duly organized state, county or municipal peace unit of this state, to arrest and hold in custody a person on the ground that he is believed to have committed a felony in this state.
L.1951 (1st SS), c.344.
2A:155-5. Hearing before magistrate; commitment or discharge
If an arrest is made in this state by an officer of another state in accordance with the provisions of section 2A:155-4 of this title, he shall, without unnecessary delay, take the person arrested before a neighboring magistrate, who shall conduct a hearing for the purpose of determining the lawfulness of the arrest. If the magistrate determines that the arrest was lawful he shall commit the person arrested to await for a reasonable time the issuance of an extradition warrant by the governor of this state or admit him to bail for such purpose. If the magistrate determines that the arrest was unlawful he shall discharge the person arrested.
L.1951 (1st SS), c.344
2A:155-6. Lawfulness of arrest
Section 2A:155-4 of this title shall not be construed so as to make unlawful any arrest in this state which would otherwise be lawful.
2A:155-7. Copies of chapter to other states
It shall be the duty of the secretary of state to certify a copy of this chapter to the executive department of each of the states of the United States.
L.1951 (1st SS), c.344
2A:156-1. Peace officer in fresh pursuit may arrest anywhere in state
Any peace officer of this state in fresh pursuit of a person who is reasonably believed by him to have committed a high misdemeanor in this state or has committed, or attempted to commit, any criminal offense in this state in the presence of such officer, or for whom such officer holds a warrant of arrest for a criminal offense, shall have the authority to arrest and hold in custody such person anywhere in this state.? ?L.1951 (1st SS), c.344
2A:156-3. Validity of arrest
Section 2A:156-1 of this title shall not make unlawful an arrest which would otherwise be lawful.
L.1951 (1st SS), c.344.
2A:156-4. Short title
This chapter may be cited as the "uniform act on intrastate fresh pursuit" .?
2A:155-1. Short title
This chapter may be cited as the "uniform law on fresh pursuit."
L.1951 (1st SS), c.344
?2A:156-2. "Fresh pursuit" defined
The term "fresh pursuit" as used in this chapter shall include fresh pursuit as defined by the common law, and also the pursuit of a person who has committed a high misdemeanor or is reasonably suspected of having committed a high misdemeanor in this state, or who has committed or attempted to commit any criminal offense in this state in the presence of the arresting officer referred to in section 2A:156-1 of this title, or for whom such officer holds a warrant of arrest for a criminal offense. It shall also include the pursuit of a person suspected of having committed a supposed high misdemeanor in this state, though no high misdemeanor has actually been committed, if there is reasonable ground for so believing. Fresh pursuit as used herein shall not necessarily imply instant pursuit, but pursuit without unreasonable delay.
?2A:155-2. Definitions? As used in this chapter:
"State" shall include the District of Columbia.
"Fresh pursuit" shall include fresh pursuit as defined by the common law, and also the pursuit of a person who has committed a felony or who is reasonably suspected of having committed a felony. It shall also include the pursuit of a person suspected of having committed a supposed felony, though no felony has actually been committed, if there is reasonable ground for believing that a felony has been committed. Fresh pursuit as used herein shall not necessarily imply instant pursuit, but pursuit without unreasonable delay.
"Felony" shall include high misdemeanor
L.1951 (1st SS), c.344.
2A:155-3. Application and construction of chapter
The provisions of this chapter shall be applicable only to such officers of a state which has enacted a statute similar to the provisions hereof, and this chapter shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate the general purpose of making uniform the laws of the states which enact it
2A:155-4. Officers of other states in fresh pursuit; authority to make arrests in this state
Any member of a duly organized state, county or municipal peace unit of another state of the United States who enters this state in fresh pursuit, and continues within this state in such fresh pursuit, of a person in order to arrest him on the ground that he is believed to have committed a felony in such other state, shall have the same authority to arrest and hold such person in custody, as has any member of any duly organized state, county or municipal peace unit of this state, to arrest and hold in custody a person on the ground that he is believed to have committed a felony in this state.
L.1951 (1st SS), c.344.
2A:155-5. Hearing before magistrate; commitment or discharge
If an arrest is made in this state by an officer of another state in accordance with the provisions of section 2A:155-4 of this title, he shall, without unnecessary delay, take the person arrested before a neighboring magistrate, who shall conduct a hearing for the purpose of determining the lawfulness of the arrest. If the magistrate determines that the arrest was lawful he shall commit the person arrested to await for a reasonable time the issuance of an extradition warrant by the governor of this state or admit him to bail for such purpose. If the magistrate determines that the arrest was unlawful he shall discharge the person arrested.
L.1951 (1st SS), c.344
2A:155-6. Lawfulness of arrest
Section 2A:155-4 of this title shall not be construed so as to make unlawful any arrest in this state which would otherwise be lawful.
2A:155-7. Copies of chapter to other states
It shall be the duty of the secretary of state to certify a copy of this chapter to the executive department of each of the states of the United States.
L.1951 (1st SS), c.344
2A:156-1. Peace officer in fresh pursuit may arrest anywhere in state
Any peace officer of this state in fresh pursuit of a person who is reasonably believed by him to have committed a high misdemeanor in this state or has committed, or attempted to commit, any criminal offense in this state in the presence of such officer, or for whom such officer holds a warrant of arrest for a criminal offense, shall have the authority to arrest and hold in custody such person anywhere in this state.? ?L.1951 (1st SS), c.344
2A:156-3. Validity of arrest
Section 2A:156-1 of this title shall not make unlawful an arrest which would otherwise be lawful.
L.1951 (1st SS), c.344.
2A:156-4. Short title
This chapter may be cited as the "uniform act on intrastate fresh pursuit" .?
2C:1-11. Former prosecution in another jurisdiction: when a bar.
2C:1-11. Former prosecution in another jurisdiction: when a bar.
When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent jurisdiction of this State and of the United States, a prosecution in the District Court of the United States is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in this State under the following circumstances:
a. The first prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction, or in an improper termination as defined in section 2C:1-9 and the subsequent prosecution is based on the same conduct, unless (1) the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted and the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not required by the other and the law defining each of such offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil or (2) the offense for which the defendant is subsequently prosecuted is intended to prevent a substantially more serious harm or evil than the offense of which he was formerly convicted or acquitted or (3) the second offense was not consummated when the former trial began; or
b. The former prosecution was terminated, after the information was filed or the indictment found, by an acquittal or by a final order or judgment for the defendant which has not been set aside, reversed or vacated and which acquittal, final order or judgment necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact which must be established for conviction of the offense of which the defendant is subsequently prosecuted.
When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent jurisdiction of this State and of the United States, a prosecution in the District Court of the United States is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in this State under the following circumstances:
a. The first prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction, or in an improper termination as defined in section 2C:1-9 and the subsequent prosecution is based on the same conduct, unless (1) the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted and the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not required by the other and the law defining each of such offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil or (2) the offense for which the defendant is subsequently prosecuted is intended to prevent a substantially more serious harm or evil than the offense of which he was formerly convicted or acquitted or (3) the second offense was not consummated when the former trial began; or
b. The former prosecution was terminated, after the information was filed or the indictment found, by an acquittal or by a final order or judgment for the defendant which has not been set aside, reversed or vacated and which acquittal, final order or judgment necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact which must be established for conviction of the offense of which the defendant is subsequently prosecuted.
2C:21-1. Forgery and Related Offenses.
2C:21-1. Forgery and Related Offenses.
a.Forgery. A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud or injure anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud or injury to be perpetrated by anyone, the actor:
(1)Alters or changes any writing of another without his authorization;
(2)Makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues or transfers any writing so that it purports to be the act of another who did not authorize that act or of a fictitious person, or to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when no such original existed; or
(3)Utters any writing which he knows to be forged in a manner specified in paragraph (1) or (2).
"Writing" includes printing or any other method of recording information, money, coins, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, access devices, and other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification, including retail sales receipts, universal product code (UPC) labels and checks. This section shall apply without limitation to forged, copied or imitated checks.
As used in this section, "information" includes, but is not limited to, personal identifying information as defined in subsection v. of N.J.S.2C:20-1.
b.Grading of forgery. Forgery is a crime of the third degree if the writing is or purports to be part of an issue of money, securities, postage or revenue stamps, or other instruments, certificates or licenses issued by the government, New Jersey Prescription Blanks as referred to in R.S.45:14-14, or part of an issue of stock, bonds or other instruments representing interest in or claims against any property or enterprise, personal identifying information or an access device. Forgery is a crime of the third degree if the writing is or purports to be a check. Forgery is a crime of the third degree if the writing is or purports to be 15 or more forged or altered retail sales receipts or universal product code labels.
Otherwise forgery is a crime of the fourth degree.
c.Possession of forgery devices. A person is guilty of possession of forgery devices, a crime of the third degree, when with purpose to use, or to aid or permit another to use the same for purposes of forging written instruments, including access devices and personal identifying information, he makes or possesses any device, apparatus, equipment, computer, computer equipment, computer software or article specially designed or adapted to such use.
L.1978, c.95; amended 1981, c.290, s.20; 1996, c.154, s.10; 1997, c.6, s.5; 2001, c.110, s.1; 2002, c.85, s.2.
2C:21-2. Criminal simulation
A person commits a crime of the fourth degree if, with purpose to defraud anyone or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he makes, alters or utters any object so that it appears to have value because of antiquity, rarity, source, or authorship which it does not possess.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:21-2, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:21-2.1 Offenses involving false government documents, degree of crime.
1. a. A person who knowingly sells, offers or exposes for sale, or otherwise transfers, or possesses with the intent to sell, offer or expose for sale, or otherwise transfer, a document, printed form or other writing which falsely purports to be a driver's license, birth certificate or other document issued by a governmental agency and which could be used as a means of verifying a person's identity or age or any other personal identifying information is guilty of a crime of the second degree.
b.A person who knowingly makes, or possesses devices or materials to make, a document or other writing which falsely purports to be a driver's license, birth certificate or other document issued by a governmental agency and which could be used as a means of verifying a person's identity or age or any other personal identifying information is guilty of a crime of the second degree.
c.A person who knowingly exhibits, displays or utters a document or other writing which falsely purports to be a driver's license, birth certificate or other document issued by a governmental agency and which could be used as a means of verifying a person's identity or age or any other personal identifying information is guilty of a crime of the third degree. A violation of N.J.S.2C:28-7, constituting a disorderly persons offense, section 1 of P.L.1979, c.264 (C.2C:33-15), R.S.33:1-81 or section 6 of P.L.1968, c.313 (C.33:1-81.7) in a case where the person uses the personal identifying information of another to illegally purchase an alcoholic beverage or for using the personal identifying information of another to misrepresent his age for the purpose of obtaining tobacco or other consumer product denied to persons under 18 years of age shall not constitute an offense under this subsection if the actor received only that benefit or service and did not perpetrate or attempt to perpetrate any additional injury or fraud on another.
d.A person who knowingly possesses a document or other writing which falsely purports to be a driver's license, birth certificate or other document issued by a governmental agency and which could be used as a means of verifying a person's identity or age or any other personal identifying information is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree. A violation of N.J.S.2C:28-7, constituting a disorderly persons offense, section 1 of P.L.1979, c.264 (C.2C:33-15), R.S.33:1-81 or section 6 of P.L.1968, c.313 (C.33:1-81.7) in a case where the person uses the personal identifying information of another to illegally purchase an alcoholic beverage or for using the personal identifying information of another to misrepresent his age for the purpose of obtaining tobacco or other consumer product denied to persons under 18 years of age shall not constitute an offense under this subsection if the actor received only that benefit or service and did not perpetrate or attempt to perpetrate any additional injury or fraud on another.
e.In addition to any other disposition authorized by this Title, the provisions of section 24 of P.L.1982, c.77 (C.2A:4A-43), or any other statute indicating the dispositions that may be ordered for an adjudication of delinquency, and, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:43-2, every person convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for a violation of any offense defined in this section shall forthwith forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period to be fixed by the court at not less than six months or more than two years which shall commence on the day the sentence is imposed. In the case of any person who at the time of the imposition of the sentence is less than 17 years of age, the period of the suspension of driving privileges authorized herein, including a suspension of the privilege of operating a motorized bicycle, shall commence on the day the sentence is imposed and shall run for a period as fixed by the court of not less than six months or more than two years after the day the person reaches the age of 17 years. If the driving privilege of any person is under revocation, suspension, or postponement for a violation of any provision of this Title or Title 39 of the Revised Statutes at the time of any conviction or adjudication of delinquency for a violation of any offense defined in this chapter or chapter 36 of this Title, the revocation, suspension, or postponement period imposed herein shall commence as of the date of termination of the existing revocation, suspension or postponement.
The court before whom any person is convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for a violation of any offense defined in this section shall collect forthwith the New Jersey driver's license or licenses of that person and forward the license or licenses to the Chief Administrator of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission along with a report indicating the first and last day of the suspension or postponement period imposed by the court pursuant to this section. If the court is for any reason unable to collect the license or licenses of the person, the court shall cause a report of the conviction or adjudication of delinquency to be filed with the director. The report shall include the complete name, address, date of birth, eye color and sex of the person and shall indicate the first and last day of the suspension or postponement period imposed by the court pursuant to this section. The court shall inform the person orally and in writing that if the person is convicted of personally operating a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension or postponement imposed pursuant to this section, the person shall, upon conviction, be subject to the penalties set forth in R.S.39:3-40. A person shall be required to acknowledge receipt of the written notice in writing. Failure to receive a written notice or failure to acknowledge in writing the receipt of a written notice shall not be a defense to a subsequent charge of a violation of R.S.39:3-40. If the person is the holder of a driver's license from another jurisdiction, the court shall not collect the license, but shall notify forthwith the director who shall notify the appropriate officials in that licensing jurisdiction. The court shall, however, in accordance with the provisions of this section, revoke the person's non-resident driving privileges in this State.
In addition to any other condition imposed, a court, in its discretion, may suspend, revoke or postpone the driving privileges of a person admitted to supervisory treatment under N.J.S.2C:36A-1 or N.J.S.2C:43-12 without a plea of guilty or finding of guilt.
a.Forgery. A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud or injure anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud or injury to be perpetrated by anyone, the actor:
(1)Alters or changes any writing of another without his authorization;
(2)Makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues or transfers any writing so that it purports to be the act of another who did not authorize that act or of a fictitious person, or to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when no such original existed; or
(3)Utters any writing which he knows to be forged in a manner specified in paragraph (1) or (2).
"Writing" includes printing or any other method of recording information, money, coins, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, access devices, and other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification, including retail sales receipts, universal product code (UPC) labels and checks. This section shall apply without limitation to forged, copied or imitated checks.
As used in this section, "information" includes, but is not limited to, personal identifying information as defined in subsection v. of N.J.S.2C:20-1.
b.Grading of forgery. Forgery is a crime of the third degree if the writing is or purports to be part of an issue of money, securities, postage or revenue stamps, or other instruments, certificates or licenses issued by the government, New Jersey Prescription Blanks as referred to in R.S.45:14-14, or part of an issue of stock, bonds or other instruments representing interest in or claims against any property or enterprise, personal identifying information or an access device. Forgery is a crime of the third degree if the writing is or purports to be a check. Forgery is a crime of the third degree if the writing is or purports to be 15 or more forged or altered retail sales receipts or universal product code labels.
Otherwise forgery is a crime of the fourth degree.
c.Possession of forgery devices. A person is guilty of possession of forgery devices, a crime of the third degree, when with purpose to use, or to aid or permit another to use the same for purposes of forging written instruments, including access devices and personal identifying information, he makes or possesses any device, apparatus, equipment, computer, computer equipment, computer software or article specially designed or adapted to such use.
L.1978, c.95; amended 1981, c.290, s.20; 1996, c.154, s.10; 1997, c.6, s.5; 2001, c.110, s.1; 2002, c.85, s.2.
2C:21-2. Criminal simulation
A person commits a crime of the fourth degree if, with purpose to defraud anyone or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he makes, alters or utters any object so that it appears to have value because of antiquity, rarity, source, or authorship which it does not possess.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:21-2, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:21-2.1 Offenses involving false government documents, degree of crime.
1. a. A person who knowingly sells, offers or exposes for sale, or otherwise transfers, or possesses with the intent to sell, offer or expose for sale, or otherwise transfer, a document, printed form or other writing which falsely purports to be a driver's license, birth certificate or other document issued by a governmental agency and which could be used as a means of verifying a person's identity or age or any other personal identifying information is guilty of a crime of the second degree.
b.A person who knowingly makes, or possesses devices or materials to make, a document or other writing which falsely purports to be a driver's license, birth certificate or other document issued by a governmental agency and which could be used as a means of verifying a person's identity or age or any other personal identifying information is guilty of a crime of the second degree.
c.A person who knowingly exhibits, displays or utters a document or other writing which falsely purports to be a driver's license, birth certificate or other document issued by a governmental agency and which could be used as a means of verifying a person's identity or age or any other personal identifying information is guilty of a crime of the third degree. A violation of N.J.S.2C:28-7, constituting a disorderly persons offense, section 1 of P.L.1979, c.264 (C.2C:33-15), R.S.33:1-81 or section 6 of P.L.1968, c.313 (C.33:1-81.7) in a case where the person uses the personal identifying information of another to illegally purchase an alcoholic beverage or for using the personal identifying information of another to misrepresent his age for the purpose of obtaining tobacco or other consumer product denied to persons under 18 years of age shall not constitute an offense under this subsection if the actor received only that benefit or service and did not perpetrate or attempt to perpetrate any additional injury or fraud on another.
d.A person who knowingly possesses a document or other writing which falsely purports to be a driver's license, birth certificate or other document issued by a governmental agency and which could be used as a means of verifying a person's identity or age or any other personal identifying information is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree. A violation of N.J.S.2C:28-7, constituting a disorderly persons offense, section 1 of P.L.1979, c.264 (C.2C:33-15), R.S.33:1-81 or section 6 of P.L.1968, c.313 (C.33:1-81.7) in a case where the person uses the personal identifying information of another to illegally purchase an alcoholic beverage or for using the personal identifying information of another to misrepresent his age for the purpose of obtaining tobacco or other consumer product denied to persons under 18 years of age shall not constitute an offense under this subsection if the actor received only that benefit or service and did not perpetrate or attempt to perpetrate any additional injury or fraud on another.
e.In addition to any other disposition authorized by this Title, the provisions of section 24 of P.L.1982, c.77 (C.2A:4A-43), or any other statute indicating the dispositions that may be ordered for an adjudication of delinquency, and, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:43-2, every person convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for a violation of any offense defined in this section shall forthwith forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period to be fixed by the court at not less than six months or more than two years which shall commence on the day the sentence is imposed. In the case of any person who at the time of the imposition of the sentence is less than 17 years of age, the period of the suspension of driving privileges authorized herein, including a suspension of the privilege of operating a motorized bicycle, shall commence on the day the sentence is imposed and shall run for a period as fixed by the court of not less than six months or more than two years after the day the person reaches the age of 17 years. If the driving privilege of any person is under revocation, suspension, or postponement for a violation of any provision of this Title or Title 39 of the Revised Statutes at the time of any conviction or adjudication of delinquency for a violation of any offense defined in this chapter or chapter 36 of this Title, the revocation, suspension, or postponement period imposed herein shall commence as of the date of termination of the existing revocation, suspension or postponement.
The court before whom any person is convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for a violation of any offense defined in this section shall collect forthwith the New Jersey driver's license or licenses of that person and forward the license or licenses to the Chief Administrator of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission along with a report indicating the first and last day of the suspension or postponement period imposed by the court pursuant to this section. If the court is for any reason unable to collect the license or licenses of the person, the court shall cause a report of the conviction or adjudication of delinquency to be filed with the director. The report shall include the complete name, address, date of birth, eye color and sex of the person and shall indicate the first and last day of the suspension or postponement period imposed by the court pursuant to this section. The court shall inform the person orally and in writing that if the person is convicted of personally operating a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension or postponement imposed pursuant to this section, the person shall, upon conviction, be subject to the penalties set forth in R.S.39:3-40. A person shall be required to acknowledge receipt of the written notice in writing. Failure to receive a written notice or failure to acknowledge in writing the receipt of a written notice shall not be a defense to a subsequent charge of a violation of R.S.39:3-40. If the person is the holder of a driver's license from another jurisdiction, the court shall not collect the license, but shall notify forthwith the director who shall notify the appropriate officials in that licensing jurisdiction. The court shall, however, in accordance with the provisions of this section, revoke the person's non-resident driving privileges in this State.
In addition to any other condition imposed, a court, in its discretion, may suspend, revoke or postpone the driving privileges of a person admitted to supervisory treatment under N.J.S.2C:36A-1 or N.J.S.2C:43-12 without a plea of guilty or finding of guilt.
2C:44-2. Fines and Restitutions
2C:44-2. Fines and Restitutions
Criteria for Imposing Fines and Restitutions
a. The court may sentence a defendant to pay a fine in addition to a sentence of imprisonment or probation if:
(1) The defendant has derived a pecuniary gain from the offense or the court is of opinion that a fine is specially adapted to deterrence of the type of offense involved or to the correction of the offender;
(2) The defendant is able, or given a fair opportunity to do so, will be able to pay the fine; and
(3) The fine will not prevent the defendant from making restitution to the victim of the offense.
b. The court shall sentence a defendant to pay restitution in addition to a sentence of imprisonment or probation that may be imposed if:
(1) The victim, or in the case of a homicide, the nearest relative of the victim, suffered a loss; and
(2) The defendant is able to pay or, given a fair opportunity, will be able to pay restitution.
c. (1) In determining the amount and method of payment of a fine, the court shall take into account the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that its payment will impose.
(2) In determining the amount and method of payment of restitution, the court shall take into account all financial resources of the defendant, including the defendant's likely future earnings, and shall set the amount of restitution so as to provide the victim with the fullest compensation for loss that is consistent with the defendant's ability to pay. The court shall not reduce a restitution award by any amount that the victim has received from the Violent Crimes Compensation Board, but shall order the defendant to pay any restitution ordered for a loss previously compensated by the Board to the Violent Crimes Compensation Board. If restitution to more than one person is set at the same time, the court shall set priorities of payment.
d. Nonpayment. When a defendant is sentenced to pay a fine or make restitution, or both, the court shall not impose at the same time an alternative sentence to be served in the event that the fine or restitution is not paid. The response of the court to nonpayment shall be determined only after the fine or restitution has not been paid, as provided in section 2C:46-2.
e. Whenever the maximum potential fine which may be imposed on a conviction for an offense defined in the "Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1986," N.J.S. 2C:35-1 et al. depends on the street value of the controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog involved and the court intends to impose a fine in excess of the maximum ordinary fine applicable to the offense for which defendant was convicted, and where the fine has not been agreed to pursuant to the provisions of N.J.S.2C:35-12, the court at the time of sentence shall determine the street value at the time and place of the offense based on the amount and purity of the controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog involved. The sentencing court's finding as to the street value may be based on expert opinion in the form of live testimony or by affidavit, or by such other means as the court deems appropriate. The court's finding as to street value shall not be subject to modification by an appellate court except upon a showing that the finding was totally lacking in support on the record or was arbitrary or capricious.
f. The ordering of restitution pursuant to this section shall not operate as a bar to the seeking of civil recovery by the victim based on the incident underlying the criminal conviction. Restitution ordered under this section is to be in addition to any civil remedy which a victim may possess, but any amount due the victim under any civil remedy shall be reduced by the amount ordered under this section to the extent necessary to avoid double compensation for the same loss, and the initial restitution judgment shall remain in full force and effect.
Criteria for Imposing Fines and Restitutions
a. The court may sentence a defendant to pay a fine in addition to a sentence of imprisonment or probation if:
(1) The defendant has derived a pecuniary gain from the offense or the court is of opinion that a fine is specially adapted to deterrence of the type of offense involved or to the correction of the offender;
(2) The defendant is able, or given a fair opportunity to do so, will be able to pay the fine; and
(3) The fine will not prevent the defendant from making restitution to the victim of the offense.
b. The court shall sentence a defendant to pay restitution in addition to a sentence of imprisonment or probation that may be imposed if:
(1) The victim, or in the case of a homicide, the nearest relative of the victim, suffered a loss; and
(2) The defendant is able to pay or, given a fair opportunity, will be able to pay restitution.
c. (1) In determining the amount and method of payment of a fine, the court shall take into account the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that its payment will impose.
(2) In determining the amount and method of payment of restitution, the court shall take into account all financial resources of the defendant, including the defendant's likely future earnings, and shall set the amount of restitution so as to provide the victim with the fullest compensation for loss that is consistent with the defendant's ability to pay. The court shall not reduce a restitution award by any amount that the victim has received from the Violent Crimes Compensation Board, but shall order the defendant to pay any restitution ordered for a loss previously compensated by the Board to the Violent Crimes Compensation Board. If restitution to more than one person is set at the same time, the court shall set priorities of payment.
d. Nonpayment. When a defendant is sentenced to pay a fine or make restitution, or both, the court shall not impose at the same time an alternative sentence to be served in the event that the fine or restitution is not paid. The response of the court to nonpayment shall be determined only after the fine or restitution has not been paid, as provided in section 2C:46-2.
e. Whenever the maximum potential fine which may be imposed on a conviction for an offense defined in the "Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1986," N.J.S. 2C:35-1 et al. depends on the street value of the controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog involved and the court intends to impose a fine in excess of the maximum ordinary fine applicable to the offense for which defendant was convicted, and where the fine has not been agreed to pursuant to the provisions of N.J.S.2C:35-12, the court at the time of sentence shall determine the street value at the time and place of the offense based on the amount and purity of the controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog involved. The sentencing court's finding as to the street value may be based on expert opinion in the form of live testimony or by affidavit, or by such other means as the court deems appropriate. The court's finding as to street value shall not be subject to modification by an appellate court except upon a showing that the finding was totally lacking in support on the record or was arbitrary or capricious.
f. The ordering of restitution pursuant to this section shall not operate as a bar to the seeking of civil recovery by the victim based on the incident underlying the criminal conviction. Restitution ordered under this section is to be in addition to any civil remedy which a victim may possess, but any amount due the victim under any civil remedy shall be reduced by the amount ordered under this section to the extent necessary to avoid double compensation for the same loss, and the initial restitution judgment shall remain in full force and effect.
The Fifth Amendment - "To take the 5th"
The Fifth Amendment - "To take the 5th"
Self-incrimination
The Fifth Amendment protects witnesses from being forced to incriminate themselves. To "plead the Fifth" or to "take the Fifth" is to refuse to answer a question because the response could form incriminating evidence.
Civil or criminal proceedings
Fifth Amendment protections apply wherever and whenever an individual is compelled to testify. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the privilege against self-incrimination applies whether the witness is in Federal or state court (see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)), and whether the proceeding itself is criminal or civil (see McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924)).
People have asserted the privilege in grand jury or in congressional hearings in the 1950s, where witnesses testifying before the House Committee on Un-American Activities and the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee claimed the privilege in response to questions concerning their alleged membership in the Communist Party. The amendment has also been used by defendants and witnesses in criminal cases involving the Mafia. The Supreme Court has also used the incorporation doctrine to apply the self-incrimination clause against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fifth_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution
The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the right of a witness to "take the 5th" if called as a witness at a trial. State of New Jersey v. P.Z. (A-21-96) - Decided November 26, 1997
The Supreme Court wrote:
"The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. As explained in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 1493, 12 L. Ed.2d 653, 659 (1964), the Fifth Amendment protects “the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own free will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for such silence.” It reflects our understanding that government is “constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured, and may not by coercion prove a charge against an accused out of his own mouth.” Ibid.
In New Jersey, the privilege is derived from the common law and is codified in our statutes and rules. State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 237, 250 (1993); see N.J.S.A. 2A:84-19; N.J.R.E. 503. Its importance is not diminished by the lack of specific constitutional articulation; rather, from colonial times, “New Jersey has recognized the right against self-incrimination and has consistently and vigorously protected that right.” Reed, supra, 133 N.J. at 250.
A person invoking the privilege against self-incrimination may do so “'in any . . . proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might tend to incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.'” Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426, 104 S. Ct. 1136, 1141, 79 L. Ed.2d 409, 418 (1984) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 94 S. Ct. 316, 322, 38 L. Ed.2d 274, 281 (1973)); Banca v. Town of Phillipsburg, 181 N.J. Super. 109, 114-15 (App. Div. 1981); see New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. S.S., 275 N.J. Super. 173, 179 (App. Div. 1994). However, the privilege is not self-executing under either federal or state law and must be invoked by anyone claiming its protection. Murphy, supra, 465 U.S. at 428-29, 104 S. Ct. at 1142-43, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 419-20; Reed, supra, 133 N.J. at 251. Generally, when the privilege is not asserted and the person questioned chooses to answer, the choice to respond is considered voluntary. Murphy, supra, 465 U.S. at 429, 104 S. Ct. at 1143, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 420; State v. Fary, 19 N.J. 431, 435 (1955)."
Self-incrimination
The Fifth Amendment protects witnesses from being forced to incriminate themselves. To "plead the Fifth" or to "take the Fifth" is to refuse to answer a question because the response could form incriminating evidence.
Civil or criminal proceedings
Fifth Amendment protections apply wherever and whenever an individual is compelled to testify. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the privilege against self-incrimination applies whether the witness is in Federal or state court (see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)), and whether the proceeding itself is criminal or civil (see McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924)).
People have asserted the privilege in grand jury or in congressional hearings in the 1950s, where witnesses testifying before the House Committee on Un-American Activities and the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee claimed the privilege in response to questions concerning their alleged membership in the Communist Party. The amendment has also been used by defendants and witnesses in criminal cases involving the Mafia. The Supreme Court has also used the incorporation doctrine to apply the self-incrimination clause against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fifth_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution
The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the right of a witness to "take the 5th" if called as a witness at a trial. State of New Jersey v. P.Z. (A-21-96) - Decided November 26, 1997
The Supreme Court wrote:
"The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. As explained in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 1493, 12 L. Ed.2d 653, 659 (1964), the Fifth Amendment protects “the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own free will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for such silence.” It reflects our understanding that government is “constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured, and may not by coercion prove a charge against an accused out of his own mouth.” Ibid.
In New Jersey, the privilege is derived from the common law and is codified in our statutes and rules. State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 237, 250 (1993); see N.J.S.A. 2A:84-19; N.J.R.E. 503. Its importance is not diminished by the lack of specific constitutional articulation; rather, from colonial times, “New Jersey has recognized the right against self-incrimination and has consistently and vigorously protected that right.” Reed, supra, 133 N.J. at 250.
A person invoking the privilege against self-incrimination may do so “'in any . . . proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might tend to incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.'” Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426, 104 S. Ct. 1136, 1141, 79 L. Ed.2d 409, 418 (1984) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 94 S. Ct. 316, 322, 38 L. Ed.2d 274, 281 (1973)); Banca v. Town of Phillipsburg, 181 N.J. Super. 109, 114-15 (App. Div. 1981); see New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. S.S., 275 N.J. Super. 173, 179 (App. Div. 1994). However, the privilege is not self-executing under either federal or state law and must be invoked by anyone claiming its protection. Murphy, supra, 465 U.S. at 428-29, 104 S. Ct. at 1142-43, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 419-20; Reed, supra, 133 N.J. at 251. Generally, when the privilege is not asserted and the person questioned chooses to answer, the choice to respond is considered voluntary. Murphy, supra, 465 U.S. at 429, 104 S. Ct. at 1143, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 420; State v. Fary, 19 N.J. 431, 435 (1955)."
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