Violations of Toll Road Statutes and Regulations

 

NEW JERSEY TURNPIKE AUTHORITY (NEW JERSEY TURNPIKE) b) REGULATIONS N.J.A.C Payable Pursuant to New Jersey Administrative Code Amount 19:9-1.2 Speed limits - same payable amount as N.J.S.A. 39:4-98 19:9-1.2 If speeding occurs in a Safe Corridor, Construction Zone or 65 MPH area - same payable amount as N.J.S.A. 39:4-98 19:9-1.3 Failure to obey traffic signs or signals $85 19:9-1.3 Safe Corridor, Construction Zone or 65 MPH area - failure to obey traffic signs or signals $140 19:9-1.4 Operation of a vehicle against the direction of traffic $85 19:9-1.5 Illegal U-Turns $85 19:9-1.5 Safe Corridor or Construction Zone - illegal U-Turns $140 19:9-1.6 Parking, standing or stopping where prohibited $54 19:9-1.7 Driving on the median strip $85 19:9-1.7 Safe Corridor, Construction Zone or 65 MPH area - driving on the median strip $140 19:9-1.9(a)(1) Use of Turnpike by pedestrians $54 19:9-1.9(a)(2) Use of Turnpike by bicycles $54 19:9-1.9(a)(3) Use of Turnpike by motorcycles during adverse weather conditions $54 19:9-1.9(a)(4) Use of Turnpike by vehicles drawn by animals $54 19:9-1.9(a)(5) Use of Turnpike by animals led, ridden or driven $54 19:9-1.9(a)(6) Use of Turnpike by vehicles loaded with animals or poultry not properly confined $54 19:9-1.9(a)(7) Use of Turnpike by vehicles with deflated pneumatic tires or with tires in unsafe condition $54 19:9-1.9(a)(8) Use of Turnpike by farm implements and machinery whether selfpropelled or towed $54 19:9-1.9(a)(9) Use of Turnpike by passenger vehicles or passenger vehicle drawn trailers with improperly secured loads, including loads on top or sides with lateral or horizontal projection in excess of 12: or vertical projection in excess 24" $54 19:9-1.9(a)(12) Use of Turnpike by vehicles that exceed regulated dimensional specification $185 19:9-1.9(a)(14) Use of Turnpike by vehicles in tow, unless in accordance with regulations $54 19:9-1.9(a)(15) Use of Turnpike by vehicles with loads extending more than four (4) feet $54 19:9-1.9(a)(16) Use of Turnpike by vehicles with improperly secured loads $55 19:9-1.9(a)(17) Use of Turnpike by vehicles loaded or operated so that contents may be scattered on roadway $55 19:9-1.9(a)(18) Use of Turnpike by vehicles unable to maintain speed of at least 35 MPH on level grade $54 19:9-1.9(a)(19) Use of Turnpike by vehicles in such condition as to create hazard to other vehicles or to persons $54 19:9-1.9(a)(20) Use of Turnpike by certain vehicles banned during adverse weather conditions $54 19:9-1.9(a)(21) Use of Turnpike by certain vehicles in tow $54 19:9-1.9(a)(23) Use of Turnpike by commercial vehicles overloaded with hay or straw $55 19:9-1.10 Throwing litter from vehicle $230 19:9-1.11 Commercial vehicles carrying loose material not covered by tarpaulin $55 19:9-1.13 Hitch-hiking and loitering $54 19:9-1.14 Failure to follow prescribed towing regulations $54 19:9-1.17 Careless driving where no accident involving personal injury (note - accident involving personal injury cannot be paid through Violations Bureau) $85 19:9-1.18 Violation of maximum sound levels $125 19:9-1.19 Failure to pay tolls $55 19:9-1.20 Failure of operator of interstate commercial motor vehicle to keep proper records $55 Violations of E-Z Pass Regulations 19:9-9.3(a).($.40-1.00) Failure to Pay Required Toll $104 19:9-9.3(a).($1.15-1.90) Failure to Pay Required Toll $105 19:9-9.3(a).($2.05-2.95) Failure to Pay Required Toll $106 19:9-9.3(a).($3.05-3.95) Failure to Pay Required Toll $107 19:9-9.3(a).($4.05-5.00) Failure to Pay Required Toll $108 19:9-9.3(a).($5.10-6.00) Failure to Pay Required Toll $109 19:9-9.3(a).($6.10-7.00) Failure to Pay Required Toll $110 19:9-9.3(a).($7.10-8.00) Failure to Pay Required Toll $111 19:9-9.3(a).($8.15-8.95) Failure to Pay Required Toll $112 19:9-9.3(a).($9.05-9.95) Failure to Pay Required Toll $113 19:9-9.3(a).($10.05-10.95) Failure to Pay Required Toll $119 19:9-9.3(a).($11.20-11.85) Failure to Pay Required Toll $120 19:9-9.3(a).($12.10-12.90) Failure to Pay Required Toll $121 19:9-9.3(a).($13.10-13.90) Failure to Pay Required Toll $122 19:9-9.3(a).($14.15-14.80) Failure to Pay Required Toll $123 19:9-9.3(a).($15.05-15.80) Failure to Pay Required Toll $129 19:9-9.3(a).($16.05-16.85) Failure to Pay Required Toll $130 19:9-9.3(a).($17.05-17.95) Failure to Pay Required Toll $131 19:9-9.3(a).($18.20-18.75) Failure to Pay Required Toll $132 19:9-9.3(a).($19.10-19.80) Failure to Pay Required Toll $133 19:9-9.3(a).($20.10-20.90) Failure to Pay Required Toll $139 19:9-9.3(a).($21.60-21.70) Failure to Pay Required Toll $140 19:9-9.3(a).($22.15-22.70) Failure to Pay Required Toll $141 19:9-9.3(a).($23.50) Failure to Pay Required Toll $142 Stautory Provisios in Addition to Regulations 27:23-25 Refusal to pay or evading payment of tolls $55 27:23-26 Careless driving where no accident involving personal injury (note - accident resulting in personal injury cannot be paid through the Violations Bureau) $85 27:23-26 Safe Corridor, Construction Zone or 65 MPH area-careless driving where no accident involving personal injury (note - accident resulting in personal injury cannot be paid through the Violations Bureau) $140 27:23-27 Slow speed so as to impede or block traffic $85 27:23-28 Failure to obey directions of police officer or traffic device $85 27:23-28 Safe Corridor, Construction Zone or 65 MPH area-failure to obey directions of police officer or traffic device $140 NEW JERSEY HIGHWAY AUTHORITY (GARDEN STATE PARKWAY) b) REGULATIONS N.J.A.C. Payable Pursuant to New Jersey Administrative Code Amount 19:8-1.2 Speed limits - same payable amount as N.J.S.A. 39:4-98 19:8-1.2 If speeding occurs in a Safe Corridor or Construction Zone or 65 MPH area - same payable amount as N.J.S.A. 39:4-98 19:8-1.3 Slow speed so as to impede or block traffic $85 19:8-1.4 Operating vehicles against the uniform direction of traffic $85 19:8-1.5 Failure to keep to the right except to pass $85 19:8-1.5 Safe Corridor or Construction Zone - failure to keep to the right except to pass $140 19:8-1.6 Illegal U-Turns $85 19:8-1.6 Safe Corridor or Construction Zone - Illegal U-Turns $140 19:8-1.7 Driving on media strip $85 19:8-1.7 Safe Corridor, Construction Zone or 65 MPH area - driving on media strip $140 19:8-1.8 Parking, standing, stopping where prohibited $54 19:8-1.9(a) Entering or leaving the Parkway at other than designated access points $85 19:8-1.9(a) 65 MPH area - entering or leaving the Parkway at other than designated access points $140 19:8-1.9(b)(1) Use of Parkway by pedestrians $54 19:8-1.9(b)(2) Use of Parkway by vehicles drawn by animals $54 19:8-1.9(b)(3) Use of Parkway by bicycles $54 19:8-1.9(b)(4) Use of Parkway by animals led, ridden, unattended or driven on the hoof $54 19:8-1.9(b)(5) Use of Parkway by vehicles containing animals or poultry not properly confined $54 19:8-1.9(b)(6) Use of Parkway by vehicles whose condition, equipment or tires create a probable hazard to such vehicles or others $54 19:8-1.9(b)(7) Use of Parkway by farm implements and farm machinery whether selfpropelled or towed $54 19:8-1.9(b)(8) Use of Parkway by vehicles with improperly secured attachments or loads $54 19:8-1.9(b)(9) Use of Parkway by vehicles with deflated pneumatic tires, metal or solid tires, or caterpillar treads $54 19:8-1.9(b)(10) Use of Parkway by construction equipment other than trucks $54 19:8-1.9(b)(11) Use of Parkway by vehicles, or combination of vehicles exceeding maximum dimensions: Height-13'6"; Width-8'0"; Length - 55'0: $185 19:8-1.9(b)(12) Use of Parkway by motor vehicle in tow or motor vehicles pushing or being pushed on travel portion of road $54 19:8-1.9(b)(13) Use of Parkway by vehicles with loads extending more than four (4) feet beyond the read or front of the body $54 19:8-1.9(b)(14) Use of Parkway by vehicles carrying anything on the top, sides, front or rear with lateral projection in excess of twelve (12) inches or vertical projection in excess of twenty-four (24) inches from body of vehicle $54 19:8-1.9(b)(15) Use of Parkway by all vehicles except cars, campers, omnibuses, and vehicles entitled to toll-free passage under N.J.A.C. 19:8-32 (Toll-free passage) is prohibited from the Parkway north of Interchange 105 $54 19:8-1.10 Violation of civil defense regulations $54 19:8-1.11 Exceeding load limit of structures on Parkway $55 19:8-1.13 Failure to obey traffic control devices $85 19:8-2.1 Throwing litter from vehicle $230 19:8-2.3 Display of unauthorized posters or advertising $54 19:8-2.4 Holding parades or demonstrations, having picnics, except at designated site $55 19:8-2.5 Hunting and trapping on Parkway $54 19:8-2.7 Igniting fires on Parkway $54 19:8-2.8 Soliciting of alms or contributions $54 19:8-2.9 Hitch-hiking and loitering $54 19:8-2.10 Unauthorized sales and distribution $54 19:8-3.1 Refusal to pay or evading payment of tolls $55 Violations of E-Z Pass Regulations Pursuant to New Jersey Statutes Annotated Amount 19:8-14.3(a).($.25-1.00) Failure to Pay Required Toll $104 19:8-14.3(a).($1.05-2.00) Failure to Pay Required Toll $105 19:8-14.3(a).(2.10) Failure to Pay Required Toll ($2.10) $106 Statutory Provisions in Addition to Regulations 27:12B-18(b) Careless driving where no accident involving personal injury (note - accident resulting in personal injury cannot be paid through the Violations Bureau) $85 27:12B-18(b) Safe Corridor, Construction Zone or 65 MPH area-careless driving where no accident involving personal injury (accident resulting in personal injury cannot be paid through the Violations Bureau) $140 27:12B-18(d) Slow speed so as to impede or block traffic $85 27:12B-18(f) Failure to obey directions of police officer or traffic device $85 27:12B-18(f) Safe Corridor, Construction Zone or 65 MPH area - failure to obey directions of police officer of traffic device $140

Violation of Probation

 

Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal offenses. Kenneth Vercammen has handled probation revocation hearings in both Superior Court and Municipal Court. We provide representation throughout New Jersey. Criminal charges can cost you. If convicted, you can face jail, fines, Probation and other penalties. Don't give up! Our Law Office can provide experienced attorney representation for criminal offenses in juvenile matters, and other offenses. Our website KennethVercammen.com provides information on criminal offenses we can be retained to represent people. The following are the major Court Rules and statutes dealing with Probation and Suspended Sentences in Superior Court matters Rule 3:21-7 states: After conviction, unless otherwise provided by law, the court may suspend the imposition of a sentence or the defendant may be placed on probation. (a) Conditions. The order shall require the defendant to comply with standard conditions adopted by the court and filed by counsel with the criminal division manager as designee of the deputy clerk of the Superior Court (except as otherwise ordered), as well as such special conditions, including a term of imprisonment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1c, as the court imposes. As a condition of probation the court may impose a term of community-related service to be performed by the defendant under such terms and conditions as the court may determine. A copy of the order, together with the standard and special conditions, shall be furnished to the defendant, and read and explained to the defendant by the probation officer, whereupon the defendant and the probation officer shall sign a joint statement, to be filed with the criminal division manager as designee of the deputy clerk of the Superior Court, as to the officer's compliance with such reading and explanation requirement. If the defendant refuses to sign such statement, the defendant shall be resentenced. (b) Detention. The court may, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:45-3a(3), upon a showing of probable cause that the defendant has committed another offense, detain without bail pending determination of the charge, a defendant who was sentenced to probation or whose sentence was suspended. (c) Revocation. At any time before termination of the period of suspension or probation, the court may revoke a suspension or probation pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:45-3. NJSA 2C:45-1. sets forth the Conditions of Suspension or Probation. a. When the court suspends the imposition of sentence on a person who has been convicted of an offense or sentences him to be placed on probation, it shall attach such reasonable conditions, authorized by this section, as it deems necessary to insure that he will lead a law-abiding life or is likely to assist him to do so. These conditions may be set forth in a set of standardized conditions promulgated by the county probation department and approved by the court. b. The court, as a condition of its order, may require the defendant: (1) To support his dependents and meet his family responsibilities; (2) To find and continue in gainful employment; (3) To undergo available medical or psychiatric treatment and to enter and remain in a specified institution, when required for that purpose; (4) To pursue a prescribed secular course of study or vocational training; (5) To attend or reside in a facility established for the instruction, recreation or residence of persons on probation; (6) To refrain from frequenting unlawful or disreputable places or consorting with disreputable persons; (7) Not to have in his possession any firearm or other dangerous weapon unless granted written permission; (8) (Deleted by amendment, P.L. 1991, c.329); (9) To remain within the jurisdiction of the court and to notify the court or the probation officer of any change in his address or his employment; (10) To report as directed to the court or the probation officer, to permit the officer to visit his home, and to answer all reasonable inquiries by the probation officer; (11) To pay a fine; (12) To satisfy any other conditions reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the defendant and not unduly restrictive of his liberty or incompatible with his freedom of conscience; (13) To require the performance of community-related service. c. The court, as a condition of its order, shall require the defendant to pay any assessments required by section 2 of P.L. 1979, c.396 (C. 2C:43-3.1) and shall, consistent with the applicable provisions of N.J.S. 2C:43-3, N.J.S. 2C:43-4 and N.J.S. 2C:44-2 or section 1 of P.L. 1983, c.411 (C. 2C:43-2.1) require the defendant to make restitution. d. In addition to any condition imposed pursuant to subsection b. or c., the court shall order a person placed on probation to pay a fee, not exceeding $25.00 per month for the probationary term, to probation services for use by the State, except as provided in subsection g. of this section. This fee may be waived in cases of indigency upon application by the chief probation officer to the sentencing court. e. When the court sentences a person who has been convicted of a crime to be placed on probation, it may require him to serve a term of imprisonment not exceeding 364 days as an additional condition of its order. When the court sentences a person convicted of a disorderly persons offense to be placed on probation, it may require him to serve a term of imprisonment not exceeding 90 days as an additional condition of its order. In imposing a term of imprisonment pursuant to this subsection, the sentencing court shall specifically place on the record the reasons which justify the sentence imposed. The term of imprisonment imposed hereunder shall be treated as part of the sentence, and in the event of a sentence of imprisonment upon the revocation of probation, the term of imprisonment served hereunder shall be credited toward service of such subsequent sentence. A term of imprisonment imposed under this section shall be governed by the "Parole Act of 1979," P.L. 1979, c.441 (C.30:4-123.45 et al.). Whenever a person is serving a term of parole as a result of a sentence of incarceration imposed as a condition of probation, supervision over that person shall be maintained pursuant to the provisions of the law governing parole. Upon termination of the period of parole supervision provided by law, the county probation department shall assume responsibility for supervision of the person under sentence of probation. Nothing contained in this section shall prevent the sentencing court from at any time proceeding under the provisions of this chapter against any person for a violation of probation. f. The defendant shall be given a copy of the terms of his probation or suspension of sentence and any requirements imposed pursuant to this section, stated with sufficient specificity to enable him to guide himself accordingly. The defendant shall acknowledge, in writing, his receipt of these documents and his consent to their terms. g. Of the moneys collected under the provisions of subsection d. of this section, $15.00 of each monthly fee collected before January 1, 1995 shall be deposited in the temporary reserve fund created by section 25 of P.L. 1993, c.275, and $10.00 of each shall be deposited into a "Community Service Supervision Fund" which shall be established by each county. The moneys in the "Community Service Supervision Fund" shall be expended only in accordance with the provisions of State law as shall be enacted to provide for expenditures from this fund for the purpose of supervising and monitoring probationers performing community service to ensure, by whatever means necessary and appropriate, that probationers are performing the community service ordered by the court and that the performance is in the manner and under the terms ordered by the court. 2C:45-2. Period of Suspension or Probation; Modification of Conditions; Discharge of Defendant a. When the court has suspended imposition of sentence or has sentenced a defendant to be placed on probation, the period of the suspension shall be fixed by the court at not to exceed the maximum term which could have been imposed or more than 5 years whichever is lesser. The period of probation shall be fixed by the court at not less than 1 year nor more than 5 years. The court, on application of a probation officer or of the defendant, or on its own motion, may discharge the defendant at any time. b. During the period of the suspension or probation, the court, on application of a probation officer or of the defendant, or on its own motion, may (1) modify the requirements imposed on the defendants; or (2) add further requirements authorized by N.J.S. 2C:45-1. The court shall eliminate any requirement that imposes an unreasonable burden on the defendant. c. Upon the termination of the period of suspension or probation or the earlier discharge of the defendant, the defendant shall be relieved of any obligations imposed by the order of the court and shall have satisfied his sentence for the offense unless the defendant has failed: (1) to fulfill conditions imposed pursuant to paragraph b. (11) of N.J.S. 2C:45-1, in which event the court may order that the probationary period be extended for an additional period not to exceed that authorized by subsection a. of this section; or (2) to fulfill the conditions imposed pursuant to subsection c. of N.J.S. 2C:45-1, in which event the court shall order that the probationary period be extended for an additional period not to exceed that authorized by subsection a. of this section. The extension may be entered by the court without the defendant's personal appearance if the defendant agrees to the extension. 2C:45-3. Summons or arrest of defendant under suspended sentence or on probation; commitment without bail; revocation and resentence a. At any time before the discharge of the defendant or the termination of the period of suspension or probation: (1) The court may summon the defendant to appear before it or may issue a warrant for his arrest; (2) A probation officer or peace officer, upon request of the chief probation officer or otherwise having probable cause to believe that the defendant has failed to comply with a requirement imposed as a condition of the order or that he has committed another offense, may arrest him without a warrant; (3) The court, if there is probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed another offense or if he has been held to answer therefor, may commit him without bail, pending a determination of the charge by the court having jurisdiction thereof; (4) The court, if satisfied that the defendant has inexcusably failed to comply with a substantial requirement imposed as a condition of the order or if he has been convicted of another offense, may revoke the suspension or probation and sentence or resentence the defendant, as provided in this section. No revocation of suspension or probation shall be based on failure to pay a fine or make restitution, unless the failure was willful. b. When the court revokes a suspension or probation, it may impose on the defendant any sentence that might have been imposed originally for the offense of which he was convicted. c. The commencement of a probation revocation proceeding shall toll the probationary period until termination of such proceedings. In the event that the court does not find a violation of probation, this subsection shall not operate to toll the probationary period. 2C:45-4. Notice and hearing on revocation or modification of conditions of suspension or probation The court shall not revoke a suspension of sentence or probation or delete, add or modify conditions of probation except after a hearing upon written notice to the defendant of the grounds on which such action is proposed. The defendant shall have the right to hear and controvert the evidence against him, to offer evidence in his defense, and to be represented by counsel.

Video Voyeurism

 

1. a. An actor commits a crime of the fourth degree if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, and under circumstances in which a reasonable person would know that another may expose intimate parts or may engage in sexual penetration or sexual contact, he observes another person without that person's consent and under circumstances in which a reasonable person would not expect to be observed. b. An actor commits a crime of the third degree if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he photographs, films, videotapes, records, or otherwise reproduces in any manner, the image of another person whose intimate parts are exposed or who is engaged in an act of sexual penetration or sexual contact, without that person's consent and under circumstances in which a reasonable person would not expect to be observed. c. An actor commits a crime of the third degree if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he discloses any photograph, film, videotape, recording or any other reproduction of the image of another person whose intimate parts are exposed or who is engaged in an act of sexual penetration or sexual contact, unless that person has consented to such disclosure. For purposes of this subsection, "disclose" means sell, manufacture, give, provide, lend, trade, mail, deliver, transfer, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, present, exhibit, advertise or offer. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:43-3, a fine not to exceed $30,000 may be imposed for a violation of this subsection. d.It is an affirmative defense to a crime under this section that: (1)the actor posted or otherwise provided prior notice to the person of the actor's intent to engage in the conduct specified in subsection a., b., or c., and  (2)the actor acted with a lawful purpose. e. (1) It shall not be a violation of subsection a. or b. to observe another person in the access way, foyer or entrance to a fitting room or dressing room operated by a retail establishment or to photograph, film, videotape, record or otherwise reproduce the image of such person, if the actor conspicuously posts at the entrance to the fitting room or dressing room prior notice of his intent to make the observations, photographs, films, videotapes, recordings or other reproductions. (2)It shall be a violation of subsection c. to disclose in any manner any such photograph, film, videotape or recording of another person using a fitting room or dressing room except under the following circumstances: (a)to law enforcement officers in connection with a criminal prosecution; (b)pursuant to subpoena or court order for use in a legal proceeding; or  (c)to a co-worker, manager or supervisor acting within the scope of his employment.  f.It shall be a violation of subsection a. or b. to observe another person in a private dressing stall of a fitting room or dressing room operate room or dressing room. zg.For purposes of this act, a law enforcement officer, reproduce the image of another person in a private dressing stall of a fitting room or dressing room. g.For purposes of this act, a law enforcement officer, or a corrections officer or guard in a correctional facility o recordings or any other reproductions. ( ( h.Notwithstanding the provisions ed to be licensed or privileged to make and to disclose observations, photographs, films, videotapes, recordings or any other reproductions.  h.Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:1-8 or any other provisions of la under subsection b.( subsection b. of this section shall not merge with a conviction under subsection c. of this section, nor shall a conviction under subsection c. merge with a conviction under subsection b.

Victorias Secret Stores Shoplifting defenses

 

Shoplifting Defenses The state must prove the Defendant had the knowing intent to commit a criminal act in a shoplifting case. Sometimes the defendant was not aware that there was a criminal act being committed because of mental issues. NJSA 2C: 4-2. Evidence of mental disease or defect admissible when relevant to element of the offense. Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did not have a state of mind, which is an element of the offense. In the absence of such evidence, it may be presumed that the defendant had no mental disease or defect, which would negate a state of mind, which is an element of the offense. Criminal Indictable and Disorderly Offense Penalties Disorderly person criminal offenses- ex Simple Assault, shoplifting & cases in Municipal Court Jail 2C: 43- 8 jail 6 month maximum probation 1-2 year  community service 180 days maximum  mandatory costs, VCCB and other penalties Disorderly- fines: 2C: 43- 3 $1,000 Fine maximum  There are many other penalties that the court must impose in criminal cases. There are dozens of other penalties a court can impose, depending on the type of matter.  Indictable Criminal Penalties [Felony type] [ Superior Court] Jail potential Fine max Probation 1st degree 10- 20 years $200,000 [presumption of jail] 2nd degree 5-10 years $150,000 [presumption of jail] 3rd degree 3- 5 years $15,000 1 year- 5 year 4th degree 0- 18 months $10,000 1 year- 5 year The NJ Model Jury charges set forth the elements of SHOPLIFTING [CONCEALMENT] (N.J.S.A. 2C: 20-11b(2)) The statute provides in pertinent part that it is a crime for: any person purposely to conceal upon his person or otherwise any merchandise offered for sale by any store or other retail mercantile establishment with the intention of depriving the merchant of the processes, use or benefit of such merchandise or converting the same to the use of such person without paying to the merchant the value thereof. In order for the finder of fact to find the defendant guilty of shoplifting, the State must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. that defendant purposely concealed upon his person or otherwise any merchandise offered for sale by (name of commercial establishment); 2. that (name of commercial establishment) was a store or other retail mercantile establishment; and 3. that defendant did so with the purpose of depriving the merchant of the processes, use, or benefit of such merchandise [OR of converting such merchandise to his/her use] without paying the merchant the value thereof. The first element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that defendant purposely concealed upon his person or otherwise any merchandise offered for sale by any store or other retail establishment. The term conceal means to conceal merchandise so that, although there may be some notice of its presence, it is not visible through ordinary observation.1 The term merchandise means any goods, chattels, foodstuffs or wares of any type and description, regardless of the value thereof.2 A person acts purposely with respect to the nature of his or her conduct or a result of his conduct if it is the persons conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result. That is, a person acts purposely if he or she means to act in a certain way or to cause a certain result. A person acts purposely with respect to attendant circumstances if the person is aware of the existence of such circumstances or believes or hopes that they exist.3 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11a(6). 2 N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11a(3). 3 N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(1). Purpose is a state of mind. A state of mind is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but must ordinarily be inferred from the facts. Therefore, it is not necessary that the State produce witnesses to testify that an accused said he/she had a certain state of mind when he/she engaged in a particular act. It is within the fact finders power to find that such proof has been furnished beyond a reasonable doubt by inference, which may arise from the nature of his/her acts and his/her conduct, and from all he/she said and did at the particular time and place, and from all of the surrounding circumstances. The third element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that defendant acted with the purpose of depriving the merchant of the processes, use or benefit of such merchandise [OR converting such merchandise to his/her use] without paying the merchant the value of the merchandise. WHEN OFFENSE CHARGED REQUIRES A PURPOSEFUL OR KNOWING STATE OF MIND, CONTINUE CHARGE AS FOLLOWS: Although the statute refers to mistake of fact or law as a defense, caselaw makes it clear that it is not genuinely a defense at all: instead, it is an attack on the prosecutions ability to prove the requisite mental state for at least one objective element of the crime. State v. Sexton, 160 N.J. 93, 99-100 (1999). Since it is obviously impossible for any single charge to explain precisely how the offered defense plays into the element[s] of every possible offense that mistake of fact or law could apply to (Sexton, 160 N.J. at 106), and at best can offer a more general charge on the subject of mistake of fact or law (State v. Pena, 178 N.J. 297, 319 (2004)), this model charge is organized by reference to the state of mind under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b contained in the offense charged by the State, and then by the degree to which the mistake of fact or law exonerates or mitigates the defendants guilt. As always, the trial court must tailor the precise type of mistake that defendant relies on to the facts of the particular crime or offense charged and the facts adduced at trial. State v. Concepcion, 111 N.J. 373, 379-380 (1988). 2 Since even an unreasonable mistake can negate the required state of mind for the charged offense, the statutory requirement that the defendant reasonably arrived at the conclusion underlying the mistake was eliminated and, therefore, is not referred to in this model charge. Sexton, 160 N.J. at 105; Pena, 178 N.J. at 306. 3 Sexton, 160 N.J. at 100; Pena, 178 N.J. at 306. STATE OF MIND Purpose/knowledge/intent/recklessness/negligence is/are condition(s) of the mind, which cannot be seen and can only be determined by inferences from conduct, words or acts. A state of mind is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but must ordinarily be inferred from the facts. It is the fact finders job to find that such proof has been furnished beyond a reasonable doubt by inference, which may arise from the nature of his/her acts and his/her conduct, and from all he/she said and did at the particular time and place, and from all of the surrounding circumstances. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE This defendant(s), as are all defendants in criminal cases, is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. REASONABLE DOUBT The prosecution must prove its case by more than a mere preponderance of the evidence, yet not necessarily to an absolute certainty. The State has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is an honest and reasonable uncertainty in your minds about the guilt of the defendant after you have given full and impartial consideration to all of the evidence. A reasonable doubt may arise from the evidence itself or from a lack of evidence. It is a doubt that a reasonable person hearing the same evidence would have. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof, for example, that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendants guilt. In this world, we know very few things with absolute certainty. In criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. 2C:20-11 b.Shoplifting. Shoplifting shall consist of any one or more of the following acts:  (1) For any person purposely to take possession of, carry away, transfer or cause to be carried away or transferred, any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale by any store or other retail mercantile establishment with the intention of depriving the merchant of the possession, use or benefit of such merchandise or converting the same to the use of such person without paying to the merchant the full retail value thereof.  (2) For any person purposely to conceal upon his person or otherwise any merchandise offered for sale by any store or other retail mercantile establishment with the intention of depriving the merchant of the processes, use or benefit of such merchandise or converting the same to the use of such person without paying to the merchant the value thereof.  (3) For any person purposely to alter, transfer or remove any label, price tag or marking indicia of value or any other markings which aid in determining value affixed to any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale by any store or other retail mercantile establishment and to attempt to purchase such merchandise personally or in consort with another at less than the full retail value with the intention of depriving the merchant of all or some part of the value thereof.  (4) For any person purposely to transfer any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale by any store or other retail merchandise establishment from the container in or on which the same shall be displayed to any other container with intent to deprive the merchant of all or some part of the retail value thereof.  (5 )For any person purposely to under-ring with the intention of depriving the merchant of the full retail value thereof.  (6 )For any person purposely to remove a shopping cart from the premises of a store or other retail mercantile establishment without the consent of the merchant given at the time of such removal with the intention of permanently depriving the merchant of the possession, use or benefit of such cart.  c.Gradation. Shoplifting constitutes a crime of the second degree under subsection b. of this section if the full retail value of the merchandise is $75,000 or more, or the offense is committed in furtherance of or in conjunction with an organized retail theft enterprise and the full retail value of the merchandise is $1,000 or more.  (2) Shoplifting constitutes a crime of the third degree under subsection b. of this section if the full retail value of the merchandise exceeds $500 but is less than $75,000, or the offense is committed in furtherance of or in conjunction with an organized retail theft enterprise and the full retail value of the merchandise is less than $1,000.  (3) Shoplifting constitutes a crime of the fourth degree under subsection b. of this section if the full retail value of the merchandise is at least $200 but does not exceed $500.  (4) Shoplifting is a disorderly persons offense under subsection b. of this section if the full retail value of the merchandise is less than $200.  The value of the merchandise involved in a violation of this section may be aggregated in determining the grade of the offense where the acts or conduct constituting a violation were committed pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct, whether from the same person or several persons, or were committed in furtherance of or in conjunction with an organized retail theft enterprise.  Additionally, notwithstanding the term of imprisonment provided in N.J.S.2C:43-6 or 2C:43-8, any person convicted of a shoplifting offense shall be sentenced to perform community service as follows: for a first offense, at least ten days of community service; for a second offense, at least 15 days of community service; and for a third or subsequent offense, a maximum of 25 days of community service and any person convicted of a third or subsequent shoplifting offense shall serve a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 90 days.  d. Presumptions. Any person purposely concealing uppercased merchandise of any store or other retail mercantile establishment, either on the premises or outside the premises of such store or other retail mercantile establishment, shall be prima facie presumed to have so concealed such merchandise with the intention of depriving the merchant of the possession, use or benefit of such merchandise without paying the full retail value thereof, and the finding of such merchandise concealed upon the person or among the belongings of such person shall be prima facie evidence of purposeful concealment; and if such person conceals, or causes to be concealed, such merchandise upon the person or among the belongings of another, the finding of the same shall also be prima facie evidence of willful concealment on the part of the person so concealing such merchandise. Copyright 2016 Vercammen Law More info at http://www.njlaws.com/shoplifting.html

Victims Testifying at Trial

Courts, Police and Prosecutors have an increased commitment to addressing the needs of crime victims and witnesses. As a victim or witness of a crime, their assistance is important to our system of criminal justice. As a victim or witness, they find yourself in the same situation as do many others, you may be unfamiliar with court procedures and have fears and uncertainties about what is expected or required of witnesses. This article, compiled from suggestions of prosecutors offices, provides a brief explanation of what to expect on the witness stand. COURTROOM PROCEEDINGS: One of the fundamental rules in a criminal case is that both the prosecution and defense have an opportunity to question the witness. There are specific rules of evidence which must be followed by the court. At times, these rules may seem unnecessary or frustrating but they are directed toward one goal- to determine the truth in the case. Some guidelines for you to remember: GUIDELINES FOR WITNESSES IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 1. Prior to testifying, try to prepare yourself by recalling the incident in your mind, but do not memorize your testimony. 2. You are sworn to tell the truth. Tell it by answering accurately about what you know. 3. Listen carefully to the questions asked and think before speaking. If you do not understand the question, ask that it be repeated or explained. Do not look for assistance from the policeman or prosecutor when you are on the stand. If you need help, ask the Judge. 4. Speak clearly and loudly. 5. Answer only the question asked, directly and simply. Do not volunteer information. 6. Do not guess or speculate. If you do not know the answer, be sure to say so. If you give an estimate, make sure everyone understands you are estimating. 7. Do not answer if there is an objection. 8. Do not lose your temper. Upon cross examination, remain calm and composed. 9. Always be courteous, even if the attorney questioning you appears to be discourteous. Being polite makes a good impression on the court and jury. Do not try to be "smart" or evasive. 10. Be serious in and around the courtroom. Avoid joking. 11. Neat appearance and proper dress are important. 12. If the question is about distance or time and your answer is only an estimate, be sure to say that it is only an estimate. 13. Leave the stand with confidence, knowing that you have presented the truth to the best of your ability. Fears/Threats If you have any fears about your involvement in your case, contact your own town's local police department. On extremely rare occasions, you may receive a threat. If you are threatened, immediately contact your law enforcement agency to get immediate assistance. ON BEING A WITNESS: No crime can be solved without the help of witnesses. It is your duty as a witness to give your testimony when needed. While it may not always be convenient for you to come to court to testify, please keep in mind that some day you may be a victim and your own case may depend on the willingness of a witness to come forward and tell what he/she knows. As your case is being prepared for trial, it may be necessary for the Prosecutor's Office to contact you. It is important to keep the Court and Police informed of your current address and telephone number. If you move, be sure to let them know. SUBPOENA A subpoena is a court order directing you to be present at the time and place stated. You may receive your subpoena by mail or in person. When you receive a subpoena to appear in court, you are required by law to attend. Be sure to bring the subpoena to court. WHERE DO I GO? You will find that most subpoenas will request that you report to the Court on the date set for your appearance as a witness. This is to allow the Prosecutor an opportunity to discuss the case with you prior to your actually taking the witness stand. GET COMFORTABLE Get a good night's rest. Dress conservatively. Your normal business attire is probably about right. Be early. Give yourself a few minutes to experience the room in which you are about to testify. It is going to be a strange environment for you, so walk around. Get used to the lighting, the acoustics, the distance your voice might have to travel. JUST THE FACTS Leave your impressions from film, television and other folklore at home. In the real world, the attorney seeking your testimony wants from you but one thing; the facts. What you saw. What you said. What you did. In limited circumstances, what you heard. Unless you are asked to do so, do not draw conclusions. Unless you were called as an expert witness, keep your opinions for another day. RULES TO REMEMBER * Rule 1. If you are asked what time it is, give the time. Don't offer instructions on how to build a watch. Listen to the question, answer that question, then wait for the next one. When they run out of questions, your testimony is over. Go home. Don't answer a question you think was asked, should be asked, or want to be asked. And take your time. As with baseball and other matters of importance, there is no clock. Your testimony is very important, that's why you were called in the first place. There is no hurry. As in golf, there are no prizes for speed, just accuracy. * Rule 2. If you do not understand a question, respond by saying "I do not understand the question.'' Have counsel rephrase the question, explain or define any word that you don't understand. That's what you mean by ''I do not understand the question.'' It's not impolite. You are not comparing education. You just don't understand the question. If counsel can not rephrase the question so you can understand and adequately respond, that's not your problem. Being a witness is hard enough. * Rule 3. If you knew the answer some time ago, but do not recall at the moment, say ''I do not recall'' Not everyone can remember which shoes they wore the second Tuesday of last month. There is no disgrace in failing to recall certain details, especially when they are remote in time. Your testimony is very important, that's why you were called in the first place. * Rule 4. If you are asked a question, and you do not know the answer, say ''I Do not know.'' Too many witnesses think they have to know, or are expected to know the answer to practically everything asked of them while on the stand. No one can be expected to know everything. If you seem to, your entire testimony may appear rehearsed and unconvincing. When you don't know, you don't know. SAY SO.. Such a reply is entirely appropriate. * Rule 5. Tell the truth. You saw what you saw. You did what you did. If someone else has a different version of these events, well, someone else has a different version of these events. In the end, the judge or jury will sort it all out. * Rule 6. Be yourself. As you would converse with a friend or neighbor, speak in your own words and use your own vocabulary. Answer the questions as naturally as you can. You don't want to sound like an actor delivering memorized lines. There is no getting around it; while giving testimony, you are on stage. Everyone in the room, especially trial counsel, is watching you testify. They not only listen to your word, but watch how you present them. You must be as relaxed and natural as possible. Body language is a powerful communication tool. Use it properly. HELP THE COURT REPORTER Speak up. What you say will be taken down by the court reporter, later transcribed onto a printed page. This is called ''making a record.'' Consider two limitations in this process; 1. Your testimony has to be verbal. It is difficult to transcribe a nod of the head or shrug of the shoulders. Don't spread your hands apart and claim ''About this much.'' If the answer is ''two and one half feet,'' Say so. 2. Only one person can speak at a time. Pace your responses so as to avoid ''talking over'' the attorney asking the questions. HELP YOURSELF Give straight, direct and specific answers whenever possible. Depending upon the question being asked, try and avoid needless qualifiers like ''In my opinion,'' ''I guess,'' ''I think,'' and ''I believe'' JUST THE FACTS. Any reservations displayed on direct examination will come back to you on cross. If the answer is ''yes'', ''blue'' or ''I don't know,'' SAY SO. Don't guess, exaggerate, or speak in broad, sweeping terms. Try not to generalize, and do not explain anything unless specifically instructed to do so. If you make mistake, or give the wrong answer, STOP.. As soon as you realize you have given the wrong information, or left something out, STOP. Tell the attorney you made a mistake, say ''I made a mistake. May I correct myself.'' Clear the record then and there. It is much better than to have the opposing attorney question you about it later on cross examination. If there is an objection, or if the judge or another attorney interrupts your testimony; FREEZE. Do not say another word until instructed to do so. The lawyers will argue out the problem on the spot. Wait until told to proceed. There is no need to ''squeeze in'' an answer during this process. Let the lawyers work it out, that's what they do. HELP THE COURT Some attorneys lose their manners right after the bar exam. Some have the personality of a briefcase. For others, this would be an improvement. Do your best anyway, and try to be polite. If you have a bad temper, leave it in the elevator. Do not engage in a battle of wits. You can't win. It's not because you don't get to ask questions. You are gathered for the purpose of finding the truth, not to judge who can best exchange sarcastic remarks.

Victims Rights

 

New Jersey Law on Victim's Rights State v. Giilchrist, Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division 381 N.J.Super. 138 (N.J.Super.A.D. 2005) Nature of the case: Prior to his trial for rape, the defendant filed a motion seeking to compel the victim to submit to the taking of a photograph of the victim he allegedly raped. The trial court granted the motion but stayed the decision pending appeal. This was revised on appeal. Ruling & Rationale: The appellate court disagreed with the trial judge reasoning as follows:__Defendant claimed that in order for him to prepare for cross-examination of the victim, he needed the victim to pose for a photograph. He claimed this would impose "no material burden" on the victim because she would eventually need to confront him at trial. Defense counsel argued the defendant "needs to have a view of her facial features in some form or fashion to determine if this is somebody who he knows, who he may have had some kind of exchange with in the past. There may have been or may not have been an incident. She may be a total stranger to him or she may be someone that he remembers from a past encounter". the victim objected to the defendant's motion and "expressed overwhelming fear that the giving of a photograph to the defendant would make it easier for the defendant to fulfill his earlier threats to find her and kill her." The victim had been advised by law enforcement officials that the defendant had forgotten her face. The prosecutor argued that defendant did not have a "right to confront witnesses pretrial," and he stated that if defendant "wants a trial, that's no problem. We'll of course, bring her in for that purpose." The prosecutor further argued that "if they're going to ask the Prosecutor's Office to go and photograph this victim, make her feel arguably, make her feel like, you know, she's being processed, then the State's position is we, we really need to know why." While acknowledging that he was uncertain why defendant wants or needs M.C.'s photograph, the trial judge, nevertheless, granted defendant's motion, reasoning as follows: "Let's throw the law aside for a minute and let's be practical. What's going to be more alarming to [the] victim, somebody standing in front of her house with a camera and when she opens the door, click, or kind of being explained to her that yes, ... this is what's going to happen. There's going to be a picture taken of you. The person will get to see you at trial anyway, but they want a picture of you to see if they ever had a confrontation with you in the past. I take it they're going to get a picture of her. She needs to live her life. She doesn't need to live her life in fear either. I don't know if something happened. I know the gentleman is charged with a brutal crime. I'm very mindful of that. But if they want to get a picture of her, ... they're going to get a picture of her. So I think why don't we just do this as easily .. as non-threatening to her as possible, other than having somebody flash a bulb in her face. I mean, there really is no law on this other than I don't think I could stop them from taking her picture if I wanted to." The appellate court expressed distaste with the trial judge's desire to "throw the law aside" in an effort to achieve a practical solution. The court wrote that "a judge's role is circumscribed by the law. A judge is not free to do whatever he or she thinks is best for a defendant, or a crime victim, without reference to controlling legal principles. To do so is to depart from his or her proper role as a judge." An analysis of the applicable law begins with the defendant's right to confront witnesses which, while important, is not absolute and in any case, "the ultimate goal of the Confrontation Clause 'is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination." The right to question adverse witnesses "does not include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any and all information that might be useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony." Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 53, 107 S.Ct. 989, 999, 94 L. Ed.2d 40, 54 (1987). Defendant has failed to articulate any legitimate basis for obtaining the victim's photograph, and we conclude that neither the Sixth Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment requires the State to furnish him with her photograph. Should this matter proceed to trial, defense counsel will have an opportunity to cross-examine the victim regarding her credibility, including any motive to fabricate, and to explore any potential bias or prejudice. If it develops that defendant has had a "past encounter" with the victim, we are confident of the trial court's ability to address any evidentiary issues or other problems that may arise without jeopardizing defendant's right of confrontation and his right to present a complete defense. "Defendant's post-indictment right to discovery is automatic." "Nevertheless, criminal discovery has its limits." A significant limitation on a defendant's right to discovery is "the chilling and inhibiting effect that discovery can have on material witnesses who are subjected to intimidation, harassment, or embarrassment." The Victim's Rights Amendment of the New Jersey Constitution mandates that "[a] victim of a crime shall be treated with fairness, compassion and respect by the criminal justice system." It also states that crime victims "shall be entitled to those rights and remedies as may be provided by the Legislature." N.J. Const. art. 1, ¶ 22. In 1985, the Legislature enacted the Crime Victim's Bill of Rights, N.J.S.A. 52:4B-34 to--38, which granted crime victims and witnesses certain rights, including the right to be treated with dignity and compassion, and the right to be free from intimidation. N.J.S.A. 52:4B-36(a), (c). As part of its findings and declarations, our Legislature stated "that without the participation and cooperation of crime victims and witnesses, the criminal justice system would cease to function. The rights of these individuals should be given full recognition and protection." N.J.S.A. 52:4B-35. And in sexual assault cases, the Court has recognized a special need to protect victims and witnesses from emotional trauma, embarrassment, and intimidation. State v. R.W., supra, 104 N.J. at 28 (finding that any possible evidentiary benefit to defendant from a court-ordered examination of a witness was outweighed by witness's right to privacy and public need to encourage victims of crimes to report and assist in prosecution of offenses). The trial court "failed to properly evaluate all of the relevant considerations". Here, any possible benefits to defendant from a court-ordered photograph of the victim are entirely speculative and are outweighed by other important considerations, including the victim's right to privacy; her right to be treated with fairness, compassion, and respect; her right to be free from intimidation; and the need to encourage crime victims to cooperate and participate in the criminal justice system.

Victims of Criminal Activities

 

Edited by Kenneth Vercammen Many people are injured when attacked on a business property, when the property owner fails to provide adequate security. Injured persons may be able to recover damages plus payment of medical bills. The New Jersey Supreme Court in Kuzmicz v. Ivy Hill Park Apartments, 147 N.J. 510. (1997) recently reviewed liability for injuries suffered by people attacked. The duty of landowners for injuries that occur on their premises, the analysis no longer relies exclusively on the status of the injured party. Instead [t]he issue is whether, in light of the actual relationship between the parties under all of the surrounding circumstances, the imposition of a duty on the landowner is fair and just. Brett v. Great Am. Recreation, 144 N.J. 479, 509 (1996) (quoting Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 438 (1993)). For off-premises liability, the issue is substantially the same. In both contexts, however, the analysis is fact-sensitive. Hopkins, supra, 132 N.J. at 439. Ultimately, the determination of the existence of a duty is a question of fairness and public policy. Snyder v. American Assn of Blood Banks, 144 N.J. 269, 292 (1996); Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494, 501 (1994); Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 108 (1994); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 544 (1984); Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 583 (1962). Foreseeability of injury to another is important, but not dispositive. Snyder, supra, 144 N.J. at 292; Carter Lincoln-Mercury v. EMOR Group, 135 N.J. 182, 194 (1994). Fairness, not foreseeability alone, is the test. Relevant to the determination of the fairness of the imposition of a duty on a landowner is the nature of the risk, the relationship of the parties, the opportunity to exercise care, and the effect on the public of the imposition of the duty. Dunphy, supra, 136 N.J. at 108; Hopkins, supra, 132 N.J. at 439; Goldberg, supra, 38 N.J. at 583. Landlord liable to Tenant Consistent with that analysis, the Court has found a landlord liable to a tenant for damages resulting from a burglary when the landlord failed to replace a broken dead-bolt lock on the tenants apartment. See Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corp., 68 N.J. 368 (1975). The apartment house was in an area where break-ins were common, and the landlord had assured the tenant that it would repair the lock. Id. at 371-73. Furthermore, a regulation of the Department of Community Affairs required the landlord to furnish a working lock. Id. at 383-84. In that context, the Court held, [a] residential tenant can recover damages from his landlord upon proper proof that the latter unreasonably enhanced the risk of loss due to theft by failing to supply adequate locks to safeguard the tenants premises after suitable notice of the defect. Id. at 383. The Court likewise have imposed liability on a landlord who provides inadequate security for common areas of rental premises for the failure to prevent a criminal assault on a tenant. See Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214 (1980). In Trentacost, the apartment was in a high crime area. Id. at 218-19. Burglars and other unauthorized persons previously had broken into the building. Id. at 219. Contrary to an administrative regulation, the landlord had not installed a lock on the front entrance. Id. at 222. On those facts, the Court held that [b]y failing to do anything to arrest or even reduce the risk of criminal harm to his tenants, the landlord effectively and unreasonably enhanced that risk. Ibid. The Court relied in part on the implied covenant of habitability in the lease and stated that [t]he premises which the landlord must secure necessarily encompass the common areas of multiple dwellings. Id. at 228. In both Braitman and Trentacost, the criminal act resulting in the imposition of liability on the landlord occurred in the apartment house. Supermarket Liability Similarly, the Court has held that the owner of a supermarket may be liable to a customer who is mugged at night in the markets parking lot. See Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270 (1982). In Butler, unknown to the customer, seven muggings had occurred in the lot during the preceding year, five in the evenings during the four months preceding the attack in question. Id. at 274. To combat the muggings, the market had hired off-duty policeman. Ibid. At the time of the attack, however, the only guard was inside the market; no one was on duty in the parking lot. Id. at 275. In that setting, the Court held that the market had a duty to protect the customer from foreseeable criminal activity. Id. at 284. Uniting Braitman, Trentacost, and Butler is the premise that landlords and business owners should be liable for foreseeable injuries that occur on their premises. The underlying rationale is that they are in the best position to control the risk of harm. See Butler, supra, 89 N.J. at 284. Ownership or control of the premises, for example, enables a party to prevent the harm. Accord Steinmetz v. Stockton City Chamber of Commerce, 214 Cal. Rptr. 405, 408 (Ct. App. 1985) (reasoning that duty is grounded in possession of premises and right to control and manage premises); LaFleur v. Astrodome-Astrohall Stadium Corp., 751 S.W. 2d 563, 565 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that duty to provide protection arises from defendants power of control). Usually there is no liability in off - premise assault. Courts from other states likewise have refused to impose liability on commercial landowners for off-premises murder or assault. See, e.g., Steinmetz, supra, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 408 (declining to impose liability because of difficulty in defining scope of any duty owed by landowner off premises and not controlled by him); Wofford v. Kennedys 2nd St. Co., 649 S.W. 2d 912, 914 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (declining to impose liability on tavern owner for injuries suffered by patron assaulted on adjacent public street because otherwise line which would cut off the landowners liability becomes nearly impossible to draw). Generally, a possessor of land is not liable for off-premises injuries merely because those injuries are foreseeable. See, e.g., MacGrath v. Levin Properties, 256 N.J. Super. 247 (App. Div. 1992), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 19 (1992); Simpson v. Big Bear Stores Co., 652 N.E.2d 702, 705 (Ohio 1995); see generally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A comment c (1965) (indicating possessor of land is not under duty to person endangered or injured when one has ceased to be an invitee). That general rule protects an abutting property owner from liability for injuries that occur on a public way. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 349 (1965); see also MacGrath, supra, 256 N.J. Super. at 251-52 (noting court follows Restatement § 349 unless exception applies). Sidewalk Fall down Liability A narrow exception imposes liability on commercial landowners for injuries to pedestrians on abutting sidewalks. See Stewart v. 104 Wallace St., Inc., 87 N.J. 146 (1981). The duty to maintain the sidewalks flows from the economic benefit that a commercial landowner receives from the abutting sidewalk and from the landowners ability to control the risk of injury. Id. at 158; Davis v. Pecoreno, 69 N.J. 1, 8 (1975) (holding gas station owner liable for injury caused by packed snow and ice on abutting sidewalk because traffic was directly beneficial to his business and enured to his economic benefit). Several decisions of the Appellate Division delineate the appropriate limits of a commercial property owners liability for off-premises injuries. Critical to those decisions is the premise that a landowners liability may extend beyond the premises for activities that directly benefit the landowner. Thus, the owner of a shopping center was not liable to a woman who fell on a dirt path leading from the shopping center to a parking lot. See Chimiente v. Adam Corp., 221 N.J. Super. 580 (1987). In Chimiente, sidewalks provided a safe alternative route. Id. at 584. The dirt path conferred no direct economic benefit on the shopping center. Ibid. Similarly, a shopping center on Route 22 was not liable to a customer who was struck by a car while crossing the highway. See MacGrath, supra, 256 N.J. Super. at 250-51, 253. A restaurant that provided parking on the opposite side of the street, however, had a duty to provide safe passage from the lot to the restaurant. See Warrington v. Bird, 204 N.J. Super. 611 (1985), certif. denied, 103 N.J. 473 (1986). The restaurant knew that its patrons would cross the street, and derived a direct economic benefit from their use of the path. Id. at 617. Finally, a caterer was found liable for the death of a business invitee who was killed crossing a county highway after parking her car in a lot the caterer knew or should have known the invitee would use. See Mulraney v. Aulettos Catering, 293 N.J. Super. 315, certif. denied, _ N.J. _ (1996). Prominent among the reasons for the imposition of liability was the proposition that the use of the lot furthered the caterers economic interest. Id. at 321. Critical to the imposition of liability is a direct economic benefit to the commercial landowner from the path taken by the injured party and the absence of an alternative route. Courts from other states likewise have concluded that a landowner does not owe a duty to protect people from criminal activity on adjacent premises that the landowner does not own or control. See, e.g., Donnell v. California W. Sch. of Law, 246 Cal. Rptr. 199, 201 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding law school not liable merely because it took no action to remedy dangerous condition on adjoining property); Steinmetz, supra, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 408-09 (holding tenant in industrial park not liable to business invitee who was mugged a block away from tenants premises but within park); National Property Investors, II, Ltd. v. Attardo, 639 So.2d 691 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding no duty for store owner to protect customer from assault in apartment premises when assailant followed customer from convenience store to apartment house across street); Simpson, supra, 652 N.E.2d 702 (holding supermarket owners duty to warn or protect business invitees from foreseeable criminal activity extends to premises in possession and control of owner and therefore owner not liable for injuries suffered by patron attacked in common area of shopping center). Southland Corp. v. Superior Court, 250 Cal. Rptr. 57 (Ct. App. 1988), is consistent with that premise. In Southland, three assailants attacked a customer from a convenience store in a parking lot ten feet away from the stores property line. 250 Cal. Rptr. at 58. The customer sued the lessee and sub-lessee, who were the franchisor and franchisee of the store. Id. at 59. The master lease provided that the store could use the adjacent lot for parking, and the injured customer believed that the store controlled the lot. Id. at 58 n.1, 59. Many customers parked in the lot. Id. at 58. The lessees did not erect a fence or do anything else to discourage the customers from using the lot. Id. at 59. Denying summary judgment for the lessee and sub-lessee, the court relied on the fact that the store controlled the lot and realized a significant commercial benefit from their customers use of the lot . . . . Id. at 62-63. Absent a landlords control of an adjacent lot or realization of a significant commercial benefit from tenants use of the lot, the landlord does not owe a duty to warn tenants of the risk of criminal assault on the lot. See Ibid. Conclusion There is a possibility of imposing on a landlord a duty to pay a tenant for injuries sustained in a criminal attack on its property to help compensate the tenant. In appropriate circumstances, property owners may be liable if they negligently conduct activities that expose others to foreseeable criminal attacks. Contact a Civil Trial Attorney to discuss your rights.